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ABSTRACT 
This study aims to investigate the disclosure of non-financial information by UK companies in the 
absence of regulatory and statutory requirements. The study focuses on answering two key 
questions: (1) whether UK companies disclose non-fiiiancial information to legitimise their 
corporate behaviours to their stakeholder groups, and (2) whether UK companies disclose non- 
financial information to meet the information requirements of their stakeholder groups. 
To start this study, traditional theories and concepts used in the accounting literature are reviewed. 
The researcher takes the view that among the existing theories and concepts, legitimacy and 
stakeholder theories provide the best explanation for the disclosure of non-financial information 
by UK companies. While the arguments presented by the proponents of the legitimacy theory is 
used to explain how companies may disclose information to present themselves as having the 
same norms and values as those of the society, the arguments in support of the stakeholder theory 
are used to highlight the existence of different stakeholder groups and how companies attach 
different importance to them. The author takes the view that if companies disclose non-financial 
information to their stakeholder groups, they should do so regardless of their corporate 
characteristics. To explore the reasons for the disclosure of non-financial information further, the 
quality of the disclosed non-financial information is heeded by considering two characteristics of 
'Social and Ethical Accounting, Auditing and Reporting' (SEAAR), namely stakeholder 
identification and stakeholder dialogue. It is argued that if companies disclose information to meet 
the requirements of their stakeholder groups, they are expected to: (1) identify their stakeholder 
groups, and (2) hold dialogue with them. 
Before starting the empirical investigation, methodological issues that are believed to be relevant 
to this research project are discussed wherein non-financial information categories are divided 
into two groups of governance and non-govemance. While governance information encompasses 
information categories on corporate managerial structures, non-governance information categories 
are on non-managerial aspects of companies and can be related to both external and internal 
matters. Having decided on the non-financial information categories, the level of non-financial 
information disclosed by the Top 100 UK companies is measured for 1985,1990 and 1995.. The 
findings show that the level of information disclosure had increased in terms of both governance 
and non-governance information categories from 1985 to 1995. 
The thesis proceeds by probing the two key questions. The question of whether companies 
xi 
disclose non-financial information to legitimise their behaviours is investigated by choosing a 
number of corporate characteristics and examining if either of these characteristics is associated 
with the level of non-financial information disclosed by UK companies. The observation of 
association between any of the corporate characteristics and the level of non-financial information 
disclosure is used to demonstrate how companies divulge information to legitimise those aspects 
of behaviours that are closely linked to their characteristics. The question of whether companies 
report non-financial information to meet the information requirements of their stakeholders' 
groups is probed using questionnaire surveys. The questionnaires were sent out to companies and 
two stakeholder groups, namely investors and employees. The responses received from the three 
groups cast light on stakeholder identification and the state of stakeholder dialogue. 
According to the findings of this study, a number of corporate characteristics were associated with 
'the disclosure of non-financial information illustrating that UK companies disclosed information 
to legitimise their behaviours to their stakeholder groups in the absence of any regulatory and 
statutory requirements. This was particularly the case for non-governance information. The 
findings also suggest that UK companies attached more importance to their investors than to their 
employees and they met the information requirements of their investors despite holding a 
relatively higher level of dialogue with their employees. 
Iii 
Chapter I 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
In the late 1980s, large volumes of information about UK companies, relating to various 
environmental issuest, were brought to public attention by the media, politicians, and 
other commentators. At the same time, there was a rising public awareness of social 
issues 2, with public opinion becoming greener and more socially concerned. At the 
same time, it was increasingly evident to some that the value of a company should not 
necessarily be perceived as its 'wealth' for its shareholders. For instance, Taylor (1988) 
agreed that Japanese or European companies or any successful British companies, such 
as Sainsbury or Marks and Spencer, did not perceive 'wealth creation' as their prime 
objective. According to Taylor, a company had to consider four stakeholder groups 3 
whose loyalty would result in corporate prosperity. The four groups were shareholders, 
employees, customers and suppliers. 
Traditionally, the focus has been mainly on the disclosure of financial information 
which is in the interest of those interest groups with whom companies hold economic 
contracts 4. Over the years the importance attached to other interest groups was 
recognised and corporations were gradually being seen as collection of long-term 
1 For instance, recycling was recognised to be a matter for the Department of trade and Industry. The 
Scottish and Welsh offices also appeared to have large powers over their own environments. In July 1989, 
the secretary of state for environment, Mr Ridley, persuaded a reluctant Mrs Thatcher to set up and chair 
a cabinet committee to draw up a government White paper on the environment by the Autumn of 1990. 
Following water privatisation, Mr Ridley set up a separate national River Authority with the job of 
enforcing environmental standards on the water companies. 2 See the poll carried out by 'Market and Opinion Research International', commonly known as MORI, - 
Ile Economist 08 Sept. 1990, "Survey of Industry and The Environment (2): Spend a pound and save the 
planet - How shoppers are turning companies green" 
A stakeholder is anyone whose welfare is tied up in a comppy - such as bondholder, an employee, a 
customer, a supplier or a member of its local community. 4 Economic contract is an explicit contract with expressed terms and conditions. 
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contracts between shareholders and stakeholders. Most of these contracts were 
'implicit' and often referred to as 'social contracts's. 
Social contract was first mentioned by the accounting profession in the Corporate 
Report (ASSC6,1975). Although the Report did not explicitly acknowledge 'social 
contract', it underlined related issues. For instance, the responsibility to report to the 
general public on issues, which were not required by law, was raised by the Report. It 
identified that the users of information have a reasonable right to information about the 
corporation. The Hampel Report (Committee on Corporate Governance, 1998) is one of 
the latest attempts by the accounting profession to draw attention to the non-financial 
aspects of companies. Even though the Hampel Report was published 23 years after the 
publication of the Corporate Report (ASSC, 1975) during which time the volume of 
non-financial information had grown considerably, the report was still too 
comprehensive to provide any detailed guidelines to contribute to the quality of non- 
financial information. 
The 1990s can be associated with the increasing concern raised at a more general level 
by commentators such as Hutton (1997), who called for the development of a 
stakeholding economy' premised on the concept of 'inclusion'. According to Hutton 
(1997) inclusion entails membership and: 
"... obligations as well as rights. So a stakeholder society and a 
stakeholder economy exist where there is a mutuality of rights and 
obligations constructed around the notion of economic, social and 
political inclusion. " (p3) 
5 Social contracts are based on trust (Shleifer and Summers, 1987). A breach of these implicit contracts, 
such as when new owners fired the workers they no longer needed, meant that non-shareholding 
stakeholders were no longer able to trust the managers. This was often followed by long-term cost 
implications. 
6 ASSC stands for Accounting Standards Steering Committee. 
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'Mus, by the early 1990s, a key issue in the UK was "in whose interest should a 
company be run? " If companies were run in the interests of stakeholders, the difficult 
question of (a) what degree of congruence and of mutual benefit existed between the 
interests of shareholders and those of other stakeholders and (b) how companies 
discharged their accountability to their stakeholders, are raised. 
With the rising level of non-financial information, the 'quality' of non-financial 
information was becoming more questionable, particularly, in the absence of regulatory 
requirements. The increasing volume of non-financial information disclosed by 
companies could be easily used for image making purposes (Harte and Owen, 1991), 
leading companies to disclose large volumes of discursive non-financial information 
with little attention being paid to the 'quality' of the dis. closed information (Adams, Hill 
and Roberts, 1995). This would conflict with the idea of a stakeholder economy, which 
was inclusive of all stakeholders. 
1.2 THE LITERATURE 
In the 1970s a large volume of the accounting literature deviated from the conventional 
accounting and concentrated on, what was regarded as, 'corporate social responsibility'. 
These studies, which were mainly empirical in nature, assessed the relationship between 
corporate social responsibility and a range of financial aspects using relatively basic 
statistical techniques. Different studies focused on examining the association between 
different corporate characteristics ranging from corporate size, industrial affiliation, 
growth and corporate performance (see Table 3.6 in Chapter 3). Most of these studies, 
in the author's view, did not offer any conclusive findings and had generally weak 
theoretical foundations. 
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By the 1980s a large volume of the literature was developed on environmental 
accounting, diverting the focus from social accounting. Most studies in this period 
provided sophisticated theoretical concepts and critical approaches along with more 
precise and'detailed technical analysis. A large proportion of the literature was 
developed based on the literature from other disciplines allowing academics to 
recognise the significance attached to social, economic and political factors from the 
external enviromnent and how these factors could be applied in explaining the 
disclosure of social and envirormental information7. 
The literature developed ftirther in the 1990s. Issues related to the 'quality' of social and 
environmental information were raised in the form of 'social audit' and what is 
commonly known as 'social and ethical accounting and auditing and reporting' 
(SEAAR). Although the issue of quality was addressed in the late 1990s, early studies 
had raised the question of the credibility of the non-financial information disclosed and 
corporate accountability- to the public in the absence of any external standards (Harte 
and Owen, 1991). Social audit, which examines the social and ethical impacts of 
corporate operations on those affected (Zadek and Evans, 1993), emphasizes the voice 
of stakeholder groups. 
Despite the emphasis on political, economic and social factors in the 1980s and the 
development of social audit in the 1990s, most of the focus yet remained on 
environmental and social information with little attention being paid to other non- 
financial aspects. For instance, corporate governance structure is one of the non- 
financial aspects that could be atfected by external factors and by stakeholder groups 
0 
7 The launch of a number of prominent journal in which most literature was published took place in the 
1980s. These journals are: Accounting, Auditing, and Accountability Journal (AAAJ, 1988), the Journal 
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(Luorna and Goodstein, 1999) as well as playing a significant role in including 
stakeholders. While some US studies drew attention to how the inclusion of stakeholder 
groups needs to be followed by the changes in. the corporate governance structures 
(Donaldson and Preston, 1995; and Freeman and Evan, 1990), the inclusion of 
stakeholders in corporate governance structure has remained an under-developed 
subject in the LK Most UK studies in the field of corporate governance exarnine the 
subject from investors' viewpoints rather than those of other stakeholders (Sh6rt and 
Keasey, 1997; Mallin, 1995; and Whittington, 1993; among many others). 
Concern over corporate governance is raised by Owen, Swift, Humphery and 
Bowerman (2000) who state that: 
without real change in corporate governance structures, social 
audit could become monopolized by consultants and/or corporate 
management and hence amount to little more than a skilfully 
controlled public relations exercise" (p8l) 
Mathews (1997), who reviewed the literature for the past 25 years, highlighted the need 
for more interdisciplinary approaches and, amongst many of his suggestions for future 
research, he recommended finiher research to investigate the reasons: 
"... why management authorizes the accounting function to 
produce social and environmental information, even when the 
accounting profession does not show any interest. Some of the 
possible reasons include the social contract, organizational 
legitimacy, and attempts to impress the capital markets 
(p504) 
Another issue which has been recently raised by academics is the danger of SEAAR 
falling under the control of the management and being used to serve managerial 
purposes rather than fulfilling its original purpose, which is discharging accountability 
OfAccounting anc(Public Policy (JAPP, 1982), and Critical Perspectives in Accounting (CPA, 1990). 
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to stakeholderss. In a recent study by Ball, Owen and Gray (2000), the authors raised 
concern on whether enviro=ental audit would. answer these concerns for external 
transparency and accountability. They state that: 
" ... there is no evidence of the verifier ... attempting to address the concerns of external constituencies in performance" (Ball et al, 
2000: p 19). 
They continue by highlighting that: 
"verifiers do not make recommendations that address failings in 
performance and in some cases, distance themselves from this 
responsibility" (ibid., p 19). 
In order to provide an overview on the development of social and environmental 
literature, Figure 1.1 presents a brief summary of the major events in the 1980's and 
1990's. Figure 1.1 shows that in the 1980's, there was a rise in the public awareness of 
social and environmental issues. This was followed by the development of the social 
and environmental accounting literature in the late 1980s. It was during this period that 
companies appeared to disclose increasing levels of non-financial information (as will 
be shown in Chapter 4). By 1990's, the academic literature had developed further and 
had entered into the new phase of social audit. It was during this period that concerns 
were raised over the issues such as the quality of non-financial information, stakeholder 
identification, stakeholder dialogue and corporate transparency. 
In the author's view, corporate communication with their stakeholders is not enough to 
ensure that companies are being held accountable to their stakeholder groups. Evidence 
is required to suggest that managers seek the views of their stakeholder groups as part of 
1 See BaIL Owen and Gray (2000). 
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their decision making process. The future literature needs to expand beyond the 
environmental and social accounting to address how corporate governance structures 
can play a more significant role in including stakeholders' views and their issues. This 
requires the application of more interdisciplinary approaches including the use of 
literature in strategic management (Mathews, 1997). 
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1.3 THE IMPORTANCE OF THis STUDY 
Unlike most previous studies that focused on either social or environmental reporting, 
this current study concentrates on the disclosure of 'non-financial information', which is 
a considerably broader term than both environmental and social information. By non- 
financial information, this study refers to those information items that are disclosed 
externally on the non-financial aspects of companies. This study divides non-financial 
information into two main groups of 'governance' and 'non-govemance' information. 
While governance information embraces managerial issues and deals solely with 
internal matters of companies, non-govemance information is on those non-managerial 
issues that are concerned with both internal and external matters. As it will be discussed 
later on in Chapter 3, many of the non-governance information categories are 
commonly regarded as social information in the literature. The two groups are selected, 
as they are believed to be closely linked. In Chapter 3, the link between the two 
information categories is discussed. 
This study carries out investigation on the disclosure of non-financial information for 
1985,1990 and 1995. The choice of these three years can be regarded as one of the 
significant aspects of the study. Significant changes took place between 1985 and 1995. 
While 1985 represents the mid 1980s, when public awareness on environmental and 
. 
social issues rose considerably, 1995 represents the mid 1990s, the period during which 
stakeholding was a popular concept and there was development in social audit literature. 
Furthermore, the period between 1985 and 1995 coincides with the major developments 
in recommendation of the best governance practice in the UK. Tberefore, companies' 
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governance structures were expected to become more transparent after the publication 
of the first regulatory govemance code of best practice (Cadbury Committee, 1992). 
The statistical analysis of collected data over the three year period provides useful 
information to determine on whether the major UK companies disclose information to 
legitimise their behaviours. While most of the previous studies in this field concentrate 
on isolated incidents or specific companies (this is shown in Table 2.1 - section 2.3.1), 
the findings of this study are used to illustrate whether the major UK companies use 
non-financial information to legitimise their behaviours to their stakeholder groups. To 
the knowledge of the author, this study is the first that does not concentrate on isolated 
incidents or on specific companies, and uses companies in the Top 100 to project a 
comprehensive picture on how the disclosure of non-financial information may be used 
for legitimacy purposes by the UK companies. 
The selection of the Top 100 major UK companies, which were from different industrial 
backgrounds, can be regarded as another distinguishing aspects of this study. The reason 
for the selection of the Top 100 UK companies was because the major changes are most 
likely to take place among the Top 100 companies. If UK companies are to discharge 
their accountability to their stakeholder groups in the absence of any legal or regulatory 
requirements the findings of this study would cast light on. two important issues. The 
findings of this study are expected to enable us to have better understanding of (a) if UK 
companies disclose non-financial information to legitimise their behaviours to their 
stakeholders, and (b) if UK companies meet the information requirements of their major 
stakeholders by paying attention to the 'quality' of non-financial information they 
disclose. 
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1.4 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
The overall aim of the study is to fill the gap in the existing knowledge of why 
companies disclose non-financial information in the absence of any regulatory 
requirements or any recognition by the professional bodies. Despite arguments in favour 
of stakeholder inclusion by commentators such as Hutton, the author believes that 
stakeholder inclusion would not be compatible for UK companies. An effective way of 
taking account of stakeholders' views is to allow stakeholders' representatives in 
corporate governance structures so that they can inform managers of their views and 
interests as well as becoming informed of companies' operations. This, however, is not 
the case in the UK. Furthermore, there are no regulatory requirements for the disclosure 
of non-financial information imposed on UK companies. In such circumstances, 
companies are highly unlikely to meet the information requirements of their 
stakeholders. Instead they are expected to disclose non-financial information to 
legitimize their corporate behaviour to their stakeholders. 
The overall aim of this study is to investigate: 
Why the major UK companies disclose non-financial information in 
the absence of any recognition by the accounting profession and the 
regulatory bodies. In order to examine this, investigation is carried 
out: (i) to assess if companies disclose non-financial information to 
legitimise their corporate behaviours, and (ii) to find evidence if 
companies pay any attention to the quality of non-financial 
information. 
Ile investigation of the above aim would require the application of appropriate and 
relevant theoretical frameworks and perspectives. This is discussed in details in Chapter 
2. Having selected an appropriate theoretical fi=ework, the two key research 
questions, derived from the gaps highlighted in the existing literature that need to be 
answered, are as follows: 
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Key Research Question I 
"Do companies disclose non-financial information to legitimise their 
corporate behaviours to their stakeholder groups? " 
To explore the first key research question, certain corporate characteristics such as size, 
growth, industrial affiliation, and corporate performance are chosen (in Chapter 3) to 
test if non-fmancial information disclosure is associated with either of the selected 
characteristics. The second key research question expands the first key research 
question and is presented as follows: 
Key Research Question 2 
"Do companies disclose non-financial information to meet the 
information requirements of their stakeholder groups? " 
The second key research question is concerned with the 'quality' of non-financial 
information and whether companies pay any attention to 'quality' so that- they could 
meet the information requirements of their stakeholder groups. 
Supporting research questions are posed for each of the key research questions I and 2. 
These supporting research"questions are derived from the existing literature and are 
discussed in Chapter 3. For the first key research question, supporting research 
questions I to 4 are presented as follows: 
Supporting Research Question I 
"Are there any associations between industrial affiliation and the level 
ofnon-financial information disclosed by the major UK companies? " 
Supporting Research Question 2 
"Are there any associations between corporate size and the level of 
non-financial information disclosed by the major UK companies? 
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Supporting Research Question 3 
"Are there any associations between corporate growth rate and the 
level of non-financial information disclosed by the major UK 
companies? " 
Supporting Research Question 4 
Are there any associations between corporate performance and the 
level of non-financial information disclosed by the major UK 
companies? " 
While supporting research questions 1,2 and 4 are based on the existing accounting 
literature, to the knowledge of the author no previous study was found in the field of * 
accounting to relate to supporting research question 3. 
The second key research question is explored using the following supporting research 
questions: 
Supporting Research Question 5 
"Do companies identify their stakeholder groups according to their 
importance? " 
Supporting Research Question 6 
"Are there any dialogues between companies and their stakeholders? 
The two. supporting research questions 5 and 6 are based on two of the five common 
aspects of 'social and ethical accounting, auditing and reporting' (SEAAR). These two 
aspects are 'stakeholder identification' and 'stakeholder dialogue' respectively. The 
reasons why only two of the five common aspects of SEAAR are selected are discussed 
in details in Chapter 3. 
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1.5 CONTRIBUTION To KNOWLEDGE 
To the knowledge of the author, no previous study was designed to investigate and 
subsequently to provide empirical evidence to show if the major UK companies 
disclosed non-financial information to legitimise their behaviours to their stakeholder 
groups. As mentioned earlier in section 1.3, while most of the previous studies 
concentrated on isolated incidents or on particular companies, the findings of this study 
provides an overall answer as to whether the major UK companies disclose non- 
financial information to legitimise their corporate behaviours. The fact that this study 
investigates this question by assessing the possibility of any associations between the 
level of non-financial information disclosure and different corporate characteristics 
enables us to broaden our understandings of why non-financial informaiion is disclosed 
by UK companies in the absence of any legal or regulatory requirements. 
The findings of this study would also provide evidence on the changing level of non- 
financial information disclosed by the major UK companies in 1985,1990 and 1995, the 
years during which major developments in social and environmental studies took place 
along with the rising public awareness on environmental issues. In addition this study 
can be regarded as one of the first studies that considers governance information 
disclosed by UK companies and provides evidence on whether there was any difference 
between governance and non-govemance information disclosed by UK companies. 
Disclosure of non-financial information for legitimacy purposes would be assessed in 
terms of both governance and non-govemance information. Considering that the 
regulatory recommendations on corporate governance were introduced by the early 
1990s, the evidence for each of the three years provides interesting findings nurturing 
our understanding of whether the introduction of regulatory requirements on the 
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disclosure of governance information had any impacts on the way companies disclosed 
information. 
While the first key research question raises our understanding of whether UK 
companies disclose non-financial information to legitimise their corporate behaviours, 
the findings on the second key research question would extend our knowledge by 
providing evidence on whether UK companies pay any attention to the quality of the 
non-financial information they disclose to their stakeholders. There is a very limited 
bank of knowledge on whether the major UK companies pay any attention to the quality 
of non-financial information. This study contributes to our existing knowledge by 
providing evidence on whether UK companies recognised their stakeholders and if they 
had any procedures for attaching different importance to them. The results would also 
determine if companies treated their stakeholder groups differently and provided their 
stakeholders with information they required. 
This study would present evidence indicates whether UK companies pay any attention 
to the 'quality' of non-fmancial information. The evidence would then shed light on the 
question whether there were any indications of UK companies becoming more 
transparent as suggested in the sustainability argument of Elkington (1999). 
1.6 BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
The whole structure of this thesis is presented in Figure 1.2. In Chapter I an overview 
of the research project is presented by providing a background to and explaining the 
importance of the study. The chapter was continued by discussing the overall aim of this 
study. This was followed by briefly introducing the two key research questions and the 
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six supporting research questions. Contribution to the knowledge was discussed in 
section 1.5. 
The literature'review of this thesis is carried out in two parts. The first part, which is 
presented in Chapter 2, provides a broader review of the accounting literature and pays 
specific attention to the existing theoretical frameworks. As a consequence the two key 
research questions which highlight the gaps in the existing literature are presented in 
Chapter 2. The second part of the literature review, presented in Chapter 3, focuses on 
the narrower part of the literature and concentrates on the review of the existing 
empirical literature. Based on the literature review carried out in Chapter 3, six 
supporting research questions are presented to explore the two key research questions. 
Chapter 2 provides a chronological review of the existing literature starting with the 
earliest accounting frameworks. The first part of the chapter provides a critical review 
of the development of conventional accounting theories. The second part of the chapter 
reviews the literature on theoretical frameworks used recently in social and 
environmental reporting literature. Discussions and arguments are presented to provide 
the theoretical justification relevant to this study. Based on the existing gaps in the 
literature, the two key research questions I and 2 are presented. 
Chapter 3 comprises three main sections. In section 3.2 discussion is offered to 
illustrate why in this study non-financial information is divided into two groups of 
governance and non-governance information. The information categories included in 
each group are subsequently presented and, where appropriate, the relevant literature is 
reviewed and discussed to explain why each category was considered. The chapter was 
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then continued by reviewing the relevant literature on four corporate characteristics (i. e. 
industrial affiliation, size, growth and performance). Based on the literature review 
carried out in section 3.3, four supporting researcb questions are presented to explore 
the first key research question. The empirical findings of the previous studies provides 
grounds to form expectations on the findings of each research question. The chapter is 
then continued in section 3.4, where the relevant literature is discussed leading to the 
presentation of supporting research questions 5 and 6. These two supporting research 
questions are posed to explore the second key research question. 
In Chapter 4 methodological issues are presented and discussed. This chapter comprises 
two main parts. In the first part, which is discussed in section 4.2, methodology selected 
for this research is presented. This is done by providing a review of the common 
methodological concepts that are used in social sciences. It is explained why one 
method is chosen over another for this research project. The second part of the chapter 
is presented in sections 4.3 to 4.9, where appropriate data collection methods are 
selected. This is followed by a discussion on the selection of appropriate data sources, 
methods of data analysis, the design of the questionnaires gs well as the response rate 
for the questionnaires. 
Chapters 5 and 6 analysc the gathered data on the first and second key research 
questions respectively. Tbc two chapters provide analytical discussions of the findings. 
In Chapter 5 evidence on supporting research questions I to 4 are analysed using 
quantitative techniques discussed in Chapter 3. The overall findings of these four 
supporting research questions arc summed up in the conclusion and summary section of 
the chapter where the first key research question is answered. 
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In Chapter 6, the responses to the questionnaire surveys received from companies, 
investors and employees are analysed to answer supporting research questions 5 and 6. 
The findings on the two supporting research questions 5 and 6 are summed up in the 
conclusion section of this chapter where the second key research question is answered. 
Chapter 7 is the summary and conclusion chapter where a brief summary of theoretical 
discussions and empirical findings are presented. The overall findings of the thesis 
together with the findings for each of the two key research questions are here discussed. 
This chapter also provides a section on the scope of the study and outlines the 
limitations that were experienced over the course of conducting this research project. 
The chapter ends by discussing recommendations for further research. 
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CHAPTER 2 CRITICAL REVIEW OF THEORETICAL AND 
PRACTICAL DISCUSSIONS OF THE DISCLOSURE OF NON- 
FINANCIAL INFORMATION 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter provided background to the disclosure of non-financial 
information and outlined the overall aim of the study. In order to be able to assess the 
overall aim, this chapter reviews the relevant literature to explain why major UK 
companies disclose non-financial information in the absence of any recognition by the 
accounting profession and the regulatory bodies. 
I As the literature review is commonly regarded as one of the important first stages in any 
research project (Bell, 1987, Howard and Sharpe, 1983, Veal, 1992, among many) the 
key aims of the literature review in this study is to demonstrate an awareness of the 
current state of knowledge (Gill and Johnson, 1991: p2l) in the field of social and 
environmental reporting. This would enable the reader to gauge what sort of 
contribution to the existing literature the proposed research is intended to make. An 
important aspect of any literature survey is the critical review of the literature which 
should provide the reader with a statement of the state of the art and major questions 
and issues in the field under consideration" (Gill and Johnson, 199 1: p2 1). The literature 
survey should also project an interpretation of the existing literature and a synthesis of 
the published research (Merriam, 1988) as well as being "... logically connected with 
the purpose of the report" (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996: p558). Thus, it should 
reflect the impact and the relevance of the literature on the research project (Hussey and 
Hussey, 1997: p 109). 
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The literature survey conducted in this research project is intended to shed light on 
those aspects of the literature that are relevant to the overall aim and objectives of this 
study as well as highlighting the existing gaps in the literature. In order to achieve this 
the literature survey of this study is carried out in two parts. The first part, which is 
presented in this chapter, is intended to provide a review of the wider accounting 
literature so that the theoretical and conceptual issues relating to information disclosure 
are explored. The second part of the literature survey, which is conducted in Chapter 3, 
is aimed at reviewing the narrower literature, exploring the empirical findings of the 
previous studies. 
In this chapter, the literature review is conducted in chronological order to reflect the 
evolution of accounting literature and to ascertain the possible links between the 
development of these theories with the disclosure of non-financial information. The 
chapter proceeds with a critical review of the early accounting theories and discusses 
why these theories fail to explain the disclosure of non-financial information and 
therefore considered as irrelevant to the overall aim of the study. 
Considering that the term 'non-financial information' encompasses a wide range of 
categories, the need for a wider perspective is recognized and is subsequently discussed 
in the chapter. In this context literature on the most relevant theories, which can be used 
in assessing the aim of the study, are reviewed in this chapter. This part of the chapter, 
which is discussed in section 2.3, leads to the two key research questions. This section 
is followed by a critical review of the relevant literature. In the first part of discussion, a 
general critique of the relevant literature is presented (in section 2.4.1) while in the 
subsequent section (i. e*. section 2.4.2), the existing gaps between theoretical discussions 
21 
Chapter 2 
and empirical evidence is explored and highlighted. Finally, in the conclusion section 
the whole chapter is summarised and the main findings are discussed. 
2.2 A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ACCOUNTING THEORIES 
It is not far from reality if we say modem accounting practice started with the formation 
of joint stock companies at the end of the 19th century and purported to provide 
information to the general public and the investors on the overall financial position of a 
company (Select Committee, 1877). From the early days of formation of joint stock 
companies, the London Stock Exchange insisted on companies sending them a copy of 
the accounts that had been presented to their shareholders in Annual General Meetings 
(Bryer, 1993). The disclosure of information in this manner was seen as one way of 
allowing owners to police the 'stewardship' of their company (see section 2A - 
Appendix 2 for more details). 
2.2.1 Stewardship -The Earliest Concept in Modern Accounting 
By definition a 'steward' is "an official appointed to keep order or supervise the 
arrangements at a meeting or show or demonstration etc" or "a person responsible for 
supplies of foods etc for a college or club etc"". These definitions provide for a rather 
simple case where a steward is. implicitly expected to act in a responsible manner whilst 
using the resources entrusted to him without providing a detailed account of the way 
those resources have been used. However, the separation of ownership and control 
meant that this could not remain the case for long. The simple definition of stewardship 
soon took a more sophisticated form and issues such as the purpose for which each 
10 These definitions are extracted from The Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus (1997). 
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resource was used and the degree of care and competence exercised in their use were all 
recognised to be of importance (Gjesdal, 1981; and Rosenfield, 1974). 
The employment of managers to run companies, on both a short-term and long-term 
basis, generated a new class of professionals and a new phenomena which has been 
termed 'managerial capitalism' (Chandler, 1977). This led to the recognition of "... the 
possible human weakness in the face of temptation" (Littleton and Zimmerman, 1962: 
p 104). It was, therefore, the job of accountants to perform auditing activities to provide 
the necessary scrutiny of management and to ensure that management was appropriately 
performing its stewardship role (Ronen, 1979). Over this period, stewardship was 
considered to be the main professional role of managers (Lehman, 1995) and companies 
were expected to report information, which was financial in nature Xi. e. mainly the 
annual profit), -with little attention being paid to non-financial 
information. 
2.2.2 Managerial Theories and The Growing Need for Information Disclosure 
As companies grew larger, increasing operational complexity enhanced the separation 
of ownership and control. As a result, managerial theories of firms, which emphasized 
this separation as well as highlighting the concern of owners (Berle and Means, 1932; 
and Gordon, 1945) were developed. The separation of ownership and control meant that 
managers had more autonomy and incentives to depart from their contracts to pursue 
their own goals, which were not necessarily the same goals as those of the 
shareholders" (Banard, 1938; and Drucker, 1946). Managerial benefits could include 
salary, security, power, status, prestige, and professional excellence (Williamson, 1963) 
11 In the author's v iew, this opportunistic behaviour of managers in allocation of resources can be 
considered as utility maximizing behaviour. 
23 
Chapter 2 
A. 
and managers could achieve their non-profit goals by having a positive preference for 
expenditures on, for instance, staff and emoluments (Williamson, 1970). 
Generally, shareholders do not have either the information on day-to-day operations nor 
the technical and expert knowledge to control managers directly. It is this lack of 
information which puts managers in a position they could exploit. Formally, this is 
experienced in the principal agent problems for owners. The principal (i. e. owner) has to 
find ways to make the agent (i. e. managers) behave in a way which benefits them. This 
would be achieved by either policing the agent or designing incentive structures (Coase, 
1937). The principal could decide to police the agent if the cost of policing is less than 
the cost of gathering information to monitor the agent. 
The introduction of an incentive mechanism led to managers' interests becoming 
consistent with those of the shareholders. Managers were given rewards, which were 
linked to the firm's financial performance. These rewards were in different formats 
ranging from equity and investment plans (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) to share options 
(Smith and Watts, 1982; 1986). This made it rational for managers to pursue a financial 
performance maximization goal, which was the same goal as that of the owners. The 
costs of such incentives, which were commonly known as agency costs", could have 
been expensive and managers could have tried to maximize their rewards. This has 
always been a predominant problem in the relationship between corporate owners and 
managers. In addition, there was the problem of moral hazard, which could arise when 
an agent was contracted to act in a particular way but where their actions were not 
observable. It was possible for them to renege but only the agent would know. 
12 Jensen and Meckling (1976) describe the cost of agency as the sum of ! nOnitoring expenditures 
incurred by the principal, bonding expenditures incurred by the agent, and the value of the lost residual 
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VVhile managerial theories clearly have values in explaining the growth of information 
disclosure, it is rather limited and fails to recognise information users other than 
shareholders. Managerial theories are rooted in the existence of an 'economic contract' 
between principal and agent according to which, companies report financial information 
to their investors to illustrate that they have acted in their best interests. In the author's 
view "traditional managerial theories" fail to recognise the possibility of a 'social 
contract' between companies and other groups and thereby fail to explain why 
companies might disclose non-financial information. In this way it maintains an isolated 
view in its analysis and does not consider factors from the external environment. 
2.23 Development of A Conventional Approach to Information Disclosure 
Decision Usefulness Approach 
A more general perspective than agency theory uses the concept of 'decision usefulness' 
of information to a range of information users as well as shareholders. According to this 
approach, reporting is demand-driven and information should reach each user group to 
meet their information needs in a satisfactory manner. Most studies on decision 
usefulness focused on financial information users (for example, Baker and Haslem, 
1973,1974; Chenhall and Juchau, 1977; and Benjamin and Stanga, 1977)". This 
information was generally intended to be applied in decision-making processes by a 
range of users (Ijiri, 1983) including. investors, creditors and other groups of individuals 
(Parker 1986,1991)". As Laughlin and Puxty (1981) argued, companies, which 
provided the information, recognised the importance of meeting the information 
boMe by the principal and attributable to the agency problem. 
" Despite the fact that the main focus of the decision usefulness studies was financial information, some 
non-financial information was also identified. 
14 For more details on 'decision usefulness approach' see Gray, Owen and Maunders (1991) (shown 
Appendix 2- Table 2A for details). 
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requirements of the user groups and the way information disclosure stimulated their 
participation for ensuring corporate survival. 
Despite the popularity of this approach in its early days, the literature survey implicitly 
highlights a number of practical difficulties associated with 'decision usefulness'. 
Firstly, most studies on this approach fail to provide any definition explaining who the 
information 'user groups' are. Companies are unlikely to simply provide information to 
any user (or user group) who demands the information. Secondly, there is no clear 
definition of what is meant by 'usefulness'. Information users could have an entirely 
different perception of 'usefulness' to that of the companies. 
A comprehensive review of studies on decision usefulness was carried out by Owen, 
Gray, and Maunders (1987). They found that these problems tended to limit the value of 
the approach. 
2.2.4 The Rising Awareness Over the Issue of Corporate Accountability and the 
Need for Non-Financial Information Disclosure 
In the 1970s, with a clear increase in non-financial information disclosure, the limitation 
of the 'decision usefulness' approach became clearer. As a result acadqmics sought an 
alternative to the decision usefulness approach and considered the role of corporate 
accountability. 
Conceptually, accountability is a more sophisticated version of stewardship (Gray, 
Owen and Maunders, 1991: p3), which recognises that companies should have a 
responsibility to contribute to social welfare as well as a responsibility to serve the 
owners' interests. Managers should not just be the stewards of their owners but also be 
the stewards of corporate employees, customers and society as a whole (Chen, 1975). In 
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any democratic system, all companies should be accountable not only to their owners 
but also to society-at-large (Gray et al, 1991) as all individuals have 'rights' to 
information" (Stanton, 1997). 
Companies remain unclear about a number of decisions on information disclosure. For 
instance, the decision on 'what information categories to disclose' is not straightforward 
nor is the decision on 'who determines the terms of accountability' and 'to whom the 
accountability is held'. There are differing views. on when accountability is due. Tricker 
(1983) and Stewart (1984) argue that unless the principal can enforce the accountability 
then there is 'no' accountability", whereas Gray, Owen and Adams (1996) take a 
different view and argue that accountability can exist even if it is not enforceable. As 
Gary, Owen and Maunders (1991: p6) point out: "most financial disclosure by 
companies to shareholders ... could 
be ... enforced 
by the shareholders" and the 
disclosure of some information items is ex gratia despite the statutory requirement". 
Therefore, in some cases, companies are forced to provide information but do not, and 
in other cases they are not forced and yqý, still do. In other words, accountability is not 
necessarily reflebted by information disclosure. This could be explained by arguing that 
in a democratic society companies are under moral obligations to fulfil certain tasks that 
are expected of them. 'Me fact that some relevant interest groups do not have the power 
15 Information should be disclosed on grounds of 'rights' to information by referring not only to the legal 
requirements but also to the natural and moral rights. 
16 This is known as positive accountability 
17 Under the UK law, companies are required to act within the legal framework for issues such as equal 
opportunity, health and safety, pollution, and charitable donations. As Gray, Owen and Maunders (1991) 
state "a duty of accountability is owed to society-at-large by organisations; that are responsible for the 
extent to which they have complied with law" (p7). The legal framework, however, lays down the 
minimum level of accountability (Tinker et al, 1991). In the case of non-disclosure, companies explicitly 
choose not to disclose information since the society-at-large has not enforced the accountability. At the 
same time, the UK government and other regulatory bodies have been passive in exercising'its authority 
in enforcing this accountability (i. e. the minimum level of accountability) (also see Gray, Owen, and 
Adams, 1996). - 
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to enforce their rights should not deter companies from discharging their implied 
responsibility to these relevant interest groups. This again raises the question of what 
form the social contract takes and who determines its existence (Gray, Owen and 
Maunders, 1991). 
In the late 1980s to the mid 1990s, a number of studies were undertaken on the nature of 
the 'social contract' (for example, Gray, Owen and Maunders, 1988,1991; and Gray 
1992)". These studies led to the common belief that information disclosure, followed by 
enhanced corporate transparency, was an essential theme for any democratic society". 
In this context Gray, Owen and Adams (1996) underline the important role of 
accounting information in raising corporate transparency by arguing that: 
"... if we consider active democracy as the appropriate moral basis upon 
which to organise society, then we can identify a complex of information 
flows - actual and potential - which do define and can be developed to 
redefine the society in which we live. A major source of those 
information flows is 'accounts' prepared and presented by organisations. 
Currently, such , 
'accounts' are predominantly financial and 
predominantly directed towards the most powerful groups in society and 
are therefore a source of anti-democracy. " (Gray, Owen and Adams, 
1996: p4l)' 
" The early implication of social contract was raised a long time ago. In 1975, a report published by the 
Accounting Standards Steering Committee, known as The Corporate Report, a section on 'public 
accountability' stating that "... to report publicly ... is separate from and broader than the legal obligations 
to report and raises from the custodial role played in the community by economic entities" (pl5, para. 
1.3) was engaged. It is explained in the report that public accountability bears no implication more than 
the responsibility to provide general-purpose information. The report adopts a user-demand approach 
whereby the amount of information to be reported depends on users' demands and the pressures exerted 
b the users on a company. 
17, 
2 
Information reported by companies should address issues of interest to a wide range of interest groups. 0 This led to proponents of accountability to argue that the disclosed information should fulfil the 
company's mission by showing that it actually does what it says and maintains its relevance by meeting 
the needs of their interest groups in an ever-changing environment (Gray S. T., 1995). The disclosed 
information should also indicate that the company meets the well being of their communities and societies 
by supporting the public education and assisting in the development of non-profit organisations. These 
arguments put pressures on companies to disclose a range of non-financial information related to their 
communities and its members. 
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In the absence of legal and regulatory requirements for non-financial information 
disclosure, the way companies predominately concentrate on financial information and 
disclose non-financial information on voluntary basis, suggests that companies do not 
discharge their accountability to their society. This means they could disclose 
information for reasons other than discharging their accountability to their society. 
There have been other alternative theoretical developments, which provide a more 
general perspective, and it is to these that we now turn. 
2-3 THE NEED FOR A WIDER PERSPECTIVE FOR THE DISCLOSURE OF NON- 
FINANCIAL INFORMATION 
In the late 1980s to the mid 1990s, a 'system thinking"' approach was adopted to 
explain information disclosure. According to this approach the economic domain in 
which companies operate is itself located within the 'social, cultural and ethical domain' 
where "... society, its culture and ethics determine, to a considerable degree, the 
structure and the acceptable modes of behaviour in the economic domain"" (Gray et al, 
1996: p33) and, hence the behaviour of companies. 
The literature survey illustrated that one of the shortcomings of conventional accounting 
is its failure to recognise the existence and, consequently, the interaction between these 
domains. When the disclosure of non-financial information is considered in this context, 
it is necessary to consider that many social, economic and cultural factors that might 
affect the relationship between a company and each of the main players (e. g. 
shareholders, employees, consumers, ... ) 
in the economic domain (Gray et al, 1996) 
21 See the work by Gray Owen and Maunders, 1987; Guthrie and Parker. 1989,1990; Hart and Owen, 
1991; Owen, 1990,1992; Owen, Gray and Maunders, 1987; Owen, Gray and Adams, 1992; Roberts R. 
W. 1992; Roberts J. and Scapens, 1985; Zadek and Evans, 1993; Puxty, 1986,1991; and many other 
studies which are available in the literature. 
22 See Appendix 2- Figure 2A. 
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needs to be considered in order to understand why companies disclose non-financial 
information. Thus, social and cultural changes inevitably lead to variations in the level 
and the categories of non-financial information disclosure. For instance, Roberts C. B. 
(1991) examined the disclosure of social information for a number of European 
countries and found evidence to suggest that different social environments did indeed 
effect the nature of non-financial information disclosed by companies. 
One theoretical framework that developed from this approach and aimed to articulate 
the changes, pressures and factors emanating from the external environment, is the 
6political economy' theory (Gray et al, 1996). Rather than focusing upon the concerns 
of shareholders and managers, political economy theory emphasizes the importance of 
accounting information to power relationship in society. It argues that accounting 
information can influence the distribution of income, wealth and power in any society 
(Lukes, 1974). 
Information is a powerful tool for listed companies. According to Hines (1988), 
information can be used significantly in constructing 'reality'. Hines argues that "we 
create a picture of an organization, or the 'economy', ... and on the basis of that picture, 
people think and act. And by responding to that picture, and consequences occur, they 
see it as proof of our having correctly conveyed reality" (p257). She goes on further by 
adding that "... anyone charged with the responsibility of providing these pictures has a 
lot of power because people will respond to what they draw-up" and the "... power is a 
hidden power because people only think of you as communicating reality, but in 
communicating reality, you construct reality" (p257). According to Hines, 'reality' 
could be anything that the information discloser wants it to be. In other words, 
information is treated as an invaluable tool that makes companies powerful. 
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The hidden power of information can be better perceived when the most primitive 
definition of power is looked at. According to Lukes (1974), power is what is counted 
as a significant manner and makes A affecting B. Parsons (1967) regards power as 
being "... generalised capacity to secure the performance of binding obligations by units 
in a system of collective organization when the obligations are legitimized with their 
reference to their bearing on collective goals" (p308). Power can be thought of "... as a 
specific mechanism that brings about changes in the action of other units, individually 
or collectively, and in the process of social interaction" (Parsons, 1967: p299). 
Consequently, companies use power for a range of purposes, which tend to change over 
time as the-nature of the relationship between companies and their external environment 
change. 
An understanding of the hidden power linked to information helps us to improve our 
understanding of why companies disclose non-financial information. At the same time, 
one needs to consider the social, political and economic context in which companies 
operate and how changing interests and attitudes within the society are associated with 
changes in information disclosure (Cooper and Sherer, 1984). In this way, accounting 
can be seen as a social practice. Lehman (1995), for example, argues that: 
"In order to understand the exact nature, direction, and momentum of social 
practices such as accounting ... they need to be related to the social 
circumstances that give rise to them. These circumstances include two 
fundamental aspects of any society: how it organises to produce the means of 
existence for its members, and how that social product is distributed. Both 
aspects are integral to understanding accounting practices as we know them 
today, and as they could be in future. " (p60) 
Political economy theory therefore concerns itself with the interrelationship between 
political and economic forces in ac6ounting practice and how they act to provide the 
31 
Chapter 2 
necessary information for decision making that allows for the exercise of Power (Miller, 
1991). In author's opinion, this is not to say that practical concerns of information 
requirements are unimportant, they clearly influence the setting up of regulation and 
accounting practices. Nor it is to understate the important role of the government in this 
process. What it implies is that the power relation in society plays an important role in 
determining accounting practice and in explaining how such practice can change over 
time. It is the interaction of these forces, which determines the particular forces of 
accounting practice and, consequently, the practice of non-financial information 
disclosure. This is why at different moments in time accounting has played very 
different roles both within organisations and society, in general. Miller (199 1) provides 
an example of this by showing how discounted cash flow procedures was developed as 
a managerial tool in the 1950s and became prominent in the 1960s. This was the result 
of government attempts to have an influence on economic growth and not a response to 
practitioner needs or academic arguments. 
There are two branches of political economy theory with important differences between 
them, particularly in the way they deal with non-financial information (Gray, Owen and 
Adams, 1996). One branch, namely 'classical' political economy, is concerned with 
structural conflict, inequality and the role of state (Gray, Kouhy and Lavers, 1995a; and 
Gray et al, 1996). According to this approach, the social system propels companies to 
divulge non-financial information (Puxty, 1986 and 1991) with the state playing a 
central role. Classical political economy focuses on well-defined groups within society 
and their interaction within the social system and its power relations that leads to 
information disclosure. Individual companies and agents are only important as members 
of particular social groups. 
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In contrast, the second branch of political economy, namely 'bourgeois' political 
economy, views the world as pluralist, in the sense that power is believed to be diffused 
with individual preferences determining social choices with no one individual having 
the power to influence society. It therefore emphasizes the relationships between 
companies and individuals or groups of individuals', whereby the power associated 
with individuals or groups of individuals compels companies to divulge non-financial 
information. 
The proponents of classical and bourgeois branches of political economy present views 
at the two opposing extreme ends of political economy spectrum. According. to Gray, 
Owen and Maunders (198 8), a large proportion of the literature on the issue of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR), which was an important area for the development of 
theories in the 1980s, adopts what they call a "middle-ground thinking" and falls within 
the framework of the bourgeois political economy. They classify the literature on CSR 
into four main categories: 
1. the left-wing radical, 
2. the acceptance of status quo, Middle-ground thinking falls 
3. the pursuit of subject/intellectual property rights into the second and the third 
4. the extreme right-wing (i. e. pristine capitalists or rig t- ing). categories 
According to the middle ground thinking, which is characterised by a pluralistic 
perspective, the status quo is accepted and the "... overt ambition is neither to destroy 
capitalism nor to refine, deregulate and/or liberate if' (Gray et al, 1988: p8). Gray et al 
(1988) argue that the middle ground thinking results from attempts to ... 
deduce a 
23 Although a large body of accounting research is based on pluralist conception of society (see Tinker, 
1977), some critiques of pluralist conception (e. g. Low and Tinker, 1977) contend that it ignores a 
substantial body of evidence related to how the powerfulness of different groups in a company determines 
the way in which'income'is distributed to them (Tinker, 1980). 
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model of society-as-it-should-be from an examination of society-as-it-happens-to-be" 
(pl2). 
Critiques of bourgeois political economy" consider it to be as a justification for 
capitalism (Tinker et al, 1991). They believe that power is not fairly distributed and 
social conflicts always arise between advantaged and disadvantaged. These conflicts are 
systematic and not random as believed by the proponents of the pluralist middle-ground 
thinking. According to these critiques, the state has an essential role in mediating these 
conflicts and the relationships within society are not, by themselves, enough to do the 
mediation. Bourgeois political economy ignores the role of the state and argues that the 
relationships within society would make the adjustments, once the conflicts arise. 
This pluralism and a passive approach to the status quo put middle-ground thinking 
under siege by its critiques. Tinker et al (1991) criticises Gray el al (1987) for the way 
they ignore questions related to status quo. For instance, Gray et al (1987: p200) 
explicitly acknowledge that they do not address questions on "... how and why the 
parameters of the status quo may have come about and what causes them to be 
maintained". Tinker et al (1991) believe that when the status quo is not questioned a 
... conservative tradition that 
benefits only a few constituencies" (p47) would be 
promoted. Tinker et al (199 1) attest the middle-ground thinking by providing cases that 
illustrate how "... accounting discourse was integral to both reproducing and changing 
the social relations of the status quo" (p47). 
"' Supporters of classical political economy or, sometimes, called conflict-based framework. 
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In criticising the middle ground thinking, Tinker et al (1991) carry out a periodisation" 
analysis to study the manner in which the middle ground has shifted over time. They 
contend that "tomorrow's middle ground cannot be ascertained by extrapolating from 
the past" (p47) and the analysis of social conflicts -in each era is essential. Their 
periodisation analysis shows that "what was the middle ground in one period can 
become an extreme in another ... and is not independent of contemporary social, 
political and economic struggles"(p36). 
Irrespective of the interesting criticisms made of the bourgeois political economy, this 
branch of political economy provides a more suitable theoretical framework for the 
analysis of non-financial information disclosed by UK companies. This is due to the 
fact that UK companies operate in an environment where the disclosure7 of non-financial 
information is not entirely regulated by either the regulatory bodies or the state (i. e. the 
government). Companies are therefore expected to disclose non-financial information as 
they are under pressure from some of their interest groups. In such circumstances, the 
analysis of non-financial information would inevitably require detailed analysis of the 
relationships between companies and different groups. 
In the author's view, bourgeois political economy only identifies the relationship 
between individuals and groups in a pluralistic world and does not offer a detailed 
analysis of the relationships between companies and their interest groups. It therefore 
fails to identify and, subsequently, to define the processes that provoked companies to 
report non-financial information. The application of sub-theories of bourgeois political 
economy is essential in providing a detailed examination of these relationships, 
25 See Appendix 2, Table 2B for details of periodisation analysis carried out by Tinker, Lehman and 
Neimark (199 1). 
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whereby the disclosure of non-fmancial information can be explored further. Two 
organisation-based branches of bourgeois political economy are legitimacy and 
stakeholder theories'. 
Legitimacy and stakeholder theories analyse non-financial information from different 
perspectives. VAýdle legitimacy theory seeks to explain the reasons why companies 
disclose certain types of non-financial information in relation to some of their 
stakeholder groups, stakeholder theory identifies various stakeholder groups. As is 
discussed in the following sections, a number of empirical studies have been carried out 
to find evidence in support of the two theories. Most empirical studies investigating the 
validity of legitimacy theory examine the disclosure of social and/or environmental 
information by the companies following the occurrence of environmental disasters or 
incidents. In contrast, studies on stakeholder theory focus mainly on companies having 
different stakeholder groups. 
2.3.1 Disclosure of Non-Financial Information Used as Means of Corporate 
Legitimacy 
Legitimacy can be defined as a condition or a status and is the end result of a 
legitimation process (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; and Brown and Deegan, 1998). 
Legitimation is, in turn, the process whereby an organization justifies to a peer or 
superordinate system its right to exist, that is to continue to import, transform, and 
export energy, material or information" (Maurer, 1971: p361). Alternatively, Lindblom 
C. K. (1994), as quoted in Gray, Kouhy, and Lavers (1995: p54), argues that legitimacy 
exists: 
26 This theoretical classification was applied by Gray, Kouhy and Lavers (199.5a) and Gray, Owen and 
Adams (1996). Also see Appendix 2- Figure 2B. 
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"... when an entity's value system is congruent with the value 
system of the larger social system of which the entity is a part. 
When a disparity, actual or potential, exists between the two value 
systems, there is a threat to the entity's legitimacy. " 
The above definitions suggest that society can evaluate the usefulness and the 
legitimacy of an organization by considering how well it performs in terms of social 
norms and values (Parsons, 1956). For companies to continue to survive and grow, they 
have to perform well and undertake various socially desirable actions, including 
distribution of economic, social, or political benefits to the groups from whom they 
derive their power (for more details see Shocker and Sethi, 1973). As far as companies 
are concerned, it is important that society recognises the compatibility of their 
behaviour with its ethical values (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). If a company fails to 
operate within the boundaries set by the social norms, the society may revoke its 
contract and prevent it continuing its operations (Deegan and Rankin, 1996). 
According to proponents of legitimacy theory, companies are considered as operating in 
a constantly changing external environment and they "seek to ensure that they operate 
within the bounds and norms of their respective societies. These bounds and norms are 
not fixed, but across time change, thereby requiring the organisation to be responsive" 
(Brown and Deegan, 1998: p22). A similar view is adopted by -Dowling and Pfeffer 
(1975) who state that: "... changing social norms and values constitute one motivation 
for organizational change and one source of pressure for organizational legitimation" 
(pl25). In this context, the disclosure of non-financial information seems to be an 
obvious way for companies to provide information on their activities to legitimize their 
behaviours. Clearly, the disclosure of social information becomes a response to 
environmental factors (Preston and Post, 1975) and is used as a means of legitimising 
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corporate actions as well as projecting their values and ideas (Dierkes and Antal, 1985; 
and Deegan, Rankin and Voght, 2000). 
Despite social and environmental information being disclosed in response to the factors 
from external environment, the level and the categories of non-financial information 
tend to vary depending on the impacts of these factors on a company. This is best 
illustrated by Mathews (1993) who discusses the disclosure of information with respect 
to the dependence of a company on society and political factors. He argues that: 
organizational legitimacy is not an absolute constant, because organizations differ 
considerably in their visibility to society as a whole and some are more heavily 
dependent than others upon social and political support" (pp30-31)., In a constantly 
changing economic and social environments ethical values also continuously change, 
leading to society imposing expectations and demands on companies. Thus, companies 
need to continuously change the level and the categories of non-financial information 
they disclose to indicate that they align their operations and values with those of the 
society and to successfully legiti mise themselves (Gray, Owen and Maunders, 1988; 
and Brown and Deegan, 1998; and Guthrie and Parker, 1989). 
Lindblom C. E. (1984) studies the challenges" to corporate social reporting (in the US) 
between the mid 1960s and the mid 1970s and uses the notion that organisational 
legitimacy serves to connect the 'social contract' with corporate social responsibility", 
27 Lindblom C. E. (1984: pp 20- 1) summarizes organizational legitimacy as follows: 
Legitimacy is not synonymous with economic success or legality. 
Legitimacy is determined to exist when the organization goals, output, and methods of operation are in 
conformance with societal norms and values. 
Legitimacy challenges are related to the size of the organization and to the amount of social and political 
support it receives with the more visible being most likely to be challenged. 
Legitimacy challenge may involve legal, political or social sanctions. 
28 Gray el al (1987: p4) define corporate social responsibility as : "... the responsibility for actions which 
do not have purely financial implication and which are demanded of an organisation under some (implicit 
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whereby the disclosure of social information facilitates the projection of a socially 
accountable image. This can be interpreted as companies being allowed to operate in 
society on the basis of some form of implicit 'social contract' (between the company 
and parties with legitimate interests"' in that company), whereby companies agree to 
perform various socially desired actions in return for the approval. of their objectives 
and to ensure their survival (Guthrie and Parker, 1989). In order to achieve the approval 
of society and to have their survival guaranteed, companies are required to release non- 
financial information that is sufficient in terms of both quality and quantity (Woodward, 
Edwards and Birkin, 1996). 
Whenever companies disclose social information to legitimise their own existence 
(Brown and Deegan, 1998), they can adopt one of ýhe four possible strategies, as 
identified by Lindblom C. K. (1994 as quoted in Gray, Kouhy, and Lavers (1995: p54)p 
in order to proceed with the process of legitimation through disclosure. Companies may 
disclose non-financial information to seek to: 
1. educate anct inforin its relevant public about actual changes in the organisation's 
performance and activities, 
2. change the perceptions of the relevant public without having to change its actual 
behaviour, 
3. manipulate the perception deflecting attention from the issue of concern to other 
related issues through an appeal to, for example, emotive symbols, and/or 
4. change external expectations of its performance. 
Apart from the first strategy, where non-financial information disclosure acknowledges 
the public about the changes taking place within a company, the other three strategies 
draw attention to the manner in which companies use non-financial information for their 
or explicit) identifiable contract". 
29 Stanton (1997: p694) argues that a "... legitimate interest is a result of the social contract: there is a 
mutually dependent relationship between a company and the society in which it operates". 
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own purposes rather than representing the truth about their organisations' performance 
and activities. Companies can also report information in response to the occurrence of 
particular incident(s) such as an environmental disaster that puts the companies in the 
spotlight. The* findings of the main empirical studies, as reviewed by the author, are 
shown in the Table 2.1. 
Apart from the study carried out by Guthrie and Parker (1989), a review of the previous 
empirical literature unanimously supports legitimacy theory. While most empirical 
literature provides evidence to suggest that the occurrence of certain events is followed 
by the changes in the level of social or environmental information, most theoretical 
literature focuses on explaining that companies disclose social or environmental 
information to legitimise their behaviours to society-at-large and to qnsure conformity 
with what is perceived to be socially acceptable. 
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TABLE 2.1 EMPIRICAL STUDIES TESTING LEGITIMACY THEORY 
Empirical Studies Findings 
Honger (1982) investigation was carried out on corporate social reporting of US steel 
corporation over a period of 80 years, between 1901 and 1980. 
Found evidence suggesting that social reporting was, indeed, in 
response to society's expectations of corporate behaviour. 
Guthrie and Parker A longitudinal review of the disclosed social information in BHP's annual 
(1989) reports was conducted over a period of one hundred years commencing 
1885. A comparison between the timing of observed peaks of corporate 
social disclosure and the major events in history of BHP was carried out. 
Found no evidence of disclosure to be in response to economic, social 
or political conditions or events. 
Patten ( 1992) The effect of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill on the annual report environmental 
disclosures of US petroleum companies was studied both before and after 
the Exxon Valdez incident in Alaska in 1989. 
Found significant increases in environmental disclosures by Petroleum 
firms after the Exxon Valdez oil spill. 
Deegan and Gordon Environmental reporting in annual reports of the Australian companies was 
(1996) reviewed between 1980 and 1991. They assessed the association between 
environmental disclosures and concerns held by environmental groups about 
particular industry. 
Found: 
" Positive association between the level of membership of environmental 
groups and the disclosure of environmental informatidn. 
" Companies in certain industries disclosed more environmental 
information. 
Deegan and Rankin Environmental reporting in the corporate annual reports of a sample of 
(1996) Australian firms that were successfully prosecuted for breaches of various 
environmental protection laws during the period 1990 and 1993 was 
examined. The sample included 20 companies, which were prosecuted for a 
total of 78 times. 
Found significant increase in the disclosure of environmental 
information when firms facing environmental prosecution. 
Wilmshurst and Frost The possibility of association between factors perceived as important by 
(2000)30 Chief Finance Officers in the decision to disclose environmental information 
within the annual report of selected Australian companies was examined. 
Found supporting evidence that management responds to the perceived 
importance of stakeholders and "... may legitimise its environmental 
performance in response to general changes in the perceived importance 
of environmental issues, and hence meet the information needs of the 
general community and stakeholders financially reliant on the firm" 
(p23). 
Deegan, Rankin and The reactions of Australian firms in terms of annual report disclosure to five 
Voght (2000) major incidents were examined. 
Found that: 
" Companies change their disclosure policies around the time of major 
company and industry events. 
" Disclosures appear to be event related rather than related to the social 
issues. 
Disclosure of social information in annual reports as an image making 
I strategy. I 
'0 Wilmshurst and Frost (2000) faiIed to provide evidence on any link between perceived importance of 
specific environment related stakeholders or legal issues. 
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The above literature survey reveals that one of the practical problems with legitimacy 
theory is the way it emphasizes 'society-at-large'. The term 'society-at-large' is too 
broad and fails to identify different groups that form society-at-large and, therefore, 
does not provide a detailed analysis of the relationship between companies and each 
group". Inevitably, the theory fails to acknowledge how powerful some of these groups 
might be in provoking companies to disclose non-fmancial information. To provide a 
more detailed analysis of the disclosure of non-financial information, a theory that 
identifies different groups in society and recognises that the existence of different 
stakeholder groups is required. 
23.2 Non-Financial Information Disclosure and Legitimisation of Corporate 
Behaviours to Stakeholder Groups 
Companies could disclose information in order to legitimise their behaviours; to their 
different interest groups, who are commonly known as stakeholders. In order to have a 
better understanding of who the stakeholders are and of their relationships with 
companies, this section initially reviews stakeholder theory followed by discussion on 
how and why companies can use information disclosure to legitimise their behaviours. 
Stakeholder theory identifies 'stakeholders' as individuals, or groups of individuals, 
who have legitimate interest in a company (Freeman, 1984; and Pearce, 1986), and 
whosc interests are recognised as vital to the company's long-term survival (Jones, 
1995). Some stakeholder groups are of more importance to their companies than others 
are, depending on the importance attached to the resources they control (March and 
3'A large volume of the latter literature focuses on a social contract between companies and society-at- 
large. For instance, Shocker and Sethi (1973: p67) argue that "any social institution - and business is no 
exception - operates in society via a social contract, expressed or implied". Shocker and Sethi (1973: 
p97) asserted that any organization owes its existence to the continuing mandate * of society-at-large. 
Gray, 
Owen and Maunders (1991) find such a view to be"... too broad and imprecise and takes too little 
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Simon, 1958; and Ullmann, 1985). The Stanford Research Institute (SRI), as quoted in 
Freeman (1984: p3l), defines stakeholders as "... those groups without whose support 
the organisation would cease to exist". 
The interests of stakeholder groups could be very wide. While some interests stem from 
within a company, others originate from the external environment of the company 
(Cyert and March, 1963). For instance, investors who are the legal owners have 
financial interests, whereas citizens who are external to a company have the right to a 
pollution free environment. Employees, on the other hand, have both financial (e. g. their- 
wages and other pecuniary benefits) and non-financial interests, such as the right to a 
pleasant working environment, equal opportunity and training programmes. 
As discussed in the earlier sections, companies operate in the bounds and norms of their 
environment characterised with new demands imposed on them by stakeholder groups. 
In such circumstances the only way of maintaining a competitive position is to remain 
responsive to the demands and the expectations of their stakeholders. (Jones, 1995). 
Considering stakeholding in a wider context Hirst (1997) argues that stakeholding 
represents a social form and the use of financial measures as the only indicators of 
corporate success and corporate financial stability is clearly inadequate in such a system 
(see Chakravarthy, 1986). It is therefore necessary to consider stakeholders other than 
investors when developing firm strategy (Cornell and Shapiro, 1987; and Barton, Hill 
and Sundaram, 1989). 
The adoption of a stakeholder mentality by companies does not necessarily mean that 
companies have to change their beliefs to conform to those of their stakeholder groups. 
cognizance of the power wielded by the organization" (p 15). 
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Sturdivant (1979)32, who is one of the proponents of this argument, contends that 
managers should consider the conflicting interests of their stakeholder groups when 
planning corporate strategy. This means that companies can maintain their own beliefs 
and prime objectives (i. e. maximisation of shareholders' funds and profit) as long as 
they keep their stakeholder groups content. In this context, companies may disclose 
non-financial information not simply to meet the information needs of their stakeholders 
but to keep their stakeholders satisfied and to justify their behaviours to them. This is 
best explained in the three dimensional model of Ullmann (1985). Ullmann (1985) 
discusses the responsiveness of a company to the intensity of 'stakeholder demands' in 
the first dimension of his model. According to this dimension, stakeholder power is a 
function of the stakeholders' control over the resources required by thý corporation. As 
Ullmann (1985) argues, the greater the dependence of a company on a specific source is 
for its continuous survival, the more powerful the stakeholder group become, and 
therefore the more important it is for the company to disclose information which is 
relevant and of interest to that particular stakeholder group. 
The second dimension of Ullmann's model deals with 'strategic posture' which is the 
mode of response of a company to social demands, whereby companies with more 
active strategic postures are expected to disclose more non-financial information to 
influence their key stakeholders". The third dimension of this model illustrates that 
companies with better economic performance disclose higher levels of non-financial 
32 Sturdivant (1979) tested the proposition that the interests of different stakeholders conflict. He used a 
survey of the activist group leaders and corporate managers. The results showed significant differences 
between the two groups indicating that the activists were stronger in their beliefs that business should be 
responsive to social issues. 
33 A company whose management continuously tries to influence their organisational status with key 
stakeholders through social responsibility activities possesses an active posture. 
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information ". This could be due to the fact that companies with better economic 
performance either treat the disclosure of non-fmancial information as a means of 
legitimising their behaviours or have more resources to afford a greater level of 
transparency to their stakeholders. 
The literature, on both legitimacy and stakeholder theories, leads to the general 
perception that there is a difference between 'satisfying' and 'meeting' the information 
requirements of stakeholders. information requiTements. Considering the four strategies 
discussed by Lindblom C. K. (1994) (see section 2.3.1), companies can be regarded to 
disclose non-financial information to legitimise their behaviours; to their stakeholders, 
thereby 'satisfying' their stakeholders. However, this does not necessarily imply that 
companies pay attention to the quality of non-financial information so that it 'meets' the 
information needs of their stakeholders. 
Companies may use non-financial information to 'satisfy' the information requirements 
of their stakeholders by adopting the second, the third or the fourth strategies, 
introduced by Lindblom C. K. (1994)" without paying much attention to its quality. If 
companies concentrate on presenting better quality of information in order to meet the 
information requirements of their stakeholders, they need firstly to identify who their 
stakeholders are and secondly to hold dialogue with them to seek their information 
requirements. 
In the absence of any regulatory requirements set by the accounting profession for the 
disclosure of non-financial information, the voluntary disclosure of non-financial 
34 Roberts R. W. (1992) also found a positive link between the two variables. 35 Companies can either change or manipulate the perception of the relevant public or change their 
expectations of corporate performance through non-financial information disclosure. 
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information can be misused to legitimise corporate behaviours; (Owen and Lehman, 
2000). As shown in Table 2.1, most studies, investigating the voluntary information 
disclosure and corporate legitimacy, focus on the disclosure of information items in 
response to the occurrence of incidents. The literature survey revealed little empirical 
investigation, exploring the possibility of any associations between the disclosure of 
non-fmancial information and corporate characteristics. 
As will be discussed in Chapter 3, a large volume of the literature on information 
disclosure emphasises corporate characteristics such as size, industrial background and 
corporate performance and discusses how the quantity of information disclosure varies 
with each corporate characteristic. The literature survey on legitimacy and stakeholder 
theories illustrated that little attention has been paid to whether companies with 
different characteristics disclose information to legitimise their behaviours to their 
stakeholders. Due to the paucity of empirical evidence in the existing literature, this 
study focuses on investigating whether companies disclose non-financial information to 
legitimise their behaviours. Thus, the first key research question that is investigated in 
this study is: 
"Do companies discl9se non-financial information to legitimise their 
corporate behaviours to their stakeholder groups? " 
As will be discussed in Chapter 4, the first key research question is investigated by 
examining the possibility of any links between corporate characteristics and non- 
financial information disclosure. If evidence is observed to suggest any association 
between corporate characteristics and the level of non-financial information disclosure, 
it can be concluded that companies use non-financial information disclosure to 
legitimise their behaviours to their stakeholders. However, if no conclusive evidence is 
obtained on the association between corporate characteristics and non-financial 
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information disclosure, finther supporting evidence is required before being able to 
argue that companies disclose information with the intention of 'meeting' the 
information requirements of their stakeholders.. The need for further supporting 
evidence stems from the possibility that companies may focus on the 'quality' of non- 
financial information so that the disclosed information would convey the true reasons to 
the relevant Public, explaining the deviations of corporate behaviours from social norms 
(i. e. Lindblom's first strategy - see section 2.3.1). 
If companies disclose non-financial information to 'meet' the information requirements 
of their stakeholders, they are expected to identify and to hold dialogue with them. The 
literature on stakeholder theory pays little attention to whether companies communicate 
with, or find out the information requirements of their stakeholders, oi how companies 
reach decisions on the information categories they need to disclose in their annual 
reports. In the next section, that part of the literature that deals with these issues is 
reviewed and discussed. 
2.3.3 Quality of Non-financial Information and The Expected Move Towards 
Corporate Transparency 
The level of interaction between companies and their stakeholders and 'quality' of 
information are closely related when discussing the disclosure of non-financial 
information in the context of 'meeting' the information requirements of stakeholders. 
As will be discussed later on in this section some academics (e. g. Elkington, 1999) 
foresee a global move towards corporate transparency. In the author's view, if UK 
companies are moving towards more transparency, supporting evidence is required to 
illustrate that UK companies pay attention to the 'quality' of non-financial information 
disclosed. 
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The mid 1990s can be regarded as the period during which companies used non- 
financial information reporting as a public relations tool (L'Etang, 1994; and Elkington, 
1999) to project an image of legitimacy (Deegan, Rankin and Voght, 2000). L'Etang 
(1994) provides supporting evidence suggesting that corporate social responsibility was 
used as an image making tool which was "an investment against the day when a crisis 
occurs and the company needs all the goodwill it can muster" (pl 16). According to 
L'Etang (1994), "corporate social responsibility itself is potentially an example of 
symmetrical public relations but when communicated to a third party it becomes 
publicity or public information ... In a case where a company acknowledges and 
communicates its self-interest the public relation is being truthful" (p 116). Unlike the 
mid 1990s, the end of the decade coincided with a surge of significant changes in the 
way academics viewed the quality of -non-financial (mainly social and environrnental) 
information disclosure and its impact on the enhanced corporate transparency. The most 
recent literature mainly focused on the social accounting and audit. The works of Zadek, 
Pruzan and Evans (1997) and Gonella, Pilling and Zadek (1998)" are regarded as the 
best examples. 
According to Gonella, et al (1998: p2l), "a social accounting process must meet the 
specific needs of an organisation and stakeholders involved, and so no two processes 
will be exactly the same". Gonella el al (1998) identifies five common aspects for all 
'Social and Ethical Accounting, Auditing, and Reporting' (SEAAR) approaches which 
are: 'stakeholder identification', 'stakeholder dialogue', 'indicators and benchmark', 
36 Zadek, Pruzan and Evans (1997) and Gonella, Pilling and Zadek (1998) discuss those key principles 
that ensure th 
ie 
quality of 'Social and Ethical Accounting, Auditing, and Reporting' (SEAAR). The key 
principles are: completeness, comparability, inclusivity, regularity and evolution, embeddedness, 
disclosure and external verification and continuos improvement (See Appendix 2. - Table 2C). 
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ccontinuous improvement', and 'public disclosure'. In this view, a 'transition' from the 
disclosure of non-fmancial information for image making purposes to the disclosure of 
non-fmancial information that is aimed at 'meeting' the information requirements of 
stakeholder groups requires the adoption of some of the above aspects. 
Elkington (1999) identifies ten characteristics of this transition (see Appendix 2, Table 
2D). Communicationý', which appears to have a significant role in this transition (as 
identified by Elkington, 1999), is expected to change from one-way passive 
communication to multi-way active dialogue. Hence, non-financial information 
disclosure will no longer be used for the 'public relation' purposes, but is expected to 
deliver a more effective means of communication with stakeholders. In other words, the 
increasingly powerful stakeholders Put more pressures on companies to provide more 
information (for more details see Tilt, 1994: p50). 
Two essential aspects of this transition are 'identification of stakeholder groups' by 
companies and 'stakeholder dialogue' whereby companies find out the information 
requirements of stakeholders. The interaction with stakeholders can be explained in the 
context of polyvocal citizenship, which is defined as being "... built around stakeholder 
dialogue, and its essence lies in providing each of the stakeholders with a 'voice' in the 
organisation" (Gray, Day, Owen, Evans and Zadek, 1997: p35). It is used to explore the 
interaction between companies and their stakeholders. In the author's view, 'the 
interaction process offers stakeholders with. the opportunity to take part in defining the 
terms of accountability by expressing what they expect of their companies. 
37 Which has been revolutionised with the introduction of internet'and advanced computer technology. 
49 
Chapter 2 
There are practical difficulties associated with polyvocal citizenship. For instance, even 
if companies have procedures for stakeholder identification and for stakeholder 
dialogue, there is always a possibility for companies to disclose non-financial 
information in the attempt to legitimise their behaviours. According to Gray et al 
(1997): 
"There is a potential difficulty in that stakeholders may not be informed 
in a manner which permits the expression of their voice to challenge their 
essential problems of organisational legitimacy. ... the voices may be heard only internally and offer comment only in the terms already set for 
them by the organisational hegemony" (p338). 
Even if independent external auditors are involved, there is always a danger of them 
failing to express their views freely. The failure of auditors to serve in the interest of 
I 
stakeholders is highlighted in a recent study by Ball, Owen and Gray (2000) which is 
discussed in section 2.4.1. 
To gain a better understanding of why 'stakeholder identification' and 'stakeholder 
dialogue' are both significant in the move towards more transparency, a broader picture 
of the changes that are believed to be taking place needs to be considered. 
Elkington (1999) depicts a broader picture of transitional changes by discussing the 
future business environment in the context of 'sustainability"'. Proponents of 
sustainability consider it as comprising of eco-justice and eco-efficiency" (Gladwin, 
1993) and regard it as raising concern over the treatment of environment, the wealth 
distribution, and the well being of future generations". For Gladwin (1997) sustainable 
development is concerned with equality, alleviation of poverty, and redistribution of 
39 Or sometimes called sustainable development. 
39 Eco-justice and eco-efficiency concern with issues related society and environment, respectively. 40 According to Gray et al (1996: p6l), the "... current modes of behaviour -especially in the developed 
world - are un-sustainable and therefore threaten current and future way of life". 
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opportunity. However, the context of sustainability has evolved over the years and is 
taking new formats. Elkington (1999) argues that sustainability" is no longer an 
attempt to harmonise the traditional financial bottom line with emerging thinking about 
the environmental bottom line"(p2). He recognises a shift from the traditional financial 
bottom line to "triple bottom line" approach, which concentrates on three main elements 
of economic prosperity, environmental quality and social justice. This new shift is 
expected to provoke in-depth changes in the global business environment and the way 
companies conduct their operations. 
It is as a result of the "triple bottom line" approach that future markets are expected to 
be characterised with more competition at global level. More companies are likely to be 
challenged by their stakeholders (e. g. customers and suppliers) about different aspects 
of the "triple bottom line" (Elkington, 1999). Contemporary to the changing global 
markets, there are shifts in the 'values' from hard commercial values to softer "triple 
bottom line" values"'. For proponents of "triple bottom line", more information on 
social, environmental and ethical issues is expected to be one of the significant features 
of the future biiiiness behaviours. 
Apart from the common belief that there is a shift towards corporate transparency, some 
academics believe that by the end of 1990s there were clear signs of convergence 
towards a broad set of standards (Gonella et al, 1998; and Zadek et al, 1997) in the 
41 While sustainability agenda was commonly perceived to have three dimensions, focusing on economic 
prosperity, environmental quality and social justice, Elkington (1999) argues that these three dimensions 
are not comprehensive to explore the sustainability agenda in today's complex world. Elkington (1999) 
argues that sustainability has become a more complex challenge. According to Elkington (1999), 
sustainability agenda can. be explored using seven dimensions. The seven dimensions are: markets, 
values, transparency, life-cycle technology, partnerships, time, and corporate governance. - 
42 Unlike 'hard' values that merely concentrate on traditional financial bottom line, 'softer' values tend to 
pay a lot of attention to social and ethical values. In a sustainable society, social, ethical and political 
goals are expected to be set to address "triple bottom line" issues. However, there are certain values that 
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practice of SEAAW', leading to a common fi-amework for the SEAAR practice". An 
early indication of the move towards standardisation is the emphasis on the quality of 
SEAAR and its development in the late 1990s. 'Me evidence found by Adams, Hill and 
Roberte' (1995) suggests that SEAAR "... is an area that is overdue for legislation ... 
However, there is clearly a great deal of scope for improvement in the quantity and 
quality of disclosures" and "... any legislation or standards need to be very carefully 
drawn-up" (pp56-57). Tilt (1994) also found evidence to suggest that standards are 
required to ensure that companies are disclosing information about their activities that 
affect society and that external audits are the most appropriate way of enforcing such 
regulations. The absence of any legislation is expected to result in the rising level of 
discursive iýfbrmation (Adams, Coutts and Harte, 1995), without much attention being 
paid to the quality of information. 
The literature clearly foresees a move towards transparency, which inevitably entails an 
increasing improvement in the quality of information disclosure. The current literature 
on the move towards more transparency implies that companies need to pay more 
attention to the 'quality' of non-financial information they disclose to their stakeholders. 
are shared globally and some tend to be society-specific. 
43 Zadek et al (1997) sets examples of this convergence by referring to some specific cases. For instance, 
two companies of Van City and Co-op are now examining how greater stakeholder participation in the 
accountancy process might be best achieved. A similar convergence is taking place in the need for the 
external agents to monitor the process of reporting. An example of this becomes evident when looking at 
Ben & Jerry's Homemade Inc. According to Parker A. (1997), the company has historically asked 
external agents to evaluate their performance and to pass personal judgement on the company's social 
performance. Nowadays, they have moved towards a view of the external agent as auditor charged with 
the duty of ensuring that the published statement is a correct description of what happened over the 
Erriod. 
Gonella el al (1998) suggest a common framework for the SEAAR practice and identifies three key 
areas that would form the basis of 'best practice': 1) A well-defined set of activities for the practice, 2) 
Both the activities and the quality of those activities should become subject to assessment, 3) There is a 
need to ensure that the necessary skills and experience required to support the process become more 
frecisely specified and testable. 
5 The three researchers carried out a survey examining the disclosure of social information, defiried in 
terms of environmental, ethical and employee-related information in the annual reports of 150 of the 
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The literature survey conducted in this chapter revealed little evidence on UK 
companies and whether there are any signs of the transition taking place among them. 
Hence, the second key research question that needs to be investigated is: 
"Do companies disclose non-financial information to meet the 
information requirements oftheir stakeholder groups? " 
2.4 CRITIQUE OF THE LITERATURE RELEVANT To NON-FINANCIAL INFORMATION 
DISCLOSURE 
This section critically examines that part of the literature that is relevant in explaining 
the disclosure of non-financial information in the VK. Section 2.4.1 provides critiques 
of the literature, including the author's critique. This is followed by section 2.4.2, where 
the existing gaps between theoretical and empirical literature are discussed and 
highlighted. 
2.4.1 General Critique of the Relevant Literature 
The literature review revealed that the most relevant and appropriate theories that 
explain the disclosure of non-financial information by UK companies, in the absence of 
regulatory requirements or any recognition by the professional bodies, are legitimacy 
and stakeholder theories. This section discusses the shortcomings of that part of the 
literature that is used in this study to discuss the disclosure of non-financial information. 
The literature review (in section 2.3.1) revealed that the empirical studies, which 
examine the disclosure of social and environmental information in the context of 
legitimacy theory, focus on the way companies divulge information in response to 
major social and environmental incidents. The literature tends to ignore other potential 
factors that can put companies under pressure to disclose non-financial information. 
largest European companies. 
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According to Lindblom's C. K (1994), companies whose values do not conform to those 
of society are likely to divulge information in an attempt either to justify or to divert 
public attention, or to change and/or manipulate external expectations. In the author's 
view, the deviation from social norms and values could be due to reasons, which stem 
from corporate characteristics (e. g. corporate industrial affiliation, size, growth rate and 
corporate performance). In a recent study by Gray, Javad, Power and Sinclair (1999)"', 
these reasons are regarded as exclusive factor§, whose inclusion would significantly 
improve the relationship between corporate characteristics and environmental and social 
information disclosure"'. 
Regardless of the common perception that companies disclose non-financial 
information to legitimize their behaviours, the move towards transparency (as claimed 
by some commentators such as Elkington, 1999) implies that companies divulge non- 
financial information to provide their public and their stakeholder groups, in general, 
with information they require. In the author's view, as companies operate in a 
constantly changing external enviroriment, they need to exhibit certain degree of 
flexibility to maintain responsiveness to the changing stakeholders' values and 
expectations. Stakeholder dialogue provides companies with the opportunity to find out 
about their stakeholders' expectations and values as well as meeting their information 
needs. Hence, the importance of stakeholder dialogue to ensure quality of non-financial 
information is demonstrated. 
46 Gray et al (1999) focused on three corporate characteristics: industrial classification, corporate size and 
gofitability. 
Gray et al (1999) consider factors such as organizational culture, experience with pressure groups and 
media profile be exclusive. 
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The recent accounting literature has dealt Aith the 'quality' of social and environmental 
information by identifying the characteristics of SEAAR (See Appendix 2, Table 213). 
Although considerable progress has been made, ftirther development is required to 
achieve a frarhework that is applicable to all companies. The number of studies dealing 
with the quality of non-financial information is relatively small and most of them 
concentrate on the identification of the common characteristics for SEAAR approaches. 
The existing* literature deals with issues such as information characteristics (e. g. 
unbiasedness and reliability of information) and the need for external verification (i. e. 
external audit) (Gonella et al, 1998; and Zadek et al, 1997) as well as highlighting the 
need for regulations (Adams and Harte, 1999, and Gray, 2000). 
In a recent study by Ball, Owen and Gray (2000), attention is drawn to the failure of 
verifiers of environmental reports to highlight the weaknesses and failures of corporate 
performance. According to Ball et al (2000: pl), "... current verification practice 
exhibits a 'managerial turn' rather than representing corporate commitment to external 
transparency and accountability". One of the alarming issues raised is that: "... the 
organizational legitimacy is sustained by the very fact that being seen to be audited 
rather than there being any real substance to the audit process itself' (Ball el al, 2000: 
p2). The work of Ball et al (2000) shows the failure of external verifiers to ensure the 
quality of environmental reports in a manner that it is expected to protect the interests of 
stakeholders. 
In the author's view, a framework which ensures the disclosure of non-financial 
information would discharge corporate accountability to stakeholders, needs to have 
stakeholder dialogue at its core. As companies have a number of different stakeholder 
groups specialist knowledge from other academic disciplines is required (a) to explore 
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effective methods of interaction between companies and their different stakeholder 
groups, and (b) to ensure the quality of disclosed information. As will be shown in 
Chapter 3, interaction with stakeholders involves different methods of one-way and 
two-way communication. 
One of the inherent difficulties in addressing issues related to quality is the way the 
relationships between companies and some of their stakeholder groups are defined by 
4social' contracts. As it was explained in section 2.2.3, the terms of a social contract are 
implicit and therefore not well-defined. This implies that even if there were interaction 
between companies and their stakeholder groups, there still remain some unresolved 
issues on, for example, the categories of and the extent to which non-financial 
information should be disclosed. These are all issues that need to be addressed and 
developed in a much broader context in the literature. 
Another aspect, which appears to be missing from the current UK literature, is the 
recognition of how significant the role of governance structures can be in 
communication between companies and their stakeholder groups. A number of US 
studies (e. g. Harrison and Freeman, 1999; and Luoma and Goodstein, 1999) have 
emphasized the significance of corporate governance structures. According to these 
studies, communication between companies and their stakeholders can be carried out 
more effectively by allowing stakeholder representatives in corporate managerial 
structures. 
One of the limited number of UK studies that draws attention to the importance attached 
to corporate governance is the recent study by Owen, Swift and Humphery (2000). 
Owen et al (2000) state that "... we must ... question how meaningftd the role of an 
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independent auditor can be in the absence of refon'ris to corporate governance 
procedures which gives stakeholders a legitimate role in corporate decision-making" 
(p95). They argue that unless there is a fundamental change in the corporate governance 
procedures, social audit can easily serve managerial purposes rather than fulfilling its 
original role, which is to discharge the responsibility of corporate accountability to 
stakeholders. 
Owen et al's proposal is in line with the triple bottom line of Elkington (1999). 
According to Elkington (1999), corporate governance needs to take on board the view 
of their key stakeholders by developing a much more inclusive way of handling 
stakeholder dialogue which is multi-way rather than focusing on one-way 
communication. 
2.4.2 The Existing Gap Between The Theoretical Discussion and Empirical 
Investigations with Regard to Non-Financial Information 
The concept of corporate legitimacy and the move towards corporate transparency are 
potentially contradictory. The fact that the findings of previous studies (Gray, 1997; and 
Adams, Hill and Roberts, 1995) suggest a rise in the quantity rather than the quality of 
social and environmental disclosure indicates the increasing use of non-financial 
information by companies for legitimacy purposes. This, in turn, undermines the 
underlying issues (i. e. stakeholder dialogue and information characteristics) related to 
the quality of non-financial information. Even though, those information categories that 
companies divulge voluntarily may be unbiased and reflect a true image, it does not 
necessarily mean that companies are willing to report on all aspects of their operations. 
For instance, in a recent study by Adams and Harte (1999) evidence is presented on the 
willingness-of companies to report on their employment practices. 
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If companies are moving towards transparency, evidence is required to suggest that 
companies do not disclose non-financial information to legitimise their operations but 
that they do so to meet the information requirements of their stakeholders. The existing 
literature concentrates on social and environmental incidents to argue that companies 
disclose the relevant information to justify their behaviours (section 2.3.1) and offers 
little evidence to suggest that companies disclose such information even when no social 
or environmental incident has occurred. In other words, legitimacy theory can be looked 
at from a much broader perspective. It is, for instance, important to note that in the 
absence of statutory or legal requirements companies have the freedom to report non- 
financial information when they wish to project certain images of themselves or to 
deviate attention from issues of concern. In this study (in Chapter 3), it is argued that 
companies with certain characteristics may have different levels of non-financial 
information disclosure. As the literature survey revealed, there are not many studies that 
have looked at non-financial information disclosure from this perspective. Following 
the above argument, if evidence is found to suggest that companies use non-financial 
information disclosure to legitimise their behaviours to a range of stakeholder groups, 
fin-ther supporting evidence is required to suggest that companies did not attempt to 
meet the information requirements of their stakeholders and are not observed to hold 
much dialogue with their stakeholder groups. 
To assess whether companies take steps to ensure quality of non-financial information, 
this study focuses on two of the five aspects"' of SEAAR. The two aspects are: 
'stakeholder identification' and 'stakeholder dialogue'. The reasons why only two 
4' The five common aspects of SEAAR are: Stakeholder identification, Stakeholder dialogue, Public 
disclosure, Indicators benchmarks, and continuous improvements. 
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aspects are selected are discussed in Chapter 3 (section 3.4). Evidence on these two 
aspects is required to show: (a) if companies identify their stakeholder groups and, (b) if 
they hold any dialogue with their stakeholder groups. The number of studies which have 
addressed these two issues is limited". The findings would also cast light on whether 
UK companies have moved towards more corporate transparency (as discussed by 
Elkington, 1999). 
In the author's view, this study is expected to find evidence that would cast light on 
whether the major UK companies disclose information to deviate attention from issues 
of main concern in the absence of any statutory or regulatory requirements. This finding 
is very likely to be supported by the evidence gathered on the secoild key research 
question. The evidence on the second key research question is expected to suggest that 
there is very little dialogue between companies and their- stakeholders. It is only in the 
presence of such evidence that one can argue that UK companies do not pay much 
attention to the quality of non-financial information. Currently, there is not enough 
evidence in the existing literature to enable one to comprehensively conclude that the 
major UK companies use non-financial information to legitimise their behaviours to 
their stakeholders in the absence of any statutory or regulatory requirements. 
The author also wishes to stat that even though this study uses legitimacy theory as its 
main theoretical theme, stakeholder theory will also be used jointly and inter- 
changeably along with legitimacy theory in order to explain the evidence that will be 
observed on the two key research questions. The reason for this is rooted in the way the 
two theories supplement each other's shortcomings when they are used in analysing the 
49 Gray, Day, Owen, Evans and Zadek (1997) discuss stakeholder dialogue in the context of polyvocal 
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disclosure of non-financial information. For instance, legitimacy theory recognises 
neither the existence of different stakeholder groups nor the importance companies 
attach to them. Conversely, stakeholder theory fails to argue that companies may 
disclose non-financial information to legitimise their corporate behaviours. The author 
believes that the use of the two theories provides a stronger theoretical theme for the 
study. %ile legitimacy theory will be used to discuss whether companies disclose non- 
financial information to legitimise their corporate behaviours, stakeholder theory will be 
used to discuss information disclosure to stakeholder groups. The two theories will be 
used jointly and inter-changeably, although with more weight being attached to 
legitimacy theory. 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
This chap'ter presented a review of the accounting literature relating to different theories 
that have been commonly used in explaining the disclosure of information over the 
years. A critical review of the early literature revealed that despite its valuable 
contribution in broadening our understanding of information disclosure, a wider 
perspective is required in order to consider various elements from the external 
environment in which companies operate. Bourgeois political economy was found to 
provide such a perspective. 
The literature review conducted in the chapter illustrated that bourgeois political 
economy, which adopts a pluralist view of the world and emphasises the relationships 
between companies and individuals/groups, considers power to be diffused and 
considers conflicts to arise randomly. As proponents of bourgeois political economy 
citizenship perspective. 
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argued, the forces of social interaction resolve these random conflicts. As bourgeois 
political economy did not provide detailed analysis of the forces of social interaction 
and how these forces may lead to the disclosure of non-financial information by 
companies, it'was decided to choose more relevant theories. Two organization-based 
theories, namely legitimacy and stakeholder theories, were reviewed and found to be the 
most relevant theories for analysing the relationship between companies and different 
players withiri the external environments. 
It was revealed that whilst legitimacy theory explains the divulgence of non-financial 
information by companies to justify their behaviours; to society-at-large, stakeholder 
theory identifies different corporate stakeholder groups whose need for certain type of 
information should be taken into account. The two theories were found to supplement 
each other. It was decided to apply the two theories jointly and inter-changeably. Based 
on the review of empirical studies on the two theories, the first key research question 
was presented as: 'whether the disclosure of non-financial information was being used 
to legitimise corporate behaviours to stakeholder groups? ' 
It was further argued that even if evidence suggests that companies do not disclose non- 
financial information to legitimise their behaviours to their stakeholder groups, it does 
not necessarily mean that they disclose information to 'meet' the information 
requirements of their stakeholder groups. It was then argued. that if companies intend to 
meet the information requirements of their stakeholder groups through non-financial 
information disclosure further supporting evidence is required to suggest that companies 
identified their stakeholder groups'and held dialogue with their stakeholder groups to 
ascertain their information requirements. In other words, evidence was required to show 
that companies paid some attention to the 'quality' of non-financial information. 
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To explore whether quality of non-financial information mattered to companies, the 
chapter was continued by reviewing the recent literature on quality of non-financial 
information and the move towards corporate transparency. The literature review 
highlighted the importance of stakeholder identification and stakeholder dialogue. In 
doing so, it was also important to consider the changes in the global business 
environment including the move towards more transparency and more effective 
communication, which were both regarded as significant features of future business 
behaviours. Concurrently, the literature suggested that there was a growing concern for 
an obligatory framework to ensure quality. Some studies even suggested signs of 
convergence towards a broad set of standards for 'Social and Ethical Accounting, 
Auditing, and Reporting' (SEAAR). 
As the above literature offered little evidence to suggest that companies disclose non- 
financial information with the intention of meeting the information requirements of their 
stakeholders, the second key research question was presented as: 'Do companies 
disclose non-financial information to meet the information requirements of their 
stakeholder groups? ' 
The chapter was then continued by presenting the critique of the literature, including the 
author's view, relevant to non-fmancial information disclosure. Finally, the gaps 
between the existing theoretical and empirical literature were discussed, providing 
fin-ther justification as why it was important to explore the two research questions I and 
2. 
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These key research questions will be explored further in Chapters 3 where supporting 
research questions 1 to 6 are presented based on the gaps in the existing literature. 
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CHAPTER 3 CORPORATE LEGITIMIZATION AND 
STAKEHOLDERS' REQUIREMENTS: CLASSIFICATION OF 
NON-FINANCL&L INFORMATION, CORPORATE 
CHARACTERISTICS, AND QUALM OF NON-FINANCIAL 
INFORMATION 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
While the previous chapter reviewed the wider accounting literature to explore the 
possible theoretical and conceptual explanations for the disclosure of non-financial 
information by UK companies in the absence of any regulatory requirements or any 
recognition from the professional accounting bodies, this chapter reviews a narrower 
part of the literature. The nature of the literature in this chapter differs from the 
literature review carried out in the previous chapter in the way it concentrates on the 
empirical findings of the previous studies. This chapter illustrates how the theoretical 
justification that was highlighted in the previous chapter could be empirically 
investigated. In doing so, the literature review carried out in this chapter explores the 
two key research questions raised in the previous chapter by presenting a number of 
supporting research questions relevant and related to each key research question. 
Before starting to explore the two key research questions in sections 3.3 and 3.4, section 
3.2 concentrates on discussing the classification of non-financial. information categories 
into two groups of governance and non-governance information. Section 3.2 starts by 
discussing why it is important that non-financial information is divided into two groups 
of governance and non-governance information and how the two categories are related 
with each other. In sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, the relevant literature on governance and 
non-governance issues are reviewed. Based on the literature review in each of the two 
sections, a number of information categories were highlighted. This study will treat 
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these information categories as the main governance and non-govemance information 
categories to consider for investigation. 
The chapter is continued in section 3.3 where the empirical literature relevant to the first 
key research question is reviewed. The first key research question raised the issue of 
whether UK companies disclose non-financial information to legitimise their corporate 
behaviours to their stakeholder groups. The previous chapter revealed that companies 
often disclose social and environmental information following social or environmental 
incidents in an attempt to legitimise their behavi ours. In this study, as stated in the 
previous chapter, companies could disclose information to legitimise their behaviours; 
not necessarily after social and environmental incidents but to legitimjse those aspects 
of their behaviours that arise as a result of their corporate characteristics. Thus, in this 
chapter the literature on four corporate characteristics will be reviewed in sections 3.3.1 
to 3.3.4. The four corporate characteristics are: industrial affiliation, size, growth and 
performance. Based on the literature review for these four characteristics, four 
supporting research questions will be posed to explore the first key research question. 
In section 3.4 the literature relevant to the second key research question, which was 
posed to supplement the first key research question, is reviewed. The second key 
research question raised the issue of 'quality' of non-financial information, and, more 
specifically, whether UK companies disclose non-financial information to meet the 
information requirements of their stakeholder groups. It was argued that if companies 
disclose non-financial information to legitimise their behaviours, they are very unlikely 
to pay much attention to the quality of non-financial information. Therefore there is 
expected to be little stakeholder dialogue between companies and their stakeholder 
groups. In sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, two aspects of stakeholder dialogue are explored 
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based on which two supporting research questions are presented to investigate the 
second key research question. 
This chapter is concluded in section 3.5. 
3.2 CLASSIFICATION OF NON-FINANCIAL INFORMATION - WHY GOVERNANCE AND 
NON-GOVERNANCE INFORMATION 
T'his study considers only those non-financial information categories that were disclosed 
externally by companies. As non-financial information categories considered in this 
study do not measure the extent of disclosure, it was decided to use the term information 
'category' and not information 'item'. Each information category, considered in this 
study, could embrace a number of information items. 
Non-financial information categories are divided into two groups of governance and 
non-govemance information categories. As it was explained in section 1.3 information 
on managerial issues and those internal matters, which are related to corporate 
managerial structures, are regarded as governance information categories. Non- 
governance information, on the other hand, embraces those non-managerial issues that 
are concerned with both internal and external matters. As it will be shown in section 3.3, 
many of the non-governance information are commonly regarded as social information 
in the literature (see Table 3.6). In this study, reference is also made to non-financial 
information. By non-financial information, we mean all those information categories 
that are included in both governance and non-govemance information categories. 
The two groups of govemance and non-govemance information categories'are believed 
to be closely linked as companies, which intend to project certain image of"themselves 
or to attempt to legitimize their behaviour, are expected to disclose both governance and 
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non-governance information. The previous chapter reviewed the relevant literature on 
how companies can disclose non-financial information (i. e. mainly social and 
environmental information) to legitimise their behaviours. At the same time, companies 
are expected to disclose information on their governance structures to provide 
assurances that they do have the appropriate managerial structures to enable them to 
behave in a socially desirable manner. 
Windsor and Preston (1988) link the concept of organisational legitimacy to that of 
corporate governance, claiming that corporate governance and corporate social 
responsibility are fundamentally and closely related aspects of the interaction between 
the organisation and its internal and external social and political environments. They 
argue that the corporate governance structure: 
"... determines the firm's objectives, policies and strategies, 
they also establish the firm's legitimacy as a social entity. ... 
Since the changing social norms is a difficult process, it is 
likely that most organisations will either adapt to the 
constraints imposed by the requirement to be legitimate or will 
attempt to identify their present output, values and methods of 
operations, with institutions, values, or outputs that are 
strongly believed to be legitimate. " (Windsor and Preston, 
1988: p45) 
In other words, the governance structure of a company is determined by external 
factors, ranging from economics and financial factors to legal and social ones (Wilkes 
and Samuels, 1991). In a recent report by the Chartered Institute of Management 
Accountants (CIMA), several advantages of having a sound governance structure 
(shown in Table 3.1) are identified among which 'transparency' and 'social 
accountability' to gain public confidence in companies are mentioned. UK companies 
are therefore expected to disclose information to show that they have sound governance 
structures. 
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TABLEM BENEFITS OFA GOOD GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 
Benefits of a Good Governance Structijre 
1. Reduce Risk -A mechanism that reviews and reduces the risk of fraud. 2. Stimulates performance - it institutes clear acýountability and effective links between performance and rewards, 
3. Improves access to Capital - It reduces the level of risk as perceived by outsiders, 4. Enhances marketability ofgoods and services - It creates confidence among other 
stakeholders, including employees, customers, suppliers and patterns in joint 
venture, 
5. Improves leadership - It allows increased expertise to be brought in. 6. Demonstrates transparency and social accountability - This fosters political 
support for, and public confidence in, the organisation. 
Source: Extracted from Corporate Governance, CIMA, (1999: p 1). 
The above literature suggests that apart from the disclosure of information on 
governance structures, companies are expected to disclose information on those aspects 
of their operations and business conducts that are perceived to be socially acceptable. 
The following two sub-sections provide explanations for the information categories 
included in each group. 
3.2.1 Governance Information 
Corporate govemance can be described as the way a company is managed or as ".. the 
system by which companies are directed and controlled" (Cadbury code para. 2.5). 
Burchell, Gordon and Miller (1991: pviii) describe govemance as "... an activity and an 
art which concems all and which touches each. And it is an art which presupposes 
thought" and Starkley (1995) defines govemance as "... more than the legitimisation of 
authority or the taming of power. Govemance lies in the heart of the organisations we 
work in and live our lives through" (p843). 
Corporate governance is about the structures and processes associated with decision- 
making and control within an organisation. Traditionally it covered issues of 
stewardship, accountability, monitoring, evaluation, and control of managers to ensure 
68 
Chapter 3 
that they behave in the interest of shareholders. The governance structures of UK 
companies are commonly known as 'Anglo-Saxon' and have a number of 
characteristics, which are shown in Table 3.2. 
TABLE3.2 CHARACTERISTICS OFANGLO-SAXON GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 
Governance Structure Characteristics 
1. Separation of ownership and control, 
2. Utility maximization behaviour of managers, 
Anglo-Saxon Structure 3. Information 
is a private good, 
4. Lack of communication ' lack of trust, S. Resistance to change, conservatism, 
6. Hieher levels of centralisation and fon-nalisation. 
Source: Extracted from Monks and Minow(1995: pp271-2) 
These characteristics raised some concerns for corporate owners. In an Anglo-Saxon 
company the separation of ownership and control has allowed managers to have the 
freedom to act in their own interests. Company directors can make decisions without 
explaining their actions to corporate owners. Corporate owners5o of large publicly 
quoted companies do not usually participate in management decisions and there is often 
little communication between companies and their owners about the day-to-day 
corporate operations. In addition, information is a private commodity, owned by the 
companies, and. can be utilised for private gains in the market placesl (Prodham, 1993). 
In such circumstances companies disclose information to provide assurances that the 
required monitoring and control measures are in place and managers do not take 
advantage of their managerial positions (Starkley, 1995). 
In the UK 70% to 80% of shares are held by institutional investors (Modern Company 
Law, 1999), who are frequently mentioned as a potentially important force for 
50 For example, equity owners, holders of bonds, or bankers providing loan finance. 
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improving corporate governance (Lunt, 1992; and Huddart, 1993). The diffuse 
ownership of public corporations had given the managers greater power over 
fundamental decision making. Ile increase in institutional investment and the 
increasing awareness of institutional investors of their roles as corporate owners 
(Mallin, 1995) should diminish the power and control of managers (Monks, 1993). The 
best example of this is the introduction of the regulatory recommendations on corporate 
governance structures in 1990s. 
During the late 1980s to early 1990s, a series of high-profile corporate disasters (e. g. ' 
Asil Nadir's Polly Peck International, Robert Maxwell's MGN/Pergamon Empire, and 
the Bank of Credit and Commerce International) resulted in concerns being raised over 
stewardship and the effectiveness of a system which was heavily self-regulated (Keasey 
and Wright, 1993). The pressures from shareholders to devise monitoring measures on 
top management were to lead to the publication of the "Cadbury code of best practice" 
by a Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (commonly known 
as the Cadbury Committee) in December 1992. 
The Cadbury code of best Practice sought to introduce guidelines and recommendations 
to ensure control over the utility maximizing behaviour that may arise from the 
separation of ownership and control (Para. 1.2 of the Code). Recommendations were 
also made on the role of non-executive directors as a strong independent element on the 
boards, who would act as experts in decision control (Para. 1.3 of the Code). One of the 
main purposes of the Cadbury code was to reduce the utility maximising behaviour of 
executive directors by strengthening the monitoring and decision control functions of 
31 To avoid this, incentives are introduced to make sure that maniagers act in the interests of their owners, 
thereby reducing their utility maximising behaviour (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
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non-executive directors. Furthermore, the need to make executive directors more 
accountable to shareholders, and the need to establish effective audit, nomination, 
remuneration and compensation procedures were recognised. 
The recommendations of the Cadbury code are aimed at raising the quality of corporate 
governance. By disclosing information on compliance with the Cadbury code, 
companies intend to present themselves as having sound governance structures. Conyon 
and Mallin (1997) observed a high compliance with the recommendations of the 
Cadbury code for the large UK companies in 1995. They found that among the Top 100 
UK companies 85.2% of companies had separate positions for chief executive officer 
(CEO) and chairman, and 98% of companies had remuneration and audjt committees. In 
comparison, they observed a low compliance for nomination committee (i. e. only 51% 
of companies had nomination committees). This heavily undermined the independence 
of procedures adopted by companies in appointing their executive and non-executive 
directors and therefore the element of an independent factor in decision-making 
procedures in various board committees. 
Buckland and Doble (1995) compared the composition of boards with the Cadbury 
code's recommendations and found further evidence of non-compliance. Their evidence 
showed that not only did newly-quoted UK firms choose to be less well governed than 
the Cadbury code had recommended, but there was no evidence in either their 
characteristics nor on their subsequent history to suggest that their compliance or non- 
compliance had any significant effect on their behaviours or on their survivals. 
Furthermore, it was found that non-compliant companies were marginally more likely to 
survive as independently quoted or listed businesses than those entrants with separate 
positions for chairman and CEO or the ones with high compliance with Cadbury in their 
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numbers of non-executives. The findings of the study by Buckland and Doble (1995) 
clearly suggests that despite the common perception that compliance with the Cadbury 
code would indicate sound governance structures and provide assurances to the 
shareholders (Corporate Governance, CIMA, 1999: p4) many companies chose not to 
comply. 
Another issue of concern was directors' remuneration. In an attempt to improve control 
over managerial pay and their other pecuniary benefits, the code recommended 
information disclosure on all pecuniary benefits enjoyed by the directors. There was 
specific reference to forming remuneration committee, which consisted wholly or 
mainly of non-executive directors and was chaired by a non-executive director 
(Cadbury code, para. 4.42). The presence of non-eýecutive directors in all board 
committees is aimed at ensuring that managers would not be unfairly rewarded large 
sums. Despite all the recommendations, evidence for non-effectiveness of the measures 
were found. For instance, Conyon and Leech (1994) found evidence that the separation 
of the highest paid directors from the CEO position had no effect on pay. Also, 
Hamberic and Finkelsstein (1995) presented evidence showing that the pay conditions 
for CEOs differed widely depending on whether there was a powerful shareholder with 
a significant holding. 
One of the central aspects of the corporate governance in the UK is the extensive 
attention that has been paid to shareholders and to their interests. The Anglo-Saxon 
companies are regarded as a piece of property, owned by their shareholders, and are not 
seen as a community with obligations to their employees, consumers and their other 
stakeholders. Inevitably most of the emphasis is on companies to disclose governance 
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information that meets the information requirements of investors. This is reflected in the 
Hampel Report (1998): 
"The single overriding objective shared by all listed companies, 
whatever their size or type of business, is the preservation and the 
greatest practicable enhancement over time of their shareholders' 
investment. All boards have this responsibility and their policies, 
structures, compositions and governing processes should reflect this. 
A company must develop relationships relevant to its success. These 
will depend on the nature of the company's business; but they will 
include those with employees, customers, suppliers, credit providers, 
local communities and governments. " (Hampel Report, 1998: para. 
1.16) 
Although the Hampel report draws attention to the presence of other stakeholders such 
as employees, customers, suppliers, credit providers, local communities and 
governments (Hampel Report, 1998: para. 1.16) it holds companies accountable to their 
shareholders only (ibid: para. 1.17). The report argues that if a company is held 
accountable to all its stakeholders it would mean that companies are effectively held 
accountable to no one. - 
In terms of non-financial information, the Hampel Report (1998) states that: 
"... auditors are required by auditing standards to review other financial and non- 
financial information in the annual report and to report on any inconsistencies 
between these and the statutory financial statements. " (Ibid: para. 6.6) 
The report provides no guidance on what is meant by non-financial information. None 
of the reports published in relation to corporate governance have paid any attention to 
the interests of other stakeholder groups and there was no mention of social, ethical or 
environmental issues (Corporate Governance, CIMA, 1999). 
This study considers 13 information categories as the main governance information 
disclosed by UK companies in 1995 (shown in Table 3.3). Most of these information 
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categories were recommended by the Cadbury Committee (1992). The only category 
that was not recommended but was considered here is the 'environment committee'. 
This information category was considered since Many companies had an environment 
committee in 1995. Also 'outside director' was another. category that was not explicitly 
mentioned by the Cadbury code. Even though the term 'outside' director is the same as 
the 'non-executive' director and is commonly used in the US literature it was decided to 
treat it as a governance information category, as it was mentioned by a few companies. 
TABLE 3-3 GOVERNANCE INFORMATION CATEGORIES 
1. Non-Executives Directors 
2. Executive Directors 
3. Outside Directors 
4. Separation of Chief Executive Officer and Chainnan Positions 
5. Shares Held by Senior Managers 
6. Options Held by Senior Mangers 
7. Salary and Bonuses 
8. Pension 
9. Audit Committee 
10. Remuneration Committee 
11. Nomination Committee 
12. Environment Committee 
13. Compensation Committee 
The disclosure of information categories considered in this study is not mandatory and 
companies disclose information at their own discretion. Uýder the recommendations of 
the Cadbury Committee (1992) voluntary codes are more effective than 'statutory' 
requirements. This is predominantly because when companies are under pressure from 
the stock exchange and their stakeholder groups they can maintain more flexibility to 
remain responsive as it suits their corporate and their board structures (the report 
published by Cadbury Committee, 1992: para. 1.10). The importance attached to each 
category is highlighted in the report by the Cadbury Committee (1992). 
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And finally, while there have been many reports and recommendations by various 
regulatory committees from 1992 onward (e. g. reports by the Cadbury committee, 1992; 
Greenbury committee, 1995; Hampel committee, 1998; as well as the Combined code, 
1998; and the Turnbull report, 1999), this section mainly focuses on the issues that were 
raised in the Cadbury report. This was because the period under investigation by this 
study is between 1985 and 1995 and most recommendations, which were issued after 
1995, would not apply to this study. As a matter of interest, the latest developments in 
the corporate governance regulations are stated in Appendix 3A. 
3.2.2 Non-Governance Information 
Non-governance information categories cover those non-managerial issues that are 
about both internal and external aspects of a company. While the literature regards most 
of the non-governance information categories as social information, in this study the 
information categories are referred to as 'non-govemance', which js a more 
comprehensive term than 'social'. Although companies appeared to disclose different 
categories of non-governance information, it was decided to include those information 
items that were most commonly being mentioned in the existing social and 
environmental literature as well as being disclosed by UK companies. This study 
considers 10 information categories, which are shown in Table 3.4. 
TABLE 3.4 NON-GOVERNANCE INFORMATION CATEGORIES 
1. Environmental Issues 
_2. 
Health and Safety 
J. Discrimination 
_4. 
Working Conditions 
-5. 
Training 
J. Employee Share Ownership 
_7. 
Communication with Employees/Others 
_8. 
Community Involvement 
-9. 
Research and Development 
L_10. 
Renewal of Technology 
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Some information categories, shown in Table 3.4, cover issues that are related to each 
other. For instance, 'working conditions' and 'health and safety' issues are closely 
related. The importance based on which each information category was selected is 
discussed in Table 3.5 where the importance attached to each information category is 
highlighted and the justification for the inclusion of each category is provided. 
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Chapter 3 
3.3 CORPORATE CHARACTERISTICS 
Having observed a rise in the level of non-financial information disclosure between 
1985 and 1995, the next stage is to select a number of corporate characteristics so that 
the first key research question can be investigated by examining if there are any 
associations between non-financial information disclosure and corporate characteristics. 
This is done by asking a number of supporting research questions, which is used in 
investigating the main research question. 
There is a large volume of literature containing different studies which examine the 
associations between different corporate characteristics and social and environmental 
reporting. Some of these studies and a brief summary of their findings are shown in 
Table 3.6. 
The corporate characteristics that are selected for the purpose of this study are: 
industrial affiliation, corporate size, corporate growth and profitability. Apart from 
corporate growth, all these characteristics were commonly used in previous studies. 
This section reviews the literature on four corporate characteristics and project 
expectations on whether companies with certain characteristics disclose more non- 
governance information. 
To the knowledge of the author, no previous study has attempted to examine the 
association between corporate characteristics and governance information disclosure. In 
this study, the association between corporate characteristics and governance information 
disclosure is examined for the first time. It is expected that for the period before the 
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publication of the governance codes of practice (i. e. for 1985), corporate characteristics 
and governance information disclosure are associated. Over this period, companies were 
under no regulatory requirements to disclose governance information. As a result, the 
few companies that disclosed governance information (as shown in the previous 
section) are expected to be different to other companies in the sample in terms of their 
corporate characteristics. % 
As there is no previous literature, it is not possible to forin expectations on associations 
between governance inforrnation disclosure and corporate characteristics for the period 
before 1992 based on the previous literature. For this period, the same logic as for non- 
governance information is applied to form expectations on the possibility of association 
between governance information disclosure and corporate characteristics. 
Since the publication of the Cadbury Code in 1992, all companies are expected to 
disclose governance information at similar levels. This is primarily because the 
recommendations on good governance practice is for all companies regardless of their 
characteristics and they are intended to promote good governance practice to ensure 
investors that managers act in their best interests. No association is, therefore, expected 
between corporate characteristics and governance information disclosure in 1995. 
In the case of non-governance information, the expectations on associations with 
corporate characteristics are discussed in sections 3.3.1 to 3.3.4. Many of the early 
studies that examined corporate social responsibility and social and environmental 
reporting did not distinguish between the two. Many of the studies that were carried out 
in 1970s refer to corporate social responsibility of companies rather than social 
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information disclosure. In 1970s, indexes or rankings that were used by professional 
judges were used by some studies as measures of corporate social responsibility. For 
instance, Sturdivant and Ginter (1977) used an index from the Council of Concerned 
Businessmen. Moskowitz (1972 and 1975) used rankings from Business and Socielýv. 
Bragdon and Marline (1972), Folger and Nutt (1975) and Spicer (1978) used the 
Council of Concerned Businessmen Pollution Performance index. Another example is 
the work of Parket and Eilbert (1975), where corporate willingness to respond to a 
questionnaire on social responsibility was used to represent corporate social 
responsibility. Even though these studies did not measure the level of social information 
disclosure, they can still be used in this study as the two are believed to be closely 
linked. The close link between the two is supported by the evidence found by Bowman 
and Haire (1975), who found a positive association between emphasis on corporate 
53 social reporting and corporate social responsibility 
Using the context of stakeholder and legitimacy theories, it was argued that in the 
absence of any regulatory or obligatory requirements companies are likely to disclose 
non-financial information for legitimacy purposes by adopting Lindblom's C. K. (1994) 
strategies 2,3 and 4. For instance, companies may use information: i) to change the 
perception of their relevant public without having to change their actual behaviours, or 
ii) to manipulate that perception., deflecting attention from issues of concern to other 
related issues, and/or iii) change external expectations of its performance (see section 
2.3.1 in Chapter 2). 
53 Bowman and Haire (1975) used Moskowitz's ratings. 
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Chapter 3 
3.3.1 Industrial Afriliation 
The findings of the previous studies (shown in Table 3.6) unanimously suggest that 
social and environmental reporting is associated with the industrial affiliation. Based on 
the findings of the previous studies, this study also expects that the level of non- 
governance information would vary for companies in different industries. For instance, 
companies in mineral extraction and utilities industries are expected to have higher non- 
governance disclosure than companies in service industry due to the nature of their 
operations. Since 'mineral extraction' and 'utilities' industries are involved in many 
&environmental' issues and 'health and safety' measures, they are expected to provide 
extensive training and high level of technical expertise to their employees. 
Companies in different industries have different stakeholder groups, with different non- 
governance information requirements and are expected to put companies under different 
pressures to meet their information requirements. Companies are, therefore, expected to 
disclose higher level of non-govemance information in response to the varying degree 
of pressures that they receive from their stakeholders. Thus, the first supporting 
research question is presented as follows: 
"Are there any associations between industrial affiliation and 
disclosure of non-financial information? 
Due to the nature of their operations, companies in certain industries can not perform 
certain socially desirable behaviours; in which case they use the disclosure of non- 
financial information to legitimise their own behaviours by adopting one of the 
Lindblom's C. K. (1994) strategies (i. e. strategies 2,3 and 4). 
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3.3.2 Corporate size 
Size is another corporate characteristic, which has been of interest to researchers over 
the years and could be regarded as one of the potential reasons for those companies 
disclosing higher levels of non-financial information. The overall perception from the 
previous studies (shown in Table 3.6) suggests that large companies disclosed more 
social and environmental information as they are believed to be more in the public eye 
and under more under scrutiny (Dierkes and Coppock, 1978). They are, therefore, 
expected to present themselves as having the same norms and values as those of the 
society, and they achieve this through information disclosure. Information disclosure 
enables large companies to adopt any of the four strategies introduced by Lindblom C. 
K. (1994) (section 2.3.1 in Chapter 2, ) and, subsequently, attempt to legitimise their 
behaviours. 
Based on the findings of the previous studies and the expected tendency of larger 
companies to legitimise their behaviour to their stakeholders, larger companies are 
expected to disclose more non-governance information. Therefore, the second 
supporting research question is presented as follows: 
"Are there any associations hetween corporate size and disclosure of 
non-financial information? 
Corporate size can be measured using a number of proxies (e. g. number of employees, 
annual turnover and total market value). In this study, 'annual turnover' is chosen as 
size proxy. This is mainly because the Top 100 UK companies were selected from the 
Times 1000, where companies were ranked according to size, which was measured in 
terms of annual turnover. 
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3.3.3 Corporate Growth 
Apart from corporate size, another characteristic, which is closely linked with size is 
corporate growth. As far as the previous literature is concerned, no study was found to 
have assessed the association between corporate growth and non-financial information. 
There are many factors that can affect corporate growth. This study takes the view that 
among other factors, growing companies need to gain the loyalty of new customers, the 
trust of new suppliers and creditors. Hence, they are likely to project a socially desirable 
picture of themselves to their relevant public, and they can achieve this by the 
disclosure of non-governance information. The third supporting research question is, 
therefore, concerned with whether growing companies disclose more non-financial 
information than non-growing companies and more specifically asks: 
"Are there any associations between corporate growth rates and 
disclosure of non-financial information? " 
3.3.4 Corporate Performance 
The fourth corporate characteristic selected is corporate performance. Corporate 
performance is another characteristic, which has been commonly used by researchers 
over the years, representing different aspects of corporate performance. The findings of 
the previous literature (shown in Table 3.6) suggest that the disclosure of non-financial 
information is associated with the overall corporate performance. 
Corporate performance is measured using either accounting-based measures (e. g. 
gearing, return on investment and return on assets) or market-based measures (e. g. 
systematic risk, market return and dividend yield). Accounting-based measures are more 
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commonly used by previous studies than market-based measures (for more details see 
McGuire, ' Schneeweis and Hill, 1986) as they are more easily available from annual 
reports and from different data sources. There are, however, several shortcomings in 
using them. Accounting-based measures reflect historical aspects of firm performance 
(McGuire et al, 1986). They are also prepared using accounting conventions, which are 
subjective and, therefore, prone to risk of bias and managerial manipulations (McGuire 
et al, 1986). Furthermore, accounting-based measures should be adjusted for risk, 
industrial affiliation and other variables (Ullmann, 1985). 
In contrast, market-based measures do not have the shortcomings of accounting 
measures. They are less open to bias or managerial manipulation. They do not rely on 
past performance. Consequently, investors can use them to elevate their perception of a 
company's ability to generate future economic earnings (McGuire, Sundgren and 
Schneeweis, 1988). However, a shortcoming of market-based measures is that 
performance is viewed from investors' viewpoints and ignores other stakeholder groups 
(McGuire et al, 1988). 
In this study, the author has decided to use accounting-based performance measures for 
a number of reasons. Firstly, they represent different performance aspects, which are of 
interest to different stakeholder groups, rather than using market-based measures, which 
reflect only the interests of the investors. Secondly, the disclosure of non-financial 
information is likely to be based on a decision that was taken by a company a while ago 
and is therefore as a result of the past performance. In consideration of this it would be 
more suitable to use accounting-based performance measures. 
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Different ratios can be used as accounting-based performance measures. There is a 
range of financial ratios that present various aspects of a company's financial 
performance (i. e. corporate profitability, managerial performance and corporate 
solvency) (sde Figure 3.1). In 1978, Courtis introduced a categorical framework for 
financial ratios. Courtis divided the ratios into three main categories: profitability, 
managerial performance and solvency. Each category was divided finther into other 
sub-categori6s (see Figure 3.1). In another study, Laurent (1979) provided evidence on 
Hong Kong public limited companies and started his work using Courtis's framework to 
develop a set of ten ratios, whicli were found to be relatively comprehensive in covering 
different financial aspects. Although Courtis and Laurent developed comprehensive 
ratio models, they clearly agreed that their models provided a collection from which 
analysts can select ratios for the financial aspects they wish to assess. Courtis's model is 
shown in Figure 3.1. 
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FIGURE 3.1 THE CATEGORICAL FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL 
RATIOS DEVELOPED BY COURTIS (1978) 
Return On Investment 
Analysis of 
Financial 
Statemenis- 
Managerial 
Profit margin Capital 
Turnover 
Credit Policy 
- Inventory Policy 
- Administration 
- Asset/Equity Structure 
Short-term - 
-Cash Flow 
Long-term - 
As there are no specific set of ratios used by all the analysts and researchers to present 
different aspects of corporate performance, this study adopts a similar framework as the 
ones applied by Courtis and Laurent. This resulted in the selection of three aspects of 
corporate performance, which are: (a) profitability, (b) managerial performance and (c) 
solvency ratios. The model selected in this study is shown in Figure 3.2. 
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FIGURE 3.2 RATIOS REPRESENTING DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF 
CORPORATE PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
Performance Measures 
a. ProfitabiIity 
Ratios Representina Performance Measures 
1. Return on Shareholders' Equity 
(Rates of Retum) 701 
2. Profit Margin 713 
b. Managerial Performance 1. Turnover/Net Current Assets 723 
(Asset Tumover) 
2. Capital Gearing (%) 731 
3. Operating Profit per Employees 763 
c. Solvency 1. Working Capital 741 
Ratios and their Codes Collected from the Datastream: 
701 Return on shareholder's equity 
713 Operating profit margin 
723 Turnover/net current assets 
731 Capital Gearing 
733 Borrowing ratio 
741 Working Capital 
763 Operating Profit per Employees 
Therefore, thefourth supporting research question is: 
"Are there any associations hetween different aspects of financial 
performance (e. g. prqfltabilijýý managerial performance, gearing) and 
non-financial information disclosure? " 
The evidence from previous studies (shown in Table 3.6) shows that profitable 
companies are more likely to disclose more social information. For example, Roberts 
(1992) and Gray, Javad, Power and Sinclair (1999) found that social and environmental 
disclosures were positively associated with corporate profitability. Furthermore, 
companies that disclosed social information were likely to have lower implicit costs in 
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exchange for higher explicit costs 54 (Comell and Shapiro, 1987). This could be one 
reason that they are more profitable. In this study, companies that disclose non- 
governance information are expected to be more profitable 
The existing evidence also suggests that companies with a lower risk (i. e. lower 
gearing) disclose more social information (Aupperle, Carroll and Hatfield, 1985). One 
potential reason for this can be that companies with a higher level of disclosure are 
perceived to have a better image and are regarded by investors, lenders and banks to be 
subject to lower risk. As a result, these companies can have easier access to capital (i. e. 
they can borrow at a lower rate with more lenders being willing to lend them) (Spicer, 
1978; and Moussavi and Evans, 1986). At the same time, in this study we assume that 
companies with lower gearing (i. e. companies with less risk) are expected to be highly 
liquid. Highly liquid companies are expected to disclose more social information (or 
non-governance information in the case of this study) to project a better image of 
themselves whereby they can have easier access to capital. 
The above review of the literature suggests that profitable companies, companies with 
lower gearing and higher liquidity disclose non-governance information to legitimise 
their behaviours by adopting either of Lindblom's C. K. (1994) four strategies. Apart 
from gearing ratio, no previous study was found to investigate the association between 
managerial efficiency (i. e. asset turnover and productivity ratios) and 
social/environmental information disclosure. However, in this study it is assumed that 
companies with efficient managers (i. e. asset turnover and productivity ratios) would 
disclose social and environmental information. 
'4 For instance, they are more likely to be sued and fined. 
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3.4 QUALITY OF NON-FINANCIAL INFORMATION 
The evidence in Chapter 4 (section 4.5) clearly shows an increasing level of non- 
financial information disclosure in the annual reports of the major UK companies 
between 1985 and 1995. Even though, this increase is suggestive of companies' 
intentions to be more open and transparent to their stakeholders, companies are 
expected to have taken actions to ensure the quality of non-financial information. 
SEAAR approaches are different for different companies as they are designed to serve 
the specific requirements of different stakeholders (Zadek et al, 1997; and Gonella et al, 
1998). Those companies that adopt SEAAR are expected to emphasise five common 
aspects, which are: 
f 
1. Stakeholder identification, 
2. Stakeholder dialogue, 
3. Public disclosure, 
4. Indicators and benchmarks, and 
5. Continuous improvements. 
As will be explained in the sub-sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, only the first two aspects 
('stakeholder identification' and 'stakeholder dialogue') are considered for investigation 
in this study. The third aspect ('public disclosure') is an important aspect of SEAAR as 
it shows how transparent and how accountable companies are to their stakeholders. In 
this study, information disclosure is measured only to a limited degree as the extent of 
information disclosure on each information category was not measured. 
The fourth and fifth aspects ('indicators and benchmarks' and 'continuous 
improvements') are closely related. Indicators and benchmarks are needed in order to 
compare performance with past or, even, future expected performance. According to 
Gonella et al (1998: p28), "social auditing seeks to develop a comprehensive set of 
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indicators, so that the indicators reflect the value systems of the organisation, 
stakeholder group and society-at-large". In social auditing, companies find out about 
these value systems through stakeholder dialogue. At the same time, as these social 
values change companies need to change their benchmarks and indicators. Companies, 
therefore, need to have commitment to continuous improvement (i. e.. the fifth aspect of 
SEAAR). 
The fourth and fifth aspects are not examined in this study as investigation on both of 
them would have required extensive research to find out whether companies recognise 
the values and interests of their different stakeholder group, and whether they have 
procedures to contemporaneously incorporate the changes in their stakeholders' values 
into their benchmarks and indicators. The author believes that the investigation on these. 
two aspects would be out of the time limit and scope of this study and itself requires a 
separate research project. 
The following two sub-sections (sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2) explain why the first two 
aspects of SEAAR (i. e. 'stakeholder identification' and 'stakeholder dialogue') have 
been selected to be investigated in this study. 
3.4.1 Stakeholder identification 
In the author's view, 'Stakeholder identification' can be regarded as one of the 
fundamental aspects of SEAAR. The inclusion of all stakeholder groups and, 
subsequently, treating them equally in terms of their information requirements is not 
practical. Different companies are expected to attach different importance to their 
stakeholder groups, depending on the significance of the resources their stakeholders 
96 
Chapter 3 
have control over their survivals (Ullmann, 1985). For different companies, different 
stakeholders are expected to place their emphasis on different issues. This becomes 
more evident in the definition of stakeholders by Gonella et al (1998). According to 
Gonella et al (1998), stakeholders are: 
"... those individuals who affect or affected by an organisation and its 
activities. A stakeholder then has some form of relationship with the 
organisation, and this relationship is a function of a particular set of 
dynamics that are exclusive to that organisation and that stakeholder 
group. No two organisations could have the same set of relationships 
with the same stakeholders. " (p22) 
They also add that: 
"Accounting processes must be practical and it is often the case that 
all stakeholder groups cannot be included at once. Many organisations 
have developed a staggered approach to stakeholders consultation, 
disclosing their intentions to include specific stakeholder groups in 
coming years. " (ibid., p23) 
In general, companies are expected to identify their stakeholder groups by 
understanding their values as well as their information requirements. In this study, 
investigation was carried out to find out whether companies identify their stakeholder 
groups. Thus, thefifth supporting research question is phrased as: 
"Do companies identify. their stakeholder groups and attach different 
importance to them? " 
As part of stakeholder identification process, companies are expected to be aware of 
their stakeholders' values, and the only way of achieving this awareness is through 
establishing a dialogue with them. 
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3.4.2 Stakeholder Dialogue 
Stakeholder dialogue is concerned with interaction between companies and their 
stakeholder groups. Companies who identify their §takeholder groups are also expected 
to communicate with their stakeholders and to find out their information requirements. 
As the nature of the relationships between companies and each of their different 
stakeholder groups differs, companies are expected to use different means of 
communication and consultation for each stakeholder groups. 
As part of stakeholder dialogue, there is expected to be active two-way communication 
and consultation as compared to one-way communication. Dialogue, which is an active 
multi-way process, requires stakeholders' involvement in the communication process in 
order to express their views and thoughts openly and companies can become fully 
informed of their stakeholders' varying views and expectations. To this end, the sixth 
supporting research question, is phrased as follows: 
"Are there any dialogues between companies and their stakeholder 
groups? Pt 
In order to be able to examine the Arth supporting research question, this study focuses 
on three aspects of stakeholder dialogue, which are: 'methods of communication', 
'information items communicated' and 'two-way communication and consultation. 
These three characteristics are extracted from work of Perkins (1987), Farnham (1993) 
and Employee Communication and Consultation (1996)55. These three aspects of 
stakeholder dialogue play significant roles in effective communication. In order to 
5'5 Most of the existing literature that discusses various aspects of communication focuses on 
communication with employees (see Appendix 3Q. Even though the nature of the relationship between 
companies and its other stakeholder groups varies, there is some common ground between them. This 
study mainly uses the literature on employees as its reference point. 
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achieve effective communication, companies need to use the appropriate 
communication methods "for each stakeholder group so that they can disclose the 
relevant information. For instance, detailed information about corporate operations is 
expected to be communicated to employees using written methods. 
At the same time, the only way of ensuring that the disclosed information provides 
stakeholders with the relevant information is when companies hold 'two-way 
communication and consultation' with stakeholders whereby companies and 
stakeholders become aware of each other's values, views and expectations. As a result, 
companies disclose information that is relevant to their stakeholder groups. In the 
following three sub-sections (sections 3.4.2.1,3.4.2.2 and 3.4.2.3), discussion is 
provided to explain why each aspect was considered in this study. 
3AZI Alethods of Communication with Stakeholder Groups 
Methods of communication play a significant role in providing the parties involved with 
effective means of communication. tffective communication is characterised with clear, 
easy and concise understanding of the exchanged information. There are different 
methods of communication. Depending on the information needs of each stakeholder 
group, different methods. are expected to be used to serve the requirements of each 
stakeholder group. For instance, written methods are expected to be More popular when 
communicating with employees as compared to face-to-face methods when 
communicating with investors. This is because employees are expected to be interested 
in internal matters, which can sometimes be detailed information, and, therefore, need 
methods that provide them with such information in a referable form. 
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In comparison, investors, who are under more time constraint, are not interested in 
detailed internal matters. Face-to-face methods are, therefore, expected to provide 
investors with more suitable mediums of information exchange as they provide 
Spontaneous interaction. 
Table 3.7 presents three main categories of communication methods, where each 
category comprises of several methods. The choice of communication methods is 
significant in providing the stakeholder groups with the appropriate and hence useful 
information items. 
TA13LE 3.7 METHODS OF COMMUNICATION 
Face-to-face methods 
I. Group meetings (Apart from the annual general meeting) 
2. Cascade networks 3. Large-scale meetings 
Written Methods 
I. Company handbooks 
2. Information notes to stakeholder representative 3 Housejournals 
4: Newsletters 
5 Departmental bulletins 
6: Notices 
7. Individual letters to stakeholder group representatives (to give information 
on major importance accurately and simultaneously) 
Other Methods 
1. Information points 2. Audio-visual aids 
3. Electronic mail 
Source: Extracted from Perkins (1987), Farnham (1993) and Employee Communication and Consultation 
(1996). 
3.4. Z2 Information Items Disclosed to Stakeholder Groups 
The disclosure of relevant information is one of the essential aspects of effective 
communication. This can be examined by considering which information items are 
disclosed and whether stakeholders found them useful. The degree of usefulness was 
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measured using a5 point ranking scale (I for 'Not at all' to 5 for 'Very much so'). The 
information items disclosed to stakeholder groups are generally divided into two main 
categories of 'information about the organisation' and 'marketing information' (shown 
in Table 3.8). While the first category comprises of information items about the 
organisation, dealing with internal matters of a company, the second category includes 
information items on matters related to the external environment. 
TABLE 3.8 INFORMATION ITEMS DISCLOSED TO STAKEHOLDERS 
Information about the organisation 
I- Work objectives and performance 2. Operating and technical information 3. Health and safety 4. Infonnation on personnel (Who the key positions are) 5. Working conditions 6. 
7 
Su rvision and management of different operational procedures ATmeinist ti d . 8. ra ve proce ures Training and development 9. Development in technology and methods 
10. Equal opportunities 
11. Social and welfare facilities to each stakeholder group 
Marketing Information 
I. Company Market Share 
2. Company Market Segment 
I Mergers and Acquisitions 4. Investment 
5. Details of products and services 6 Future plans on developing products and services 7: Future plans on other issues 8. Research and development 9. Environmental issues 
Source: Extracted from Farnham (1993) and Employee Communication and Consultation (1996). 
Companies are expected to disclose different types of information to different 
stakeholders. For instance, companies are expected to focus on 'marketing information' 
when communicating with their investors and more on 'organisational' matters when 
communicating with employees. 
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3.4. Z3 Two-way communication and Consultation with Stakeholder Groups 
Two-way communication and consultation can be regarded as the most important aspect 
of stakeholder dialogue. In two-way communication and consultation, companies 
provide their stakeholders with information on organisation and on related marketing 
issues. At the same time, stakeholders have the opportunity to inform their companies of 
their interests, expectations and their information needs so that the company can either 
provide them with the relevant information on the spot and/or to take their stakeholders' 
views into account, when making decisions. The evidence on participation in two-way 
communication would reveal if companies had any intention of finding out their 
stakeholders' information requirements. 
There are several methods through which companies can hold two-way communication 
and consultation with their stakeholders and find out about their expectations, needs and 
values. These methods are: 56 
I. Dialogue circles, 
2. Joint consultation committee, 
I Training programmes, 
4. Suggestion schemes, and 
5. Attitude surveys. 
A dialogue circle, sometimes called quality circles (in the case of employees) or focus 
groups (in the case of customers or other stakeholder groups), is a group of people 
within an organisation who meet together on a regular basis to identify, analyse and 
solve problems on quality, productivity or other aspects of daily working life, using 
problems solving techniques (see Farnham, 1993). Quality circles or focus groups are 
M The selected methods wem extracted from Consultation and Communication - The 1990 Survey (1996). 
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good indicators of the top managements willingness in finding out about stakeholders' 
interests, expectations and values. Those companies that genuinely consider their 
stakeholder groups provide them with the opportunity to express their views as well as 
presenting thbm with information on their operations, products and services. Each 
dialogue circle consists of representatives of particular stakeholder groups as well as 
corporate managers. 
Another way of interaction between companies and their stakeholders is through joint 
consultative committees. Joint consultative committees are made up of managers and 
stakeholder representatives who agree on a set of predetermined rules and procedures to 
govern the committee's operations 57 . 
Other alternative methods that can be used by companies are: training programmes, 
attitude surveys and suggestion schemes. Training programmes are relevant and helpful 
when companies intend to communicate their values and expectations to their 
stakeholders (i. e. employees in particular). At the same time, companies offer training 
programmes to some of their stakeholders to give them appropriate communication 
skills5s. Both attitude surveys. and suggestion schemes indicate the willingness shown 
by managers in finding out the interests, expectati'Ons and values of their stakeholder 
groups by providing them with opportunities to communicate their ideas and views 
freely. 
57 They also agree on a number of issues. The most common issues are: (1) size and composition of the 
committee, (2) organization of committee meetings, (3) subjects to be discussed, (4) facilities for 
Committee members, (4) arrangements for reporting back (Extracted from Employee Communication and 
Consultation. 1996). 
'g For further details see Cowling and James (1994) and Employee Communications and Consultation 
(1996). 
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As it will be explained in Chapter 4, this study investigates the level of stakeholder 
dialogue between companies and two of their stakeholder groups by trying to find out 
evidence on all of the 5 different aspects mentioned above 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter presented the second part of this thesis the literature review. While the 
previous chapter reviewed the theoretical and conceptual literature, this chapter focused 
on empirical literature in order to explore the two key research questions that were 
presented in the previous chapter. 
The chapter comprised three main sections. In section 3.2, the classification of non- 
Enancial information into two groups of governance and non-governance information 
categories was discussedL It was argued that both groups of governance and non- 
governance information are fundamentally and closely related aspects, and companies 
that are socially responsible are expected to have transparent governance structures. 
Having a sound and a transparent governance structure was regarded as a means of 
illustrating that a company is legitimate. In section 3.2.1, corporate governance structure 
and the development of the regulatory requirements were discussed. It was decided to 
include 13 information categories as governance information in this study. These 
governance information categories were mostly mentioned in the report by the Cadbury 
Committee (1992). 
Information categories, which were regarded as non-governance information, were 
discussed in section 3.2.2. As the 10 non-govemance information categories selected in 
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this study were not recommended by any regulatory bodies, the literature review of each 
category was presented in order to justify why it was important to include them in this 
study. 
The relevant empirical literature on the first key research question was reviewed in 
sections 3.3.1 to 3.3.4. Each of these four sections presented a review of the relevant 
literature on one corporate characteristic and focused on whether there was any 
evidence of the associations between the level of non-financial information disclosure 
and any of the four characteristics. The literature review revealed that most of the 
previous studies have focused on the social and environmental activities of companies. 
No previous study was found to consider the information disclosure on corporate 
governance structures of companies. The findings of many studies that have examined 
the association between social/environniental disclosure/activities and either of the three 
characteristics (i. e. industrial affiliation, size and performance) were presented in 
tabular format. Based on these findings, expectations were formed of the association 
between non-financial information disclosure and each corporate characteristic. For 
instance, companies in certain industries were argued to be under more pressure to 
disclose more non-financial information than companies in other industries. Similar 
expectations were formed in the case of size (i. e. larger companies were expected to 
disclose more non-financial information than smaller companies). 
In the case of corporate growth (discussed in section 3.3.3), little empirical evidence 
was found in the existing accounting literature. The third supporting research question 
focused on whether there was any association between corporate growth rate and the 
attempt of n on-fmancial information disclosed. 
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In the case of corporate performance (discussed in section 3.3.4), one research question 
was posed. This was despite the fact that the literature review presented several aspects 
to corporate performance. Based on the literature related to each aspect, expectations 
were formed. For instance, it was argued that companies with high gearing (i. e. risky 
companies), higher profitability and higher liquidity were expected to disclose more 
non-governance information to project a more socially responsible image. Hence they 
could have lower implicit costs and easier access to capital. 
Section 3.3 presented four supporting research questions that would make the 
investigation of the first key research question possible. 
In section 3.4, the literature relevant to the second key research question was reviewed. 
The second key research question was concerned with whether companies paid any 
attention to the quality of non-financial information thereby met the information 
requirements of their stakeholder groups. Two supporting research questions 5 and 6 
were presented. Question 5 was concerned with whether companies identified their 
stakeholder groups' whereas question 6 focused on investigating Whether there was any 
stakeholder dialogue between companies and their stakeholder groups. 
The two supporting research questions 5 and 6 were based on two of the common 
aspects of SEAAR, namely 'stakeholder identification' and 'stakeholder dialogue. It 
was discussed that the presence of stakeholders' dialogue would indicate that companies 
would seek to find out their stakeholder expectations and value systems. In this way, 
companies would be in a position to disclose non-financial information that was of 
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interest to their stakeholder groups. In order to be able to assess stakeholder dialogue, 
three aspects were discussed. These three aspects were: 'methods of communication, 
'information items disclosed to each stakeholder group' and 'two-way communication 
and consultation'. 
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CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Even though many researchers debate the merits of different schools of research 
methodology, what many authors do not debate is the vital importance of methodology 
in producing valid and reliable outcomes from research. One of the main objectives of 
this chapter is to present the decisions taken for this research project in respect of the 
methodology employed and to make a case for the validity and reliability of that chosen 
methodology. Issues related to the methodology selected for this research project is 
discussed in section 4.2 only. In sections 4.3 to 4.9, the methods that have been-selected 
for this project are"presented. A brief summary of different sections of this chapter is 
provided in section 4.10. 
In section 4.2, standard research concepts, which are commonly used by social science 
researchers, are presented to explore two main schools of positivism and 
phenomenology along with the key methods of exploration, data collection and analysis 
associated with each school. In section 4.2.4, the reasons are presented why one school 
is more suited to serving the purpose of this research project. 
The chapter is continued by discussing different research methods that are used in 
different stages of the research project. In section 4.3, content analysis and survey 
methods are discussed as the two main methods of data collection used in this study. 
The process of the selection of data sources is discussed in section 4.4. Before being 
able to proceed with this project, the author carried out an examination of the level of 
non-financial information disclosed by the major UK companies in their annual reports. 
The evidence for this investigation is presented in section 4.5. In sections 4.6 and 4.7, 
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methods of data analysis and the design of questionnaire are presented and explained. 
Financial and non-fmancial characteristics of respondents and non-respondents and the 
possibility of any associations between these characteristics and the decision to respond 
to the survey are analysed and presented in sections 4.8 and 4.9, respectively. The 
chapter is concluded in section 4.10. 
4.2 STANDARD RESEARCH CONCEPTS 
There are different forms of research in the business environment. Jankowicz notes 
three types: pure research, consultancy and applied research (Jankowicz, 1995: p92). 
The variation between these differing types stems from the differing ends that the 
research is intended to address, within the context of the environment. In the business 
environment, the impact on the environment can be identified as the provision of 
solutions to real business problems. Pure research is intended to have no immediate 
practical application. It is undertaken to increase the fund of academic knowledge, and 
is theory basedL Consultancy, on the other hand, is only concerned with practical 
application, in this case providing a solution to a managerial problem. Applied research 
represents a combined approach, where academic investigation provides solutions to 
specific problems. 
As far as the nature of research is concerned, the consensus is that it must be about the 
solution of problems, whatever their origin, and for whatever their ultimate purpose. 
Pure research will aim to build, test or disprove theory. Consultancy will seek to find a 
solution to a particular managerial problem. Applied research will take an academic 
theory based approach to resolving a practical problem. This project is intended to be 
located in the area of applied research, as it is hoped that the eventual outcomes will 
provide valuable insights into why companies disclose non-financial information. 
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Research in the social sciences is often overshadowed by a debate on the inherent 
validity of competing methodological approaches. The main focus of this debate is on 
the extent to which social science research can achieve its validity by the application of 
the 'scientific method'. There is a general consensus within the literature that "good 
research uses the scientific method" (Cooper and Emory, 1995: p12), or hypothetico- 
deductive methods (Jankowicz, 1995) as the concept is sometimes described. According 
to Gill and Johnson (1991: p32), consideration of the scientific method or hypothetico- 
deductive reasoning implies an acceptance, shared with the natural sciences, that what is 
important in research is not the source of theories and hypothesis, but the process by 
which these ideas are tested and verified. The debate within the social research arena is 
how best, or indeed whether it is possible, to succýssfully to apply the scientific 
approach to social research. 
The competing schools, primarily positivism and phenomenology (Gill and Johnson, 
1991; and Easterby-Smith, Tborpe and Lowe, 1991)59, argue for the validity of one 
approach and often for the invalidity of the other, based upon the ability of either 
approach to achieve scientific methods of investigation and analysis. Some authors have 
argued that each approach is quite different from the other, generating different 
concepts and using different tools (Burrell and Morgan, 1979) and so are not in 
competition. Other authors, such as May (1997), have argued for the validity of either 
approach in the appropriate circumstances and providing that rigour in methodological 
terms is achieved. 
59 Other schools of thought have developed within the literature: realism, subjectivity, idealism and Post- 
modernism. A decision was taken not to review these competing schools of thought as their relevance to 
tile research in question was not thought to be significant. 
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This debate is explored in this section in order to facilitate an appropriate choice of 
research methodology for this thesis. Both positivism and phenomenology will be 
explored, in terms of their guiding philosophy, principal methods of exploration and 
analysis, andtheir appropriate research contexts. In addition, the relationship between 
both positivism and phenomenology and deductive and inductive approaches to research 
will be discussed. 
4.2.1 Positivism 
The underlying philosophy of the positivist is that social scientists must seek to divorce 
themselves as much as possible from the views of the people in society 60 , and hence 
study social phenomena -in the same state of mind as the physicist, chemist or 
physiologist when he probes into a still unexplored region of the scientific domain" 
(Durkheim, 1964: pxiv as quoted in May, 1997: plO). In short, therefore, a positivist or 
behaviourist approach seeks to adopt a scientific detachment, free from the distorting 
potential of opinion and bias, in order to achieve "the prediction and explanation of the 
behaviour of phenomena and the pursuit of objectivity" (May, 1997: plO). Such an 
approach would therefore share the same aims as the natural scientist. 
Gill and Johnson (1991) argue that the two most significant characteristics of a 
Positivist approach are that: 
research should concern itself with "only directly observable phenomena, with any 
reference to the intangible or subjective being excluded as being meaningless" (Gill 
and Johnson, 199 1: p 132); and 
60 In business research this would equate to industry. 
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research should seek "the testing of theories, in a hypothetico-deductive fashion, by 
their confrontation with the facts of a readily observable in external world" (Gill and 
Johnson, 1991: p132). 
Johnson (1983) provides a succinct explanation of ýhe rationale for the positivist 
approach when he argues that "human behaviour is subject to the operation of laws of 
cause and effect, and the nature of these laws can be identified by the process of 
hypothesis-testing against empirical evidence" (Johnson, 1983). 
The outcomes of a positivist approach, therefore, seek to produce sets of covering laws, 
in the same fashion as do the natural sciences. These covering laws describe, on the 
basis of observed phenomena, expected behavioural characteristics, which may be 
applied to the whole of society/mdustry. It is an approach which seeks to understand 
causality within society, on the basis of generalizable behaviour, but without direct 
reference to the opinions of actors within society. This approach has been associated 
with more quantitative research driven by surveys, experimentation, and content 
analysis, rather than more qualitative, opinion based research (Sapsford and Jupp, 
1996). Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (1997) identify the steps necessary in an 
hypothetico-deductive approach as including: 
deducing the hypothesis from the theory; 
expressing the hypothesis in operational terms; 
* testing the operational hypothesis; 
4o examining the outcome; and 
modifying the theory in the light of the outcome, if necessary (Saunders et al, 1997: 
p7 1). 
This approach will inevitably be highly structured. 
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The concept of empiricism is closely related to the concept of positivism. It is generally 
accepted that empiricism is separated from positivism by each school's perspective on 
the issue of theory. As can be seen from the above discussion, in a positivist approach 
data is collected with the intention of either defending or falsifying a theory. 
Empiricism, on the other hand "refers to a conception of social research involving the 
production of accurate data -meticulous, precise, generalizable - in which the data 
themselves constitute an end for the research" (Bulmer, 1982; as quoted in May, 1997: 
pI I). In short, the view of the empiricist school is that data generated by research is an 
end in itself "and requires no explanation via theoretical proj5ositions" (May, 1997: 
p 11). Despite this, the school shares many similarities with a positive approach, not 
least the view that "there is a world out there that we can record and we can analyse 
independently of people's interpretations of it" (May, 1997: p 11). 
4. Zl. I Chosen Methods of Exploration 
The previous section referred to the tendency for positivist (or empiricist) approach to 
rely upon quantitative methods. There are various methods of data collection among 
which documentary research, interview and surveys can be regarded as the most 
common methods to be mentioned in the literature. The extent to which each method is 
related to the positivist tradition is determined by (a) the extent to which the approach 
can be divorced from subjectivity on the part of the respondent/observa and (b) the 
6xtent to which the collected data can be analysed by quantitative methods. 
One of the major quantitative approaches associated with a positive view is content 
analysis. This approach does not seek to survey organisations or people operating in 
the field, but predominantly seeks to quantitatively analyse large quantities of 
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secondary textual data, e. g. annual reports (Beardsworth, 1980). As it will be shown, 
the analysis of the content of annual reports is a significant feature of this research and 
so the subject will be addressed in section 4.3.1. 
Of the different methods of data collection, the approach most frequently associated 
with a positivist view is that of the survey. In other branches of social science research 
other positivist methods are successfully employed. For instance, in psychology where 
laboratory experiments are frequently used, surveys are often seen as a way by which 
statistical evidence can be collected to confirm, or falsify, a theory. Subject to the' 
appropriate measures to ensure standardisation, replicability, validity and 
representativeness, surveys can provide data about which generalisation can be made in 
respect of the behavioural characteristics of a specific sample of people, companies and 
so on. Surveys, which are replicated and found to provide similar findings, increase the 
confidence that can be placed upon the validity of results and hence the confidence that 
can be placed upon the confirmation of the theory. Surveys are often associated with a 
positivist philosophy as they provide the means of gathering data which allow the 
researcher to remain detached from their subjects, but which allows for the creation of 
generalizable rules. They are seen to utilise a methodology with "logical similarities to 
that used by physical scientis&' (May, 1997: p83). Ferber, Sheatsley, Turner and 
Wakesberg (1980) identified a key attribute of a survey as a method of gathering 
information, from a sample of some description, to gain insight into the larger 
population from which the sample was drawn. Surveys are forms of data collection, as 
well as methods of analysis (De Vaus, 1996). 
Surveys provide a researcher with an approach where data collection is relatively 
straightforward, theoretically grounded, providing the appropriate procedures have been 
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followed in the construction of the research instrument, and easily replicable, aiding the 
process of verification and strengthening the reliability of the outcomes. This approach 
does, however, have a number of inherent weaknesses, which may actively restrict the 
option of using the approach in certain contexts. The principal objection to a survey 
approach is that it attempts to show a causal relationship between sets of variables, 
when the reality of social interaction is not based upon causality (May, 1997: p104). It 
is argued in certain sections of the literature that the correlation of variables does not 
imply that one has caused the other, just that there may be an association. The tendency 
of the survey approach is to suggest a relationship between variables that does not in 
reality exist, and by seeking to understand relationships statistically, a researcher may 
overlook the true significance of their findings (May, 1997: p 104). 
May (1997) notes that another associated criticism of the survey approach is that it 
"rules out the possibility of understanding the process by which people come to adopt 
particular values or behaviours" (pI04). It is possible for researchers to ground their 
survey in theory, and so overcome this criticism, but the literature continues to perceive 
that this is still a common feature of the use of questionnaires. Another related concern 
is that the bias of the surveyor will become apparent within the construction of the 
survey. Bias in question formulation will lead inevitably to the outcomes that the 
researcher is seeking, and hence undermines the validity of the process undertaken. 
Surveys also tend to be 'snap-shots' of opinion at a particular time, unless they are 
undertaken longitudinally (May, 1997: p 105). 
The underlying concern vith the use of survey method is therefore that of validity. 
Without interaction %ith the participant, a number of questions are posed. How is the 
researcher to be sure that the respondent has understood the question? How is the 
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researcher to know the respondent has answered the questions truthfully? How is the 
researcher to know that the respondent has access to the data required, and is in a 
position to speak for their organisation authoritatively? How is the researcher to know 
that what the respondent says that they do, they do in reality? (Jankowicz, 1995: p 184; 
and Cooper and Emory, 1995: p269). Surveys, driven as they are by the needs of 
quantitative analysis, will tend towards reducing potentially complex problems to a 
series of limited responses, which arguably reduces the quality and breadth of the 
potential responses. Hence, reliability is a key issue, although as Gill and Johnson note, 
reliability is no guarantee of validity (Gill and Johnson, 1991: p88). In this study, survey 
is used to collect evidence on the status of stakeholder dialogue between companies and 
their stakeholder group. Different methods of survey will be discussed later on in this 
chapter. 
4. ZI. 2 Methods ofAnalysis 
Clearly, as indicated in the previous sections, positivist approach is most closely 
associated with quantitative methods of analysis. Quantitative methods are usually 
associated with the use of descriptive statistics, so that cause and effect can be assessed. 
A first stage therefore is description, as De Vaus (1996: p24) notes, "unless we have 
described something accurately and thoroughly, attempts to explain it will be 
misplaced". A wide range of techniques can be applied in descriptive analysis, from 
simple reporting of mean scores, to significance testing using tests such as chi-square. 
The aim of this stage of a quantitative analysis is to prepare the data prior to its testing 
in relation to the underlying hypotheses. 
The objective of hypothesis testing through quantitative approaches is to prove causal 
relationships through the application of rigorous and verifiable statistical techniques. 
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Quantitative approaches are of particular importance in areas of study requiring an 
understanding of the behaviour of large sample populations, and the testing of the 
relationship between variables through the use of statistical analysis. 
4.2.2 Phenomenology 
The opposite position to the positivist philosophy has been described as an interpretative 
or phenomenologist approach. This approach seeks to interpret social phenomena in 
terms of the relationship between actor and act. In a phenomenological approach, there 
is no attempt to separate out the effect that the human actor has upon observable actions, 
to account for the possibly illogical underpinnings of decisions, and the possible 
66 structural inequalities in society/industry" (Sapsford and Jupp, 1996: p304), which can 
affect the decisions taken. Generally, this school holds that a positivist approach (e. g. 
clinical, scientific, and seeking to downplay the effects of the human) seeks explanation 
rather than understanding, and hence produces a situation which limits research, and 
reduces the outcomes of research. Research that is interpretative will, it is argued, more 
accurately reflect what is happening, and hence contribute to the creation of responses, 
which more accurately reflect reality, than a positivist approach. 
Phenomenological approaches have tended to be associated with more qualitative 
methods of exploration, and hence with more exploratory research (Cooper and Emory, 
1995: p 118). An implication of the existing definition (Creswell, 1994: pp 12-15; and 
Hussey and Hussey, 1997: pp 66-67) is that phenomenological approaches are useful for 
the generation of research questions, especially the case when inductive research is 
being undertaken, or for establishing rough propositions for development into more 
definite hypotheses, which would then be tested more scientifically. 
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4. ZZI Methods of Erploration 
In much the same "-ay that certain methods of data collection are associated with 
positivist/quantitative approaches, certain methods of data collection are associated with 
phenomenological/qualitative approaches. The fact that amongst a variety of approaches 
in social sciences 61 no one dominant approach has emerged is the major reason for 
concern. The use of case studies most frequently characterises a qualitative approach, 
either in conjunction with in-depth interviewing or techniques like participant 
observation. 
The. value of utilising a case based approach in social science research is increasingly 
being argued by a number of social science researchers (Yin, 1994; Hamel, 1992; and 
Perry and Kraemer, 1986). Increasingly, case studies are perceived- as providing a 
degree of detail, and an opportunity to understand complex social phenomena that other 
research methods fail to achieve (Yin, 1994). There are, however, limitations for a case 
based approach. 
Firstly, it is necessary to assess the occasions in social research when a case based 
approach may be considered appropriate, and to explain. the characteristics of these 
Occasions. Yin (1994) argues against the generally accepted viewpoint that "various 
research strategies should be arrayed hierarchically" (p3). In such an arrangement the 
only role that a case approach would perform would be that of the initial exploratory 
phase of a research project, to be followed subsequently by more scientifically rigorous 
approaches, such as surveys or experiments. Yin argues that all approaches have 
applications in all phases of research, whether that stage is exploratory, descriptive or 
61 Case studies, in-depth interviews, surveys, quasi-experimental and action research (RapopoM 1970: 
p499), participant observation (May, 1997) are all examples of approaches predominantly used in social 
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explanatory, and cites his own research as evidence (Yin, 198 1 a; and Yin, 198 1 b). The 
key issues, in Yin's view, is that the appropriate strategies are applied to research 
project and that "gross misfits" of strategy and project are avoided (Yin, 1994: p4). 
According to Yin (1994) selecting an appropriate research approach involves three key 
factors for the business researcher to consider. These are: 
9 the type of research question posed; 
o the extent of control an investigator has over actual behavioural events; and 
the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events. 
Secondly, there are concerns about the replicability and generalizability of case based 
research, and the question of external and internal verification. It is generally held that 
these are valid concerns in relation to case based approaches, but again, these are 
concerns which could be applied to other research approaches. 
Thirdly, Yin (1994) notes a general concern that a case based approach results in an 
over long research process, and produces documents that are themselves generally over 
long, and therefore ineffective. As Yin notes, such a criticism may be appropriate, or it 
may not (Yin, 1994: plO). This depends upon the method of data collection applied in 
the case. If the case is based upon lengthy data collection procedures, such as 
participant-observation, then the preparation of the case may take a long time, and run 
to many pages. Conversely, if another method. is chosen, such as the use of a telephone, 
or a series of in-depth interviews, the data collection can both be undertaken more 
concisely, and can also be focused upon achieving specific objectives. 
sciences. 
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Other writers have identified fin-ther potential problems with the use of a case 
approach. Moser and Kalton (1983) recognise three more issues. The first of these is 
accessibility and the question of whether the interviewees had access to "the 
information that the interviewer seeks". The interview framework utilised took into 
account the potential for interviewees to refuse to answer questions due to a concern 
for commercial confidence. Additionally, Moser and Kalton (1983) identified the 
question of interviewee cognition. Did the person to be questioned possess an 
understanding of what was required of him or her in the role of the interviewee. Moser 
and Kalton also identified the question of motivation, where the interviewer must 
make the interviewee feel that their participation and answers are valued. 
4.23 Deductive and Inductive Approaches 
In making a decision as to whether to adopt a deductive or an inductive approach in a 
research project, the researcher must know the precise starting point of the investigation, 
as the 'logical ordering' of each approach is the opposite of the other (Gill and Johnson, 
1991). A deductive approach "entails the development of a conceptual and theoretical 
structure prior to its testing through empirical observation" (Gill and Johnson, 1991: 
p28) while an inductive approach "involves moving from the 'plane' of observation of 
the empirical world to the construction of explanations and theories about what has been 
observed" (Gill and Johnson, 1991:. p33). 
Deduction is identified as a process whereby a relationship is established between 
reasons and conclusions, where through the research process reasons will be found to 
imply the conclusion, and can therefore be seen to represent a proof (Cooper and 
Emory, 1995: p26). This approach requires empirical testing, as for the approach to 
succeed it must be shown to be "both true and valid" (Cooper and Emory, 1995: p26) in 
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order to show that the conclusions reached necessarily follow from the premises, or 
reasons, established at the outset. In deduction, theory forming comes before research 
Induction is identified as a process where the relationship between reason and 
conclusion is not as strong. As Cooper and Emory (1995) note, "to induce is to draw a 
conclusion from one or more particular facts or pieces of evidence" (p27), where your 
conclusion will explain the facts available, while the facts available will support the 
conclusion. However, it is in the nature of an inductive approach that there may be a 
variety of possible conclusions. Hence any conclusion arrived at is by necessity viewed 
as a hypothesis, which needs to be tested empirically. In an inductive approach 
conclusions are inferred, until they are substantiated, and "the task of research is largely 
to determine the nature of the evidence needed and to design methods by which to 
discover and measure this other evidence" (Cooper and Emory, 1995: p28). 
As the preceding section shows, there would appear to be a close relationship between 
deduction and positivist, quantitative research, and between induction and 
phenomenological, qualitative research. The importance of theory, and empirical 
analysis links deduction and quantitative approaches, while the search for theory 
appears to link induction and qualitative approaches. The question would inevitably 
come down to a choice of the appropriate method of exploration being selected to 
address the research question to be resolved. 
4.2.4 Approach Chosen for This Research 
Following the discussions in the previous sections, the author believes that it is 
necessary to clarify the research methodology that has been adopted in this thesis. The 
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important points related to the methodological issues of this research project are stated 
below: 
This research is applied research as it is intended to elevate our understanding of the 
level of non-financial information disclosure using the data gathered from a sample 
of the major UK companies. In this thesis empirical evidence is used to find answers 
to specific questions. 
This research has adopted a deductive approach where research questions are 
developed based on the existing relevant concepts and theories. In this study, the 
research questions were posed so that they would possess what Kerlinger (1986) 
regards as the characteristics of good research questions. According to Kerlinger 
(1986), "good research questions for a positivis. tic approach study should: (a) 
express a relationship between variables, (b) be stated in unambiguous terms in 
question form, and (c) imply the possibility of empirical testing (as quoted in 
Hussey and Hussey, 1997: p 126). For these reasons, the research questions posed in 
this study were designed to empirically investigate the issues of concern. In doing 
so, some research questions (i. e. questions 14) were statistically tested while basic 
statistics were used to answer others (i. e. questions 5-6). 
The research methodology is located within the field of positivism as it relies on 
empirical evidence rather than the opinions of individuals or groups in society to 
explain why companies disclose non-financial information. This study uses the 
empirical evidence obtained from statistical testing to offer explanation for 
companies' behaviours. 
The study employs quantitative methods of data collection. As will be discussed 
later in the Chapter, content analysis was used to quantify the disclosure of non- 
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financial information. In addition, surveys were used to collect data on the existing 
level of dialogue between companies and their two stakeholders groups. 
4.3 CHOICE OF DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUES 
Research data may be collected in various ways. Some of these methods depend on the 
methodology and the theoretical assumptions used in the research. The author chose to 
use content analysis and questionnaires as they were the mo. st suitable data gathering 
techniques. While content analysis is used to find empirical evidence that would be used 
to illustrate if certain corporate characteristics explained the disclosure of non-financial 
information (i. e. the first key research question), questionnaires were designed to gather 
empirical evidence on the state of stakeholder dialogue among UK companies (i. e. 
second key research question). A description of each technique is given in the following 
sections. 
4.3.1 Content Analysis 
Content analysis can be defined as "... a technique that consists of codifying qualitative 
information in anecdotal and literary form into categories in order to derive quantitative 
scales of varying levels of complexity" (Abbott and Monsen 1979: p504). The concept 
of content analysis is based upon the need for an approach which allows large quantities 
of textual data resources to be analysed and verified scientifically and so produce "hard, 
objective data" (Beardsworth, 1980: p372). These large quantities of textual data 
resources are regarded as "a very convenient and easily handled source of raw material 
for the analyst" (Beardsworth, 1980: p372). It is the scientific verification that 
eliminates subjectivity from this data collection process and makes it mainly associated 
with a positivistic approach (Hussey and Hussey, 1997: p25O) even though it is argued 
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by some researchers to be a technique used for analysing qualitative data (Easterby- 
Smith et al, 199 1). 
One definition available in the literature is that Proposed by Budd, Thorp and Donohew 
(1967), which states that "content analysis is a systematic technique for analysing 
message content and message handling - it is a tool for observing and analysing the 
overt communication behaviour of selected communicators" (p2). Holsti (1969) adopts 
a wider perspective, identifying -the concept as being any technique for making 
inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of 
messages" (pl4). As Beardsworth (1980: p374) notes, the key to this latter definition is 
its core characteristics which are its objectivity, systematic approach and generality. 
Using content analysis, he argues, involves explicitly formulated rulei and procedures. 
He further notes that there is an assumption that the outcomes of content analysis will 
be analysed using statistical methods. Silverman (1993: p9) identifies this aspect of 
content analysis as placing the technique in the quantitative/positivist school and sees it 
as an attempt to provide a scientific means of analysing data that could otherwise only 
be analysed subjectively. 
Content analysis can have different applications. Hence, the researcher needs to select 
the application that suits the nature of his/her research project. According to Nachmias 
and Nachmias (1996) there are three general applications of content analysis. The first 
application of content analysis, which is widely used, "... is most frequently applied in 
describing the attributes of the message" (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996: p325). Here 
the researcher analyses a message by testing hypotheses about characteristics of the text. 
The second application is concerned with questions such as 'who says what and why 
and to whom' "... in order to make inferences about the sender of the message and 
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about its causes or antecedents" (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996: p326). The third 
application of content analysis is when "... researchers make inferences about the 
effects of messages on recipient. The researcher determines the effects of A's messages 
on B by analysing the content of B's messages" (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996: p326). 
In this study, the first application is not relevant as the study does not test hypotheses 
about the characteristics of the text. The third application is not relevant either as the 
study does not determine the effects of a message on the recipient. This study uses 
content analysis in order to gather empirical evidence on the level of non-financial 
information disclosed by the major UK companies. The level of non-financial 
information will subsequently be used in the analysis that is expected to provide 
answers to the question of why companies decide to disclose non-financial information. 
Hence, the second application of content analysis is relevant to this study. 
An important issue when deciding to use content analysis is the reliability'of the final 
outcomes, or what is sometimes called coded data. Krippenorff (1980: p130-154 as 
quoted in Weber, 1990: p17) identifies three types of reliability: stability, 
reproducibility and accuracy. As Weber (1990) argues stability is obtained when "... the 
same content is coded more than once by the same coder" (pl7) and any observed 
inconsistencies in coding constitutes unreliability. Reproducibility, on the other hand, is 
obtained if the same results are observed when different coders codify the same text. 
Accuracy, which is the strongest form of reliability, "... refers to the extent to which the 
classification of text corresponds to a standard or norm" (Weber, 1990: p17). Many 
researchers do not assess this form of reliability, as Weber (1990) points out. 
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Before discussing how the reliability of codification was ensured in this research 
project, the author believes it to be necessary to discuss the coding units. There are 
different units of measurement from which researchers are expected to select the 
appropriate coding unit. A summary of the most commonly used units is shown in Table 
4.1. 
TABLE 4.1 EXAMPLES OF CODING UNITS 
Coding Unit Example 
Word/phrases/ According to Nachmias and Nachmias (1996: p327) "when the recording unit is 
terms a word, the analysis yields a list of frequencies of these words or terms". 
Words/phrases/terms can be used to "examine minutes of company /union 
meetings for the word 'dispute' ... or to examine circulars to shareholders for the 
words 'increased dividends' " (Hussey and Hussey 1996: p25 1). 
Theme "A theme is a simple sentence, that is, a subject and a predicate" (Nachmias and 
Nachmias, 1996: p327). For instance, when the researcher examines. either the 
... minutes of company/union meetings for occasions where discussions lead to 
agreements" or the "... circular to shareholders ... where increases in 
productivity are linked to increased profits" (Hussey and Hussey 1996: p25 1). 
Item "The item is the whole unit the producer of a message employs" (Nachmias and 
Nachmias, 1996: p328). For instance, when the researcher examines 
"... newspapers for whole articles dealing with redundancies" or "... company 
annual reports for entire pieces on environmental issues" (Hussey and Hussey, 
1997: p251). 
Time Here the recording unit used is "... the time allocated in broadcast news bulletins 
to industrial issues (Hussey and Hussey, 1997: p25 1). 
Character When the recording unit is a character, "the researcher counts the number of 
persons appearing in the test rather than the number of words or themes" 
(Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996: p327). 
Paragraph Paragraph as a measure of "... is infrequently used ... because of its complexity. Coders have the difficulty in classifying and coding the numerous and varied 
elements covered in a single paragraph" (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996: p327). 
As far as the issue of reliability of the outcome is concerned, the arguments by Weber 
(1990) highlight two factors: the clarity, or lack of complexity, of the coding unit, and 
the reliability of the researcher who is responsible to carry out the codification. 
Selection of the unit of analysis is significant as it determines the reliability of the 
results. As Weber (1980: p17) argues, in all the three cases of reliability, discrepancies 
could be as a result of ambiguity in the choice of definition'of coding unit or coding 
rules. Most studies use one word or a combination of words, sentences or pages as the 
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unit of analysis. Counting number of words or pages can be problematic as there can be 
considerable differences in writing styles, margin sizes and sizes of graphics (Milne and 
Adler, 1999). 
According to Milne and Adler (1999) once the coding units are well defined with little 
ambiguity, the overall reliability of coded data increases and the whole process can be 
carried out by a single coder who has had the relevant training on a pilot sample. The 
author shares the same view as Milne and Adler (1999) and believes that the reliability 
of coded data becomes more of an issue when each coding unit (in the case of this study 
each information category) has a number of sub-categories. For this reason, as was 
shown in Chapter 3, the information categories are kept simple witbout having any 
subcategories. The second common problem in obtaining reliability for the coded data is 
related to how well trained the coders are and the level of agreement between them. In 
this study, there was only one coder (i. e. the author) who carried out the content 
analysis. The author conducted the content analysis three times to ensure that similar 
outcomes were obtained. The comparison of the three sets of coded data revealed that 
there were not significant variations between the three sets. 
The most reliable coded data is produced by the simplest form of content analysis, 
which was carried out by Ernst and Ernst (1978) and is commonly known as 'indexing' 
(Milne and Adler, 1999). Under this form of content analysis, at least one information 
item needs to be disclosed under each information category. A score of "I" is assigned 
to each information category for every information item disclosed by companies. If no 
information item is disclosed for an information category a score of "0" is assigned. The 
total score gained by each company is, therefore, a percentage number of the 
information categories that companies had disclosed. 
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One of the shortcomings of indexing is that the researcher is not able to measure the 
extent of information disclosure and therefore can not provide any indication of the 
importance companies attached to each information item (Zdghal and Ahmed, 1990; 
Gray et al, 1995b). At the same time, one of the advantages of indexing is that it can be 
used when there is no obvious weighting procedures available in which case equal 
weights are assigned to each information category. This form of content analysis has 
been used by many researchers in accounting (qooke, 1989,1991,1992,1993; Hossain 
et al, 1994; Raffournier, 1995; and Wallace and Naser, 1995). 
Indexing was chosen for the purpose of this study for its simplicity and hence the 
reliability of its outcomes. As the reliability of the selected technique was important, 
'indexing' was the appropriate technique for this study. Another reason for the 
suitability of indexing is that this study does not intend to measure the extent of 
information disclosure and therefore the coded data is not required to reflect the 
emphasis that companies make on each information category. As far as this study is 
concerned, one of the weaknesses of indexing is its failure to include all the non- 
financial information items disclosed by UK companies. The diversity of non-financial 
information categories disclosed by public limited companies is so wide that their 
inclusion would be a long process. For instance, in this study most of the non-financial 
information categories that were disclosed by the Top 100 UK companies were selected. 
The author would like to point out that the disclosure of some non-financial information 
is non-mandatory while others are compulsory and required by the statute (e. g. some 
environmental issues, equal opportunity issues, health and safety matters and etc). In 
this study, the non-financial index (or indices - see sections 3.2. l. and 3.2.2) does not 
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distinguish between the two. In addition, public limited companies do not necessarily 
disclose all the available non-financial information (Wiseman, 1982). Despite these 
caveats the indices are expected to pick up many of the changes that took place in the 
disclosure of hon-financial information over the period under investigation. 
Another relevant point to consider is the use of graphics and pictures by companies in 
capturing the attention of certain stakeholder groups. Unerman (2000) refers to the 
importance of graphics and pictures and argues that "... photographs are sometimes a 
more powerful tool in CSRý2 than narrative disclosures for stakeholders who do not 
have either the time nor the inclination to read every word in the annual report and just 
flick through it, looking at the pictures and possibly reading the chairman's statement" 
(p675). Even though the author agrees with Unerman, she believes that the 
quantification of graphics and pictures can be highly subjective depending on how 
powerfiil the graphics or pictures are perceived to be in conveying certain messages. In 
essence, the author believes that by the selection of phrases in this study the subjectivity 
related to the quantification of graphics and pictures will be avoided. The author also 
takes the view that the inclusion and, subsequently, the quantification of graphics and 
pictures could be regarded as measuring the extent of disclosure. 
Although content analysis has been commonly used in the areas of social and 
environmental reporting (Ernst and Ernst, 1978; Abbot and. Monsen, 1979; Guthrie and 
Parker, 1990; Zdghal and Ahmed, 1990; Gray, Kouhy and Lavers, 1995b; Hackstone 
and Milne, 1996; Tilt, 1998; and Milne and Adler, 1999) for the quantification of social 
and environmental information, the author sees it as necessary to explicitly state why 
62 CSR stands for corporate social responsibility. 
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content analysis was selected in this study and the measures that were taken to ensure 
the quality of coded data. The reasons for the selection of content analysis are: 
This research project presents the level of information disclosed by the major UK 
companies in their annual reports for three years. Indexing, which is the simplest 
form of content analysis, was chosen as it could be used to measure the level of 
disclosure without attaching different weights to different information categories. 
* This study has adopted a positivist/quantitative approach. As the preceding 
discussion illustrates, content analysis is also used in positivist/quantitative 
approaches. 
4.3.2 Survey Methods 
4.3. Zl Questionnaires 
Questionnaires have, according to Sharp and Howard (1996: p145), "over the past 
century, become a common method of gathering information. " Questionnaires can be 
defined as "a pre-formulated written set of questions to which respondents record their 
answers, usually within rather closely defined alternatives" (Sekaran, 2000: p233). In 
the US the term "survey" is used for this data collection method (Nachmias and 
Nachmias, 1996: p224). Creswell (1994) states that a survey design, through the data 
collection process of asking questions, provides a quantitative or numeric description of 
some fraction of the population (i. e. a sample, which can be in turn generalised to the 
population from which the sample was drawn). 
In general, questionnaires can be divided into perceptional and factual questionnaires. 
Perception questions ask questions concerning the feelings, thoughts, knowledge and 
130 
Chapter 4 
opinion of participants, which are quite subjective. Factual questions ask questions of 
fact. Even in perception questionnaire, there is usually a 'personal details' section, 
which is factual. Questionnaires can also be categorised by the method of delivery (i. e. 
Postal Questionnaire, Personally Administered Questionnaire and telephone and its 
recent extension - e-mailed questionnaires). In the author's opinion, the main 
advantages of these methods are structure and timeliness. 
Although questionnaires can be both open ended or closed ended, both types provide 
structure to the process of data collection, the closed ended one being more specific and 
less prone to interpretation than the open ended questionnaire. As compared to 
participant or process observation, where only general points can be watched for, the 
questionnaire structures the data and makes it easier for later analysis especially when 
nominal or ordinal scales are used to capture data. These can be used in computerised 
statistical analysis, which makes the research more robust and rigorous. 
The timeliness of data gathering is another feature especially of postal or telephone 
questionnaire surveys. Controlling for the response rate, more data can be collected in a 
shorter period of time by- using questionnaires than by interviewing sequentially or 
observing over long periods of time. 
Sections (a) and (b) discuss postal and personally administered questionnaires 
a) Postal Questionnaires 
In this process, the questionnaires are mailed to the sample participants, usually with a 
pre-paid self-addressed envelope to encourage response. This enables a larger sample to 
be obtained in a short space of time. Although in theory the researcher could employ a 
large numb er of interviewers to administer questionnaires, this is a costly affair and is 
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not practical for a PhD project. In terms of reliability, posting questionnaires avoid 
accusations of incorporating researcher bias. 
Another advantage is greater anonymity due to the absence of the interviewer, 
especially when sensitive questions are asked (e. g. ethical practices). "People in the 
sample are more likely to respond to sensitive questions when they do not have to face 
an interviewer or speak to someone directly" (Sekaran, 1992: p225). In this particular 
research project, the identities of the companies and stakeholder groups to whom the 
questionnaires were posted were kept confidential as anonymity was important for 
many participants in this research. 
The negative side to postal questionnaires is that the response rate is usually small, 
which requires a second or even a third mailing. The ever increasing number of research 
and posting ofjunk mail means that many questionnaires end up straight in the dustbin. 
A ftu-ther more important disadvantage of this method is that different participants may 
interpret the questions differently and certain questions can be completely 
misunderstood by many or all participants. To avoid this problem questions would have 
to be simple. In this research project the questions were to be kept as simple as possible, 
and participants only needed to tick boxes rather than express their views or 
perceptions. This was compatible with the methodology approach adopted in this study. 
This approach is compatible with the positivist approach adopted by this study. 
h) Personally Administered Questionnaires 
Here the researcher personally administers the questionnaire to the participants, usually 
at the participants' workplace or residence. This has the advantage of a faster response, 
as the researcher and his/her team can get the qugstionnaires completed quickly as 
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compared to the postal method, where the participant might postpone completing and 
returning the questionnaire. This method is especially suitable in a survey confined to a 
local area where the researcher can get the participants and/or his/her organisation to co- 
operate to allow the researcher access. 
Advantages of this method include: (i) doubts regarding the meaning of the questions 
can be clarified to ensure that the participant is answering the questions in the sense that 
the researcher intended, (ii) the importance of the research can be personally presented 
to the participants and its significance explained to them to motivate honest answers by 
emphasising their contribution to the research, (iii) it requires fewer skills than 
interviewing, and therefore, relatively low skilled assistants can be recýuited to perform 
this task to speed up the research, and (iv) it ensures better response rates because there 
is a 'personal face' to the questionnaires as personal persuasion usually increases 
interest. 
The main disadvantage seems to. be that the researcher may introduce his/her personal 
bias by giving facial or verbal expressions, which may make the participant uneasy. 
Furthermore, explaining questions differently to different people, participants may be in 
fact answering different questions as compared to those whom the questionnaire was 
mailed to. In this study, interviews were not selected as the most appropriate of survey 
method. As it will be explained later it was not possible to gain access to different 
individuaWmanagers representing companies or stakeholder groups. 
4.3. Z2 Interviews 
Nachmias and Nachmias (1996) define an interview as a "face-to-face, 'interpersonal 
role situation in which an interviewer asks participants questions designed to elicit 
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answers pertinent to the research hypotheses" (p 232). However, in Sekaran's (2000) 
view interviews need not be face to face as it can be conducted through the telephone or 
can even be computer assisted. 
Interviews can be classified as structured or unstructured (or non-directive interview) 
although Nachmias and Nacbinias (1996) identifies a third category - the focused 
interview, which is a variation of the structured interview. In the structured interview, 
the format is more rigid and assumes thaý the researcher knows exactly what 
information is needed and has a list of pre-determined questions she/he intends to ask of 
the participants. The same questions are administered to every interviewee, although in 
certain cases depending on the circumstances or participants' answers, the researcher 
may elicit additional information by asking additional questions not on his schedule. 
In the non-structured or non-directive interview, the researcher does not have a schedule 
listing a set of pre-specified questions, nor are the questions asked in a specific order. 
The researcher does not direct the interviewee and thus the interviewee is encouraged to 
relate to his/her experiences and to reveal their attitudes and perceptions on the topic of 
interest. In this method, the interviewer has an opportunity to explore various areas and 
to raise specific queries during the interviews. 
4.3. Z3 Advantages and Disadvantages of Interviews versus Postal Questionnaires 
"The main advantage of face to face interviews is that the researcher can adapt the 
questions as necessary, clarify doubts and ensure that the responses are properly 
understood by repeating or rephrasing the questions" (Sekaran, 2000: p230). Interviews 
provide the possibility of eliciting additional information and details, which can provide 
deeper insights. The interview also results in a higher and more complete response rate 
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than mailed questionnaires. This may be the only way to get information from people 
who cannot read or write or understand technical language. One further advantage is 
that during interviews the researcher can collect information on the environment of the 
interviewee (ý. g. request for annual reports, organisation. charts, brochures, which are 
normally entertained as opposed to requests through the mail). 
The disadvantages of the interview include cost and the possibility of bias. It is very 
costly to conduct many interviews over large geographical areas as it may involve 
training interviewers, transportation and accommodation out of town. The very 
flexibility of an interview is also an opportunity for researcher bias to influence the data 
collected. Facial or verbal clues may influence the answers the participants give. 
A finther disadvantage of the interview would be the lack of anonymity. Participants 
may feel threatened or intimidated by the interviewee, as she/he knows many personal 
details of the interviewee such as name, position, organisation, telephone number and 
addresses. This is especially true if the topic of the research or particular questions is 
sensitive. 
4.3. Z4 Telephone Surveys 
Telephone surveys may consist of polls, interview or questionnaire survey conducted 
over the telephone. Compared to mailed questionnaires or personal interviews they can 
cover a wider geographical area in a shorter time. However, the disadvantage is the 
higher cost compared to mailed questionnaire but there can be substantial cost savings 
compared to personal face-to-face interviews. 
The effect of the anonymity of the telephone 'survey varies; the lack of face to face 
contact can both be an advantage and a disadvantage. Personal clues cannot be given or 
135 
Chapter 4 
received, therefore there cannot be an accusation of researcher bias. However, this is not 
conducive to getting a greater insight into the perceptions, feelings and thoughts of the 
interviewee. Furthermore, interviewees may not be comfortable with a faceless 
researcher as they may fear lack of confidentiality of their views. 
In this research, the length of the questionnaire and the nature of the questions, which 
required some thought was not suitable for administration over the phone. Hence, the 
telephone was used only for the follow up procedures. 
4.4. COLLECTION OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
4.4.1 Choice of Data Sources 
In order to collect non-financial information, it was decided to use the corporate annual 
reports of UK companies. Many studies of corporate social reporting use annual reports 
to measure social and environmental reporting (Adams, Coutts and Harte, 1995; Barret, 
1976; Buzby, 1974; Guthrie and Parker, 1989; Singhvi and Desai, 1971). Although 
many researchers used corporate annual reports for gathering data on the level of non- 
financial information disclosure, the use of annual reports as the only data source can be 
criticised. Even though companies can disclose information using other mediums of 
communication than annual reports, it was decided to use only annual reports for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, annual reports were the main corporate documents, which 
represent a company and are widely used. Secondly, collection of data on all the non- 
financial information that was disclosed on companies was virtually impossible. And 
thirdly, as most other studies used annual reports, there was a greater potential for 
comparability of results. 
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Having decided on the use of annual reports for content analysis, it was decided to 
collect data for three years; 1985,1990 and 1995. The reasons why these three years 
were chosen for this study were discussed in section 1.3. This was followed by the 
selection of a sample of the largest Top 100 UK companies from the Times 1000 in 
1985 and 1995. This resulted in a sample of 132 companies (see Appendix 4A). A 
number of selection criteria were then used to omit companies from the original list of 
132 companies. Limited companies were removed as their annual reports were not 
publicly available. Companies in government ownership that were not responsive to the 
market forces, and non-UK companies that had different annual report formats to UK 
companies were also removed from the sample. This gave a sample of 97 companies 
(shown in Appendix 4B). Unfortunately it was only possible to find annual reports for 
81 of these companies (see Appendix 5A for the list of companies). Non-financial data 
were collected from the annual reports of the 81 companies using the two governance 
and non-governance indices. 
To check that the selected sample was representative of its population (i. e. UK 
companies) the aggregate and average values of a number of financial variableS63 were 
collected for companies in the sample. All the financial data were collected from 
Datastream. for the periods 1985,1990 and 1995. Figures 4.1,4.2,4.3 and 4.4 represent 
the aggregate and average graphs on sales and number of employees for both the 
selected sample and its population. There are two graphs for each variable; one 
aggregate and one average. Each graph indicates the movement of a specific variable for 
the selected sample and its population. All the aggregate and average graphs show 
parallel movements for the selected sample and its population, suggesting that the 
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selected sample is a representative of its population. Similar aggregate and average 
graphs for different fmancial. variables are also presented in Appendix 4C. 
63 Sales, profit, number of employees, preference capital, capital gearing, and borrowing rate. 
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FIGuRE 4.1 AGGREGATE SALES 
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FIGURE 4.3 AGGREGATE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES 
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4.4.2 Selection of Respondents and Response Rates 
It was decided to approach three groups of respondents to participate in the 
questionnairq survey. Company management together with investors and employees, 
representing two stakeholder groups were the three selected groups. This study was 
limited to only three groups due to resource and time constraints. The three groups were 
expected to provide different angles on the existing situation for stakeholder dialogue. 
The UK investors were expected to be more interested in financial aspects. It was 
interesting to see whether the companies communicate their non-financial information 
to their investors and if their investors were interested in such information. At the same 
time employees were likely to be interested in a range of non-financial information (e. g. 
equal opportunity, working conditions, health and safety at work, and etc). 
The level of responses received from each of the three groups was different. There were 
generally three categories: (i) the 'respondents' who completed and returned the 
questionnaires, (ii) the 'non-respondents' who refused to complete the questionnaires, 
and (iii) the 'no response' companies, that neither co-operated in completing the 
questionnaires nor acknowledged their refusal to do so. There was also another group 
who agreed to co-operate but'no response was ever rieceived from them. This group was 
added to the 'no response' category. 
The following sub-sections (sections 4.4.2.1,4.4.2.2 and 4.4.2.3) provide the details on 
how each group was approached and the responses received from each group. 
4.4. Zl Companies Managers 
The questionnaires were sent out to company secretaries in two separate attempts. It was 
originally decided to carry out the survey on a sample of 20 companies; 10 companies 
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with the highest non-financial scores and 10 companies with the lowest non-financial 
scores. The non-financial scores used here were the total scores of the companies 
selected in the sample (as measured in section 4.5. ). The top ten highest and the lowest 
10 scoring companies were selected in order to represent two different ends of the non- 
financial disclosure spectrum. 
All companies were selected from the original sample of 81 companies selected the 
previous section (section 4.4.1) -including only those companies that were alive in the 
period when the survey was carried out (i. e. the survey was carried out in May 1997). 
Due to the smallness of the response rate after the first attempt and because of concern 
over the low response rate and whether it would be possible to draw any conclusion, it 
was then decided to try a second attempt and to approach more comýanies (see Table 
4.2). A second sample was therefore selected. This sample included 40 companies (the 
same selection procedure was applied as for the first sample). The questionnaires were 
then sent out to all the 40 companies. 
In both attempts, the companies were contacted to make sure that they had received the 
questionnaires. In some cases the company secretaries agreed to complete the 
questionnaires while in some other cases the q uestionnaire was passed on to a person 
with the relevant knowledge. A large number of companies who agreed to participate 
specifically asked for their identity not to be revealed under any circumstances. Some 
other companies replied that they had a policy not to respond to questionnaires (see 
Appendix 4D for the names of non-respondents and no response companies). In 
comparison some companies had an unfriendly attitude to the idea of communication 
with their stakeholder groups. In other cases some companies claimed that they could 
not complete the questionnaire since the detailed knowledge of their operations was not 
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available to them. Apart from some companies, who specifically indicated their dislike 
of communication with stakeholders, other companies regarded time constraint and the 
lack of human resources as the main reasons for their lack of co-operations. Other 
possible reasons could be failure to recognise the importance attached to the survey, 
threat from their competitors and a general uneasiness of companies for revealing 
information" could be also mentioned. 
TABLE 4.2 ]RESPONSE ]RATES FROM COMPANIES 
FirstAttempt 
20 compani s were selected Number of Questionnaires Percentage 
Respondents 7 35 
Non-Respondents I1 55 
No Response 2 10 
SecondAttempt 
40 companies were selected Number of Questionnaires Percentage 
Respondents 9 22.5 
Non-Respondents 20 50 
No Response 11 27.5 
Overall 
60 companies were selected Number of Questionnaires Percentage 
Respondents 16 26.7 
Non-Respondents 31 51.7 
No Response 13 21.6 
Depending on each individual company questionnaires were followed up by phoning 
companies at different time periods. Overall, only 26.7% of companies in the sample 
participated and completed the questionnaires (shown in Table 4.2). The remaining 
73.3% of companies were continuously contacted on several occasions. 
4.4. Z2 Institutional Investors 
The Cadbury Code of Best Practice attaches a great deal of emphasis on shareholders 
and the fact that companies should serve their shareholders' interests. An example of 
this is meetings with institutional investors, which are held on done-to-one basis and 
64 In a traditi6nal Anglo-Saxon financial system, companies have a great tendency to remain secretive and 
refuse to share information publicly. The lack of transparency is one of the imp6rtant characteristics of an 
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where the company is represented by a combination of the chairman, the chief executive 
and the fmance directors while fund managers represent institutional investors. In a 
study by Mallin (1995), it was found that most institutional investors are becoming 
much more aware of the fact that as large shareholders, they are increasingly expected 
to play more active role. Mallin (1995) found that: 
"... the increasing willingness of the institutional -investors to work together, through their representative bodies, or through informal 
groupings, or even an ad hoc basis, to try to ensure that high corporate 
governance standards are kept to the fore, and that management are 
mindful of the institutional investors' role. " (p15) 
For the purpose of this study, the 3 largest institutional investors (i. e. with holdings of 
more than or equal to 3%) were selected for each of the 20 companies in the sample 65 
The names of the 3 major investors were publicly available. Some companies appeared 
to have foreign investors, who were also included in the sample. 
Many of the institutional investors had holdings in more than one company. Some 
institutional investors were the subsidiaries of larger investors, who were also in the 
sample. These subsidiaries, often small in size, passed on the questionnaires to their 
investment managers in the holding company, which were already in the sample. As a 
result, the selected sample included 29 institutional investors. Having received a small 
number of completed questionnaires it was then decided to use a second sample. This 
time, the largest 10 fund managers and the largest 10 unit trust managers were selected 
(see Table 4.3). 
Anglo-Saxon Structure (Monks and Minow, 1995). 
6' The selected institutions belonged to one of the major categories of investors, which are: Banks and 
nominees, Insurance companies, Nominees, Pension Funds, Investment and unit trusts, Charities, local 
authorities, hospitals, colleges & etc., Other Corporate Bodies (e. g. cornmercial and industrial 
companies), and Foreign investors. 
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Institutional investors were often too busy to respond to questionnaires. Although many 
of the investors promiied to complete the questionnaire when contacted, no response 
was ever received from some of them. These investors were then placed in a 'no 
response' category. Overall, a response rate of 31% was achieved (shown in Table 4.3). 
TABLE 4.3 RESPONSE RATES FROM INVESTORS 
FirstAttempt I 
29 Institutional Investors Number of Questionnaires Percentage 
Respondents 10 35 
Non-Respondents 5 17 
No Response 14 48 
SecondAttempt 
20 Institutional Investors Number of Questionnaires Percentage 
Respondents 5 25 
Non-Respondents 0 - 
No Response 15 75 
Note: In the second attempt neither of the Unit Trusts responded while 5 out oý 10 fund 
managers completed and returned the questionnaires 
Total Positive Response Rate = (10+5)/49 =31% 
4.4. Z3 Employees 
Employees form the most important stakeholder groups, who play a long-term role in 
the corporate success. Over the years many attempts have been made to Protect 
employees' rights through either legislation or trade unions. In the 1970s, for example, 
there was pressure to place a statutory requirement on companies to disclose financial 
and non-financial information to their employees. Such legislation was never enacted. 
The Companies Act 1985 requires companies to inform shareholders about their 
66 information provision to employees 
66 The directors' report must include a statement, which describes the action taken during the financial 
year to introduce, maintain or develop arrangements aimed at: 
" Providing employees systematically with information on matters of concern to them as employees; 
" Consulting employees, or their representatives, on a regular basis so that the views of employees can 
be taken into account in making decisions which are likely to affect their interests, 
" Encouraging the involvement of employees in the company's performance through an employees' 
share scheme or by some other means; 
" Achieving a common awareness on the part of all employees of the financial and economic factors 
affecting the performance of the company. 
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In order to target employees and ask them to participate in the questionnaire survey two 
approaches could be adopted. One approach was to send questionnaires to the head of 
personnel or the human resource manager (HRM) of companies. The second approach 
was to send questionnaires to trade unions and branch managers for each company. 
Each of the two approaches is discussed in the following sub-sections (4.4.2.3.1 and 
4.4.2.3.2). 
4.4.2.3.1 Head of personnel/Human resource manager (HRM) 
This approach had several advantages over that of the trade unions. The names and 
addresses of the head of personnel/HRM were publicly available. They could e. asily be 
approached and asked if they were willing to co-operate in the survey. 
There is empirical evidence to suggest that trade union membership has dropped 
considerably since the Second World War. The trade unions are known to represent less 
than one third of the work force and have 62% of employee members who are in the 
public sector compared with 23% of employees in the private sector (Wickersham, 
1995). There are also other variations in unions membership with regard to different 
industrial or geographical categories (e. g. 88% of those in the electricity generation and 
supply industry are union members compared with just 4% in computing). This raised 
the question of whether the responses from trade union representatives would be a fair 
representation of the population'of employees in the private sector. This however, 
would not be of relevance to this study since the study addressed the stakeholders as 
groups and not as individuals. A good example of such changes is The Collective 
Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) (Amendment) 
- (See The Corporate Governance Handbook p. 9/2). 
146 
Chapter 4 
Regulalion 1995 67 . Under this new regulation, employers are required to recognise the 
employee representatives; these representatives may be trade union representatives, but 
where no union is recognised, the representatives must be elected by the employees. 
Finally, the changes in the traditional roles of human resource managers should be taken 
into consideration. Personnel managers are expected to play different roles in 
comparison to their traditional roles. Generally, companies are increasingly required to 
be aware of their employees' affairs. According to an article published in 1996: 
"A Personnel management in the last two decades has grown out of its 
origins in welfare and no longer exists to carry out a plethora of reactive 
functions such as sorting out wages queries or sending out reminders 
that appraisals are due. It is now a function which requires professionals 
to become strategists in many areas such as planning, remuneration, 
industrial relations, training, recruitment, employment law or 
management development. " (CORNER, September 1996, pp4-5) 68 
Although stakeholder theory has not been explicitly mentioned in the human resource 
management literature, the emphasis on a more efficient human resource management 
appears to be in line with or to favour a stakeholder mentality, thereby more attention is 
paid to employees' welfare. 
There are however, practical difficulties associated with approaching a head of 
personnel/HRM. If the questionnaires are sent out to them, they may not be passed on to 
their employee representatives. Rather the head of personnel/HRM may complete the 
questionnaires, or they may be passed on to employees sympathetic to the management. 
There is also a chance that if questionnaires are passed on to employee representatives 
67 This regulation is to protect employees in the case of redundancies and transfer of undertakings from 
those employers who do not recognise an independent trade union for every employees. For further 
details see the following: "Consultation and Employee Representatives". CRONER Reference Bookfor 
Employees, Issue No 108,30 July 1996, p4. 
63 "The Devolution of Managing Human Resources", CRONER Reference Bookfor Employees, Issue No 
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through the management, employee representatives might not feel they have the 
freedom to report the true situation. 
Companies were also approached to provide the names of their employee 
representatives. Some companies claimed to have no representative and, in general, 
companies were not willing to provide the names of their employee representatives. The 
names and addresses of employee representatives were not publicly available to 
approach them directly. It is noteworthy that this study addresses employees as one of 
the major stakeholder groups and does not address employees individually. Hence it 
was not appropriate to approach individual employees. This can be regarded as a serious 
shortcoming of this approach and would make the outcomes of this approach highly 
prone to bias. It was therefore decided not to use this approach. 
4.4.2.3.2 Trade Unions 
There was no directory providing a list of the names and addresses of the trade union 
representatives in public limited companies. Once again when companies were 
approached they expressed their unwillingness to provide such information. Companies 
are not required by law to disclose public information on thýir employee representatives 
or on their trade union representatives. The only publicly available information was the 
Trade Union Congress (TUC) Directory 1997 providing the names and addresses of 
major trade unions together with the names of their general secretaries. Due to these 
caveats, it was decided to approach the general secretaries of the 10 largest unions. A 
cover letter coupled with a copy of the questionnaire together with a list of 20 
companies were sent out to the general secretaries asking for them to send the 
questionnaires to their union representatives in companies on the list. For those 
109,2 September 1996, pp 4-5. 
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companies that did not recognise a union representative, the general secretaries were 
asked to provide the names of their associated branch officials. This approach was 
decided to be the least biased approach available in representing the employees' 
situation. 
From the 10 largest trade unions, only I replied that it was not interested in the survey. 
The remaining 9 supported the survey and indicated that they were willing to 
participate. Despite this, only 3 unions co-operated and positively contributed to the 
survey. Although the remaining 6 unions were repeatedly contacted at different time 
periods and the questionnaires were faxed to them several times (since they claimed not 
to have received the questionnaire), no positive contribution was made by them. These 
unions were classified as 'no response'. 
Due to the Data Protection Act (1984) the unions were not allowed to provide the names 
and addresses of their union representatives to externals. Because of this limitation the 
third and the most co-operative union agreed to identify their most informed union 
representatives and to send out the questionnaires together with a cover letter from the 
Union General Secretary, asking for their co-operations. This union sent out about 10 
questionnaires of which seven questionnaires were completed in detail (see Table 4.4). 
Another union was covering only two. of the companies in the sample. The head of 
research in this union agreed to complete the questionnaire as a representation of the 
situations in the two companies since the two companies had too many representatives 
and not all of them were thought to be well informed of the situation in different parts of 
their company. The questionnaire received from this union had been thoroughly 
completed. From the three unions who contributed positively, one union provided a list, 
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incIuding the narnes and addresses of their representatives. The questionnaires were 
then sent out to these representatives. 
TABLE 4.4 RESPONSES FROM THE TRADE UNIONS 
Unions Approached 
The 10 largest unions were approached. 
3 contributed positively, i. e. agreed to co-operate 
I replied negatively, i. e. was not interested in the survey 
6 no response - although they showed interest no contribution was made by them 
Questionnaire Response Rate 
Union A: 7 responses out of 10 Questionnaires sent out. 
Union B: I response out of I was sent out. 
Union C: 2 responses out 7 were sent out. 
Total Positive Response Rate = (7+1+2)/18 = 56% 
4.5 EVIDENCE ON THE DISCLOSURE OF NON-FINANCIAL INFORMATION 
In order to proceed with the investigation of the first key research question, evidence on 
the rising level of non-financial information is required. In the case of governance 
information, a lower level of non-financial information disclosure is expected before the 
introduction of the Cadbury code in 1992. Many of the corporate disasters took place in 
the late 1980s. At the same time, following the increased public awareness on social and 
environmental issues, a higher level of non-govemance information is expected for 
1990 and 1995. 
If evidence on the rising level of non-financial information is observed, the first key 
research question can be investigated to find out if there were any significant 
associations between corporate characteristics and non-financial information disclosure. 
Content analysis is used to quantify the level of non-financial infonnation disclosed in 
the annual reports of the major UK companies. The -outcomes of the content analysis 
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present the level of information disclosure for the three chosen years. Figure 4.5 
presents the level of non-financial information disclosed in the three years under 
investigation. The evidence clearly shows that there was an increase in the level of non- 
financial information disclosure in the annual reports of the major UK companies from 
1985 to 1995. Looking at the growth rate of non-financial information disclosure (see 
Figure 4.5), the largest growth rate was observed for 1985-90, indicating the rising 
public awareness of social and environmental issues in the late 1980s. 
According to the statistics (shown in Table 4.5 and Figure 4.5), both the mean and the 
median values of non-financial scores had grown considerably (i. e. 68.3% and 72.6%, 
respectively) over the period 1985-95. Looking at the two component$ of total scores 
(i. e. governance and non-governance scores) it was evident that governance scores 
were, generally, higher than non-governance scores for all the three years. One possible 
explanation for this is that companies were disclosing more governance information as 
they were considering their governance issues to be investor related and were therefore 
paying more attention to meet their investors' information requirements. But, more 
importantly, this could be due to the explicit guidelines on good governance practice. 
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FIGuRE 4.5 NON-FINANCIAL INDICES AND THEIR GROWTH 
ENon-Governance Scores ED Governance Scores E]TotaIScores 
Note: NGscore stands for non-governance scores, Gscore stands for governance score and Tscore stands 
for total score. Also, corporate growth rates are shown below: 
Tscore Ngscore Gscore Growth (%) Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
1985-95 68.3 72.6 75.0 83.3 62.1 66.7 
1985-90 51.2 60.5 62.2 75.0 45.6 54.0 
1990-95 32.8 30.7 33.9 33.3 30.3 27.5 
The histograms shown in Figure 4.5 repre sent the mean values shown in Table 4.5. 
Two further interesting observations can be obtained from Figure 4.5. Firstly, it was 
interesting to observe that the highest growth rate for the level of non-financial 
information was for the period between 1985 and 1990. Secondly, the level of non- 
governance information grew considerably faster than the level of governance 
information (62.2% and 45.6%, respectively). As it was discussed in Chapter I (section 
1.1), 1985-90 coincides with the rising public awareness on social and environmental 
issues. At the same time, the initiatives for the European Union, which emphasized the 
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development of the social dimensions of the union, took place during the same period 69 . 
The rising public awareness in the UK coupled with the European Union can be 
regarded as two potential reasons that put companies under more pressures to divulge an 
increasing IeVel of non-financial information. 
TABLE 4.5 BASIC STATISTICS FOR NON-FINANCIAL INFORMATION SCORES 
_Total 
Scores 1985 1990 1995 
Mean 0.20 0.41 0.61 
Median 0.17 0.43 0.62 
Variance 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Coeff of variation 0.62 0.31 0.20 
Number of Observations 64 73 71 
Non-Governance Scores 1985 1990 1995 
Mean 0.14 0.37 0.56 
Median 0.1 0.40 0.60 
Variance 0.03 0.05 0.04 
Coeff of variation 1.17 0.59 0.37 
Number of Observations 64 73 72 
Governance Scores 1985 1990 1995 
Mean 0.25 0.46 0.66 
Median 0.23 0.50 0.69 
Variance 0.02 0.02 0.01 
Coeff of variation 0.57 0.33 0.15 
Number of Observations 64 74 71 
Notes: All figures are proportions 
Another interesting observation is the declining coefficient of variation of index values 
from 1985 to 1995 (see Table 4.5). The high coefficient of variation in 1985 (e. g. 0.62) 
implies that the level of non-financial information disclosure varies considerably across 
the sample. The coefficient of Variation appeared to be halved (e. g. 0.3 1) by 1990 and a 
further drop (e. g. from 0.31 to 0.20) by 1995 indicates that the variation in the level of 
non-fmancial information disclosure by companies across the sample was generally 
low. 
69 As a result of the movements, the social policies were no longer the "end result" but the "pre-requisite" 
of the political and economic success (Hantrais, 1995; and Room, 1994). 
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Looking at the reported coefficient of variations in Table 4.5, it is obvious that the 
coefficient of variation for non-governance index is almost twice as high as those of the 
governance index in each of the three years. This. implies that the disclosure of non- 
governance information in the annual reports of UK companies was not as widespread 
across the companies in the Top 100 as the disclosure of governance information was. 
This could be due to greater pressures felt by UK companies in disclosing governance 
information to their investors. As discussed earlier, the corporate governance guidelines 
mainly focus on investors' interests and their expectations (Hampel Committee, 1998). 
In order to gain better insight into the rising level of non-financial information 
disclosure, the percentage number of companies disclosing information on each non- 
financial information category is reported in Table 4.6. The results shbw considerable 
growth in all non-financial information categories. Particularly noticeable are the moves 
towards compliance with the Cadbury recommendations by the companies in the 
sample. 
Despite the absence of any regulatory requirements for the disclosure of non- 
governance information in the LJK, the results in Table 4.6 clearly show a considerable 
rise in the number of companies disclosing non-govemance information. The only non- 
governance category, which was reported by only a few of companies in 1995, was 
'working condition' (e. g. reported by 22.6% of companies) but instead it had a high 
growth rate of 83.2% for 1985-95. At the same time, the number of companies that 
disclosed information on 'discrimination' fell from 64.2% in 1990 to 51.2% in 1995. 
This information category had the smallest growth rate (i. e. 37.3%) for 1985-1995. 
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TABLE 4.6 PERCENTAGE NUMBER OF COMPANIES DISCLOSING INFORMATION ON 
EACH NON-FINANCIAL CATEGORY 
Non-Financial Information 1985 1990 1995 Growth 1985-95 
A. Non-Governance Information % % % % 
Environmental Issues 4.9 22.2 70.2 93.0 
Health and Safety 11.1 35.8 54.8 79.7 
Discrimination 32.1 64.2 51.2 37.3 
Working Conditions 3.8 6.2 22.6 83.2 
Training 21.3 43.2 77.4 72.5 
Employee Share Ownership 22.2 45.7 72.6 69.4 
Communication/Others 22.5 42.0 64.3 65.0 
Community Involvement 17.5 56.1 69.0 74.6 
Research and Development 18.8 37.8 50.0 62.4 
Renewal of Technology 5.0 22.0 42.9 88.3 
B. Governance Information 
Non-Executives Directors 51.9 82.9 100.0 48.1 
Executive Directors 56.8 85.4 100.0 43.2 
Outside Directors 0.0 0.0 2.5 2.5 
Separation of CEO & Chairman Positions 28.0 52.4 60.4 53.6 
Shares Held by Senior Managers 50.6 84.1 94.0 46.2 
Options Held by Senior Managers 38.3 64.6 94.0 59.3 
Salary and Bonuses 74.1 80.5 96.4 23.1 
Pension 1.2 26.8 73.8 98.4 
Audit Committee 11.1 39.0 92.9 88.1 
Remuneration Committee 7.4 22.0 91.7 91.9 
Nomination Committee 1.2 8.5 67.9 98.2 
Environment Committee 0.0 2.4 8.3 8.3 
Compensation Committee 0.0 1 3.7 1 17.9 17.9 
Another interesting observation was the large number of companies disclosing 
information on 'environmental' issues. This information category had the highest 
growth (i. e. 93% in 1985-95). While in 1995 70.2% of companies disclosed 
environmental information only 8.3% of companies appeared to have environmental 
monitoring committees as part of their governance structures. 'Renewal of technology' 
is another information category, which had the second highest growth rate (i. e. 88.3%) 
for 1985-95. Although this information category is not regarded as 'social' information 
in the existing literature many companies (i. e. 42.9% in 1995) disclosed information 
relevant to it. 
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In the absence of any regulatory requirements for the disclosure of non-govemance 
information the 'quality' of non-governance information can be questioned. Even 
though the guidelines on corporate governance hardly consider any monitoring 
measures for non-governance issues companies that paid attention to the quality of their 
non-governance information were expected to have implemented monitoring measures 
for their governance structures, as recommended by the codes of best practice and 
guidelines provided by various committees. 
To see if there was any correlation between governance and non-govemance, scores, the 
correlation between the two indices were measured (as will be explained in section 4.6 
Spearman rank correlation was used). The results (shown in Table 4.7) show that the 
correlation between the two indices was high for 1985 (i. e. 80.3%). The correlation was 
halved by 1990 (i. e. 44.2%) and had a finther drop to 20.5% in 1995. 
TABLE 4.7 SPEARMAN RANK CORRELATION BETWEEN GOVERNANCE AND NON- 
GOVERNANCE SCORES 
Year Spearman Correlation 
1985 0.803 
(0.000) 
1990 0.442 
(0.000) 
1995 0.205 
(0.000) 
Notes: Ile figures in bracket show the significant level. 
The high correlation in 1985 can be explained by the absence of any regulatory 
recommendation on corporate governance. By 1990, when companies were expecting 
the publication of the Cadbury codes and in 1995, when the codes had been published, 
the level of governance information had risen considerably. Most of the governance 
information was in compliance with the regulatory codes. While regulatory codes had 
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been introduced on corporate governance since 1992, no code of conduct was published 
to regulate the disclosure of 'non-governance' information in the period. The absence of 
any codes of conduct can be regarded as a potential reason for the fall in the correlation 
between the two scores from 1985 to 1995. 
4.6 METHODS OF DATA ANALYSIS 
In order to investigate the supporting research questions I to 4, the empirical analysis 
of the gathered data is carried out in Chapter 5. Companies in the sample are classified 
into different industrial, size and growth categories. No classification was carried out for 
corporate performance as companies were selected from the Top 100 companies and 
were therefore from different industrial backgrounds. I 
Basic statistics and cross-tabulations are used, when appropriate, to present the level of 
non-financial information disclosure across different categories of corporate 
characteristics. All other supporting research questions will be investigated in two ways. 
One way is to test if the average -non-financial scores are equal for different categories 
of corporate characteristics. If the test shows that the average non-financial scores is 
different for different categories of corporate characteristics, it will be argued that 
companies with certain characteristics disclosed more non-financial information (for 
example, larger companies, faster growing companies or companies in certain industries 
had disclosed more non-financial information than others). 
The second way is to test whether the non-financial scores of companies in different 
categories are equal. In order to do so, one way is the analysis of variance (ANOVA), 
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which is a parametric test, that can be used 70 . In order to decide whether the ANOVA 
test is the appropriate test to use for the gathered data, it is necessary to ensure that three 
assumptions needed for the test are met. The three assumptions are: 'independence', 
'normality' and 'equality of variance'. In this study, the non-financial scores observed 
for a company were found to be independent of the non-financial scores observed for 
other companies. Therefore, the assumption of 'independence' holds. 
The second assumption, which is the most cTucial assumption, requires a 'normal' 
distribution for companies in each category. A West for normal distribution can be 
carried out to ensure the 'normal' distribution. At the same time, in the case of small 
samples the presence of an unusual observation (i. e. an outlier) can easily deter the 
normal distribution assumption and have a big impýct on the mean and standard 
deviation. If there is any doubts about the normal distribution in each category, a non- 
parametric test should be carried out instead of a parametric test. Tests for 'normality of 
distribution' were conducted using West for kurtosis and skewness 71 . The evidence did 
not unanimously support the condition of 'normality' for all categories over the three 
years under invýstigation. Therefore, the assumption of 'normality' did not hold. 
The third assumption was the equality of variance. As will be shown in cross-tabulation 
tables in Chapter 5, the number of observations in different corporate categories were 
small and similar, and as a result the equality of variance assumption was not too 
important (Norusis, 1995: p283). 
70 Cooke (1993), who used indexing, used a similar method in analysing his data. He used a parametric 
test when the assumption of 'normality' was held, and used a non-parametric alternative when the 
assumption of normality was deterred. 
71 The test was carried out in excel. Cooke Q 993) carried out a similar test for 'normality'. 
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As the assumption of 'normal' distribution did not hold, it was decided to use the 
Kruskal Wallis test, which is the non-parametric alternative test to ANOVA and does 
not require the assumption of 'normality'. One of the shortcomings of non-parametric 
tests is that they are not as powerful as parametric tests as they ignore some of the 
available information. However, as they require less stringent assumptions they can be 
used in place of parametric test. 
Another way of exploring the above supporting research questions is to test for 
associations between corporate characteristics and non-financial scores (governance, 
non-governance and total scores). This is done using Spearman rank correlation, which 
is the non-parametric version of Pearson Chi-square. Spearman rank correlation is used 
to investigate the supporting research questions 1,2,3 and 4. 
4.7 QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN 
4.7.1 Construction of The Questionnaires 
Questionnaire surveys have been used in many different research studies. At the same 
time, there have been many authors discussing the methods of constructing 
questionnaires and suggesting how questions can be worded so that they serve the 
purpose that they have been designed for (Sekaran, 1992; and Nachmias and Nachmias; 
1996). 
In this study, questions were kept short and simple so that they could be easily 
understood. In addition the respqndents would have more time to respond to the 
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questions. The questionnaire went through several versions before it was developed to 
its fmal version72. 
Three slightly different questionnaires were designed, one for companies, one for 
investors and one for employees (a copy of the questionnaire designed for each group is 
shown in Appendices 4E, 4F and 4G). The original questionnaires were very long 
winded with little structure in terms of classification of the questions and sequence of 
questions that were asked. Although the questionnaires were not pilot tested among UK 
companies, several were administered to some researchers. In the case of employees, it 
was - not possible to send the questionnaire to a pilot sample of the trade union 
representatives. The author had only one chance of sending out the questionnaires to the 
trade union representatives. It was not, therefore, possible to pilot t6st either of the 
questionnaire to employees. In order to treat all the three respondents in a similar 
manner it was decided not to pilot test the questionnaires to either of the three groups. 
This decision was based on the fact that the questions in each questionnaire were easy to 
understand. To support this assertion, none of the respondents contacted us to enquire 
about different aspects of the questionnaires and the lack of clarity of the questions. 
4.7.2 The Objectives of The Questionnaires 
The three questionnaires were designed in a way that they would provide answers to the 
two supporting research questions 5 and 6. The questionnaire that was prepared for 
companies addressed the supporting research question 5, which was concerned with 
identification of the stakeholder groups. In this part, companies were asked to classify 
72 The questionnaires were discussed with and commented by fellow Phl), students, a professional 
researcher specialised in industrial relations and another researcher, who had experience in working with 
the trade unions, at Middlesex University Business School. 
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their stakeholder groups according to their importance. Companies were also asked if 
they had any procedures for doing so. Apart from this section, all the three 
questionnaires addressed the supporting research question 6 by focusing on the three 
aspects of stakeholder dialogue, which were discussed in section 3.4.2. The three 
aspects were 'methods of communication', 'information items communicated' and 
'two-way communication and consultation'. 
The objectives of the questionnaires were to provide answers to the following questions: 
1. Supporting Research Question 5 
A. Stakeholder Identification 
(i) Whether companies attached different importance to their major stakeholder 
groups? 
(ii) Whether companies had any procedures to classify their major stakeholder groups? 
2. Supporting Research Question 6 -Stakeholder Dialogue 
B. Communication Methods 
(i) Which communication methods were used to communicate with each stakeholder 
group? 
(ii) Whether appropriate methods of communication were used for different stakeholder 
groups? 
- This was measured by asking stakeholders' preferences. 
C Information Items Disclosed to Stakeholder Groups 
(i) Which information items were disclosed to each stakeholder group? 
(ii) How useful the disclosed information items were as perceived by stakeholder 
groups? 
D. Two-way Communication and Consultation 
Whether there was two-way communication between compqnies and each of the 
stakeholder groups? 
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- This was investigated by assessing if there were quality/dialogue circles with 
stakeholders. 
Whether companies were making any attempts to inform their stakeholders of 
corporate values and expectations? 
- This was investigated by assessing if training prograinznes were offered to 
stakeholder groups 
(iii) Whether there was consultation between companies and their stakeholder 
groups? 
- This was investigated by assessing if there was any joint consultation committee 
with stakeholder groups? 
(iv) The usefulness of the communication and consultation methods as found by 
stakeholder groups. 
(v) Whether companies made any attempt to find out about their stakeholders' 
values, expectations and interests? 
- This will be investigated by seeking to find out if attitude surveys were sent out 
to stakeholder groups. 
(vi) Whether companies kept an open mind to receive suggestions from their 
stakeholders? 
- This will be investigated by seeking to find out if suggestion schemes were 
available to stakeholder groups. 
Table 4.8 presents a brief summary of different sections that is included in the 
questionnaires. Despite minor discrepancies in the questionnaires sent to the three 
groups and apart from part A (e. g. 'stakeholder groups' - as shown in Table 4.8), all the 
questionnaires sent out to the three stakeholder groups shared the same structures that 
were shown in Table 4.8. A copy of the questionnaire that was sent out to each 
stakeholder group is shown in Appendices 4E, 4F and 4G. The findings for the 
questionnaire will be discussed in details in Chapter 6. 
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TABLE 4.8 QUESTIONNAIRE SECTIONS AND PURPOSES OF EACH SECTION 
Questions Asked and Purpose of the Question 
A Stakeholder Groups 
" Whether companies attach different importance to their major stakeholder groups 
" Do companies have any procedures for classifying their stakeholder groups according to their importance? 
This section was included in the questionnaires sent out to companies only. 
B. Methods of Communication used 
Face-to-face methods 
1. Group Meetings (Apart from the annual general meeting) 
2. Cascade networks 
3. Large-scale meetings 
Written Methods 
1. Company Handbooks 
2. Information notes to stakeholder representative 
3. Housejournals 
4. Newsletters 
5. Departmental Bulletins 
6. Notices 
7. Individual letters to stakeholder group representatives 
Other Methods 
1. Information points 
2. Audio-visual aids 
3. Electronic mail 
This section seeks to find out which methods of communication were used for each stakeholder group and how 
useful each stakeholder group found each method. 
C. Information Items Disclosed 
Information about the organisation 
I. Work objectives and performance 
2. Operating and technical information 
3. Health and safety 
4. Information on personnel (Who the key positions are) 
5. Working conditions 
6. Supervision and management of different operational procedures 
7. Administrative procedures 
8. Training and development 
9. Development in technology and methods 
10. Equal opportunities 
11. Social and welfare facilities to each stakeholder group 
Marketing Information 
1. Company Market Share 
2. Company Market Segment 
3. Mergers and Acquisitions 
4. Investment 
5. Details of products and services 
6. Future plans on developing products and services 
7. Future plans on other issues 
8. Research and development 
9. Environmental issues 
This section seeks to find out which information items were disclosed to each stakeholder group and how useful 
each stakeholder group found each item. 
D. Two-way Communication and consultation 
I Quality Circles 
Measures the level of two-way communication between companies and their stakeholders 
Training Programmes 
Companies use training Rrogrammes to communicate various aspe s of their o2erations as well as their 
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Questions Asked and Purpose of the Question 
expectations to their employees. 
Joint Consultative Committees 
Measures the level of consultation between companies and their stakeholders 
Attitude Surveys 
Companies provide their stakeholder groups with one-way communication 
Ile use of attitude surveys shows how keen a company is in finding out their stakeholders' expectations, interests 
and values 
Suggestion Schemes 
One-way Communication 
The use of suggestion schemes shows whether companies kept an open mind to receive suggestions from their 
stakeholders 
4.8 CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS AND NON-RESPONDENTS 
4.8.1 Non-Financial Information Disclosed by Respondents * and Non- 
Respondents 
This section considers the non-financial characteristics of both respondents and non- 
respondents, using the non-financial information indices introduced in Chapter 3. The 
governance and non-governance scores for both respondents and non-respondents are 
shown in Table 4.9. The difference between the two groups in terms of each non- 
financial information category in the index is shown in the third column. 
The results in Table 4.9 indicate that the differences between the statistics on the non- 
governance scores of both the respondents and the non-respondents are not large. For 
instance the non-govemance scores were 58.8% and 52.3% for both respondents and 
non-respondents respectively. Looking at individual non-govemance information 
categories, the respondents had - higher scores for five non-goverriance information 
categories which are: 'discrimination', 'environmental issues', 'renewal of technology', 
, contribution to communities', and 'research and development' (shown in Table 4.9). In 
comparison to the respondents, 'health & safety' and 'working conditions' were the 
only two information categories for which the non-respondents had scored'higher. In 
order to explore the reasons for the observations on 'healthy & safety' and 'working 
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conditions' Table 4.10 presents the industrial affiliations of respondents and non- 
respondents. 
TABLE 4.9 NON-FINANCIAL INFORMATION DISCLOSED By RESPONDENTS AND NON- 
RESPONDENTS 
Respondents Non- Respondents 
Difference between 
Respondents and Non- 
Respondýnts 
Number of Companies 
Non - Governance Index 
1. Environmental Issues 
16 
% 
81.3 
44 
% 
61.4 
% 
19.9 
2. Health & Safety 43.8 50.0 -6.2 
3. Discrimination 68.8 45.5 23.3 
4. Working Conditions 18.8 27.3 45 
5. Training N 75.0 75.0 0.0 
6. Employees Share Ownership 68.8 63.6 5.2 
7. Communication/others 56.3 59.1 -2.8 
8. Communities 75.0 61.4 13.6 
search and Development 43.8 38.6 5.2 
10. Renewal of Technology 56.3 40.9 15.4 
Mean 
Governance Index 
1. Non-Executives Directors 
58.8 
% 
100.0 
523 
% 
97.7 
6.51 
% 
2.3 
2. Executives Directors 100.0 97.7 2.3 
3. Outside Directors 6.3 0.0 6.3 
4. Separation of CEO/Chairman 
Position 
62.5 50.0 12.5 
_5. 
No. of Shares owned by Directors 87.5 93.2 -5.7 
_6. 
No. of Options owned by Directors 93.8 95.5 -1.7 
_7. 
Salary & Bonuses 93.8 100.0 -6.2 
8. Pensions 75.0 70.5 4.5 
9. Audit Committee 87.5 93.2 -5.7 
10. Remuneration Committee 62.5 86.4 -23.9 
11. Nomination Committee 50.0 59.1 -9.1 
12. Environmental Committee 0.0 
- - 
4.5 -4.5 
- 
_13. 
Compensation Committee 15 51 13.6 J 11.4' 
Mean 64.9 1 66.3 1 -1.35 
Notes: Percentages in 'Respondents' and 'Non-Respondents' columns represent the number of companies 
disclosing information. 
In the case of 'health and safety' Table 4.10 shows that non-respondent companies were 
mainly from 'Food Producing', 'Engineering', 'Communication', 'Oil, Gas and Nuclear 
Fuel', 'Retailers', and 'Transport' industries. It is in the nature some of these industries 
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to be involved in operations that require high standards of 'health & safety'. In fact, 
these companies are required by law to comply with 'health and safety' regulations and 
are very likely to be under scrutiny by the activist groups as well as the media for non- 
compliance. 
In the case of 'working conditions' (shown in Table 4.10), the only plausible 
explanation for higher disclosure was that 4 non-respondents were from "Food 
Producing' industry (e. g. 4 out of a total number of 7 non-respondents companies in 
'Food Producing' industry). Companies in Food Producing industry appeared to 
disclose relatively more information on 'working conditions'. It was interesting to 
observe that all companies in 'Food Producer' were non-respondents. At the same time, 
it is worth noting that companies in Food Producer industry face various health and 
safety regulations and guidelines set by Health and Safety Executive (HSE). Many of 
the health and safety guidelines encompass issues related to working conditions. For 
instance, there are explicit guidelines on the safe usage of equipment as well as the safe 
conditions of premises and equipment. There are explicit references to the well being of 
the employees. In a report by HSE (2000), called Injuries and III Health Caused By 
Handling The Food and Drink Industry, reference is made to different injuries and ill 
health caused by working in the industry and provides instructions and guidance as how 
to prevent them. The report refers to activities involving stacking (e. g. trays), cutting 
(e. g. meat), wrapping, packing and positioning (e. g. poultry industry) as specific 
industry causes of illness. 
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TABLE 4.10 INDUSTRIAL AFFILIATION OF RESPONDENTS AND NON-RESPONDENTS 
AND THE NUMBER OF COMPANIES DISCLOSING INFORMATION ON 'HEALTH & 
SAFETY9 AND 6WOREING CONDITIONS9. 
REsPONDENTS 
Industrial Category Total Number of Respondent 
Companies in Each Industrial Group 
Working 
Condition 
Health & 
Safety 
I. Brewers & Distillers 0 0 
2. Electronics; 0 1 
3. Engineering 0 0 
4. Food Retailers 2 0 0 
5. Hotel & Leisure 1 0 1 
6. Media 2 0 0 
7. Merchandising 3 1 2 
8. Oil, Gas& Nuclear Fuels 0 
9. Pharmaceutical 
IO. Retailers 3 0 2 
NON-RESPONDENTS 
Industrial Category Total Number of Non-Respondent 
Companies In Each Industrial Group 
Working 
Condition 
Health & 
Safety 
I -Brewers & Distillers 2 
2-Building & Construction I 
3. Chemicals 2 0 
4-Communications 2 0 2 
S. Distributors 2 0 0 
6. Diversified Industries 4 1 1 
7. Electricity 2 
S. Electronics I 
9. Engineering 5 0 2 
IO. Food producer 7 4 3 
1 I. Food Retailing 1 0 1 
12. Health Care 1 0 0 
U. Merchanding 2 0 0 
14. Oil, Gas & Nuclear Fuels 2 0 2 
15. Paper, Packaging & Printing 1 0 0 
16. Pharmaceuticals 1 0 1 
17. Retailers 3 0 2 
18. Support Services 0 0 
19. Textile 0 1 
1 20. Transport 1 3 
-0 
1 2 
Note: All figures represent the number of companies. The figures in the two columns, named 'Working Conditions' 
and 'Health & Safety', show the number of companies that disclose information on each information category. 
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According to the above observation, even though companies in highly regulated 'Food 
Producer' industry disclosed information on issues relevant to them (i. e. 'Working 
Conditions' and 'Health & Safety'), all of the companies explicitly stated their 
unwillingness to take part in the questionnaire survey which clearly assessed the level of 
interaction between companies and their stakeholders. This could undermine the quality 
of the non-governance information that these companies disclose in the absence of an 
audit procedures or any other regulatory or statutory requirements that would ensure the 
quality of the disclosed non-govemance information. 
The second half of Table 4.9 presented the level of governance information disclosed by 
respondents and non-respondent groups. In the presence of codes of conducts (e. g. 
Cadbury and Greenbury reports), there appeared to be a small discrepancy between the 
two groups. On average, the respondent companies had scored slightly lower (i. e. 64.9% as 
compared to 66.3% of non-respondents). 
The above observation on governance score is not at all unexpected. All companies 
selected for the purpose of this survey were among the Top 100 companies and were 
expected to highly, if not fully, comply with the Cadbury's requirements. Although the 
overall governance scores did not distinguish between the two groups, there were a few 
information categories in the governance index that were considerably higher for. the 
respondents. For instance, 'outside directors' is one of those categories. By definition, 
there is no difference between outside directors and non-executive directors. However, 
6.25% of respondents, as compared to 0% of non-respondents, showed that they had 
outside directors in addition to their non-executives directors (see Table 4.9). None of 
the respondents were approached and asked why they made such a distinction. It is 
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nevertheless assumed that by outside directors companies meant those non-executive 
directors who were completely independent with no previous connections or any 
indirect links with the company. In other words, the respondent companies indicated the 
presence of more independent external bodies in their governance structures than the 
non-respondents did. 
The other governance information category that was considerably different for the two 
groups was 'separation of chief executive officer (CEO) and Chairman Positions'. The 
evidence showed that 62.5% of respondents had two separate positions in comparison to 
50% of non-respondents. Clearly, the respondent companies had taken more 
independent measures in their monitoring systems than the non-respogdent companies 
had. 
In the case of directors' pecuniary benefits, the evidence showed that the respondents 
scored higher for 'pension schemes' and 'compensation committees', suggesting that 
higher independent measures were taken by respondents (see Table 4.9). This was, 
however, contradicted when the non-respondents scored higher for 'number of shares 
owned by directors', 'number of options owned by directors, 'salary & bonuses' and 
Gremuneration committee'. The evidence is therefore contradictory and no distinction 
between respondents and non-respondents could be made in relation to their pecuniary 
benefits. 
4.8.2 Financial Characteristics of Respondents and Non-Respondents 
This section examines if non-respondents had certain financial characteristics, which were 
distinctly different from respondents. Several financial characteristics were selected. 
Profitability and sales were selected to represent corporate financial performance and 
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corporate size respectively. Respondent companies with higher profit and sales figures are 
expected to be able to dedicate more financial resources to respond to the questionnaires. 
'Number of employees' was also selected as an alternative measure of size, despite being a 
non-financial measure, and was used to measure managerial efficiency in terms of both 
profit and sales. Respondents were also expected to have more efficient managers who 
would be more willing to participate in the survey. There are different measures of 
managerial efficiency but it was decided to choose efficiency in terms of employees as 
employees form one of the most important stakeholder groups. 
Table 4.11 revealed that the respondents had higher medians and considerably smaller 
coefficient of variations for sales and profit. In addition, respondents had higher efficiency 
ratios as compared to non-respondents. As shown in Table 4.11, sales per employees and 
profit per employees are both higher for the respondent companies than for -the non- 
respondent ones, suggesting higher fmancial performance and efficiency of respondents. 
TABLE 4.11 FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS AND NON- 
RESPONDENTS 
RESPONDENTS NON- RESPONDEN TS 
Financial Information Median 
W000) 
Std dev 
(L'OOO) 
CoVar 
% 
Median 
--- 
(L'OOO) 
Std dev 
W000) 
CoVar 
% 
Sales 95 4,887,699 2,096,486 46 3,663,884 9,829,429 150 
Profit 95 655,900 1,608,343 124 399,100 1,895,815 163 
Prorit per Employees 95 18.32 25.65 92 15-99 25.00 111 
Sales per Employees 95 114.60 29.03 28 105.14 153.05 104 
Notes: Std Dev stands for standard deviation, and CVar stands for Co-efficient of Variation. 
The median values for the 'Number of Employees' of Respondents and Non-Respondents are 37,100 and 
39,482. 
The respondent companies also emerged to have smaller numbers of employees than the 
non-respondents. Considering that the degree of variation in the number of employees is 
noticeably higher for the non-respondents (i. e. 108% as compared to 51% for the 
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respondents), the median values are still lower for the respondents than for the non- 
respondents. This implies that companies who were not interested to participate in the 
survey had a larger number of employees t1m companies who willingly participated. 
With higher sales and profit figures, coupled with, a smaller number of employees, 
respondent companies had used their employees more efficiently in generating profit as 
well as selling their products and services (see Table 4.11). These companies had also 
scored higher in terms of non-governance scores. Financial strength is clearly one of the 
major reasons that explains why respondents were willing to participate in the survey. In 
addition, smaller number of employees could be regarded as another reason why 
respondent companies had disclosed more information on issues related to employees (i. e. 
'discrimination and equal opportunity' as shown in Table 4.9). Conversely, larger number 
of employees and weaker financial resources (e. g. lower profits) were the main 
characteristics of non-respondents. In a study by Watson (1997), empirical evidence 
suggested that companies with larger number of employees have more underpaid 
employees, and hence fail to deliver high level of employment benefits to their employees. 
The implication of Watson's finding is in line with the finding of this study where non- 
respondents were found to have lower employees' share ownership than respondents' did. 
4.9 APPLICATION OF STATISTICAL TESTS To DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE 
FINANCIAL AND NON-FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF. REsPONDENTS AND NON- 
RESPONDENTS 
In this section two statistical tests are carried out to probe if financial or non-financial 
characteristics of companies could distinguish between the two groups of respondents. 
These financial and non-financial characteristics of respondents and non-respondents 
were the swne as the ones selected for sections 4.8.1 and 4.8.2. 
171 
Chapter 4 
4.9.1 T-test for Independent-Samples for Financial Characteristics 
In order to investigate whether corporate financial characteristics are associated with 
companies' decision to take part in the survey '! -test for independent samples' was 
carried out. The independent-samples' West compares whether the mean values of two 
different groups are the same 73 . The results revealed that there were not significant 
differences between the corporate characteristics such as sales, total number of 
employees, and profit of respondents and non-respondents (see Appendix 4H). - 
4.9.2 Mann-Whitney Test for Non-Financial Scores 
To test whether there were any differences between non-financial information scores of 
respondents and non-respondents, Mann-Whitney test was used. Mann-Whitney test is 
the alternative non-parametric test to the independent-samples t-te ýtU . The results 
(shown in Appendix 41) showed that there was no difference between the governance, 
non-governance and total scores of respondents and non-respondents. 
4.9.3 Logit AnaIysis 
It could be the case that companies with a combination of financial or non-financial 
characteristics decided not to co-operate with the survey. In'order to investigate whether 
this was the case, a combination of financial and non-financial characteristics were 
selected (see Table Q, Appendix 4J). 
Companies with larger numbers of employees were expected to be less interested in the 
issues related to employees (i. e. the issues mainly addressed in the questionnaire) and 
73 Independent-sample West is computed the same way as the ANOVA test that was explained in section 
4-6. The only difference is that independent-sampIe t-test is carried out for two groups whereas ANOVA 
test is carried for more than two groups. 
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therefore less co-operation was expected of them. At the same time, companies with 
larger sales and profit figures were expected to be more co-operative with the survey. 
Also, those companies that efficiently used their employees in generating profit and 
sales were expected to respond to the questionnaire survey. 
Based on the findings of section 4.8.1, it was expected that companies with low non- 
governance scores were unwilling to co-operate in the survey. Although the 
questionnaire did not consider any of the issues related to the governance structure of 
companies, the findings of the previous chapter suggested that governance and non- 
governance scores were correlated in 1995. It would be, therefore, reasonable to expect 
that companies with lower governance scores would also be unlikely to respond to the 
survey. 
Given the nominal nature of the response variable and the ordinal nature of the financial 
variables, a model that was able to use both types of data was required. It was, therefore, 
decided to use logit analysis as it. allowed the simultaneous use of nominal and ordinal 
variables. In logit analysis, a regression model which is used to estimate the probability 
of an event occurring or not, i. e. responding or non-responding. The model is written as: 
eZ 
Prob(event) =P+ 
ez 
Equation (1) represents what is known as the (cumulative) logistic distribution 
function. And Z is the linear combination and is as follows: 
74 Mann-Whitney test is computed exactly the same way as the Kruskal Wallis's test that was explained in 
section 4.6. The only difference is that Mann-Whitney test is used for two groups whereas Kruskal 
Wallis's test is used for more than two groups. 
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Z ý-- PO + PIXI + P2X2 + --- +PnXn 
Where, 
On = coefficients estimated from the data, 
X. = independent variables (in this case the percentage change in the performance 
measures) 
e= the base of natural logarithms 
Variable Z ranges from -oo and +oo, and P ranges between 0 and 1, where P is non- 
linearly related to Z. If P represents the probability of responding, as given by equation 
(1), then (I - P) is the probability of not responding and it is shown below as: 
+ez 
The above equation can be re-written as: 
p+ ez 
-- = ez 
I-P + e-z 
P/(I-P) is simply the odds ratio in favour of responding to the questionnaire (i. e. the 
ratio of the probability that a company will respond to the questionnaire to the 
probability that it will not respond to the questionnaire). Taking the natural log of the 
odds ratio results in linear Z, 
In G pp) = 
"ý 00 + PIXI + 02X2 + ... +PnXn 
Where 
P =probability of responding 
Pn = coefficients estimated from the data, 
X= independent 
, 
variables (in this case the percentage change in the performance 
measures) 
174 
Chapter 4 
Logistic regression estimates the parameers of the model using the, maximum 
likelihood method. 
The analysis was run in two different stages. Firstly, the model simply included the non- 
financial scores as independent variables. In the second stage, financial characteristics 
were included in the regression model in addition to non-financial scores to see if this 
gave a greater goodness of fit. No significant improvement was observed and none of 
the above combinations gave a significant model (the results are shown in Table 4J in 
Appendix Q). The overall results indicated that neither the financial nor the non- 
financial characteristics of companies were determining factors in companies' decisions 
to participate in the survey. 
4.10 CONCLUSION 
This chapter began by providing discussion on the methodological issues and arguments 
as which methods were most suited to conduct investigation on the research questions 
of this research project. This was done in section 4.2 where different methodologies in 
social sciences were discussed and explored. It was argued that the research 
methodology adopted in this study fell in the fields of positivist and deductive 
approaches. It was argued ihat deductive approach was selected as the research 
questions were developed from the existing literature. In addition, the research 
methodology was argued to be located within the field of positivism as it relies on 
empirical findings rather than the opinions of individuals or groups in society to answer 
the research questions. It was also argued that the methodology adopted in this research 
project is undoubtedly an applied one, as it was decided to use data gathering and 
analysis techniques to answer research questions. 
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In section 4.3, it was illustrated why content analysis and postal questionnaires were 
selected as the appropriate methods of data collection for this research project. While 
content analysis is used to gather data that can be analysed to answer the first key 
research question (i. e. whether there were any associations between corporate 
characteristics and the level of non-financial information disclosed), the postal 
questionnaires were de&ided to be the appropriate method to gather data for the second 
key research question (i. e. the state stakeholder dialogue between UK coml)aniýs and 
their stakeholder groups). It was also contended that the two methods were selected 
after considering the limitations that were imposed on the research project. For instance, 
as there was only one coder (i. e. the author) indexing which is the simplest form of 
content analysis was argued to produce the most reliable outcomes. 
In section 4.4, discussion was presented on the choice of data sources. It was argued that 
for the content analysis, annual reports of the Top 100 UK companies are used as the 
main data source. Several reasons were stated for this choice among which annual 
reports being the main corporate document can be regarded as the most important 
reason. It was decided to select the Top 100 UK companies as they represented the 
major changes among UK companies. 
In the case of the questionnaire survey, it was decided to send questionnaires to three 
groups: company secretaries, investors and employees. As the questionnaires were 
aiming to assess the state of stakeholder dialogue between UK companies and their 
stakeholder groups, it was important to selected companies and two stakeholder groups 
to be able to view the state of stakeholder dialogue from different perspectives. 
Institutional investors and trade union representatives were selected to present investors 
and employees, respectively. Trade unions were decided to be the best representatives 
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of employees who could be approached and would provide responses with the lowest 
possible bias. The responses to the questionnaires from each group were also analysed 
in this section. 
In section 4.5, evidence was produced on the level of non-financial information 
disclosed by the UK companies in three years: 1985,1990 and 1995. Having observed 
evidence on the rising level of non-firiancial information, it was argued that it was 
possible to proceed with this research project. The findings from this section clearly 
showed that the level of non-firiancial information disclosed by UK companies had risen 
considerably from 1985 to 1995. This rise was observed for both the governance and 
non-governance indices. This section provided insight into the increasing level of 
disclosure for different information categories. This section was followed by section 4.6 
where different methods of data analysis were discussed. It was decided to use 
Spearman rank correlation and Kruskal-Wallis test as the main statistical tests for the 
analysis of data gathered for the investigation of the first key research question (i. e. to 
examine the associations between corporate characteristics and the level of non- 
financial information disclosed). 
In section 4.7, questionnaire design was discussed to explain how each question was 
aimed at addressing different aspects of stakeholder dialogue which were highlighted by 
research questions 5 and 6. It was illustrated how different questions were posed and 
exactly which aspects of stakeholder dialogue they were trying to address. In the case of 
postal questionnaires, it was argued that most of the correspondents were not easy to 
approach and hence it was not possible to hold interviews with them. For instance, it 
was possible to send questionnaires to trade union representatives only once. Trade 
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unions who kindly agreed to co-operate in the survey were far too busy to send out a 
pilot questionnaire. This also lead to questionnaires being sent out only once. 
The non-financial and financial characteristics of respondents and non-respondents were 
considered in section 4.8 to find out if they were differences in the non-financial 
characteristics of the two groups. The non-financial characteristics were measured in 
terms of non-financial information categories disclosed by companies. The findings 
suggested that the respondents had higher non-govemance scores than the non- 
respondents did. Further analysis showed that, for instance, many of the non- 
respondents were from heavily regulated 'Food Producer' industries where companies 
appeared to disclose more information on 'working conditions' as required by Health 
and Safety Executives. Despite many of these companies divulging information on both 
'health & safety' and 'working conditions' they explicitly stated their unwillingness to 
respond to the questionnaires. This finding raised the issue of the quality of non- 
governance information that companies disclose in the absence of any regulatory or 
statutory requirements to ensure the quality of the disclosed non-govemance 
information. In the case of non-govemance information no significant difference was 
observed between respondents and non-respondents. The introduction of the Cadbury 
code of best practice followed by a series of regulatory recommendations on governance 
issues was regarded as one of the main reasons for this observation. 
The financial characteristics were measured in terms of sales, profit and efficiency (i. e. 
generation of sales and profit per employee). It was found that respondents were 
generally in a much better financial position than the non-respondents were. However, 
the results for statistical tests (shown in section 4.9) revealed no significant statistical 
differences between the groups of respondents and non-respondents. 
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CHAPTER 5 ANALYSIS OF NON-FINANCIAL INFORMATION 
DISCLOSURE - EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE I 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on the empirical investigation of the first key research question, 
using content analysis in order to find out "whether companies disclose non-financial 
information to legitimise their corporate behaviours to their stakeholder groups? " 
Investigation is carried out by seeking to gather empirical evidence on supporting 
research questions I to 4, presented in Chapter 3. Supporting research questions 1,2,3 
and 4 focus on examining the significance of association of non-financial information 
disclosure with corporate characteristics. These characteristics are: industrial affiliation, 
corporate size, corporate growth rate and different aspects of corporate performance. 
For each supporting research question, investigation is carried out using the relevant 
techniques that were discussed in Chapter 3. The four supporting research questions are 
investigated in sections 5.2,5.3,5.4 and 5.5. Each section comprises of two sub- 
sections. In the first sub-section, entitled 'descriptive analysis', empirical evidence is 
presented in different formats (e. g. basic statistics, cross-tabulation and statistical tests). 
In the second sub-section, entitled 'analytical discussion', the results are analysed in 
order to answer the relevant supporting question, where each question is answered in 
terms of the three indices (i. e. total index, non-governance index and governance index) 
for each of the three years under investigation (i. e. 1985,1990 and 1995). 
Section 5.6 presents a summary of the empirical findings and links the findings to the 
previous literature. The chapter concludes in section 5.7, where the overall results for all 
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of the four supporting research questions are used to answer the first key research 
question. 
5.2 INDUSTRIAL AFFILIATION AND NON-FINANCIAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE 
This section investigates the first supporting research question which is presented as: 
"Are there any associations between industrial affiliation and the 
level of non-financial information disclosed by the major UK 
companies? " 
As discussed in Chapter 4, many researchers argue that the level of non-financial 
information disclosure depends on the type of the industry to which a company belongs 
(Cowen, Ferrier and Parker, 1987; Gul, Andrew and Teoh, 1984; Kelly, 1979; 'Ingram, 
1978; and many other studies that were shown in Table 3.6 in Chapter 3). Furthermore, 
stakeholder groups in one industry may impose common demands and pressures on 
companies in that industry. While on the other hand, different industries are expected to 
attach varying degree of importance to each stakeholder group. 
5.2.1 Descriptive Analysis 
In order to be able to carry out empirical investigation, companies are classified into 
five main industrial sectors (and 23 sub-sectors) using FT-SE Actuaries Industry 
Classification (see Appendix 5A - Table 5A, Columns INDUST, CINDUST and A). 
5.2.1.1 BasicStatistics 
Table 5.1 presents the mean values of non-financial scores for companies in different 
industries as well as the coefficient of variation of non-financial inforniation scores 
within each industrial category. 
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TABLE 5.1 INDUSTRIAL CATEGORIES AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
TscS5 NGsc85 Gsc85 
Industrial Categories Mean Coeff of Var (%) Mean 
Coeff Of 
Var (%) mean 
Coeff of 
Var (%) 
A. Mineral Extraction 0.43 147 0.67 173 0.18 138 
B. General Industries 0.16 75 0.11 150 0.22 53 
C. Consumer Goods 0.23 57 0.17 103 0.29 48 
D. Services 0.20 48 0.13 115 0.27 56 
E. Utilities 0.27 62 0.20 141 0.35 16 
Tsc90 NGsc90 G C90 
Industrial Categories Mean Coeff of Var (%) Mean 
Coeff of 
Va L(! /. ) 
Mean 
- 
Coeff of 
Var (%) 
A. Mineral Extraction 0.47 29 0.33 69 0.61 7.9 
B. Geneml Industries 0.42 32 0.35 66 0.48 38 
C. Consumer Goods 0.42 30 0.41 47 0.43 40 
D. Services 0.39 35 0.34 69 0.45 21 
E. Utilities 0.51 53 0.51 113 0.52 5 
Tsc95 NGsc95 Gsc95 
Industrial Categories Mean Coeff of Var (L*L Mean 
Coeff of 
Var (%) Mean 
Coeff of 
A. Mineral Extraction 0.70 11 0.67 23 0.74 6 
B. General Industries _ 0.61 19 0.54 42 0.69 12 
C. Consum r Goods 0.61 19 0.56 32 0.65 65 
D. Services FO. 58 26 0.52 45 
- 
0.64 
- 
20 
E. Utilities 1 0.64 15 0.70 1 20 0 755787 9 
Notes: FT-SE Actuaries Industry Classification Definitions was used for industrial classification (Stock 
Exchange Yearbook, 1994-95). 
Tsc stands for total non-financial scores, NGsc stands for non-governance scores, and Gsc stands for 
governance scores. Coeff of Var stands for coefficient of variation. 
1985 
The results suggest that the total non-financial information scores for both 'mineral 
extraction' and 'utilities' industries were the highest scores in 1985, whilst companies in 
'general' and 'services' industries scored the lowest in the sarne year. 
When the total index was broken down into non-govemance and governance indices, 
the difference between the highest and the lowest non-governance scores (i. e. 0.67 - 
0.11 = 0.56) was considerably larger than the difference between the highest and the 
lowest govemance scores (i. e. 0.35 - 0.18 = 0.17). This suggests that there were more 
companies from different industrial groups disclosing differing levels of governance 
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information. Apart from the coefficient of variation for the 'mineral extraction' 
industry, the coefficient of variation of each industrial group was smaller for the 
governance scores than for the non-governanpe scores, supporting the earlier 
presumption that most UK companies attached similar -importance to the disclosure of 
governance information regardless of their industrial affiliations. 
1990 
By 1990, the overall level of non-fmancial information disclosure had risen 
jor 
all 
industries with lower values of coefficient of variation, indicating that more companies 
were disclosing non-financial information relative to 1985. The results show that the 
governance scores of companies in all industries were higher than their non-gov. emance 
scores and the values of coefficient of variation were lower for governance scores than 
for non-governance scores. 
The difference between the highest and the lowest non-governance scores was almost 
similar to that of 1985 (e. g. 0.51-0.33=0.18 in 1990 relative to 0.17 in 1985). 
Companies in the 'Utility' industries, which had major new entrants in the newly 
privatised gas distribution (e. g. British Gas Plc) and electricity (e. g. PowerGen Plc and 
National Power Plc) sub-sectors, had the highest non-governance scores (i. e. 0.51). 
These new entrants could be regarded as the reason for the higher non-governance 
scores of these industries relative to the other four industrial groups, which had 
relatively similar non-governance scores. 
1995 
In 1995, finther increase was observed in the total scores of companies in all industries 
with even lower values of the coefficient of variation in comparison to 1990. Apart from 
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the 'Utility' industry, the governance scores of all other four industries were higher than 
their non-governance scores. 
The non-governance scores of both 'Utilities' and 'Mineral Extraction' industries were 
higher than the other three industries. This could be due to the higher pressures for the 
disclosure of non-governance information within the 'Utilities' industry. At the same 
time, the lower values of coefficient of variation illustrated a wider spread of companies 
across industries with higher levels of both non-goverriance and governance 
information. 
5.21.2 Cross-Tabulation 
While the previous section presented basic statistics, this section presents the difference 
between the means of non-fmancial information scores for different industries using 
cross-tabulation. The five industrial categories were cross-tabulated over ten categories 
of non-financial information scores. The cross-tabulation tables, (Tables 5.2,5.3 and 
5.4), present a spread of the companies from various industrial backgrounds across non- 
financial information scores categories. 
The cross-tabulation of total scores against industrial categories, shown in Table 5.2, 
showed that companies from certain industries (e. g. 'General Industries' and 'Consumer 
Goods') disclosed a slightly higher level of non-financial information in 1985. But in 
general cross-tabulations of industrial categories against total scores did not provide 
enough grounds to discuss any potential reason. It was, therefore, decided to cross- 
tabulate industrial categories against non-governance and governance scores. 
Cross-tabulation of non-governance scores is shown in Table 5.3. The evidence reveals 
that in both 1985 and 1990, companies from certain industries - (e. g. "General industries', 
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'Consumer Goods' and 'Services' in 1985, and 'Services' and Utilities' in 1995) had 
achieved higher non-govemance scores than companies in other industries. In 1995, 
there appeared to be an even spread for different industries across non-governance 
categories, suggesting that companies in different industries disclosed similar levels of 
non-governance information. 
In the case of governance scores, the cross-tabulation table (see Table 5.4) shows that a 
few companies appeared to have scored higher in 1985 and 1990. For instance, in 1985 
a few companies in 'Service', 'Consumer Goods' and 'Mineral Extraction' had scored 
higher than companies in other industries. And in 1990, a few companies in 'General 
Industries' and 'Consumer Goods' had scored higher than companies in other industries. 
In 1995, companies from different industries appeared to have similar governance 
scores. 
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TABLE 5.2 CROSS-TABULATION OF INDUSTRIAL CATEGORV AGAINST TOTAL INDEX 
Indust ial Categorv 
Count Mineral General Consumer Services utilities Row Total % Extraction Industries Goods Total 
0.0 -0 0" 
2 1 4 1 
. 3.1 12.5 3.1 3.1 21.9 
0.1-0 199 8 8 6 1 23 . 12.5 12.5 9.4 1.6 35.9 
0.2-0 299 1 3 2 7 13 . 1 .6 
4.7 3 1_ 10.9 20.3 
W) 0.3-0.399 
1 
1.6 
2 
3.1 
3 
4.7 
4 
6.3 
1 
1.6 
11 
17.2 
0.4-0.499 1.6 
2 
3.1 
3 
4.7 
0.5-0.599 
0.6-0.699 
0.7-0.799 
0.8-0.899 
0.9-1.00 
Column 4 22 17 19 2 64 
Total 63 34.4 26.5 297 32 100 
Indust rial Catego 
Count Mineral General Consumer Services Utilities Row 
Total % Extraction Industries G Total 
0.0 - 0.0" 
0.1-0.199 3 4.1 1A 
4 
5.5 
0.2-0.299 2 2.7 
3 
4.1 
3 
4.1 
8 
11.0 
0.3-0.399 2 2.7 
7 
9.6 
3 
4.1 
7 
9.6 
1 
14 
20 
27.4 
0.4-0.499 3 41 
9 
12.3 
6 
8.2 
5 
68 
1 
JA 
24 
319 
0.5-0.599 1 
5 
68 
4 
55 14 14 15 1 
0.6-0.699 11.4 1 1.4 
2 
27 
--- 
4 
55 
0.7-0.799 1.4 
1 
14 
2 
2,7 
.- . 899 
0.9-1.00 
Column 6 -6 27 77 19 4 73 
Total 82 82 37ýO 23 3 260 55 100 
Industr ial Categor 
Count Mineral General Consumer Services Utilities 
Row 
Total % Extraction Industries Goods Total 
0.0- 0.099 
0.1-0.199 
0.2-0.299 L4 L 1A 
2 
2.8 
0.3-0.399 
1 
11 A 
:4 
Ch 0.4-0.499 
4 
5.6 
2 
2,8 
6 
8.5 
0.5-0.599 
1 
6 
8.5 
6 
8.5 
5 
8.5 
1 
1A 
18 
25 4 
0.6-0.699 2 
28 
'0 
14.1 
8 
113 
6 
8.5 
2 
2.8 
28 
39.4 
0.7-0.799 3 
42 
4 
5.6 
2 
2.9 
2 
2.8 
1 
1.4 
12 
16.9 
0.8-0.899 1 
1.4 
1 
1.4 
1 
1.4 
ý. 
4_ 
4 
5.6 
0.9-1.00 
column s 25 18 18 5 71 
Total o 7 352 25.4 254 7.0 1 100 
Notes: TSc stands for total scores. 
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TABLE 5.3 CRoss-TABULATION OF INDUSTRIAL OF INDUSTRIAL CATEGORY AGAINST 
NON-GOVERNANCEINDEX 
Industri I Category 
Count Mineral General Consumer Services Utilities 
Row 
Total % Extraction Industries Goods Total 
0.0- 0.099 2 31 
13 
203 
6 
9.4 
6 
94 
ý. 
6 
28 
43 8 
0.1 - 0.1" 
2 
31 
3 
4.7 
7 
10.9 
12 
18.7 
0.2-0.299 2 
3A 
2 
3.1 
3 
4.7 
2 
3A 
9 
14ýO 
Wý 
0.3-0.399 2 3.1 
3 
4.7 
5 
7.8 
0.4-0.499 2 3.1 
2 
3.1 
1 
1.6 
5 
7.8 
1 2 2 5 
Z 0.5-0.599 1.6 31 3.1 7.8 
0.6-0.699 
0.7-0.799 
.- . 899 
0.9-1.00 
Columa 3 
E 
22 17 19 2 64 
TOW 6.2 344 26.6 297 31 100 
Industria l Category 
Count Mineral General Consumer Services Utilities 
Row 
Total % Extraction Industries Goods Total 
0.0- 0.099 1 
14 
3 
4ý2 
3 
4.2 
7 
9.8 
0.1-0.199 6 8.5 
32 
4 
4 
5.6 
1 
1.4 
14 
19.7 
0.2-0.299 
4 
2 
2.8 
11 
A 5.6 
0.3-0.399 
1.4 
3 
4.2 
2 
28 
4 
5.6 
10 
14.1 
0.4-0.499 1 
1.4 
4 
56 
5 
7.0 
5 
7.0 
1 
1A 
16 
22.5 
z 
0.5-0.599 
14 
6- 4 
5.6 
1 
L4 
12 
16.9 
1 3 0.6-0.699 
1.4 1.4 
:. 
4 4.3 
0.7-0.799 1.4 
1 
1.4 
1 2 0.8-0.899 LA 1.4 - 
2.8 
1 2 
0.9-1. 14T 4 2.8 
Column 27 17 19 3 71 
Total 38 1 23 9 26.6 
4.3 100 
Industri I Category 
Count Mineral General Consumer Services Utilities 
Row 
Total % Extraction Industries Goods Total 
0.0- 0.099 
0.1-0.199 2 2.8 
1 
1A 
1 
1.4 
4 
5.6 
0.2-0.299 
1 
1.4 
1 
1.4 
0.3-0.399 '1.4 
5 
6+9 
6 
8.3 
all 
W 
0.4-0.499 5 69 
2 
2.8 
1 
1.4 
9 
11.1 
0.5-0.599 1 
14 
4 
5.6 
7 
9.7 
1 
1.4 
3 1181 
- 
0.6-0.699 1 
14 
7 
9.7 
5 
6.9 
6 
8.3 
3(60.0) 
4.2 
22 
306 
0.7-0.799 :4 2 2.8 
3 
4.2 
. 99 
1 
141 
3 
4.2 
2 
2+8 
3 
4.2 
1(20 
+ 
6) 
1A 
10 
13ý9 
0.9-1.00 :. 4 
1 
1.4 
1 
1.4 1.4 
1 1 (20.0) 
1.4 
- 
5 
6.9 
Column 4 25 Is 19 5 
72 
Total 7.0 34.7 25.0 26.4 7.0 100 
Notes: NGSc stands for non-govemance scores. 
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TABLE 5.4 CROSS-TABULATION OF INDUSTRIAL CATEGORY AGAINST GOVERNANCE 
INDEX 
Industria Category 
Count Mineral General Consumer Services Utilities Row 
Total % Extraction Industries Goods Total 
0.0 - 0.0" 
1 
31 
8 
12 5 
3 
4,7 
4 
6.3 
17 
26.6 
0.1 - 0.1" 
2 
3.1 
1 
1,6 
3 
4.7 
0.2-0.299 
6 
94 
4 
6.3 
6 
9.4 
16 
250 
lfý 00 0.3-0.399 1 16 
6 
9.4 
7 
10.9 
5 
78 
2 
31 
21 
32.8 
C. ) 
rA 0.4-0.499 6 
3 
4.7 
2 
3.1 
6 
9.4 
0.5-0.599 1 1.6 
1 
1.6 
0.6-0.699 
0.7-0.799 
0.8-0.899 
0.9-1.00 
Column 4 22 17 9 2 64 
Total 6.2 34 4 26 6 29.7 3.1 100 
Industria l Category 
Count Mineral General Consumer ervices Utilities 
Row 
Total % Extraction Industries Goods Total 
0.0 - 0.0" 
2 
27 7 2 
0.1-0.199 
11.4 ýA 
1 3 6 0.2-0.299 1.4 4.1 1.4 1.4 8.1 
5 3- 4 12 0-3-0.399 6.8 4.1 5.4 16.2 
W- 3 5 15 
0.4-0.499 1A 8.1 41 &8 20.3 
4 8 5 10 3 30 
0.5-0.599 5.4 10.8 6.8 13 5 4A 40,5 
1 3 1 5 0.6-0.699 1.4 4.1 1.4 6.8 
F- 1 
0.7-0.799 1.4 1.4 
1 1 2 
0.8-0.899 1.4 1.4 1 2.7 
0.9-1.00 
Column 6 2 
L77 
17 20 4 74 
1 Total 8.2 36 23ýO 27,0 
5.4 100 
Industrial Category 
Count Mineral 6eneral Consumer Services Utilities Row 
Total % Extraction Industries Goods Total 
0.0 - 0.0" 
0.1-0.199 
0.2-0.299 
0.3-0.399 2.8 2.8 
41ý 0, 0.4-0.499 1.4 
:A 2 
2.9 
0.5-0.599 
1 
1.4 
3 
4.2 
3 
4.2 4 
8 
11.3 
3 13 -jo 9 3 38 
0.6-0.699 42 18.3 14.1 1 12.7 4.2 53.5 
0.7-0.799 2 8 10 14.1 
4 
5.6 
3 
4.2 1.4_ 
20 
28 
.2 
9 
1 
4 
_L. 
4 
1 
14 
0.9-1.00 
Column 5 25 19 18 5 71 
Total 
1 
70 1 35.2 25.4 25.4 7ýO 1 
00 
Notes: GSc stands for governance scores. 
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In the above cross-tabulation tables, the number of cells with the expected number of 
less than 5 companies was well above 20%. This meant that statistical tests could not be 
carried out unless the number of cells with an expected number of less than 5 companies 
was well below 20%. To overcome this problem, both the non-financial scores and the 
industrial categories were re-categorised into a smaller number of categories. This time, 
the industrial categories were classified into 2 main categories of 'industrial' and 'non- 
industrial' categories (See Appendix SA - Table 5A, Column B). These two 
categories were then used for all the three years under investigation. Non-financial 
scores were also re-categorized. The cross-tabulation tables showed that as the level of 
non-financial information increased from 1985 to 1995 (i. e. Figure 4.5), the spread of 
companies in different industrial categories shifted to higher levels of non-financial 
information scores. Hence, different re-categorization of non-financial scores was 
required for each of the three years under investigation (see Appendix 513, Table 513). 
5.2-1.3 Spearman Rank Correlation and Kruskal Wallis ]-Way ANOVA Test 
Having re-categorised both non-financial scores and industrial categories, statistical 
tests were conducted to probe significant association between corporate characteristics 
and non-financial information disclosure. 
The results for Spearman Rank correlation and Kruskal Wallis tests (shown in Table 
5.5) showed that the only observable significant associations between the industrial 
classification and total scores were in 1985. No significant link was found for either 
1990 or 1995. This was not, however, the case when the total non-financial index was 
broken down into non-govemance and governance indices. 
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Significant associations were found between industrial categories and governance 
scores in both 1985 and 1995. No significant association was found between industrial 
classification and either of the categories in 1990. In 1995, the governance scores, 
which had risen to an even higher level relative to 1990, was found to be associated 
with industrial categories, suggesting that companies in certain industries had higher 
governance scores than companies in other industries. 
TABLE 5.5 SPEARMAN RANK CORRELATION AND KRuSKAL-WALLIS 1-WAY ANOVA 
TEST 
Non-Financial 
Scores 
Spearman Rank 
Correlation 
Sig Level 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Chi-square 
Sig Level 
Tsc85 0.29 0.02 5.10 0.02 
Tsc90 -0.06 0.59 0.29 0.59 
Tsc95 -0.15 0.20 1.66 0.20 
NGsc85 0.17 0.17 1.87 0.17 
NGsc90 -0.06 0.64 0.23 0.63 
NGsc95 -0.10 0.43 0.64 0.42 
Gsc85 0.22 0.07 3.13 0.0 
Gsc90 -0.06 0.63 0.23 
0.63 
Gsc95 -0.26 0.05 4.81 O. A - 
As for the non-govemance scores, no significant association was found with industrial 
categories in either of the three years. This was despite the continuous rise in the non- 
governance scores from 1985 to 1995 and the earlier expectations that were discussed in 
section 3.3.1. 
5.2.2 Analytical Discussion 
The results found in this section provides answers to the first supporting research 
question, which is: "whether there was any association between industrial affiliation 
and the level of non-financial information disclosure? ". The overall evidence used in 
answering this question is presented below: 
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Total Scores Non-Governance Scores Governance Scores 
1985 V x W, 
1990 x x x 
1995 x x V 
V' denotes association between industrial affiliation and non-financial information scores. 
'X ' denotes no association between industrial affiliation and non-financial information scores. 
The above summary shows that only three significant associations were observable for 
the first supporting research question. The three associations were between industrial 
categories and (i) total scores in 1985, and (ii) governance scores in 1985 and 1995. 
Total Scores 
Basic statistics showed that in 1985 and 1995 companies from certain industries 
reported higher levels of non-financial information than companies in other industries. 
For instance, companies in 'Mineral Extraction' and 'Utilities' industries were scoring 
the highest in 1985 and 1995. The two industries, which included 'Gas Distribution'74 , 
'Electricity 75 and 'Telecommunication 76 as their sub-sectors, had a number of new 
entrants between 1985 and 1995. In the author's view, the new entrants can be regarded 
as the possible reason explaining why companies from these two industries had the 
highest total scores for 1985 and 1995. The new entrants were under scrutiny and 
pressure to be transparent about their decision making processes, which could affect 
their customers' welfare and interests. 
While the cross-tabulation tables do not show that companies in any specific industry 
disclosed higher or lower levels of non-financial infonnation, the statistical tests 
revealed significant association between the level of non-financial information and 
74 British Gas became a public limited company in December 1986. 75 PowerGen (was a public company by 1989) and National Power (went public in March 199 1). 76 British Telecom became a public limited company on November 1984. 
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industrW affiliation in 1985. In comparison to 1985, neither the cross-tabulation tables 
nor any of the statistical tests provided any evidence to suggest that in 1990 and 1995 
companies in certain industries had disclosed higher or lower levels of non-financial 
information than companies in other industries. 
A potential reason for the lack of association in 1990 and 1995 could be rooted in the 
increasing level of non-financial information from 1985 to 1995 (shown in Figure 4.5). 
It is important to remember at this point that the indices used in this study picked up the 
overall rise in the level of non-financial information and did not measure the extent of 
non-financial information disclosed by companies (i. e. this was explained in section 
3.3.1). This is an important point to consider when discussing non-financial information 
disclosure by companies in different industries, as one would expect that some 
companies disclose more information on certain aspects (e. g. non-managerial aspects) 
due to the nature of their operations. For instance, even though companies in 'Oil 
Integrated' sub-sector are expected to have extensive environmental reports in 
comparison to companies in 'Hotel and Leisure' industry, the index assigned a score of 
one to companies disclosing information on environmental issues regardless of the 
quantity of information being reported. Bearing this in mind, it can be argued that in 
1985 when public awareness had not started to rise, only companies in certain industries 
were under pressure to disclose non-financial information. By 1990 and, subsequently, 
1995, public awareness had already risen and companies in all industries were expected 
to report on different managerial and non-managerial issues. 
To have better insight on the findings, the empirical findings for governance and non- 
governance indices are examined below. 
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Non-governance scores 
According to the basic statistics, the highest scores were obtained for 'Mineral 
Extraction' industry in 1985 and for 'Utilities' industry in 1990 and 1995. Despite these 
observations, the statistical tests revealed no significant association between industrial 
affiliation and non-govemance information disclosed in either of the three years. As it 
was discussed earlier, one potential reason could be due to the way the indices did not 
measure the extent of information disclosure and as the level of information disclosure 
increased, companies from *all industries were disclosing information on all non- 
governance categories regardless of their industrial backgrounds. For instance,. in a 
study by Hackston and Milne (1996), where the extent of social and environmental 
disclosure was measured, it was suggested that disclosures are higher for high profile 
industrieS77. 
The overall findings of this section are not in line with the findings of previous studies. 
Most previous studies, listed in Table 3.6, found association between certain social 
information items and industrial affiliation. For instance, Cowen, Ferreri and Parker 
(1987) observed evidence on the association between 'energy' and 'community' 
disclosures and industrial affiliation, Freedman and Jaggi (1988) found association 
between pollution control and industrial affiliation and Adams, Hill and Roberts (1995, 
1998) presented evidence suggesting that industrial affiliation is associated with some 
environmental and some employee disclosures. Another point to consider here is the 
way this study measures the association with the overall non-governance scores and not 
for each information category included in the non-governance index. The non- 
77 For high profile industries, Hackston and Milne (1992) referred to Robert's (1992) definition according 
to which high profile industries had "... consumer visibility and, a high level of political risk, and 
concentrated, intense competition" (Roberts J992: p605). 
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governance index that was used in this study included different types of non-managerial 
information ranging from 'environmental' to 'renewal of technology' information. 
Considering the diversity of non-financial information categories in the index, the 
results for noii-govemance scores imply that there was no particular industry that could 
be associated with the disclosure of a number of information categories included in the 
index. Considerable rise in the level of non-govemance information from 1985 to 1995 
(i. e. an average growth of 75% - shown in Figure 4.3) and the lack of association 
between non-governance scores and industrial background show that companies 
disclosed information on a variety of non-managerial issues regardless of their industrial 
backgrounds. Hence, despite the basic statistics presenting higher non-govemance 
scores for some industries, statistical tests did not provide any evidence to suggest that 
companies used non-governance information to legitimise their behaviours. 
Governance Scores 
In the case of governance. scores, the evidence suggested association with the industrial 
backgrounds in 1985 and 1995. An implication of this finding is that companies in 
certain industries paid more attention to their investors. Investors are commonly 
concerned with the rate of return on their investment and they need to be sure that top 
managers act in their best inteiests. Despite the earlier expectations and the findings of 
the earlier studieS78 that companies from all industries would disclose similar levels of 
governance information after the introduction of the Cadbury code of best practice in 
1992, it was interesting to find associations between governance scores and industrial 
affiliation in 1995. This finding was in line with the overall finding of a study by 
78 Conyon and Mallin (1995) found that most of the major UK companies had complied with the 
Cadbury code of best practice. 
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Buckland and Dobble (1995) who found that many companies preferred not to comply 
with the Cadbury code. 
It is also worth noting that between 1985 and 1995,13 companies were born and 
entered into the market (shown in Table 5.6). Some of these 13 companies were in 
heavily regukted industries such as 'Electricity' and 'Gas Distribution' and therefore 
under scrutiny by their investors. 'Gas Distribution' sub-sector, classified under 
'Mineral Extraction' industry, and 'Electricity' sub-sector, classified under 'Utilities' 
industry, were regulated by the office of gas supply (OFGAS) and the office of 
electricity regulation (offer), respectively. Under the Gas Act 1986 and the Electricity 
Act 1989, OFGAS and offer were aiming to promote competition so that they could 
protect customers' interests. OFGAS, for instance, was committed to*the principle of 
transparency by committing themselves to putting into the public domain information 
that the regulated companies considered to being commercially confidential (Office of 
Gas Supply, 1987). In the author's view, it could have been the case that the new 
entrants were expected to comply with many regulations and the disclosure of 
information on governance structures was one way of assuring their investors that 
efficient managerial structures were in place to run the company in highly regulated 
industries. 
The requirement to comply with various regulations in 'Electricity' sub-sector can also 
be used to explain why basic statistics in section 5.2.1.1 showed that companies in 
'Utilities' industry were found to have higher non-governance than the governance 
scores in 1995, while companies in all other industries had higher governance than non- 
governance scores. Highly regulated 'Electricity' sub-sector is a good example of how 
regulations meant higher level of disclosure. 
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TABLE 5.6 CompANiEs BoRN AFTER 1985 
COMPANY Date of Entry Industrial Sector Industrial Sub-sectors 
I- Associated British Foods Plc July 1994 Consumer Goods Food Producers 
2. Berisford International Pic 
- 
December 1989 General Industries Merchanding 
3. Booker Plc July-86 Consumer Goods Food Producers 
4. British Gas Plc December-86 Mineral extraction Oil Integrated 
5. British Steel Plc December-88 General Industries Engineering 
6. Cortlauds Plc January-90 General Industries Textile 
7. GKN Pic June-86 General Industries Engineering 
8. Hanson Pic December-87 General Industries Diversified Industries 
9. National Power Plc March-91 Utilities Electricity 
10. Powergen Plc*' March-91 Utilities Electricity 
11. Wellcome Pic February-86 General Industries Pharrnaceuticýl 
12. Wolseley Plc April-86 General Industries Merchanding 
113. Zeneca Plc une-92 General Industries Pharmaceutical 
*In January 1995, an offer was made for the whole of the issued share capital of the company by GIaxo 
Pic. Offer was received in March 1995. Wellcome Pic was included in the sample of this study for 1990 
only. 
4* Powergen was launched as a Public Limited Company owned by the government in March 1990.60% 
of Powergen shares were sold to public in May 199 1. 
In the author's view, even though the indexing method used in this study did not 
measure the extent of non-fmancial information disclosure and non-govemance index 
encompassing different non-managerial issues (see Table 3.4 in Chapter 3), companies 
in 'Utility' industry appeared to be under lots of pressure and scrutiny and disclosed 
more non-governance information. This led companies to disclose higher levels of non- 
governance information to legitimise their actions by adopting one of the four strategies 
introduced by Lindblom C. K. (1994) (discussed in section 2.3.1). Companies could 
have disclosed governance information either to educate and inform their relevant 
public about the actual changes in their organization (i. e. Lindblom's C. K. first 
strategy), or to manipulate the perception of their relevant public by deflecting attention 
fiorn issues of conceM79 (i. e. Lindblom's C. K. third strategy), or to change external 
expectations of their performance (i. e. Lindblom's C. K. fourth strategy). The second 
strategy introduced by Lindblom C. K. (1994) also applies here. Under the second 
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strategy, companies may disclose governance information to change the perception of 
their relevant public without complying with the regulatory recommendations and 
requirements of their industries. In the case of the second strategy, the regulatory 
recommendations and requirements of their industries can be referred to as the issues of 
main concern. 
Looking at the dates of the new entries, shown in Table 5.6, it is evident that many 
entries took place in the late 1980s. For this reason, Table 5.7 was drawn up to present 
the average size of companies that were already in the selected sample of the Top 100 in' 
terms of 'total number of employees', 'profit' and 'sales' figures relative to an average 
company in the industry and to make comparison between them and the new entrdnts in 
1990. 
For instance, Table 5.7 shows that Booker PIc entered the 'Food Producer' sub-sector in 
July 1986 and by the end of 1990, the company was considerably smaller in terms of 
'total number of employees', 'profit' and 'sale' figures than the relevant industry 
averages. Hence, one would inevitably think that there were larger firms with 
competitive advantages to Booker plc in 'Food Procedure' industry. In addition, 'Food 
Producer' industry was highly regulated on 'Health and Safety' and 'Working 
Condition' (Health & Safety Executive, 2000). High competition and high regulatory 
requirements were two reasons that could determine company's financial success and 
having a sound managerial system (i. e. governance structure) was essential to ensure 
that Booker plc would do well under the circumstances. 
79 In the case of industrial affiliation, competition and regulatory requirements can be regarded as issues 
of concern. 
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Similar examples to Booker Plc can be observed in 'Merchandising' and 
'Pharmaceutical' sub-sectors (shown in Table 5.7). In the case of 'Merchanding' sub- 
sector, Wolseley Plc and Berisford International Plc entered the market in April 1986 
and December 1989, respectively. By the end of 1990, the average size between the two 
companies was still well below their industry average size in terms of 'total number of 
Employees', 'Profit' and 'Sales'. Once again, these new entrants could have focused on 
the disclosure of governance information to show that they had sound managerial 
structure so that they could be successful despite the fact that they were financially in 
disadvantaged positions. 
Companies in 'Food Producer', 'Merchandising' and 'Pharmaceutical' ijidustries are all 
indicative of companies being in the position of needing to project an image illustrating 
their strong managerial structures that would enable them to operate successfully. When 
the average managerial efficiencies of the new entrants and all companies in the sample 
are measured (shown in Table 5.7), it becomes evident that by 1990 the new entrants in 
4 out of the 5 industries had performed considerably better than the average company in 
their industries. The only company whose managerial performance was poorer than the 
industry average was Wellocme Plc in the 'Pharmaceutical' industry. Wellcome plc was 
later on taken over by Glaxo plc in 1995. 
In the author's view, companies operating in more regulated industries disclosed more 
information on their governance structures to project sound managerial structures with 
the ability to achieve compliance with regulations in competitive industries. In a way, 
this indicates that companies paid more attention to reassuring their investors rather than 
concentrating on disclosing financial information to their other stakeholders. This 
finding fits into the first dimension of the model introduced by Ullmann (1985), where 
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companies are more likely to meet the information demands of their most powerful 
stakeholder groups (i. e. investors) (Freeman, 1984). 
The findings of this section also showed that in 1990 all companies disclosed similar 
levels of non-financial information, both in terms of governance and non-governance 
information and regardless of their industrial backgrounds. In the author's view, by 
1990 almost twice as many- companies were disclosing non-financial information 
relative to 1985. A growth rate of almost 50% from 1985 to 1995 may be the reason 
why no association was found. 
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5.3 CORPORATE SIZE AND NON-FINANCIAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE 
This section investigates the second supporting research question, which was phrased 
as: 
"Are there any associations between corporate size and the level of non- 
financial information disclosed by the major UK companies? " 
The size of companies could be regarded as one of the potential reasons for the 
disclosure of non-financial information. As was discussed in Chapter 3, the common 
understanding in the literature is that larger companies disclose more non-financial 
information t1m smaller companies as they are more likely to be under scrutiny by the 
general public (Dierkes and Coppock, 1978; and Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989) (for more 
relevant literature see Table 3.6). 
5.3.1 Descriptive Analysis 
In order to examine if companies in different size categories disclosed different levels of 
non-financial information, descriptive analysis was carried out using basic statistics 
followed by cross-tabulation of size categories over different categories of non-financial 
scores. Finally, statistical test is carried out to examine if size categories are associated 
with non-financial information disclosure. 
5.3.1.1 Basic Statistics 
Table 5.8 presents the mean and coefficient of variation of non-governance, governance 
and total scores for each size category. The results indicated no significant observation 
for total scores in terms of mean and co-efficient of variations. According to the 
observations, larger companies did not appear to disclose considerably higher or lower 
levels of governance information in either of the three years. In the case of non- 
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governance information, companies categorised as the largest ones had scored the 
highest (shown in grey-shaded cells). For instance, the largest companies had non- 
govemance scores of 0.500,0.909 and 0.700 in 1985,1990 and 1995, respectively. 
Overall, the summary of basic statistics did not show higher or lower levels of 
disclosure by any particular size category. 
202 
L) 
2: 
U 
N 
rA 
00 
'n P 'o = ;z %n 
= en 
1 
00 
1 
;ý ch kn " Q6 8 I -: CD -1 0 N 0 -1 0 -t = -: CD . 0 . CD . 0 N 0 - 15:: . p = a %0 S z V) as n - %0 wl en 10 W) I z; .o I ýr 00 'Aý C4 r- 14R ON 4D ýq 1ý0 en q I w') ON -? 'Ir C) p V'l m 14ý ýo ON Iq . 
. , 
1 l ' 
4n 
00 as W 1 ON 
CD 
O l 
q 
ON 
-1 
4: r 
. 
rl 
CP,, : C; c; C; 
C; C; CD 
C2, w u: I 
C4 Cý vi N en C. ) cy, 00 M 
. Oll 1ýr r- t- % 
0ý 
1 
-4 
r- 
I 
1 r- 
1 0 
(71 
ko 4.0 %q 
C; c; 
%q "o Q 
aI 
0 
c; c; C; 
. 
I C5 C5 6 
C)" 
00 
An Ch . -. 
00 
Cl I 
r- 
el 
co 
I-T 
00 
en 
N 
N 
co 
N N N 
Q 
Iq 
en 
Ci * - 
I 
Cli - 45 , 
0 cc C) C; 6 ci C; o 0 >1 
z r- (" 
tn "D - "", 
ON (D 0 
A- ,, . 0 CD 14ý (D wi V: - , A 
I 
In 
r 
i- , 'o a C, , I 0 I ci o C; 6 0 C5 o a o 
t en 'D ,, 00 In 
l 
m %0 It wl N N 
r- 
O L-. ý C) r- " m Ci 00 C-? w , en 
I'D iz 00 ýo N 
;ý 
w! 
0 0 C; 0 0 CD 0 
1 , 
-0 
m 
77 
DO 
ON 
CD 
I 1.0 
co 
I'D 
-IT 
1 eq 
Sý 
(7s 
C14 
00 
en 
C4 
C-4 
0 
:; 
-T 
CD 
C14 
1-11 ýo 
I 
ýI CD CD CD CD 0 0 Q = 0 
I 
C; (D CD CD 
? 
_q rq . ", "- 'o (D ; - eq ' w r- I. 00 en ri C14 'IT C14 , r4 00 
cc CD 0 (D 0 0 Q 
> I I f I 
in tn 
40 1 
, 
G 
I 
m 
0 C; C; C; 0 0 0 a 
0 
0 0, 00 N t- t- 
- 
I 
a 
o 
r- 
cc 
It vi 
C4 
Wi 
ON rl CD r- 00 
r 
eq 
'T 
'": 
N, 
w! ;ý * a , C"A 40 1. 
go - Cý Cý = (D C; c; C5 C; C> co 0 
u> 
z ;3 00 1 0 
en C) (D 00 C> W-1 CD %n t-- , 1 Ci 1 Cli V: V: C; C; 
ve 
0 
'o 
tn 
o, 
00 
4, L. 
0 C) 0 CD Q Q Q 
00 ""1 "' 
C. 4 . q cs 6 C; 
. 0 
1, e -0 co 1 0 1. as 
00 
ON 
in 
r- 
0 
ýo 
en t-- 
0 
kn ,n 00 
1 
1 0 V: . . 
00 
Ch 
u > 
N ri ri ri N . 
'o 
, 
%0 
(ý! 
t- 
m 
W) 
C, 
' 
0% 
'IT 
r 
ON 
Itr 
r7l 
. m * * 
tn C 4 N t l N 
00 
%0 %n 
'D 
qq, 
en 
m 
r- 
ýc 
r- 
1.0 
r- (D Cý 
I 
C5 C; C; 1 6 C; C; 
Q 
on 
M M ON iz c2 c2 0 
M . 92 JD 
, 
M 
oN V 
.2 Ch 47% k 
CN 
e 
Ch 
ON C; " `ý Ol 
c7A 
it 
OA 
cr, 5, cý 
VA 
az o 0 U 
CrA 
= Z; 
"T Z; * " , " Q ý .4 .4 4 z ýu s 40 C5 0 Q 0 0 
6 
0 
;2 , n .0 
15 0 -n I 12 0 0 JD CD ; In . 5 46 5 n c) wl in Q S en ' " 
iz c 41 ;; I zI r Ji ld ý Z, '4 "'i 'I ;; 1 "41 1 " t io t #1 % 
ci 0 
0) 
U) 
Q 
U) U) 
2 
. U) 
tu 
4) 
*EI) -5 c 
90 
1.. 0 
0 
0 
z 
Chapter 5 
5.3.1.2 Cross-Tabulation 
The cross-tabulation of corporate size against non-financial information indices (shown 
in Tables 5.9,5.10 and 5.11) indicated the number of companies in each size category 
against different non-financial information indices. Tables 5.9,5.10 and 5.11 present the 
cross-tabulation of corporate size over total, non-governance and governance scores, 
respectively. The cross-tabulation of the total scores over the size categories, shown in 
Table 5.9, did not reveal any significant pattern regarding the dispersion of companies 
in different size categories across different categories of total scores in either of the 
three years. The cross-tabulations clearly showed that companies fr= different size 
categories had scored within similar ranges in each of the three years. However, the 
cross-'tabulation results began to tell a different story when the corporate size was cross- 
tabulated over the non-govemance and governance scores. 
Non-Governance Scores 
In the case of non-governance score, the cross-tabulations indicated an increase in the 
spread of companies disclosing non-govemance information over the period between 
1985 and 1995 (shown in Table 5.10). Patterns were observed for 1985 and 1995 for 
companies at the bottom and at the top ends of the size categories (i. e. companies 
ranked as small and as large). Looking at Table 5.10, in each of the two years, there are 
two shaded grey areas. The grey area on the left-hand side of the cross-tabulation table 
presents the spread of small companies and the shaded area on the right hand side 
presents the spread of large companies. 
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The important observations from the cross-tabulation table are summarised and shown 
below: 
Small Companies I Large Companies 
W) 
00 
u 
rA 
u 
z 
kn 
u 
z 
Total number of small companies = 11 4 
13 + 18 = 42 
Total number of companies scoring 
between 20% to 60% 2 
(2+1+1+2)+(2+2+1+1)=14 
Percentage of small companies (14/42) 
33% 
Total number of small companies =I+I 
=2 
Total number of small companies scoring 
between 70% to 100% = 3+1+9+9 = 22 
Percentage of small companies (2/22) 
9% 
Total number of large companies =7+I+I 
=9 
Total number of large companies scoring 
between 20% to 60% = (2+1+1) +15 
Percentage of large companies (5/9) 56% 
Total number of large companies = (3 + 2) + 
2 +1 =8 
Total no. of large companies scoring between 
70% to 100% = 13+5+1 +3 =22 
Percentage of large companies (8/22) =3 6% 
As it is shown above, in 1985 there was a total number of 42 small companies out of 
which 14 companies scored between 0.20 and 0.60 (shown in Table 5.10 - the grey area 
on the left-hand side). This meant that 33% of small companies scored between 0.20 
and 0.60. At the same time, the grey area on the right-hand side of Table 5.40 shows 
that there were 9 large companies. Out of these 9 large companies, 5 companies scored 
between 0.20 and 0.60. Hence, 56% of large companies scored between 0.20 and 0.60 
as compared to only 33% of small companies scoring within the same range. 
In 1995, the grey area on the left-hand side of the Table 5.10 showed that 2 out of a total 
of 22 small companies scored between 0.70 and 1.00. This made an overall 9% of small 
companies. As for the large companies, the grey-shaded area on the right-hand side of 
Table 5.10 shows that 8 of the 22 large companies scored between 0.70 and 1.00. This 
. meant that 36% of large companies had non-govemance scores of 0.70 or more as 
compared to only 9% of small companies. 
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The evidence for both 1985 and 1995 suggest that more large companies had disclosed 
high level of non-governance information in comparison to the number of small 
companies disclosing the same level of information. 
Governance Scores 
In contrast to non-govemance information, different observations were made for 
governance scores. Cross-tabulation of governance scores over size categories is shown 
in Table 5.11. A summary of the cross-tabulation interpretation is shown below: 
Small Companies 
Total number of small companies = 12 + 
18=30 
Total number of small companies scoring 
20% or more = (3+2+1+1+1) + (6+6+1) = 
21 
Percentage of small companies (21/30) = 
70% 
Large Companies 
Total number of large companies =7+I+I 
=9 
Total number of large companies scoring 
20% or more = (2 +3+ 1) =6 
Percentage of large companies (6/9) = 67% 
In 1985, the grey shaded area on the left hand side of the cross-tabulation shows that 
70% of small companies, that is 21 of the 30 small companies, had governance scores of 
0.20 or more. A similar percentage number of large firms were observed to score 0.20 
or more. At the same time, the grey area on the right hand side of the cross-tabulation 
table shows that out of a total of 9 large companies, 6 companies had scored 0.20 or 
more. This meant that a similar percentage number of large companies (i. e. 67%) were 
found to score 0.20 or more in comparison to 70% of large companies. 
In 1990, companies from all different size categories had an increase in their 
governance scores with most scores falling within the range of 0.30 to 0.60. There was a 
similar observation for 1995, when all companies had increased their governance 
disclosure even further and were all scoring similarly regardless of their size categories. 
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TABLE 5.9 CROSS-TABULATION OF COMPANIES SIZE AGAINST TOTAL INDEX 
I Sales 1985 
Count 40.1b 2fAlb 2! LO. lb 211-% ý12.0b 212.5b 213.0b I 2: 13. Sb M. Ob 214.5b A5.0b I ZVO. Ob 
I ý120 Ob a30 
Total 
I 
41.0b -dl. Sb <MOb <12.5b <E3. Db <E3.5b 
I ýJ[A. Ob 'M -Ob -110b <MOb <130. Ob 
b 
0-0.09 2 4 2 3 2 14 
32 63 32 48 32 6 22 2 
6 7 5 2 22 
95 11 1 79 6 392 6 1411 
0.2-0.299 2 3 2 2 2 13 
32 49 32 32 6 6 32 206 
0.3-OJ" 1 3 3 2 :1 
kr) 16 49 48 16 32 
75 
0.4-0.4" 3 
0.5-0.5" 
0.6-0.6" 
0.7-M" 
0.84.8" 
0.9ý1.00 
colunto 18 13 6 3 3 7 
3 
Total 
1 ý75 
28 61 10 95 1a 48 1 
Sales 1990 
count -dO. lb 2LO. Ib aG lb 211.5b 'ýM. Ob 212.5b *dl(lb ZUS 
a4. Ob a4.5b ai&Ob ZLIO. Ob I MO. Ob 2130 
Total % <E1.0b 
. 
<E! *Sb <ELOb 
dL51t <L3. Ob <E3.5b 44.9b <L4.5b 45.0b 110b <EZO. Ob 
I <L30.0b b 
0-0.0" 
0.1-0.1" 4 
4 4 
ýA 
56 
0.2-0.2" 2 
9 
14 14 29 14 14 4 4 
It 1 
0.3-0.3" 2 4 4 1 2 4 1 1 
20 
29 57 57 141 2,9 57 1 14 141 1 4_ 
278 
0.4-0.4" 4 5 2 2 1 3 5 
24 
33 3 :A 
57 71 29 29 14 43 71 
Z 0.5-0.599 1 F- -7- 1 1 2 
10 
14 29 29 14 14 29 
13 9 
0.6-0.6" 
14 
1 
14 14 14 
4 
56 
0,7-0.7" 
14 14 
2 
2 8_ 
0.9-1.00 ý 
Column 1 
[ 
4 7 4 9 
t 
2 1 70 
Total 14 57 1 
1 
7 10, 8 f, 100 100 2 29 57 17 1- L7 28 14 
100 
ý _ 
Sales 1995 
Count <LO. Ib ý18 lb aG lb al-Sb 2LLI)b a2.5b A3.8b 213-51, 214 , 
Ob I 2: U. 5b 213.0b aLlO. Ob 2120.0b ýý00 
Total % . ý11.9b 
. 
I 
ýIL! Sb ýMllb ýU. Sb <L3. Db <L3-5b ý14. 
Ob <L4.5b <I&Ob <Ll*b <L20.0b <L30.0b b 
0-0.0" 1 
I 
0.1-0.1" - - 
- - 
0.2-0.2" 1(14) 
14 
2 
2 
4 4_ 
Iro 0.4-0.4" 2 2 
2 
29 29 29 
85 
2 3 18 
(A 0.54.5" ý 3 3 (14) : : ý : 281 
:4 
, 4 
:4 
25 4 
4 42 42 4 4 4 4 . _ 
0.6-0.6" 1 4 2 4(57) 3 3 4 
3 1 1 28 
94 
14 4 56 28 56 4 42 42 56 
41 14 14 2 
0.7-0.7" (14) 2 
4 
4 
56 4 
1 
14 
12 
169 
4 4 4 29 
0.11-0.3" 
14 14 4 
1 
14 
4 
56 
+ 
9 9 7 4 
7 4 8 13 5 1 3 
14 12 7 11.3 99 56 1- 56 11 3 1 Is 7A 14 
421 
Notes: TSc stands for total scores. 
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TABLE 5.10 CROSS-TABULATION OF COMPANIES SIZE AGAINST NON-GOVERNANCE 
INDEX 
Sales 1985 
Count <(&Ib 2LO, 1b b 2JO Ab al-5b ; dZ. Ob 112.5b 20, I)b aL3.5b a4. Gb ; dA. 5b aS. Ob 2110. ob ZC20.0b ý13 Total % -dl. Ob ý11: 
L 
<L2. Ob <EL5b <UOb <Wb <L4.8b <L4.5b 115.0b -di6b <120. Ob <M. Ob 
Ob 
6 6 7 3 1 3 3 
30 
go Q0 104 4 5 45 4 44 4 
3 b I 
4 q0 1 0 
2 2 2 1 2 2 
30 30 3.0 1 10 3.0 
0.14.3" 1 2 1 1 F 30 is 3 
w 0.4-0.4" 
I ' : 
z .., , 
U - 0.5-0.5" - 2 1 
z 
- 
30 .. 5 13 79 
0.6-0.6" 
0.7-0.7" 
0. ". 8" 
0.9-1.00 1 
Cal 1 I1 19 3 6 3 7 67 
T. 
r 
. 16 5 . 270 
ý94 
96 45 10 5 1 100 
Sa les 1990 
Count -dO. Ib 2: W. Ib 210.1 b aLl. 5b 2LLOb 2ILSb a3. Ob ZO. 
5b 4'Ob a I a4,5b -, ýOb kLI Ob 
10 ;! M. Ob 213 
Total % <Ll. ft Idi-% <MOb aft 493.0b <L3.5b <L4. Ob <L4.5b <15.0b <910b 
420.0b dXOb Ob 
010.0" 2 
7 
97 ý4 
4 28 2 4 
0.1-0.1" 2 5 1 1 3 1 
:4 
2R 69 14 14 42 1.4 4 
94 
0.2-0.2" 1 1 1 
4 
14 14 14 14 
56 
034.3" 2 3 
11 
4 4 29 4 4 4.2 4 4 
15 3 
0.4-0.4" 2 3 2 2 2 
16 
4 29 42 28 4 4 2 209 4 4 
2- 
1 1 3 2 2 2 .1 
: 
14 14 42 29 29 29 4 
67 
z 7.6 0.6" 1 
3 
14 4 4 4 
0.7-0.7" 
14 4 
0.8-0.8" ý 2 
4 00 
28 
1 
0.9ý1.00 
1 
:4 4 
2 
28 
Column 6 2 7 4 9 4 
1 2 1 72 
Total 4 83 
ýýI :67 
8 
__ 
S6 L25. 
-1 
56 28 14 100 
Sales 1995 
Count <EO. Ib 2: U. Ib . 2: U. lb 20.5b d2. Ob AL5b 
zL3. Ob 213.5b 2"Ob I 2141.5b kI&Ob ;! LIO. Ob 2420.0b 213 
Total % <91.9b ýLI. Sb <ELOb 4E2.5b 110b <L3*Sb 
44. Ob E4.5b 45.0b ýLlOb 420.0b <00.0b Ob 
1 
14 
1 
14 
2 
28 
4 
S6 
:4 4 
0.2-0.2" 1 3 1 1 
6 
14 4 2 14 14 
0.3-0.3" 
, 1 2 
4 4 14 28 
69 
0.4-0.4" 1 1 2 
14 14 14 1-4 14 29 4 
14 
" 5" 0 2 5 2 4 1 2 3 4 
2 27 
. . 29 
ýA 
69 
1 
28 56 14 23 4,2 56 28 4 
37 S 
0.6-0.6" 2 3 3 
9 
29 42 42 4 _12 
1- 
0.7-8.7" 3 2 
7 
14 14 42 2.9 
97 
2 4 
4 29 14 
0.9-1.00 
Column 3 1 7 4 ý 
-- 
Lmo-w 97 56 69 56 11 1 81 6 4 
Notes: NGSc stands for Non-govemance scores. 
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TABLE 5.11 CROSS-TABULATION OF COMPANIES SIZE AGAINST GOVERNANCE INDEX 
Sales 1985 
Count 110.1b aO. 1b 210.1b al. 5b a2. Ob 2: USb a3. Ob a3.5b Zf*Ob a4.5b 2: 1119b 2110. Ob . 2120.0b aMb 
Total % Ille0b -dI. 5b <L2. Gb ý12.5b <E3. Gb 43.5b <L4. Ob <L4.5b 45.0b -dlOb <00.0b ýL)O. Ob 
0-0.0" 3 4 3(-3) 2(33) 1(33) 2(29) 2(29) 1000) 18 
48 63 48 3,2 1.6 32 3 
_I 
6 25 4 
0.1-0.199 1 1 1(17) 3 
16 ib 16 4 2_ 
0.2-0.2" 3 6 2(15) 1(33) 1(33) 2(29) 2(29) 1(100) 18 
4.8 95 3 16 1.6 32 3.2 L6 254 
0.3-0.399 2 6 5(39) 2(33) 2(67) )(33) 3(43) 3(43) 24 
2 8 95 9 32 32 16 48 4.9 338 00 . 
U 0.4-0.499 1 1 (23) 3 (17) 6 
16 1 6 5 
: 
6 5 
0.5-0.5" 1 
1.6 4 
0.6-0.6" 1 
1.6 14 
0.7-0.799 
0. ". 899 
0.9-1.00 
Column - 17-7 1s 3 6 3 
7 1 : . 
71 
Total 169 1 2S4 
ý83 
85 42 4' 9 99 14 4 100 
Sales 1 990 
Count <EO. Ib 210.1b aO. Ib 211.5b 212-0b ýU. Sb 2: 13-01) AIM ý! LI. Ob a-1.5h kMOb alo. Ob ZL20.0b 2130b 
Total % ýV. Ob Ll. 5b 42.0b <E2.5b 43.0b <E3.5b 44.01, <14.5b 4S. Ob 410b <L20.0b <E3O. 
Ob 
0-0.01" 1 1(25) 2 
14 14 Z. L- 
- 0.1-0.199 I(SO) I 
14 14 
0.2-0.299 1 1(50) 2(50) 1(11) 5 
14 14 27 1 4_ 68 
0.3-0.3" 2 2 4(33) 1(14) ](17) 2(29) 12 
27 17 55 14 IA 27 164 
as 0.4-0.499 2 3 3(25) 3(43) 1(17) 
2(22) (100) 15 
27 41 41 41 14 27 4 20 5 
0.5-0.599 2 3 4(33) 2(29) 4(67T 5(71) 1(50) 2(50) 6(67) (25) 
30 
2,7 41 55 27 55 69 1.4 27 82 4 41 1 
0.6-0.6" 2 - 2(50) (50) 5 
27 27 4 6. 
0.7-0.799 1(8) 
14 4 
1 1(14) 2 
14 14 27 
0.9-1.010 
c mo olu 6. 2 2 7 6 7 2 4 9 4 
2 73 
l 92 
ý64 : 
64 96 82 
--2_6 
27. 5ý 12 3 55 100 
Sales 19 95 
Count 110.1b aO. 1b 2LO. 1b al. 51, ; ýU. Ob ý12.5b 213.0b 2: 0.5b 214.0b kusb ý15.4)b 2110. 
Ob ý120.0b IMb 
Total % ý11.0b <Ll. 5b ýU. Ob 42-5b <L3. Ob 43*5b <L4*Ob -14&Sb <ESaOb -dl0b <E2O. 
Ob 430.0b 
0.0.099 
0.2-0.2" 
0.3-0.3" 1(14) ](8) 2 
14 )4 28 
kn 0.4-0.4" 2(15) 2 
as 
- - 
209 28 
U 
Z 0.5-0.5" 2 )(25) 
772 5) 1(13) 2(40) 1(33) 1 
298 14 1.4 14 299 
14 l13 
0.6-0.6" 2 5 6(75) 3(43) )(2T)- 
=(40) 3(75) 4(50) 7(54) 3(60) )(33) 38 
29 
:. 
4 70 85 42 14 28- 41 56 99 4.2 
14 53 5 
0.7-0.799 1 2 2(25) 3(43) 2(50) 3(60) 3(39) 3(23) 1(100) 
20 
14 1 IS 29 42 1 2.8 42 42 42 14 
29 2 
0.9.0.999 1(33) 1 
14 14 
0.9-1.00 
TO", 9 9 7 4 5 13 5 1 
3 
Col... 
_L2 
7 113 99 56 70 18 3 70 an 
14 42 
Notes: GSc stands for Non-governance scores 
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5.3.1.3 Spearman Rank Correlation and Kruskal- Wallis . 1-way ANOVA 
Test 
A similar problem that was experienced with cross-tabulation of industrial category was 
experienced in this section (i. e. the number of cells with expected number of less than 5 
companies was well above 20%). As a result, statistical tests could not be carried out 
unless the number of cells with an expected number of 5 companies is below 20%. 
Therefore, in order to be able to proceed with the statistical tests, both the non-financial 
scores and the size categories were re-categorised into smaller number of categories. 
Furthermore, it was important to consider corporate growth rates over the period under 
investigation as some of the shifts in the cross-tabulation tables may have been caused 
by corporate growth. The impact of growth was taken into account by re-classification 
of size categories for each of the three non-financial information indices in each year. 
The size classification, therefore, presented the size concentration of the period (see 
Appendix 5C, Tables 5C. 1,5C. 2 and 5C. 3, for the rearrangement of the size category). 
At the same time, non-financial scores were also re-classified so that there were three 
different categories of non-financial scores (i. e. one for total index, one for non- 
governance index and one for governance index) for each size category (see Appendix 
5D) in each year. in this way, the rise in the level of non-financial information was 
taken into account. 
The results for both the Chi-Square and Spearman Rank correlation are shown in Table 
5.12. The results show no significant association between size and total index in 1985 
and 1990. The only significant association was found between corporate size and non- 
governance score in 1995. This suggested that larger companies disclosed more non- 
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governance information than smaller companies. No other significant associations were 
found. 
TABLE 5.12 SPEARmAN RANK CORRELATION AND KRUSKAL-WALLIS I-WAY ANOVA 
TEST 
Non-Financial 
Scores 
Spearman Rank 
Correlation 
Sig Level Kruskal-Wallis 
Chi-square Sig Level 
Tsc85 0.05 0.70 0.15 0.70 
Tsc90 0.11 0.34 0.91 0.34 
Tsc95 0.19 0.11 2.57 0.11 
NGsc85 0.17 0.18 1.85 0.17 
NGsc90 0.14- 0.24. 1.51 0.47 
NGsc95 0.30 0.01 6.35 0.04 
Gsc85 0.04 0.70 2.20 0.14 
Gsc90 0.15 0.22 1.55 0.46 
Gsc95 -0.01 0.92 2.39 0.30 
5.3.2 Analytical Discussion 
The findings of this section provide answers to the second supporting research question, 
which raised the question of "whether there are any associations between corporate 
size and the level ofnon-financial information disclosure? ". The overall findings on the 
second supporting research question is shown below: 
Total Scores Non-Governance Scores Governance Scores 
1985 x 1( x 
1990 x x x 
1995 x v x 
V' denotes association between size categories and non-financial information scores. 
'X ' denotes no association between size categories and non-financial information scores. 
While the basic statistics, shown in Table 5.8, did not suggest that larger companies had 
disclosed higher or lower levels of non-financial information disclosure than smaller 
companies in either of the three years, the cross-tabulation of non-governance scores 
over size categories suggested differently. It was found that larger companies had higher 
non-governance scores than smaller companies in 1985 and 1995. Cross-tabulation of 
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governance and total scores over size categories did not reveal any distinct pattern for 
either of the three years. In the case of statistical test, significant associations were 
observed between corporate size and non-governance scores in 1995. 
No association was found between size and the level of governance information 
disclosure. One of the arguments used when analysing the findings for the first 
supporting research question (in section 5.2.2) was that companies in certain industries 
needed to disclose more governance information to legitimise their behaviours to their 
investors. Investors were often concerned whether or not companies would perform well 
in highly regulated and competitive industries. Governance information categories that 
are considered in this study are recommended by the Cadbury code of best practice 
which mainly aims at meeting the information requirements of investors. In the author's 
view, the finding of this section illustrates that before and after the introduction of the 
Cadbury code in 1992, companies from different size categories paid attention to the 
information requirements of their investors. This finding is also in line with the findings 
by Conyon and Mallin (1997) indicating that in 1995 most of the Top 100 UK 
companies complied with the Cadbury code's recommendations and disclosed 
information on their governance structures (see Chapter 3, section 3.2.1). 
The findings of this section also provide evidence on the association between non- 
governance information disclosure and corporate siz6. This. is in line with thefindings 
of the previous literature which suggested that companies could have disclosed non- 
governance information to project a certain image. In the case of large companies, one 
could argue that more stakeholders other than investors are interested to know about 
companies' behaviours. Apart from being in the public eye, large companies are in 
control of many financial and human resources and their business conducts affect the 
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welfare of a large group of stakeholders. In other words, non-managerial information 
was used by companies to legitimise their corporate behaviours to their stakeholders and 
to illustrate that they have the same values and norms as those of the society. In doing 
so, they could have adopted one of the four strategies. introduced by Lindblom C. K. 
0 994). The author takes the view that companies could have disclosed non-governance 
information to either educate and inform their relevant public about the actual changes 
in their organization, or to change the perceptions of the relevant public without having 
to change their actual behaviours (i. e. the second strategy), or to change external 
expectations of their performance (i. e. the fourth strategy). According to the third 
strategy introduced by Lindblom C. K. (1994), companies can disclose information to 
manipulate the perception by deflecting attention from the 'issue of concern'. In the 
author's view, the third strategy was not relevant as the size of a company could not be 
regarded as an 'issue of concern'. Environmental incidents, poor managerial 
performance or intense competition within an industry could be regarded as the reason 
for raising stakeholders' concerns. Stakeholders would not necessarily be concerned 
simply because a company is large. 
For example, a large company who suffers from poor working conditions, 
discrimination or poor health and safety records, is more exposed to the risk of its 
employees taking legal actions followed by negative publicity for the company. Another 
relevant example can be a large food retailer whose dairy products have been purchased 
from farms suspected of poor hygiene records. In this case, the food retailer would be 
under pressure from its customers to present them with their hygiene procedures and 
that they took to ensure public health and safety. If customer groups are not satisfied 
with explanations, more formal enquiries can be set up to officially investigate the case. 
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Both examples are indicative of larger companies encompassing a larger number of 
stakeholders in each stakeholder group who can be, in turn, more powerful in 
comparison to stakeholders of a smaller company. 
In the author's view, this could be one of the reasons explaining why large companies 
disclosed information on non-governance information categories addressing issues that 
were of interest to different stakeholder groups. The findings of this section suggest that 
in the case of a large company, the pressures from stakeholders are exacerbated with the 
large number of stakeholders. This ultimately results in the disclosure of more non- 
governance information. Here, the lack of disclosure may be interpreted by stakeholders 
as managerial failure in recognising, and subsequently responding to their demands and 
expectations (Hammond and Solcum, 1996). Hence, companies disclose such 
information to legitimise their behaviours by adopting either of the Lindbllom's C. K. 
three strategies that were discussed earlier in this section. 
From the author's point of view, another interesting finding in support of the above 
argument is that even though the non-governance index did not measure the extent of 
non-governance information disclosure, non-governance scores and size were found to 
be associated. The association with corporate size suggests that larger companies 
disclosed different levels of non-governance information to meet the information 
requirements of their stakeholder groups rather than focusing to meet the information 
requirements of their investors. In the author's view, investors are more likely to pay 
extra attention to those companies that face new challenges or are under regulatory or 
competitive pressures. 
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In a study by Belkaoui and Kaprik (1989), evidence was found that larger companies, 
which are politically more visible, disclose more social information. Similar findings 
were obtained by Adams., Hill and Roberts (1995,1998) and Hackston and Milne 
(1996). Ilie observed significant association between non-governance information and 
corporate size provides further evidence to support the findings of earlier studies. 
5.4 NON-FINANCIAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND CORPORATE GROWTH RATE 
This section investigates the third supporting research question. As it was discussed in 
Chapter 3, the third supporting research question is concerned with: 
"nether there is any significant association between corporate growth 
rate and the non-financial information disclosed by the major UK 
companies? " 
The third supporting research question examined whether companies with higher or 
lower growth rates disclosed higher or lower levels of non-financial information, using 
the Spearinan rank correlation and Kruskal Wallis test. 
5.4.1 Descriptive Analysis 
5.4.1.1 Basic Statistics and Growth Rate 
Table 5.13 presents basic statistics on growth rates of companies whose non-financial 
scores are similar. For instance, in 1985-95, there were 4 companies, whose non- 
governance scores fell within the range of 0.1 to 0.2, with a growth rate of 54%. The 
evidence in Table 5.13 suggests that growing companies disclosed more non-financial 
information, when companies with the highest growth rates are observed to have the 
highest non-financial scores in that period. For instance, in 1985-95,18 companies with 
the highest growth rate (i. e. 75%) scored between 0.6 and 0.7, which was not the highest 
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range of non-financial scores. Over the same period, a higher total score was obtained 
by companies with a considerably lower growth rate (i. e. 2 companies, which had total 
scores between 0.7 and 0.8, had an average growth rate of 33%). As the evidence did 
not show that faster growing companies disclosed a different level of non-financial 
information than companies with slower growth rates, the period was divided into 1985- 
90 and 1990-95. 
For the period 1985-90, there was no significant association. The only observation, 
which suggested that companies with a higher growth rate disclosed a higher level of 
non-financial information, was in 1990-95. In this period, 4 companies with highest 
growth rates (i. e. 39%) scored the highest level of non-governarIce information 
disclosure (i. e. 0.9 to 1.0). 
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TABLE 5.13 GROWTH AND NON-FINANCIAL INDICES 
1985-95 Non-Governance Index Governance Index Total Index 
Scores 
1995 
No. of 
Co's 
% Growth 
1985-95 
No. of 
Co's 
% Growth 
1985-95 
No. of 
Co's 
% Growth 
1985-95 
<0.1 
,;? 0.1 <0.2 4 54 - - 
Z!! 0.2 < 0.3 1 - - - 2 38 
ý: 0.3 < 0.4 5 44 2 43 - - 
'AA < 0.5 7 64 2 95 6 65 
ýA5 < 0.6 10 69 7 105 15 76 
ý: 0.6 < 0.7 18 75 30 60 23 62 
ýb. 7 < 0.8 2 33- 18 47 8 4 
A. 8 < 0.9 10 53 - - 3 37 
A. 9 < 1.0 3 37 - 
1990-5 Non-Governance Index Governance Index Total Index 
Scores 
1990 
No. of 
Co's 
% Growth 
1985-90 
No. of 
Co's 
% Growth 
1985-90 
No. of 
Co's 
% Growth 
1985-90 
<0.1 
ýAl < 0.2 4 -9 - - 
ý!! 0.2 < 03 1 - 2 -8 
A. 3 < 0.4 5 23 2 19 - - 
A. 4 < 0.5 8 22 2 -38 6 -13 
A*5 < 0.6 12 -23 7 11 17 
6 
ýb. 6 < 0.7 20 15 37 18 26 1 13 
A. 7 < 0.8 3 22 18 6 12 2 
ýA8 < 0.9 10 31 - - 3 50 
2.0.9 < 1.0 4 39 
_ 
1985-90 Non-Governance Index Governance Index Total Index 
Scores 
1995 
No. of 
Co's 
% Growth 
1990-5 
No. of 
Co's 
% Growth 
1990-5 
No. of 
Co's 
% Growth 
1990-5 
<0.1 6 28 -- - - - 
A. 1 < 0.2 14 53 - - 3 38 
ýb. 2 < 0.3 4 46 5 113 7 72 
A. 3 < 0.4 8 61 11 56 19 40 
AA < 0.5 12 68 12 46 18 72 
A*5<0.6 11 52 25 63 10 75 
A. 6 < 0.7 3 138 5 56 4 26 
A. 7 < 0.8 - - 2 66 
ýA8 < 0.9 2 50 2 33 - - 
A. 9 < 1.0 2 43 3 38 
Notes: '% Growth' is corporate growth rate in terms of sales. 
No. of Co. 's stands for number of companies. 
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5.4.1.2 Spearman Rank Correlation and Kruskal- Wallis ]-way ANO VA Test 
The results for both the Spearman rank correlation and Kruskal-Wallis test are shown in 
Table 5.14. The results show negative association between governance scores and 
growth rate in 1985-95, suggesting that companies with negative growth rates reported 
more information on their governance structures. No association was observed between 
growth rate for 1985-95 and non-governance scores. When the period was divided into 
1985-90 and'1990-95, no association between corporate growth rate and either of the 
non-financial indices was observed for 1985-90. In comparison, evidence from both 
statistical tests showed that both non-governance and total indices were positively 
associated with growth rate in 1990-95, suggesting that companies with positive growth 
rate had disclosed a higher level of non-governance information. 
TABLE 5.14 SPEARMAN RANK CORRELATION AND KRuSKAL-WALLIS 1-WAY ANOVA 
TEST 
Spearman 
Rank 
Correlation 
Sig Level 
Kruskal- 
Wallis chi- 
squa e 
Sig Level 
1985-95 Growth 
NGsc95 -0.06 0.96 1.07 0.59 
Gsc95 -0.23 0.08 4.43 0.04 
Tsc95 -0.01 0.49 0.17 0.92 
1985-90 Growth 
NGsc90 0.15 0.23 0.06 0.94 
Gsc90 -0.04 0.75 0.04 
0.84 
Tsc90 0.13 0.29 1.49 0.48 
1990-5 Growth 
NGsc95 0.23 0.05 5.26 0.07 
Gsc95 -0.04 0.77 2.23 0.33 
Tsc95 0.28 0.02 3.06 0.08 
Notes: NGSc stands for non-govemance scores, GSc stands for governance scores and TSc stands for 
total scores. Sig stands for significant. 
5.4.2 Analytical Discussion 
As was explained in Chapter 3, no previous study was found in the accounting literature 
which referred to the possible significant association between corporate growth rite and 
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non-financial information disclosure. This section investigated the third supporting 
research question in an attempt to find out whether there was any association between 
corporate growth rate and the level of non-financial information disclosure. The overall 
evidence from statistical tests is presented below: 
Growth 
1985-95 
Growth 
1985-90 
Growth 
1990-95 
NGSc95 x NGSc90 x NGSc95 V 
GSc95 GSc90 x GSc95 x 
TSc95 I X TSc90 X TSc95 
VI 
Notes: NGSc stands for non-governance scores, GSc stands for governance scores and TSc stands for- 
total scores. 
V' denotes association between growth rate and non-financial information scores. 
'X ' denotes no association between growth rate and non-financial information scores. 
For the whole period 1985-95, only a negative association with governance scores was 
observed. Interesting findings were obtained when the period between 1985 and 1995 
was divided into 1985-90 and 1990-95. While no association was observed between 
either of the non-financial scores and growth rate in 1985-90, growth rates were 
observed to be associated with the total and governance scores in 1990-95. The author 
believes that this can be explained by looking at the average corporate growth rates for 
the two periods. Figure 5.1 presents the average growth rates for 1985-90 and 1990-95. 
In the author's view, a generally high percentage of corporate growth rate (i. e. 65%) in 
1985-90 meant that companies did not need to make extra efforts in order to grow. At 
the same time, the general level of non-financial information disclosure had an average 
rise of 51% (shown in Figure 4.5) over the same period. In comparison to 1985-90, in 
1990-95 the general corporate growth rate of 13% (shown in Figure 5.1) together with 
32% increase in non-financial scores (shown in Figure 4.5) was relatively small. The 
association between non-governance scores and growth rate suggests that companies 
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needed to make extra effort to achieve high growth rates when in 1995 general growth 
rate was low (i. e. 13%). 
FIGURE 5.1 CORPORATE GROWTH RATES 
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Among many other factors that could have affected growth, the author believes that in 
1990-95 companies could have disclosed more non-governance information to project a 
more socially desirable image so that they could gain easier access to various human 
and financial resources they required for their growth. It is important to remember that 
growing companies need to finance new operations, to purchase fixed assets and to 
employ new technical expertise and managerial skills. A company with a more socially 
desirable image is perceived to have better future prospects and is, therefore, more 
likely to have a lower cost of raising capital (Navarro, 1988). In addition, human capital 
is more easily attracted when companies have a good track record for employment 
(McGuire et al, 1988) and, more generally, social or environmental issues. 
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In a way, companies disclosed information on their non-managerial aspects to portray a 
certain image of themselvesgo. Whether this image is a true image of the company 
remains unknown in the absence of any statutory or regulatory requirements ensuring 
the quality of such information. In other words, companies could have used non- 
governance information disclosure to adopt either of the four strategies discussed by 
Lindblom C. K (1994) (see section 2.6.1). In 1990-95, even though growing companies 
were associated with the disclosure of non-governance information, no such association 
was found with governance information suggesting that growing companies were not 
trying to assure their investors of their sound managerial structures. In the author's 
view, raising finance through attracting new investors is one way of gaining access to 
financial resources. If growing companies intend to raise finance through investors, it is 
possible that they disclose non-govemance information to show their responsiveness to 
social changes and expectations. Hence, companies present themselves as having future 
prospects so that they are in better position to attract new investors. 
5.5 NON-FINANCIAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND CORPORATE FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE 
This section provides statistical analYSiS in order to answer the fourth supporting 
research question, which is: 
"Are there any associations between different aspects of corporate 
performance and the non-financial information disclosed by the major UK 
companies? 
go See Hines (1988). 
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1 
5.5.1 Descriptive Analysis 
As it was explained in Chapter 3, this study used accounting-based measures of 
performance to investigate the fourth supporting research question. This section 
provides descriptive analysis, using Spearman rank correlation, only (as discussed in 
section 3.3.2). 
5.5.1.1 Spearman Rank Correlation 
The results of Spearman rank correlation are shown in Table 5. IS. The Table presents 
the evidence on association between non-financial information indices and three main 
performance aspects, namely profitability, managerial performance and liquidity. 
1985 
In 1985, the total score was found to be associated with profit margin and with liquidity 
ratios. Positive significant association with the profit margin meant that profitable 
companies reported non-financial information, and negative link with liquidity ratio 
suggested that companies with lower liquidity disclosed more non-financial 
information, and vice versa. 
When the index was broken down into its two components (i. e. governance and non- 
governance indices), it was found that the disclosure of governance infonnation was 
significantly associated with rates of return on shareholders' equity. 
As for the non-governance scores, positive significant association was observed with 
profit margin ratio, suggesting that profitable companies disclosed more non- 
governance information than non-profitable companies. No significant association was 
found between either of the three indices and either gearing ratio, which presented how 
risky companies were, or turnover ratios, which presented managerial efficiency. 
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1990 
In 1990, the total index was linked to one more performance aspect relative to 1985. 
The total index was associated with turnover ratio, which is a measure of managerial 
efficiency, as well as with profit margin and liquidity ratios as in 1985. The negative 
significant association with turnover ratio suggested that companies with inefficient 
managers disclosed more non-financial information. When the total index was broken 
down into governance and non-goverriance indices, significant associations with more 
aspects of corporate performance were observed. 
Negative significant associations were observed between governance scores and rate of 
return on shareholders' equity, suggesting that companies with high rates of return were 
disclosing less governance information, and vice versa. Conversely, both profitability 
and rates of return on shareholder's equity were found to be positively associated with 
non-governance scores. This meant that companies with a higher rate of return on 
shareholder's equity disclosed more governance information. 
In addition, the results showed negative association between managerial efficiency and 
non-governance scores, suggesting that companies with less efficient managers 
disclosed more non-governance information. None of the indices were associated to 
either gearing or productivity ratios. 
1995 
By 1995, the number of significant associations between the total index and different 
aspects of corporate performance had increased relative to 1990. As the level of non- 
financial information disclosure increased, the total index was found to be significantly 
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associated with the profitability ratios (i. e. rates of return on share's equity and profit 
margin), liquidity ratio and, for the first time, the productivity ratios. 
TABLE 5.15 ' SPEARMAN RANK CORRELATION BETWEEN CORPORATE PERFORMANCE 
AND NON-FINANCIAL INFORMATION DISCLOSED 
Performance Profitability Managerial Performance Liquidity Aspects 
Ratios Rates of Profit 
Turnover 
. Gearing Productivity 
Working 
Return Margin rat os Capital 
701 713 723 731 763 741 
_ 1985 
GSc 0.207 0.115 0.030 0.126 0.105 -0.192 
(0.107) (0.371) (0.817) (0.326) (0.420) (0.132) 
NGSc 0.105 0.220 -0.047 0.006 0.181 -0.147 
(0.418) (0.083) (0.713) (0.966) (0.162) (0.251) 
TSc 0.189 0.214 -0.015 0.076 0.180 -0.209 
(0.141) (0.092) (0.909)--] (0.554) (0.165) (0-101) 
1990 
CSC -0.271 0.168 -0.089 0.038 0.052 -0.126 
(0.021) (0.154) (0.456) (0.749) (0.667) (0.289) 
NGSc 0.199 0.139 -0.330 0.047 0.021 -0.217 
(0.094) (0.243) (0.005) (0.692) (0.865) (0.067) 
TSc 0.006 0.213 -0.328 0.060 0.046 -0.258 
(0.960) (0.073) (0.005) 1 (0.620) (0.706) (0.029) 
1995 
GSc -0.058 -0.052 0.022 . 0.097 0.147 -0.178 
(0.633) (0.667) (0.859) (ý. 420) (0.224) (0.138) 
NGSc 0.262 0.1-76 0.079 0.007 0.267 -0.202 
(0.026) (0.020) (0.514) (0.952) (0-025) (0.089) 
TSc 0.199 E-0-3 0.020 -0.037 0.279 -0.252 
1 (0.096) (0.092) (0.869) (0.762) (0.019) (0.034) 
Note: TSc stands for total scores, NGSc stands for non-govemance scores, and GSc stands for governance 
scores. Figures in brackets show the significant level. Ratios and their Codes collected from the 
Datastream are shown below: 
Rate of Return 
701 Return on shareholder's equity 
Profit Manyin 
713 Trading profit margin 
Turnover ratios 
723 Tumover/net current assets 
Liquiditv ratio 
741 Working Capital ratio 
Gearine Ratio 
Capital gearing (%) 
Productivitv Ratios 
763 Operating Profit per employee 
Components of each ratio are shown in Appendix 5E. 
When the total index was broken into governance and non-govemance indices, non- 
governance index was associated with the high rates of return on shareholders' equity, 
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Profit margin, productivity and liquidity ratios. No link was found between governance 
scores and any of the performance aspects. 
The emergence of links between productivity ratio and non-governance scores meant 
that companies, which had focused on efficient human resource management, also 
concentrate on the disclosure of more non-governance information. 
5.5.2 Analytical Discussion 
The findings of this section provided answers to the fourth supporting research question 
which ask "Whether'there are any associations between different aspects of corporate 
performance and the non-financial information disclosed? " The overall finding of this 
section supports the findings of the earlier studies, shown in Table 3X, suggesting that 
in 1995 different aspects of corporate performance were associated with the disclosure 
of non-financial information. A brief summary of the findings for each performance 
aspect is presented below: 
Performance Aspects Profit bility Managerial Performance LiquiditV 
Ratios Rates 
-o-Q 
Return 
-Profit 
IMargin 
I Turnover Gearing f Ratim Productivity 
Working 
Capital 
1985 
GSc85 x X X X x 
NGSc85 x X X X x 
TSc85 x x X X 
1990 
GSC90 x x x x x 
NGSc90 x x x 
TSc90 x x 
1995 
GSc95 x x x x x 
NGSc95 X X V 
TSc95 x x V 
Notes: Tsc stands for total non-financial scores, NGsc stands for non-governance scores, and Gsc stands 
for governance scores. Coeff of Var stands for coefficient of variation. 
V'denotes association between performance aspects and non-financial information scores. 
'X ' denotes no association between performance aspects and non-financial information scores. 
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With the increasing number of companies disclosing more non-financial information by 
1995, non-financial scores appeared to be associated with more aspects of corporate 
performance relative to 1985. One of the ratios that was found to be associated with 
total scores in each of the three years was profit margin ratio. 
The lack of non-firiancial information disclosure may be interpreted by stakeholders as 
managerial failure in recognising and, subsequently, maintaining responsiveness to the 
changing external environments (Hammond and Slocum, 1996). This would raise 
doubts about managers' ability to run companies efficiently (Bowman and Haire, 1975; 
Sethi, 1975; and Ullmann, 1985), resulting in more implicit costs'(Comell and Shapiro, 
1987) and making it more difficult and costly for companies to raise finance (McGuire, 
Sundgren, and Schneeweis, 1988). 
When the total index was broken down into governance and non-governance indices, 
the findings illustrated that in 1985 and 1990, governance scores were associated with 
the rate of return ratio, which was in the main interest of shareholders. While this link 
was positive in 1985, a negative link was observed for 1990. 
The positive link of 1985 indicated that companies with a positive rate of return had 
reported governance information. In other words, as companies provided more 
information to assure their shareholders that they acted in their best interests, they were 
found to have increasing positive rates of return on their shareholders' equity. One way 
of explaining how companies could have disclosed governance information to legitimise 
their corporate behaviour is by looking at the way the level of governance information 
disclosure is expected to reduce the risk perceived by outsiders, including investors, and 
therefore, made it easier for the company to raise finance (Corporate Governance, 
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1999: pl). This means that companies were able to raise profitability by reducing 
implicit costs" (Cornell and Shapiro, 1987) and, hence a higher rate of return. 
In the case of negative significant association in 1990, companies with high rates of 
return on shareholders' equity were found to reveal less governance information. A 
possible reason for this could be that the rate of return on shareholders' equity was 
shareholders' main concern and as long as its value was high, shareholders were not 
perhaps interested to know how the company was run at the top managerial level. 
In this part of the study, we are concerned with stakeholder groups who are interested in 
financial performance of companies. Thus, companies can use the disclosure of non- 
financial information to adopt one of the four strategies introduced by Lindblom C. K. 
(1994) to justify their corporate behaviours. For instance, the negative significant 
association between total scores and liquidity ratio for all the three years can be 
explained using any of the Lindblom's C. K. (1994) four strategies. Companies could 
have adopted the first legitimacy strategy by Lindblom C. K. (1994) simply to inform 
their stakeholders of the actual non-governance changes that were taking place within 
their companies. By adopting the first strategy, in a way, companies could explain that 
as a result of the investment in non-govemance aspects, their liquidity position was 
weak over the accounting period (i. e. presentation of the actual situation). At the same 
time, they could have disclosed non-financial information, possibly, as part of an image 
making process to change or to manipulate the perception of their stakeholders (the 
second strategy) or to manipulate their perceptions by deflecting attention from their 
poor liquidity positions (the third strategy). Companies can adopt the second and third 
81 For example, potential investors can be ensured of the quality of the top management and the way the 
top management acts in their best interests. They can be, therefore, attracted to invest in the company 
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strategies by showing to their stakeholder groups that they are socially responsible and 
have fiiture prospects and can improve their poor liquidity position in a foreseeable 
future. Alternatively, companies may disclose non-govemance information to change 
the external expectations of their poor liquidity position (the fourth strategy). 
The observation of negative significant associations between liquidity and non- 
governance scores in both 1990 and 1995 can be regarded as a special reference to the 
non-governance scores in terms of the above findings (i. e. companies used their non- 
governance information to legitimise their performance). 
The evidence revealed little difference between governance and non-governance indices 
in terms of their significant associations with different aspects of performance in 1985 
and 1990. This was not, however, the case in 1995, when non-govemance score was 
shown to be significantly associated with many different aspects of performance in 
comparison to only one aspect, with which the governance score was linked. In the 
latter case, the disappearance of significant associations between governance score and 
various performance aspects was due to the introduction of the Cadbury code in 1992, 
which was complied with by most UK companies as found by Conyon and Mallin 
(1997). The findings on the lack of significant association meant that we had no 
evidence which could be interpreted as companies disclosing governance information to 
adopt one of the four legitimacy strategies introduced by Lindblom C. K. (1994). It is 
most likely that they disclosed information to comply with the Cadbury code. In the 
case of non-governance scores, the evidence observed in 1995 was in line with the 
findings of the earlier studies such as Cochran and Wood (1984), Ullmann (1985) and 
more easily. 
228 
Chapter S 
McGuire, Sundgren and Schneeweis (1988) and many other earlier studies, which were 
carried out in the 1970s to 1990s and found associations with corporate perfomance 
(shown in Table 3.6). 
With the increasing level of non-governance information, the emergence of more 
significant associations with different aspects of corporate performance is indicative of 
the increasing use of non-governance information by companies for various purposes, 
including the promotion of firm's image in order to reduce costs of raising capital, 
increasing the goodwill support by customers (Navarro, 1988), and maintaining a good 
track record in the labour market (McGuire et A 1988). Alternatively, a potential 
reason could be that companies disclosed non-financial information in response to the 
increasing pressures from their stakeholder groups (as suggested by Ullmann, 1985). 
5.6 SUMMARY OF EmpiwcAL FINDINGS AND THE LINK WITH THE PREVIOUS 
LITERATURE 
This section provides a summary Of the main findings of this chapter as well as the 
expected outcomes that were originally formed in Chapter 3 after the literature review. 
This section also provides discussions on the likely reasons why some of the findings of 
this study were not in alignment with the findings of the previous studies. The overall 
findings of the preceding sections on the association between the two non-financial 
indices and industrial affiliation, corporate size, growth rate and corporate performance 
are shown in Table S. 16. 
In Table 5.16, the black shaded areas represent those findings that are not supported by 
the previous literature and the grey shaded areas represent those findings that are in 
aligmnent with the findings of the previous studies. In the case of supporting research 
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questions I to 3, it was possible to measure the association between each corporate 
characteristic and non-financial disclosure directly. Unlike supporting research 
questions 1 to 3, the association between corporate performance and the two non- 
financial indkes (i. e. the fourth supporting research question) could not be measured 
directly as there were different aspects of performance to consider. Hence, the final 
decision on whether corporate performance and non-financial information disclosure 
were associated was based on whether the number of the observed associations was 
larger than the number of cases where no association was observed. In 1985, for 
instance, 5 out of a total number of 6 ratios were found not to be linked with non- 
governance scores (shown in Table 5.16). Hence, it was decided that in 1985 corporate 
performance and non-governance information were not linked with the overall 
performance. This was represented with No' in the black shaded area (shown in Table 
5.16). 
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5.6.1 Discrepancies between the actual and the expectejd results 
As it was shown in Table 5.16, those findings that were not in aligrunent with the 
expected results were denoted by superscripts V to T. In this section, the possible 
reasons for the observed discrepancies are presented with reference to the alphabetic 
letters by which the discrepancies were denoted in Table 5.16- The author takes the 
view that explanations of why the observed discrepand es occurred would assýst the 
reader to have a better understanding of how companies may decide to disclose non- 
fInancial information in the absence of any regularity requirements or any recognition 
by the professional bodies. 
a) Industrial Affiliation and Non-Governance Scores - 1985 to 1995 
The overall finding suggested that non-governance scores %ýere not associated with the 
industrial backgrounds of companies in either of the three years. This is despite the 
findings of the previous studies. As it was shown in Table 3.6,9 out of 10 studies found 
associations. Only Ng (1985) found no association between social information 
disclosure and industrial affiliation. 
This discrepancy can be explained by focusing on three aspects which are relevant to 
this study. Firstly, many of the previous studies focused on specific aspects of non- 
governance issues (see Table 3.6). For example, Adams, Hill and Roberts (1995 and 
1998) focused on environmental and employee aspects of disclosure, Hacyston and 
Milne (1996) and Gray, Javad, Power and Sinclair (1999) concentrated on social and 
environmental disclosures, while Cowen, Ferreri and Parker (1987) examined the 
association between industrial backgrounds of companies and energy and community 
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disclosures. This study, however, was concerned with the disclosure/non-disclosure of 
information on a range of different non-governance information categories (as it was 
discussed in section 3.2.2). 
Secondly, this study used indexing which is one form of content analysis and does not 
measure the extent of non-governance information disclosure (as explained in section 
5.2-2). While 'indexing' is mainly used in other fields of accounting (Cooke, 198 9,199 1, 
1992,1993; Hossain et al, 1994; Raffournier, 1995; and Wallace and Naser, 1995), 
most studies in the field of social and environmental accounting use other forms of 
content analysis and measure the extent of disclosure (e. g. Adams, Hill and Roberts, 
1995,1998; Gray et. al., 1999; and Hackston and Milne, 1996; among many others). 
Thirdly, as was discussed in section 3.3, many of the studies that were mentioned in 
Table 3.6, measured corporate social responsibility which was not necessarily the same 
as social/environmental information disclosure. 
b) Industrial Affiliation and Governance Scores - 1995 
In 1995, corporate governance scores and industrial backgrounds were found to be 
associated suggesting that despite the earlier expectation in 1995, all companies would 
report governance information regardless of their corporate characteristics. This finding 
was despite the earlier findings of Conyon and Mallin (1995) who found a high 
compliance with the recommendations of the Cadbury code among the large UK 
companies. However, this finding is in alignment with the findings of a study by 
Buckland and Dobble (1995) who found evidence to suggest that despite the common 
perception that compliance with the Cadbury code would indicate-a sound governance 
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structure and provides assurances to the shareholders, many companies in their sample 
chose not to comply. 
The above discrepancy between the actual and the expected results may also be 
explained by the 13 companies that entered the market between 1985 and 1995 (see 
Table 5.6). These new entries which belonged to certain industries needed to be 
financially successftd in order to survive in a highly competitive and highly regulated 
industries (as discussed in section 5.6). Hence, it is likely that these new entrants 
reported governance information to provide assurances to their investors of their sound 
managerial systems and the fact that they were acting in the best interest of 
. 
their 
investors. This can be a potential explanation why companies in certain industries 
disclosed more governance information than companies in other industries. 
q) Corporate Size and Governance Scores - 1985 
The findings suggest that in 1985, despite the earlier expectations that larger companies 
would disclose governance information as they were in the public eye, the level of non- 
financial information disclosure was not found to be associated with corporate size. One 
possible explanation can be that in 1985 the overall level of governance scores was 
generally low (i. e. 25% in 1985 in comparison to 66% in 1995) and most of the Top 100 
UK companies disclosed similar levels of governance information. Similar logical 
explanations can be applied for the discrepancies denoted by V, 'e' and T '. 
Apart from the above discrepancies ('a! to T), Table 5.16 highlights many of the 
associations that are found in this study are supported by the -findings of the previous 
studies. For instance, size was associated with both governance and non-govemance 
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scores. In the case of non-governance scores, most of the previous studies (Gray et al, 
1999; Adams et al, 1995 and 1998; and Hackston and Milne, 1996; Belkaoui and 
Karpik, 1989; Cowen, Fefferi and Parker, 1987, among many others) had found 
association with corporate size (see Table 5.16). In the case of performance, many 
aspects of performance were linked to non-governance scores in 1990 and 1995. As it 
was shown in Table 3.6,21 out of the 27 studies that were reviewed had found 
associations with corporate performance. Hence, the findings of this study are supported 
by most of the previous studies. 
The summaries of the findings in Table 5.16 show that governance scores were not 
associated with either size, growth or performance in 1990 and 1995. These findings are 
in line with the expectations formed in Chapter 3, indicating that the major UK 
companies disclosed governance information regardless of their size, financial 
performance and growth rate. The lack of any associations between governance scores 
and these three corporate characteristics means that as far as the governance scores are 
concerned this study has not found evidence in support of companies using information 
disclosure to legitimise their behaviours. In comparison to the governance scores, the 
findings of this chapter (as shown in Table 5.16) provided evidence that non- 
governance scores were linked with size, performance and growth (i. e. growth 90-95) in 
1995. As it was argued in the final parts of section 2.3.2, any evidence on the 
association between corporate characteristics and non-financial information indices can 
be interpreted as companies disclosing non-financial information to legitimise their 
corporate behaviours to their stakeholders. 
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5.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter concentrated on empirical investigation of supporting research questions I 
to 4 in order to answer the first key research question which was concerned with 
"whether companies disclose non-financial information to legitimise their corporate 
behaviours to their stakeholder groups? ". Each supporting research question was probed 
in terms of governance, non-govemance and total scores for 1985,1990 and 1995. The 
investigation for each supporting research question concentrated on finding evidence on 
whether there was any association between non-financial scores and each of the four 
corporate characteristics. As it was argued in Chapter 2, the observation of associations 
with any of the corporate characteristics, would indicate that companies coilld have 
adopted one of the four strategies introduced by Lindblom C. K. (1994) when disclosing 
non-financial information. 
The following table provides a summary of the overall association between the two NFI 
indices and corporate characteristics. The overall findings indicated that there were links 
between corporate characteristics and non-financial information. 
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Corporate Characteristics Non-. Governance 
1 I Gover 
ý 198-ý, 1 990 ý 1995 ý 1985 1 1990 ý 1995 
Industrial affiliation 
Observed X 
Expected .7X 
Co t i 
Observed X 1( X 
rpora es ze . y Expected 1( X 
OverallfindingsJor Observed Yes Yes No I IN o 
Cor porate Performance No No 
Growth 85-90 Growth 90-95 
N 
Observed - 
on-Governance 90 Expected - 
Observed X - Governance 90 Expected X - 
Observed 
Non-Governance 95 Expected 
Observed X 
Governance 95 Expected X 
Notes: V' denotes association between corporate characteristics and non-financial information scores. 
'X ' denotes no association between corporate characteristics and non-financial information scores. 
The black shaded areas represent those findings that are not in line with the previous literature. 
The grey shaded areas represent those findings that are in alignment with the previous literature. 
The major conclusion from the results can be surm-narized as follows: 
9 The first supporting research question was analysed by focusing on industrial 
affiliation. In the case of industrial backgrounds, the findings showed that in 1985 
and 1995 the governance -scores and industrial backgrounds were associated. In 
1985, the overall level of governance information disclosed by companies was low 
and the observation of association shows that only companies from certain 
industries were disclosing governance information. In 1995, the link between 
governance scores and industrial affiliation was despite the earlier expectations that 
companies from all industries would disclose similar levels of governance 
infonnation after the introduction of the Cadbury code of best practice in 1992. 
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In the case of industrial affiliation and governance scores, the discussion in section 
5.2.2 explained that companies could have disclosed governance information to 
adopt one of the four Lindblorrfs C. K. (1994j strategies. This was to assure their 
investors that they had sound governance structures to run the company efficiently 
in regulated and competitive industries. It was interesting to find out that in 1995 
governance scores were still associated with the industrial backgrounds of 
companies. This was despite the recommendations of the Cadbury code of best 
practice (1992). One possible explanation for this is that companies from certain 
industries were paying more attention to the information requirements of their 
investors and they were highly likely to be under more pressure from their investors. 
e The lack of observation of any association between non-governance information and 
industrial affiliation in 1995 was not in line with the findings of previous studies. 
This was explained by the fact that the non-governance index used for the purpose 
of this study did not measure the extent of disclosure. Companies in certain 
industries are likely to concentrate on certain non-govemance information 
categories and report extensively on them. It was, however, argued that this could 
not have been reflected by the index used in this study and can be regarded as a 
potential reason why no association was observed between non-governance scores 
and industrial affiliation. 
In section 5.3, investigation was carried out to assess the link between corporate size 
and non-fmancial information disclosure (i. e. the second supporting research 
question). The fmdings showed that the only observed association were in 1985 and 
1995 when larger companies disclosed more non-governance information than 
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smaller companies did. This finding supports the earlier contentions by some 
researchers that in the absence of any regulations or any recognition by the 
professional bodies, non-governance information can be easily used for different 
purposes. While the first, second and fourth strategies of Lindblom C. K. (1994) 
were applied to explain the disclosure of non-govemance information, it was argued 
that the third strategy could not be used to explain the disclosure of non-governance 
information. 
With the increasing size of companies, each stakeholder group comprised a large 
number of individual stakeholders resulting in higher stakeholder pressure on 
companies. As a result, larger companies were more exposed to the risk of negative 
publicity. Hence, they disclosed more non-managerial information covering the 
interests of a wider range of stakeholder groups other than investors. 
The chapter proceeded to investigate the third supporting research question, which 
was concerned with the association between corporate growth and disclosure of 
non-financial information. significant association was found between non- 
governance scores in 1995 and growth rate for the period 1990-95. Once again, with 
the increasing level of non-financial information in 1995, growing companies were 
disclosing more non-governance information than companies with lower growth 
rates. It was argued that companies could have adopted any of the four strategies 
discussed by Lindblom C. K. (1994) when disclosing non-governance information 
to their stakeholders. One possible explanation is that growing companies, which 
needed to expand their operations, required to employ extra financial and human 
capital. It was argued that it would be less costly for companies to access different 
resources if they appear to have a prosperous future, which ultimately gained 
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companies the goodwill of their stakeholder groups such as lenders, customers and 
employees. No association was found between corporate growth and governance 
scores. 
The fourth supporting research question, which was concerned with corporate 
performance and non-financial information disclosure, was investigated in section 
5.5 using accounting-based measures of performance. It was found that in 1985, 
well before the publication of the Cadbury code of best practice in 1992, different 
aspects of performance were linked to governance scores. Once again,, the* 
observation of this link points to the direction that companies could have disclosed 
governance information to adopt either of the Lindblom's C. K. (1994) four 
strategies. In 1990, just before the publication of the Cadbury code in 1992, and in 
1995, well after the publication of the Cadbury code, significant associations 
between governance scores and performance measures had disappeared indicating 
that companies were disclosing governance information regardless of their corporate 
performance. 
Finally, the result showed that as the level of non-financial information disclosure 
rose in 1995, the number of links between various performance aspects and non- 
governance scores also increased. This showed that in the absence of any 
regulations or any recognition by the accounting profession, companies chose to 
report non-governance information most possibly to legitimise their behaviours to 
those stakeholder groups, who mainly had financial interest in companies, 
in return 
for their stakeholders' goodwill. In this way, companies could have had less costly 
access to financial and labour capital. It was argued that in doing so, companies 
could have adopted either of the Lindblom's C. K. (1994) four strategies. 
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CHAPTER 6 THE ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS FROM 
QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY- EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE II 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate "Whether companies paid any attention to 
the quality of non-financial information by meeting the information requirements of 
their stakeholder groups? " (i. e. the second key research question). While the previous 
chapter investigated the first key research question suggesting that companies with 
certain characteristics (i. e. industrial affiliation, corporate size, growth and financial 
performance) used non-firiancial information disclosure to legitimise their corporate 
behaviours, this chapter focuses on the 'quality' of non-financial information. 
Following the design of the questionnaire surveys to investigate the second key research 
question in Chapter 4, this chapter expands the findings of the previous chapter and 
concentrates on analysing responses to the questionnaires to answer the supporting 
research questions 5 and 6. The two supporting research questions were concerned with 
two of the five aspects of 'Social and Ethical Accounting, Auditing, and Reporting' 
(SEAAR) aspects, namely 'stakeholder identification' and 'stakeholder. dialogue'. 
The fifth research question, which is concerned with 'stakeholder identification', is 
addressed to companies only. The sixth research question, which deals with 
'stakeholder dialogue, is analysed by looking at the responses from companies, 
investors and employees. The responses from each group are used to assess stakeholder 
dialogue in terms of its three aspects, namely 'methods Of communication', 
'information items disclosed to stakeholder groups' and 'two-way communication and 
consultation with stakeholder groups'. 
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This chapter analyses the responses received from companies, investors and trade union 
representatives in sections 6.2,6.3 and 6.4, respectively. In section 6.5, the responses 
from the three groups are compared to provide a more in-depth understanding of the 
findings. Each section comprises two sub-sections, namely 'descriptive' and 'analytical' 
sections. In the descriptive sections, the gathered evidence on each of the three aspects 
of stakeholder dialogue is reported in a separate section. For companies, there is an 
additional section, which . examines the corporate responses on 
'stakeholder 
identification'. 
Unlike the previous chapter, where analytical sections provided answers to the. relevant 
supporting research question, in this chapter the sixth research question will be 
answered in the concluding section. This is because the responses from three groups 
(i. e. companies, employees and investors) need to be analysed individually and, 
subsequently, the responses from companies and each of the two stakeholder groups are 
compared before drawing the overall conclusion on the state of stakeholder dialogue. 
The comparison between the responses from companies and each of their two 
stakeholder groups is carried out in section 6.6. The fifth research question is answered 
in the analytical section 6.2.2 as this research question was addressed to companies 
only. 
Empirical findings are Presented'in tabular formats and, in section 6.6, graphs are used 
to illustrate the discrepancies between the responses received from companies and their 
two stakeholder groups. The figures shown in the Tables present the percentage number 
of respondents (i. e. companies, investors or trade union representatives) unless stated 
otherwise. 
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The chapter will be concluded in section 6.6, where the overall findings for supporting 
research questions 5 and 6 are summarised to answer the second key research question. 
4 
6.2 RESPONSES FROM COMPANIES 
6.2.1 Descriptive Analysis 
As it was explained in Chapter 3, the questionnaire designed for companies was 
different to the questionnaires sent to investors and trade union representatives in the 
way its first part had addressed the fifth supporting research question, asking companies 
about 'stakeholder identification'. The remaining three sections were similar to the 
questionnaires sent to investors and trade union representatives. The results for this 
section are shown in Tables 6.1,6.2,6.3 and 6.4. 
6Z1.1 Stakeh older Recogn ition 
Companies were asked- to identify the importance they attach to each of 
-their 
stakeholder groups and whether they had any procedures to recognise their major 
stakeholder groups. The responses indicated that the most important stakeholders were 
investors with employees in second place and customers, public and suppliers coming in 
the third, fourth and fifth places, respectively (shown in Table 6.1). The responses 
revealed that 37.5% of companies had procedures for recognising their stakeholder 
groups. Some companies claimed that they used the percentage of share ownership as 
the basis of identifying the importance they attached to each stakeholder group. 
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TAi3LE 6.1 DEGREE OF IMPORTANCE ATTACHED To EACH STAKEHOLDER GROUP 
Stakeholder Group The Importance Attached to Each Stakeholder Group By Companies* 
Investors 1.19 
Employees 1.75' 
Customers 2.14 
2.62 
Suppliers 3.08 
* Note: I=Very major, 2=Major, 3=Somewhat Major, 4=Not Very Major, 5=Not At All Major. 
6.21.2 Methods of Communication 
When companies were asked about the methods they used to communicate with their 
stakeholder groups, it was revealed that face to face methods were most popular used 
for investors. For example, 75% of companies claimed to use 'group meetings' to 
communicate with their investors in comparison to 43.8% of companies using the same 
method to communicate with their employees. A similar result was observed for 'large 
scale meetings'. The responses showed that companies preferred to have group meetings 
with their investors as the investors had the opportunity to ask questions and to discuss 
matters with them. None of the written method nor any of the audio visual and 
electronic methods appeared to be popular with companies when communicating with 
their investors. 
While face to face methods were the most popular methods of communication with 
investors, the responses revealed that companies commonly used written methods for 
communication with their employees. According to the evidence shown in Table 6.2,6 
out of 8 of the written methods (i. e. 75% of the written methods) were used by 37.5% or 
more companies to communicate with their employees in comparison to only 2 out of 8 
of the written methods (i. e. 25% of the written methods) used by 37.5% or more 
companies to communicate with their investors. The results suggest that written 
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methods were commonly used by companies when communicating with their 
employees as they provide detailed information about operations and organisation on 
regular basis. Some written methods were more popular than others were. For instance, 
a high percentage of companies used 'Newsletters' (81.3%), 'Information Notes to 
Stakeholders' (68.8%), 'Company Handbook' (68.8%), and 'Departmental Bulletins' 
(62.5%), when communicating with their employees. 
TABLE 6.2 METHODS OF COMMUNICATION USED BY COMPANIES TO COMMUNICATE 
WITH THEIR EMPLOYEES AND WITH THEIR INVESTORS 
Com nies 
Methods of Communication EmployeesM Investors(%) 
Face to Face Method 
Group Meetings 43.8 75.0 
Cascade Networks 62.5 12.5 
Large Scale Meetings 25.0 50.0 
Written Method 
Company Handbook 68.8 37.5 
Information Notes to Stakeholder 
Representative 68.8 37.5 
House Journals 25.0 31.3 
Newsletters 81.3 31.3 
Departmental Bulletins 62.5 6.3 
Notices 50.0 12.5 
Individual Letters to Stakeholders 37.5 31.3 
Other Methods 
Information Points 25.0 18.8 
Audio-visual Aids 37.5 31.3 
E-mail 56.3 6.3 
Notes: The percentages show the number of companies using communication methods. 
6. Z L3 Information Items Disclosed 
The responses and the statistics for this section are shown in Table 6.3. In response to 
the question of 'which type of information items on organization (100) they disclose to 
their two stakeholder groups', companies responded that 50% or more of them reported 
all of the I1 (100) information items to their employees. In comparison, only 2 out of 
the II (i. e.. 18%) information items were disclosed by 50% or more companies to their 
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investors. The reverse held true for 'Marketing Information' (MI). Only 4 out of 8 (i. e. 
50%) marketing information (MI) items were disclosed by 50% or more companies to 
employees in comparison to all marketing information items being disclosed by 50% or 
more to investors. In other words, as far as the investors were concerned, companies 
mainly focused on disclosing 'Marketing Information' to them. 
TABLE 63 INFORMATION ITEMS DISCLOSED BY COMPANIES TO THEIR EMPLOYEES 
AND INVESTORS 
Companies disclosing information to: 
Type of Information Employees Investors Tnformation 
on Organisation a0: T- 
75.0 31.3 Working 9bjectives 75.0 43.8 Operating & Technical Information 75.0 25.0 Health & Safety 80.0 50.0 Inf. on Personnel 62.5 00.0 
Working Conditions 62.5 12.5 
Supervision & Management 62.5 00.0 
Admin. Procedure 81.3 25.0 
Training Development 68.8 56.7 Development In Technology 62.5 12.5 
Equal Opportunity 50.0 18.8 
Social Welfare 
Marketing Information (M 
Company Market Share 31.3 56.3 
Company Market Segment 43.8 62.5 
Mergers & Acquisition 75.0 81.0 
Investment 56.3 62.5 
Details of Products and Services 62.5 68.8 
Future Plans on Development 37.5 56.3 
Research and Development 43.8 62.5 
Environmental Issues 75.0 62.5 
Notes: The figures show percentage number of companies, which disclosed information. 
The evidence is in alignment with the earlier expectation that companies would provide 
their employees with more detailed information on internal issues relating to the day to 
day running ýof the company. Despite companies concentrating on disclosing 'marketing 
information' (MI), mainly to their investors, there was also evidence that many 
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companies disclosed a number of marketing information items to their employees. For 
instance, 75%, 63% and 56% of companies disclosed information on mergers and 
acquisition', 'details of products and services' and 'investment', respectively. 
6. ZI. 4 Two-way Communication and Consultation 
The responses for two-way communication and consultation are shown in Table 6.4. 
The evidence suggests that the most popular stakeholder group with whom companies 
held two-way communication and consultation with were their employees. 
TABLE 6.4 Two-wAy COMMUNICATION AND CONSULTATION 
-(i)- 
Dialogue Circles 
yes 
(%) If YES, How often? 
If NO, How useful do you expect the dialogue circles 
to be for each stakeholder group 
Investors 6.3 Once a year Not at all useful 
Employees 62.5 2-3 times a year Not very useful 
Customers 50 3-4 times a year _ Not very useful 
Suý PhLer:: s: ý 50 Twice a ISE Not very useful 
Public 6.7 _. Not at all useful 
(ii) Joint Consultati on 
Yes 
V/-) If YES, How often? 
If NO. How useful do you expect the joint consultation 
method to be for each stakeholder group 
Investors 31.3 Twice a year Not at all useful 
Employees 66.7 2-3 times a year Not very useful 
Customers 33.3 3-4 timeLý ýear Not very useful 
Suppliers 26.7 . Three times a year Not very useful 
Public -1 1-3.3 1 2-3 times a year Not at all useful 
(iii) Attitud Survey: n Schemes esti iv Su 
YES (%) 
-- 
YES (%) I 
Investors 31.3 Inv estors 6.7 
Employees 66.7 Employees 64.3 
Customers 33.3 Customers 21.4 
Suppliers 26.7 Suppliers 7.1 
Public 13.3 Public 0 
Notes: The figures show percentage number of companies, which used the two-way communication and 
consultation methods. 
As it is shown in Table 6.4, investors did not take part in either quality circles, nor joint 
consultation committees, nor attitude surveys. Both dialogue circles and joint 
consultation required investors' involvement in internal issues. As it will be discussed 
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later, investors clearly indicated that they were not interested in being involved in the 
internal affairs as they would find it too time consuming. Most companies claimed that 
they would not find dialogue circles with investors useful. 
6.2.2 Analytical Discussion 
The findings of section 6.2.1.1 answer the fifth supporting research question, which was 
concerned with 'stakeholder identification' and whether companies attach different 
importance to their stakeholder groups. As it was discussed in section 3.4-1, 
'stakeholder identification' can be regarded as one of the fundamental characteristics of 
'Social and Ethical Accounting, Auditing, and Reporting' (SEAAR). It was also argued 
that by definition the relationships between companies and each of their stakeholder 
groups vary. Hence, it is important for companies to recognise this so that they can have 
a better understanding of the values and, subsequently, the information requirements of 
their stakeholder groups. In the author's view, if companies treat their stakeholders 
equally and fail to recognise the differences between these groups, they are unlikely to 
use appropriate methods of communication and would not be in a position to disclose 
the relevant iniormation to stakeholders. 
The findings of this section illustrate that companies attached different importance to 
their stakeholder groups with investors being the most important stakeholder group. 
This supports the findings of the previous chapter suggesting that companies pay more 
attention to those stakeholder groups who have financial interests in companies when 
disclosing non-financial information. According to Ullmann (1985), the most powerful 
stakeholder group is the one who has control over the most vital resources. In the case 
of UK companies, investors can be regarded as the most important stakeholder group as 
they have control over financial resources. 
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Employees and customers were found to be the second and third most important 
stakeholder groups, respectively. An interesting finding was that most companies had 
found the public to be more important than their suppliers. In the author's view, 
companies could have regarded the public as comprising potential new customers, 
potential new employees and potential new investors and lenders. If companies intended 
to expand or to raise finance or to attend new employees, they need to have a sound 
Public image. However, as it was explained in Chapter 4, only two stakeholders were 
approached in this study. They were investors and employees. 
VvUle investors' interests can be regarded to be mainly financial, employees' interests 
can be regarded to have a combination of financial and non-fixiancial interests. For 
instance, employees are concerned with job stability and pecuniary benefits as well as 
with issues such as working conditions, training programmes, equal opportunity and 
communication with employees. 
Ile findings of this section suggest that by 1997, companies were still using share 
ownership as the main basis for stakeholder classification. In other words, control over 
the financial resources was determining stakeholders' power. This provided further 
evidence that UK companies mainly concentrated on financial aspects. This finding is 
also in alignment with the recommendations stated in the Hampel report published in 
1998, Proposing that companies need to disclose information to their different 
stakeholders as long as doing so is in the best interest of the investors. In other words, 
the Hampel report elevated the mentality of being more financially oriented. 
As different stakeholder groups have different values and expectations, the nature of 
dialogue between companies and stakeholder group was expected to differ with each 
250 
0 
Chapter 6 
stakeholder group (i. e. the sixth supporting research question). In section 3.4.2, 
stakeholder dialogue was considered to have three aspects. The findings of this section 
showed that as far as each aspect was concerned, companies claimed to have treated 
their two stakeholder groups differently. 
The evidence showed that 75% of companies held group meetings with investors in 
Comparison to only 43.8% of companies using the same method for employees. In 
general, face to face methods were more popular to communicate with investors than 
with employees. Conversely, the responses showed that companies generally used 
written methods when communicating with their employees. As it was explained earlier, 
employees are internal stakeholders who are not only financially interested in the 
company but are also interested in matters such as 'Training', 'Working Conditions, 
'Equal opportunity,, 'Health and Safety, etc. As they need to know the details on non- 
financial aspects, written methods are appropriate, providing them with detailed 
information. For instance, it was shown that companies used e-mail mainly when 
communicating with their employees as e-mail provided them with an excellent 
Opportunity to inform their employees of the day-to-day activities within their 
organization and what is taking place in different parts of the organization. 
A similar difference was found for the second aspect of stakeholder dialogue (i. e. 
information items disclosed to stakeholder groups). Once again, the findings suggested 
that companies disclosed information items that were expected to be relevant to each 
group. This meant that companies concentrated on disclosing marketing information to 
investors and focused on disclosing information on organization to their employees. 
This indicated that companies took account of their stakeholders' information 
requirements and provided them with the relevant information. 
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For the third aspect of stakeholder dialogue (i. e. two-way communication and 
consultation), the responses showed that the highest level of two-way communication 
and consultation was held with employees. However, whether companies made the right 
choice of two-way communication and consultation methods for each stakeholder group 
cannot be known until the responses from the two stakeholder groups are also analysed. 
The same holds true for the other two aspects of stakeholder dialogue (i. e. 'methods of 
communication' and 'information items disclosed to stakeholder group'). 
Even though companies have identified their stakeholder groups, it does not necessarily 
imply that they have understood their stakeholder groups' values or whether they have 
indeed taken them into account and held dialogue with them. In addition, the responses 
from both investors and employees need to clarify (a) if stakeholders found 
communication methods and information items used by companies to communicate 
with them to be relevant and useful and (b) whether there were any discrepancies 
between the responses from companies and investors. In the latter case, if there were 
any discrepancies the possible reasons and what implications they had need to be 
explored. 
As it was explained at the beginning of this chapter (in section 6.1), the overall analysis 
that would answer the sixth supporting research question will be discussed in the 
concluding section (i. e. section 6.6). 
6.3 RESPONSES FROM INVESTORS 
The responses received from investors are presented in Tables 6.5,6.6 and 6.7. When 
investors were asked about the methods of communication, information items disclosure 
and two-way communication and consultation, they were also asked about their 
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preferences and how useful they found each method or each information item. In this 
way, it was possible to compare investors' preferences with the actual situation. This 
would enable us to see if companies met the information requirements of investors and 
used the appropriate methods of communication. 
6.3.1 Descriptive Analysis 
6.3-1.1 Methods of Communication 
When investors were asked about methods of communication, 73.3% of investors 
responded that they had used 'group meetings'. This method was the mo7st popular 
method and was preferred by 80% of investors (see Table 6.5). Large-scale meetings 
were also popular (as claimed by 46.7% of investors). The institutional investors, who 
took part in this survey, stated that they preferred 'face to face' methods, and if they felt 
they needed to communicate with companies, they would do so by contacting them 
directly. 
Little preference was shown for written methods or any of the other methods that were 
either used or preferred by the investors. Some investors expressed that due to the time 
constraints they faced, they were hardly interested in detailed information on the 
internal aspects of companies. 
Among the written methods, the ones providing an overall picture of the company were 
mainly used and preferred by investors. For instance, 40% of investors claimed that 
companies used 'information notes to stakeholders' representatives', when 
communicating with them, even though this method was preferred by only 13% of 
investors. 
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TABLE 6.5 METHODS OF COMMUNICATION USED TO COMMUNICATE WITH 
INVESTORS 
Methods of Percentage N ber of Investors 
Communication Used Preferred_(%)4. 
Face to Face Method 
Group Meetings 73.3 80.0 
Cascade Networks 6.7 6.7 
Large Scale Meetings 46.7 13.3 
Written Method 
Company Handbook 6 7 20.0 Information Notes to . 
Stakeholder Representative 40 0 13.3 House Journals . 13.3 6.7 Newsletters 26.7 13.3 Departmental Bulletins 20.0 6.7 Notices 6.7 6.7 Individual Letters to 6.7 6.7 Stakeholders 
Other Methods 
Information Points 0.00 0.00 
Audio-visual Aids 20.0 13.3 
_E-mail 
13.3 20.0 
Notes: * The figures show percentage number of investors who used each communication method. 
4 The figures show the percentage number of investors who preferred to use the method. 
6.3.1.2 Information Items Disclosed 
The evidence, shown in Table 6.6, illustrates that apart from financial information, 
which was used by almost all investors (e. g. mergers and acquisitions, 100%; and 
investment, 100%), there were some non-financial information items, which were used 
by investors to a large degree. 'Details on products and services' (e. g. used by 92.3% of 
investors) and 'Future plans on development' (e. g. used by 84.6% of investors) are 
relevant examples. Investors found that all of the 'marketing information' (MI) items 
disclosed to them to be 'very' useful. In comparison to the marketing information, 57% 
or more investors claimed that 3 out of II (i. e. 27%) information items on organization 
had been used by them. 
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TABLE 6.6 INFORMATION ITEMS DISCLOSED TO INVESTORS 
Percentage Nu ber of Investors Type of Information Used Usefulness-& 
Information on Organisation aOO): 
Working Objectives 57.1 3.5 
Operating & Technical Information 21.4 2.3 
Health & Safety 21.4 2.0 
Information on Personnel 85.7 3.9 
Working Conditions 7.1 2.3 
Supervision & Management 35.7 3.3 
Administration Procedures 7.1 2.5 
Training Development 21.4 2.8 
Development In Technology ý7.1 3.5 
Equal Opportunity 21.4 1.7 
Social Welfare 00.0 2.2 
Marketing Information (Aff): 
Company Market Share 84.6 3.7 
COmPanY Market Segment 92.3 3.6 
Mergers & Acquisition 100.0 3.6 
Investment 100.0 3.6 
Details of Products and Services 92.3 3.6 
Future Plans on Development 84.6 3.6 
Research and Development 
Environmental Issues 
Note: * The figures show percentage number of companies, which disclosed information. 
6 lbe degree of usefulness found by investors, I-Not at all useful, 2=Not very useful, 3=Somewhat usefifl, 4=Very 
useful. 
Overall, the evidence shows that investors found information on internal matters of 
organizations less 'useful'( i. e. only 4 out of 11, or 36% of, information items on 
organization, 100) were found to be somewhat useful as compared to all of the 
marketing information items, which were found to be 'very' useful. Although investors 
did not claim to receive information on internal matters of the organization, there were a 
few information items on internal matters that were highly used by investors and were 
generally found to be useful by them. These information items were: 'information on 
personnel' (i. e. used by 86% of investors and found to be 'very' usefa . 
1), 'working 
objectives', 'development in technology' (i. e. both were used by 57% of investors and 
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found to be 'very' useful) and 'Supervision and Management' (i. e. used by 35.7 of 
investors and found to be 'somewhat' to 'very' useful). 
6.3.1.3 Two-jýqy Communication and Consultation 
The responses received from investors showed that only 14% of them took part in 
dialogue circles. The remaining investors (i. e. 86%) who claimed not to take part in 
dialogue circles showed no interest to do so. In the case of joint consultation, a large 
number of investors (i. e. I- 42.9% = 57.1%) who replied claimed that they did not take 
Part in joint consultation with companies and even if they did, they would not find it 
'very' useful. 42.9% of investors had found the consultation process 'very' useftil. 
The responses also revealed that about half of the respondents had received attitude 
surveys. At the same time, some respondents claimed that they received surveys 
whenever companies were in trouble. None of the respondents indicated to have 
received any suggestion schemes. 
TABLE 6.7 TWO-WAY COMMUNICATION AND CONSULTATION USED TO 
COMMUNICATE WITH INVESTORS 
YES if YES. How usefulness did 
you find each method 
Lf Ný04 
How interested are you to take part in 
either of the four methods 
0) DialOgue Circles 14.3 Somewhat useful_ Not very interested 
Qi) JOint Consultation 42.9 Very useful Not very interested 
. -(iii) 
Attitude Survey 50.0 Somewhat useful 
_ 
Not ve! y interested 
- 
Qv) Suggestion Schemes I - 
Not very interested 
Note: * Percentage number of investors who used two-way communication and consultation method. 
63.2 Analytical Discussion 
The main objective of investors is to focus on financial issues rather than being 
concerned with non-financial matters. This is supported by the findings that investors 
were not interested in using written methods which would have provided them with 
more details about the day-to-day operations of companies. The only method of 
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communication commonly used by investors was group meeting (i. e. general meeting 
held with investors). 
Even though there were only a few non-financial information items which were of 
interest to investors and were found to be useful by them (e. g. 'Information on 
Personnel', 'Development in Technology' and 'Working Objectives' and 'Supervision 
and Management'), the overall findings suggested that investors were not interested in 
information items about non-financial issues. For instance, the findings showed that 
investors were not interested in 'Equal Opportunity', 'Health and Safety', 'Working 
Conditions' and 'Social Welfare"'. Conversely, all of the information items related to 
the overall financial position of companies were found to be 'very useful' by investors. 
The lack of interest by investors in two-way communication and consdItation provided 
further Support, suggesting that investors were not interested in non-financial aspects of 
companies. 
To explain why investors pay attention to information related to financial positions of 
companies and to only a few non-financial information items, we look at the changes in 
the percentage number of institutional investors in the UK.. As mentioned in Chapter 3, 
70% to 80% of shares in the UK are held by institutional investors (Modern Company 
Law, 1999), who can play a significant role to improve managerial structures of 
companies (Lunt, 1992; and Huddart, 1993). According to Keasy and Wright (1997), 
"the major growth in institutional shareholders is mainly the result of the growth in 
pension funds" (p24-25). The pension funds arc not 'owners', they are investors 
(Drucker, 1976) and their job is to invest the beneficiaries' money in the most profitable 
" Ibis study categorised these information items as non-managerial information. 
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investment Hutton (1995) argues that "pension ftmds ... have become classic absentee 
landlords, exerting power without responsibility and ... without reciprocal obligation as 
owners" (P304). Many institutional shareholders view shares as commodities that can be 
readily tradable in an active market and many of them adopt a short-termistic view of 
their holdings (Charkham, 1990). 
The author takes the view that the growing percentage of holdings by institutional 
investors and the way fund managers view it to be their responsibility to maximise their 
beneficiaries' investment explains why most institutional investors' attentions were paid 
to financial matters and why investors were interested in neither 'written methods' nor 
in 'Information on Organization'. 
The best way to explain why there were few non-financial information items in the 
interest of institutional investors is by looking at the separation of ownership and 
control. Since the beginning of the formation of modem companies in the late 19'h 
century, owners have been concerned with managers maximizing their own interests 
rather than maximizing owners' return. Short and Keasey (1997) showed that the 
presence of institutional shareholders could have a positive effect on corporate 
performance by affecting the relationship between performance and other ownership 
interests. The findings of this section shows that the non-financial information items, 
which were of interest to investors, were more on managerial aspects (i. e. information 
on personnel) and would indicate whether managerial structure was designed in a way 
to protect owners' interests. Even though it was argued earlier that institutional 
investors are concerned with profit maximiztion, the Cadbury committee recommended 
institutional investors to take note of managerial structures of companies. 
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The Cadbury Report (Cadbury Committee, 1992) expects institutional investors to take 
on the role of monitoring corporate managers on behalf of smaller shareholders so that 
management would act in the best interest of the owners. According to the Cadbury 
Report "Given the weight of their votes, the way in which institutional shareholders use 
the power to influence the standards of governance is offundamental importance. "(para. 
6.10) 
The above - explanation illustrates why investors paid attention to managerial 
information as well as financial information. The findings also showed that little' 
attention had been paid to what this study regards as non-govemance information. In the 
author's view, the findings of this section clearly support the way investors are believed 
to be interested in financial matters and pay little attention to non-financial issues. The 
findings also suggest that despite the absence of a two-way communication and 
consultation between investors and companies (i. e. little stakeholder dialogue), invLstors 
were provided with the information that they were interested in (i. e. there was not much 
difference between what investors used and what they preferred to use). 
6.4 RESPONSES FROM TRADE UNIONS 
6.4.1 Descriptive Analysis 
The responses from trade unions are shown in Tables 6.8,6.9 and 6.10. Trade union 
representatives were asked about their preferences for methods of communication, 
information items they wished to receive as well as two-way communication and 
consultation with companies. 
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6 4-LI Methods of Communication 
The responses revealed that the most popular method of communication was group 
meeting (used by 90% of respondents - as shown in Table 6.8). Although most methods 
were in use by more than 50% of respondents, apart from 'Group Meetings', the most 
popular methods were mainly written methods (e. g. 'Company Hand books', 70%; 
'Notices', 70%; 'Information Notes to Stakeholder Representatives', 60%; 
'Departmental Bulletins', 60%; and 'Individual Letters to Stakeholders', 60%). 
TABLE 6.8 METHODS OF COMMUNICATION USED TO COMMUNICATE WITH UNION 
REPRESENTATIVES 
Percentage Number of Union Representatives Methods of Communication Used Preferred (%)4. 
Face to Face Method 80.0 
Group Meetings 90.0 10.0 
Cascade Networks 50.0 40.0 
Large Scale Meetings 
Written Method 50.0 
Company Handbook 70.0 
Information Notes to Stakeholder 10.0 
Representative 60.0 3u 
House Journals 4u 3M 
Newsletters 60.0 5 U 
Departmental Bulletins 5M - 40.0 
Notices Im 20.0 
Individual Letters to stakeholders 60.0 
Other Methods 30.0 
Information Points 50.0 20.0 
Audio-visual Aids 60.0 10.0 
E-mail 40.0 
Notes: * The figures show percentage number of respondents. 
4. The figures show the percentage number of union representatives who preferred to use each method. 
For all of the communication methods, the percentage number of respondents, for whom 
each method was used (see Table 6.8 - column 'used'), was considerably higher than 
the percentage number of respondent who preferred that method. There were only two 
communication methods for which the difference was not considerably large. They 
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were: 'Large Scale Meetings' and 'House Journals'. In the case of 'Large Scale 
Meetings', while 50% of respondents claimed that companies used this method, only 
40% of employees preferred this method. In comparison, 'Notices', which were also 
preferred by 40% of respondents, was used by 70% of employees. 
Similar comparisons were observable between 'Departmental Bulletins' and 'Company 
Handbook'. The evidence, shown in Table 6.8, illustrates that while 'Departmental 
Bulletins' were used to communicate to 50% of qMPloyees, exactly the same number of 
employees (i. e. 50%) preferred using this method. When compared to 'Company 
Handbook', ý the same preference (i. e. 50%) was observed but with a considerably larger 
number of companies (i. e. 70%) who claimed to have used 'Company Handbook'. A 
similar discrepancy was observed for 'House Journals' and 'News Letters' when 40% of 
respondents used 'House Journals' with a preference rate of 3 0%. In comparison, 'News 
Letters', which had the same preference rate (i. e. 30%), were used by 60% of 
employees, which was a relatively higher percentage. 
The above evidence shows that there are large discrepancies between the 
communication methods preferred by the trade union representatives and the 
communication methods that were used by institutional investors. When this is 
compared with the methods of communication used for investors (see section 6.3.1.1), 
the evidence shows that more different methods of communication were used for the 
communication with employees than for the communication with investors. 
6.4-1.2 Information Item Disclosed 
As it was argued in Chapter 3, the disclosure of information items relevant to 
stakeholders would require the use of appropriate communication methods. Evidence in 
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this section shows 7 out of 10 (i. e. 70%) information items organization had been 
disclosed to 66.7% or more of the union representatives as compared to 3 out of 6 (i. e. 
about 50%) of marketing information items that had been disclosed to 66.7% or more 
union represdntatives. The evidence also showed that 9 out of II (i. e. 81.2%) 
information items on organization were found to be useful in comparison to only 3 out 6 
9i. e. 50%) of marketing information items that were found to be useful. 
TABLE 6.9 INFORMATION ITEMS DISCLOSED TO UNION REPRESENTATIVES 
Trade Unions 
Type of Information Used Usefulness4. 
Information on Organisation 
Working Objectives 100.0 IL6 
3.3 
1B 
Operating & Technical Inf. 88 9 
3.7 
Health & Safety . 7 66 
2.8 
Information on Personnel . 88 9 
3.0 
Working Conditions . 77 8 
2.7 
Supervision & Management . 55 6 
3.0 
Administration procedure . § U 
ZB 
Training Development - 44 4 
ZB 
Development In Technology - 7 66 2.4 Equal Opportunity . 9-6 
12 
Social Welfare 
Marketing Information (MD: 
Company Market Share 77.8 2.8 
Company Market Segment 31.1 U 
Mergers & Acquisition 66-7 LB 
Investment 33.3 2.3 
Details of Products and Services' 66-7 U 
Future Plans on Development 0-7 2ý4 
Research and Development - - 
Environmental Issues 
Note: * The figures show percentage number of respondents. 
4 The degree of usefulness found by employees, I=Not at all useful, 2=Not very useful, 3=Somewhat 
useful, 4=Very useful. 
In terms of whether companies disclosed information items that were found useful by 
employees, most discrepancies were observed for marketing information disclosed to 
employees. For instance, while information on, Company Market Segment' was found 
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to be 'somewhat' to 'very' useful, only 33.3% of respondents claimed to have received 
such information. The opposite holds true for information on 'Mergers and 
Acquisition', where 66.7% of respondents who received the information found the 
infonnation 'not very' useful. 
Another example of the observed discrepancy is for 'Details of Products and Services' 
and 'Future Plans on Development'. Even though the respondents had found the 
information on 'Details of Products and Services' to be considerably more useful than 
the information on 'Future Plans on Development' (Le. 3.2 for the former as compared 
to 2A for the latter), the evidence suggested that the level of disclosure was exactly the 
same for both information items (i. e. both information items were disclosed to . 67% of 
respondents). 
'Similar discrepancies were observed for 'Information on Organization' (100). For 
instance, only 55.6% of employees received 'Operating and Technical Information' 
even though the information item was found to be very useful. At the same time, similar 
response rates (55.6%) were observed for 'Social Welfare' and 'Administration 
Procedures', which were both found to be considerably less useful than 'Operating 
Technical Ifformation'. Furthermore, the information items, which were found to be 
equally useful (i. e. 'somewhat' useful - 2.8 as shown 
in Table 6.9), were disclosed to 
different number of employees (i. e. -Information on Personnel, 66.7%; 
"Training 
Development', 66.7%; as compared to 'Development in Technology, 44.4%). 
The evidence clearly suggests that there were many differences between information 
items disclosed to employees and the information items- that were found to be useful by 
263 
Chapter 6 
them. When comparing this with information disclosed to investors, companies did not 
take into account their employees' preferences. 
6 4-L3 Two-way Communication and Consultation 
In the case of two-way communication and consultation, the level of interaction with 
employees was expected to be higher than the level of interaction with investors'. This 
was because employees on were expected to be more interested in the details of the 
corporate operations than investors were. 
As it is shown in Table 6.10, the evidence illustrates that among the four selected 
methods of communication and consultation, the most popular method and the most 
usefid method was 'joint consultation'. All respondents had joint consultation with their 
companies. Among the items listed in the questionnaire, the results indicated that 
'welfare' and 'pay related issues' had the lowest positive response rates. 
The evidence shows that, on average, attitude surveys and suggestion schemes were 
unpopular. Suggestion schemes were found to be unpopular in communication with 
employees. On occasions when suggestion schemes were available to employees, 
employees did not find them particularly useful. The issues companies were commonly 
questioning employees were related to their internal operations to improve working 
conditions, to increase productivity and to reduce costs. In other words, issues that 
would increase the overall managerial performance were found to be specifically 
focused on rather than issues associated with employees' 'Welfare', 'Training', 
'Staffing Levels', and 'New Equipment'. For example, companies were using attitude 
surveys and suggestion schemes to ask employees about 'Working Conditions' (80%), 
'New Ways of Working' (60%), 'Output and Quality' (40%), 'Pay Related Issues' 
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(40%), 'Methods of Working' (44.4%), 'Increasing Productivity' (44.4%) and 'Cutting 
Costs' (44.4%). 
TABLE 6.10 TwO-WAY COMMUNICATION AND CONSULTATION USED TO 
COMMUNICATE WITH UNION REPRESENTATIVES 
IVIES E/Eoj*j If YES How useful did you find each method 
(i) Quality Circles 66.7 Note very useful 
(ii) Joint Consultation 
Working Conditions 100 Somewhat useful 
New Ways of working 88.9 Somewhat useful 
Output and Quality 77.8 'Not very' to 'somewhat' useful 
Training 77.8 Somewhat useful 
Health & Safety 88.9 'somewhat' to 'very' useful 
New Equipment 77.8 Somewhat useful 
Staffing 100 Somewhat useful 
Welfare 66.7 Somewhat useful 
Pay-related issues 66.7 'Not very' to 'Somewhat' useful 
(iii) Attitude Survey 
- Working Conditions 80 Not very useful 
New Ways of working 60 'Not very' to 'somewhat' useful 
-Output 
and Quality _40 
Not very useful 
Training 20 Not very useful 
Health & Safety 40 Not very useful 
New FAuipment 20 'Not at all' to 'Not very' useful 
Staffing Levels 20 Not very useful 
Welfare 20 Not at all useful 
Pay-related issues 40 'Not at all' to 'Not very' useful 
OV) Suggestion Schemes 
Methods of Working 44.4 Somewhat useful 
Increasing productivity 44.4 Somewhat useful 
Cutting Costs 44.4 'Not very' to 'Somewhat' useful 
Pay-related 11.1 'Not very' useful 
Any other aspect of the work 
environment which might benefit the 
Organisation and/or its work force 
33.3 Somewhat useful 
Note: * The figures representing the degree of usefulness are all averages. 
6.4.2 Analytical Discussion 
Ile overall findings of this section suggests that union representatives were more 
demanding in acquiring information on both financial and non-financial issues related to 
companies tl= investors were. For instance, trade union representatives appeared to 
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use both 'Information on Organisation' and 'Marketing Information'. However, union 
representatives appeared to be more interested in 'Information on Organisation'. 
The reasons why employees were more demanding in acquiring information could be 
explained using the nature of their relationship with companies. Employees are internal 
stakeholders whose day-to-day lives are affected not only by the financial positions of 
their companies but also by matters such as 'Working Conditions, 'Health Care', 
'Relevant Training', 'Equal Opportunity' and 'New Technology'. As far as some of 
these non-financial issues are concerned, companies are legally required to consult their 
employees. Examples of these statutory requirements, among many others are Health 
and Safety at Work Act 1974, The Social Security Pension Act 1975, Race Relations 
Act 1976, Equal Pay (amendment) Regulations 1983, Sex Discrimination Act 1986, 
Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act 1993 and Disability Act 1995. 
Despite the statutory requirements, the evidence clearly showed that not all of the trade 
union representatives were consulted about these issues. This finding is in alignment 
with the findings of Adams, Hill and Roberts (1995: p26), showing that UK companies 
were not found to fully comply with the legal requirements and did not disclose 
information on different issues related to employees. For instance, Adams et al (1995) 
found that 56% of UK companies had disclosed information on 'Health and Safety', 
60% on 'Training' and only 16% on 'Trade Unions and Pay Rewards'. These findings 
suggest that even in the presence of different legal requirements, companies ignored 
employees' interests at times. 
The evidence also suggests that unlike the way companies had disclosed information to 
their investors, they did not provide their employees with a bank of information on 
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various issues. It was found that while union representatives claimed that they would 
have found certain information items useful, only a small number of them responded 
that those information items had been disclosed to them. 
In the author's view, another important aspect to consider when talking about a two-way 
communication and consultation is to seek evidence that communication was indeed 
two-way. This implies that not only companies disclosed information to their employees 
to keep them informed, companies also needed to find out about the information 
requirements of their employees. In order to do so, companies needed to provide their 
employees with opportunities to express their opinions and views. The findings from 
this study illustrated that there was a considerably higher level of a two-way 
Communication and consultation between companies ýmd trade union representatives 
than between companies and investors. Despite the existence of stakeholder, dialogue 
and companies' awareness of the information requirements and preferences of their 
employees, the responses from the trade union representatives showed that the methods 
that were used were not always highly preferred by them. 
UUle companies had, for example, asked their employees many questions about 'Pay- 
related Issues' and 'Outputs and Quality', union representatives did not generally find 
these questions to be useful. In the author's view, the reason for this could be due to the 
Way companies had phrased the questions and their failure in addressing their 
employees' issues. Alternatively, it could be due to the lack of opportunity being given 
to employees to discuss some of their issues. The information items, which companies 
had used in two-way communication and consultation and were found to be useful by 
their employees, were on issues directly related to the overall productivity. For instance, 
gnew ways of working' was the information item that had been asked in all of the three 
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methods of two-way communication and consultation (i. e. joint consultation, attitude 
survey and suggestion schemes) and was found to be useful by most of the union 
representatives. 
The author takes the view that the findings of this section support the earlier findings for 
the fifth supporting research question, illustrating that employees are of less impo rtance 
to companies than investors. The author believes that despite the comprehensive 
disclosure of information on employees' issues and the existence of dialogue between 
companies and union representatives, there were instances when companies had not 
fully met the information requirements of their employees. This suggests that companies 
had disclosed information at their own discretion when doing so suited them. This is 
supported by the evidence that companies did not always disclose information items that 
were found to be useful by their trade union representatives. In other words, companies 
could have disclosed information to project a certain image of them. For instance, 
companies could have disclosed information to change externals' perception without 
changing their behaviours (i. e. the second strategy introduced by Lindblom C. K., 
1994). 
6.5 COMPARISON BETWEEN THE THREE GROUPS OF RESPONDENTS 
In this section, the responses from the three groups of respondents (e. g. companies, 
investors and employees) are compared in two pairs of companies-investors and 
companies-employees. The comparison is expected to illustrate whether companies 
overstated or understated the dialogue with their stakeholders. 
268 
Chapter 6 
6.5.1 Descriptive Analysis 
This section looks at the overall responses from companies and the two stakeholder 
groups (i. e. investors, and employees). In this seption, the comparison between the 
responses from companies and the two stakeholder groups are represented by measuring 
the discrepancies between company responses and the responses received from 
companies and the responses received from each of the two stakeholder groups. This 
would allow us to approximately compare the responses. The reason for this is that not 
all companies had their employees and institutional investors taking part in the survey. 
The discrepancies in responses were measured by subtracting the responses from each 
of the two stakeholder groups from the responses received from companies (see 
columns C and F in Tables 6.11,6.12 and 6.13). The discrepancies are presented in the 
form of three graphs (Figures 6.1,6.2 and 6.3) in order to facilitate an easier 
comparison. The difference between companies' and investors' responses is represented 
by dark shaded histograms and the difference between companies' and employees' 
responses is represented by lightly shaded histograms. 
Each graph needs to be viewed in parallel with its table, representing the data relevant to 
that graph. Numbers 1,2,3, ... on the x-axis of each graph corresponds 
to the first 
column of the table used in parallel with that graph. 
The observed discrepancies were either positive or negative. A positive discrepancy 
shows that companies claimed to use more communication methods or to disclose more 
information items or to hold more two-way communication and consultation than their 
stakeholders claimed. In the case of negative discrepancies, the reverse holds true. 
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6.5.1.1 Discrepancies in Responsesfor Methods of Communication 
According to the graph shown in Figure 6.1, most dark shaded histograms reveal 
positive discrepancies. This -suggests that companies claimed to use more 
communication methods than the methods that were claimed by investors to be used. In 
comparison, many of the lightly shaded histograms showed negative discrepancies, 
suggesting that trade unions representatives claimed that they were more interested to 
use different communication methods than companies had offered them. 
When the graph was divided into three parts with each part presenting one category of 
communication methods, different observations were made for each category. For 
instance, most dark shaded histograms for 'face to face' method showed small 
differences between companies' and investors' responses, indicating that companies 
were, indeed, taking account of their investors' preferences. In comparison, two of the 
lightly shaded histograms presented considerably large differences between companies' 
and employees' responses, where a considerably larger number of employees claimed to 
use 'Group Meetings' and 'Large Scale Meetings' (i. e. differences for 'Group Meeting' 
and 'Large Scale Meetings' were -46.2% and -25%, respectively). 
In the case of written methods, the observation of large positive discrepancies between 
companies' and investors' responses suggest that most companies offered varieties of 
written methods while only a small number of investors used them (i. e. investors were 
less in favour of written methods). As for the employees, no conclusive observation 
could be made (i. e. 3 out of 7 lightly shaded histograms presented positive differences 
while 4 of them Presented negative differences). In the case of other communication 
methods, companies gave preferences to their investors and offered them more means of 
communication than they offered their employees. 
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FIGURE 6.1 METHODS OF COMMUNICATION 
V 
40 
Face to-fac WrittenMelhods Other Methods 
30 
Methods _ 
20 
,0 
m 0 - - 
. 0-- - , 
2 457 I 
10 
20 
30 
40 
en I I 
Difference between Companies' 13 
Difference between Companies' 
& Investors' responses & Em ployees' 
Res pons es 
Notes: The numbers on the x-axis corresponds to the Methods of communication shown 
in Table 6.11. 
TABLE 6.11 METHODS OF COMMUNICATION 
I-- 0 Communication with Difference Communication Difference 
M h d f Investors Between with E ployees 
Be een 
, Q et o so Companies'& i ' Z ees' E l & " .. P`uies .. cc E Communication Companies' Investors' Investors' es ompan mp oy Employees' 
responses responses responses 
responses responses responses 
B B=C A D E D-E-F A 
1. Group Meetings 75 73.3 1.7 43.8 90 -46.2 
2. Cascade Networks 12.5 6.7 5.8 62.5 50 12.5 
3. Large Scale Meetings 50 46.7 3.3 25 50 -25 
4. Company Handbook 37.5 6.7 30.8 68A 70 -1.2 
5. 
Information Notes to 
Stakeholder 37.5 40 -2.5 68.8 60 8.8 l ReDresentative 
6. l House Journals 31.3 13.3 18 25 40 -15 
7. I Newsletters 31.3 2 ý67 4.6 81.3 60 21.3 
8. I Departmental Bulletins 6.3 20 -13.7 62.5 50 12.5 
9. I Notices 12.5 6.7 5.8 50 70 -20 
10. Individual Letters to 31.3 6.7 24.6 37.5 60 -22.5 Stakeholders 
11. Information Points 18.8 0 18.8 25 50 -25 
12. Audio-visual Aids 31.3 20 11.3 37.5 60 -22.5 
113. E-mail 
6-3 13.3 -7 1 56.3__j 40 16.3 
Notes: The figures represent the percentage number of responses. 
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6 5. L2 Discrepancies in Responsesfor Information Items Disclosed 
Despite the findings of the previous section suggesting that companies used appropriate 
communication methods for their investors, the findings of this section shows that this 
was not necessarily the case for information items. Large negative discrepancies (shown 
by dark shaded histograms in Figure 6.2) suggests that investors received larger volume 
of information items than companies had claimed to disclose to them. This holds true 
particularly for 'marketing information'. 
For employees, positive differences were observed suggesting that companies claimed 
to disclose more information items to their employees than employees claimed to have 
received. It is possible that companies mis-represented their lever of information 
disclosure to their employees by claiming that they disclosed a higher level of 
information than they disclosed in reality. 
FIGuRE 6.2 INFORMATION ITEMS DISCLOSED 
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TABLE 6.12 INFORMATION ITEMS DISCLOSED TO INVESTORS AND EMPLOYEES 
Communication with Difference Communication with Difference 
121 x Investors 
Between Emp oyees Between 
Information Items Companies' Investors' 
Companies- 
& Investors Companies' Employees' 
Companies'& 
' Disclosed responses responses responses responses responses 
Employees 
responses 
A B A-B=C D E D-E=F 
I. Working Objectives 31.3 57.1 -25.8 75 100 -25 
2. Operating & Technical 43.8 21.4 22.4 75 55.6 19.4 Information . 
3. Health & Safety 25 21.4 3.6 75 88.9 -13.9 
4. Inf. on Personnel 50 85.7 -35.7 80 66.7 13.3 
5. _ Working Conditions 0 7.1 -7.1 62.5 88.9 -26.4 
6. Supervision & 12 5 35.7 -23.2 62.5 77.8 -15.3 Management . 
7. Admin. Procedure 0 7.1 -7.1 62.5 55.6 6.9 
8. Training Development 25 21.4 3.6 81.3 66.7 14.6 
9. 
1 Development in 56 7 57.1 -0.4 68.8 44.4 24.4 Technology . 
10. Equal Opportunity 12.5 21.4 -8.9 62.5 66.7 -4.2 
11. Social Welfare 18.8 0 18.8 50 55.6 -5.6 
_L2. 
Company Market Share 56.3 84.6 -28.3 31.3 77.8 46.5 
13. Company Market Segment 62.5 92.3 -29.8 43.8 33.3 10.5 
14. Mergers & Acquisition 81 100 -19 75 66.7 8.3 
15. Investment 62.5 100 -37.5 56.3 33.3 23 
16. Details of Products and 68 8 92.3 -23.5 62.5 66.7 
1 4.2 
Services . 
- 17. Future Plans on 56 3 T 84.6 28.3 37.5 66.77 7 -29.2 Development . 
Notes: The figures represent the percentage number of responses. 
6.5.1.3 Discrepancies in responsesfor Two-way Communication and Consultation 
The discrepancies between responses are shown in Figure 6.3. According to the 
responses for dialogue circles, there were relatively small negative discrepancies 
between corporate responses from each of the two stakeholder groups and that of 
I companies. According to both investors and employees, the number of quality circles 
that they had attended was more than companies had claimed to hold with each of thern. 
Although the observed discrepancies are small, they suggest that the two stakeholder 
groups were more willing to take part in dialogue circles. 
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Similar observations were made for joint consultation but this time the observed 
difference was considerably larger for employees than for investors. This suggests that 
the high interest shown by employees in taking part in joint consultation was taken into 
account by companies. 
For attitude surveys and suggestion schemes, positive discrepancies between 
employees' and companies' responses illustrate that companies claimed to make more 
attempts to find out the information requirements of their employees than those of their 
investors. More interest was shown by companies to seek out their stakeholders' 
viewpoints using suggestion schemes. 
The overall findings of this section are analysed and discussed in the following section. 
FIGURE 6.3 DISCREPANCIES IN RESPONSES FOR Two-WAY COMMUNICATION AND 
CONSULTATION 
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TABLE 6.13 Two-wAy COMMUNICATION AND CONSULTATION 
Communication 1 Difference Communication with Difference 
with Inve stors 
Between 
' 
Emp oyees Between 
Methods of two-way Co panies' M ý Investors' 
Companies 
& Investors' Companies' Employees' 
Companies' 
Communication responses responses responses responses responses 
& Employees' 
and consultation responses 
A B A-B=C D E D-E=F 
Quality circles 6.3 14.3 -8 62.5 66.7 -4.2 
2. Joint Consult2tion 31.3 42.9 -11.6 66.7 100 -33.3 
3. Attitude Survey 31.3 50.0 -18.7 66.7 55.6 11.1 
4. Suggestion schemes 6.7 0 6.7 64.3 44.4 19.9 
Notes: The figures represent the percentage number of responses. 
6.5.2 Analytical Discussion 
This section compares the responses from companies and two of their stakeholder 
groups (i. e. investors and employees). The findings show that there are discrepancies 
between the responses from companies and the two stakeholder groups.. 
In the case of methods of communication, the findings show that companies claimed to 
offer the use of more methods of communication to their investors than investors 
claimed to have used. In the author's view, companies could have used more different 
methods of communication than their investors were interested in. For instance, 37.5% 
of companies mentioned the use of 'Company Handbooks' in comparison to only 6.7% 
of investors. At the same time, there were cases where investors' responses showed 
slightly higher use of some methods of communication with investors, giving some 
negative discrepancies. As in most of these cases, the negative discrepancies were small 
(i. e. -2.5%, -13.7% and -7%). Hence, it was decided to ignore thern. 
The reverse held true for responses from companies and trade union representatives. In 
the case of communication methods used for employees, there were lots of negative 
discrepancies indicating that the trade union representatives had claimed to use more of 
some methods than companies had indicated. The author believes that the differences 
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could have been due to the fact that companies who took part in this study regarded 
their employees as individuals and not necessarily as trade union representatives who 
were more powerful and well-informed about employees' rights than individual 
employees were. Also, no distinction was made in the questionnaire between individual 
employees and trade union representatives. The author believes that it is very likely that 
many of the companies who responded to the questionnaires did not have union 
representatives. It is not possible to say precisely how many companies who responded 
did not have any union representatives, as some of the companies did not reveal their 
names. At the same time, it is not possible to know if companies considered their 
individual employees when responding to the questionnaire. In addition, the employees 
of some companies that took part in the survey were not represented in the survey. 
In the case of information items disclosed to stakeholders, many negative discrepancies 
were found between companies' and investors' responses suggesting that investors 
claimed to have received more information than companies had claimed to disclose to 
them. Large negative discrepancies were observed for 'Marketing Information' items. In 
the author's view, there can be two reasons for this. Firstly, companies could have 
disclosed more information to their investors than they were prepared to admit. 
Alternatively, companies could have considered individual investors as well as 
institutional investors when responding to the questionnaires. It is possible that 
companies did not provide their individual investors with as much information as they 
provided their institutional investors with. According to Short and Keasey (1997), 
institutional investors are more powerful than individual investors are and theyC'an play 
a significant role in monitoring managerial performance. 
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The non-financial information items, which were categorised under 'Information on 
Organisation', were found to have the highest negative discrepancies for the responses 
received from companies and investors indicating that investors claimed to receive more 
non-financial information than employees did. Information items with high negative 
discrepancies were 'Information on Personnel', 'Working Objective' and 'Supervision 
and Management. All of these information items were found to be useful by investors 
earlier on in section 6.3.2. In the case of non-financial information, the author believes 
that negative discrepancies could be explained by the way companies took into 
consideration their individual investors as well as their institutional investors when 
responding to the questionnaire. It is possible that companies did not provide their 
individual *investors with as much non-fmancial information items as they provide their 
institutional investors. 
As far as other non-financial information items are concerned, there were zome 
information items for which positive discrepancies were observed between the 
responses from companies and investors. The highest positive discrepancies were 
observed for 'Operating and Technical Information' and 'Social Welfare'. The 
responses from investors (shown in Table 6.6) revealed that neither of the two items 
were found useful by investors and only a small percentage number of investors claimed 
to be in receipt of them (i. e. 21.4% of investors used 'Operating and 
Technical 
information' and 0% of investors used 'Social Welfare' information). The author 
believes that as investors did not show interest in the two information items, the 
possibility of companies actually disclosing information on these two items is small. 
Nevertheless, companies claimed to have done so, as doing so would elevate their social 
image. This is in alignment with the second strategy introduced by Lindblom C. K. 
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(1994). Under Lindblom's second strategy, companies could have disclosed such 
information to change the perceptions of their employees without having to change their 
actual behaviours. 
In the case of the disclosed information items, there was an average discrepancy of 
-13.3%83 between the responses received from companies and investors in comparison 
to an average discrepancy of -2 . 9%84 between companies' and employees' responses. 
The discrepancy between responses from companies and investors was considerably 
larger (i. e. -13.3%) than the discrepancy between responses from companies and 
employees (i. e. -2.9%). This showed that companies claimed to disclose more 
information to their employees than to their investors while in reality jhe reverse held 
true. In other words, companies had disclosed more information to their investors than 
they had revealed. Similar findings were observed for the two-way communication and 
consultation. 711le responses showed that the negative discrepancies between responses 
from companies and investors was (i. e. -7.9%) higher than the negative discrepancy 
between responses from companie s and employees (i. e. -1.6%). 
In the author's view, the reason for the above findings can be explained by the findings 
on the fifth research question suggesting that companies paid more attention to their 
investors than to their employees. This was despite employees being more demanding to 
acquire more information items than investors were (as shown in sections 6.2.2 and 
6.3.2, respectively). The findings for the fifth supporting research question also explains 
the observation for joint consultation. The above finding can be also explained using the 
83 [(-226*/o)1l7]=l3.3%, where -226% is the total discrepancy between the responses from companies 
and investors and 17 is the number of information items disclosed. 
" [(49-9%)/l7j=-2.9%, where -49.9% is the total discrepancy and 17 is the total number of infomation items disclosed. 
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first dimension of Ullmann's (1985) model. According to the first dimension., the 
powerfulness of a stakeholder group depends on how significant the resources they have 
control over are to companies. In this case, although employees were found to be more 
demanding than investors in obtaining information, companies disclosed more 
information to their investors as investors had control over financial resources and were 
regarded to be the most important stakeholder group. 
A similar finding was observed for 'joint consultation'. In the case of 'joint 
consultation', even though 82.7% of employees (shown in Table 6.10) had 'joint 
consultation' with companies, they showed that on average they found joint consultation 
'somewhat' useful. In comparison, only 42.9% of investors claimed to have joint 
consultation with companies but they found the joint consultation to be more useful than 
employees did (shown in Table 6.7). Regardless of a higher volume ofjoint consultation 
between companies and employees rather than between companies and investors, the 
observation of a higher degree of usefulness found by investors than by employees 
illustrated, once again, that companies could have paid more attention to their investors 
than to their erriployees and provided their investors with better quality of information 
and communication, in general. 
According to Adams et al (1995), in the absence of any regulatory requirements the 
amount of discursive information is likely to rise without much attention being paid to 
the quality of information. The above finding is in alignment with Adams et al's 
findings and indicates how easily companies could increase the quantity of information 
without paying much attention to its quality. This undoubtedly shows that companies 
used information disclosure at their own discretion to serve their own purposes. This 
behaviour of companies can be best explained by the second legitimacy strategy 
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introduced by Lindblom's C. K (1994). This is to say that companies appeared to 
disclose information to change the externals' perceptions %rithout having to change their 
actual behaviours. 
6.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter presented the responses to the questionnaires and provided evidence to 
answer the second key research question. The second key research question was 
concerned with the 'quality' of non-financial information and asked whether there is 
any dialogue between companies and their stakeholder groups. This chapter presented 
evidence to answer whether companies attach different importance to their different 
stakeholder groups (i. e. supporting research question 5), and whether UK companies 
met the information requirements of their stakeholder groups (i. e. supporting research 
question 6). The chapter examined the evidence on the two research questions 5 and 6 
which were based on two aspects of 'Social and Ethical Accounting, Auditing, and 
Reporting' (SEAAR). the two aspects were 'stakeholder identification' and 
'stakeholder dialogue', respectively. 
The evidence on the fifth supporting research question, which focused on 'stakeholder 
identification' (i. e. the first i. sPect of SEAAR), suggested that companies attached 
different importance to their different stakeholders. The overall responses showed that 
investors were identified as the most important group with employees, customers, 
public and suppliers in the second, third, fourth and fifth places, respectively. Apart 
from a few companies that responded to use share ownership as the main criteria for 
classifying their stakeholder groups, the overall responses showed that most companies 
did not appear to have any procedures for doing so. 
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The sixth supporting research question focused on 'stakeholder dialogue' (Le. the 
second aspect of SEAAR). As discussed in Chapter 3, the state of stakeholder dialogue 
could be assessed by examining three aspepts: 'methods of communication', 
'information items disclosed to each stakeholder group' and 'two-way communication 
and consultation'. Even if companies attached different importance to each stakeholder 
group, they were still expected to: (a) use relevant methods of communication, (b) 
disclose relevant information items, and (c) use relevant methods of two-way 
communication and consultation for each stakeholder group to ensure that they hold 
dialogue with that group. This meant that when companies disclosed non-financial 
information to meet the information requirements of their stakeholder groups, 
stakeholders were expected to find the information to be relevant and useful. 
The evidence suggested that companies held dialogue with their stakeholders according 
to the way they attached importance to them. It was shown that companies provided 
their investors with more useful information relative to the information they provided 
their employees with. In the case of investors (i. e. the most important stakeholder 
groups), not only companies incorporated their investors' preferences when deciding on 
the communication methods they would use but provided them with more information. 
Based on the findings of this chapter, as the degree of importance attached to 
Stakeholder groups fell (e. g. employees), so did the attention companies paid to their 
communication with that group. Hence, employees did not find the information items 
disclosed to them useful. This was despite companies holding more 'two-way 
communication and consultation' with their employees than with their investors. 
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The findings of this chapter could be interpreted as illustrating that companies held 
more dialogue with their employees than with their investors. The responses from the 
two stakeholder groups implied that employees were generally more demanding in 
acquiring information than investors were. Even though the responses received fi-om 
companies can be interpreted as companies holding more dialogue with their employees 
than they did with their investors, the responses received from employees and investors 
suggested that according to them this was not the case. Companies had also claimed to 
hold more dialogue with their employees to disclose detailed information about their 
internal affairs. 
Overall, the findings of this chapter provided limited evidence to be able to argue that 
UK companies paid much attention either to the identification of their stakeholder 
groups or to the dialogue with their stakeholder groups. In other words, the findings of 
this chapter cannot be used to suggest that UK companies paid attention to the quality of 
non-financial information by meeting the information requirements of their stakeholder 
groups. As it was argued in Chapter 2, the lack of evidence to suggest that companies 
paid attention to the quality of non-financial information they disclosed together with 
the evidence from the previous chapter on the association between non-financial 
information disclosure and some aspects of corporate characteristics suggest that 
companies could have disclosed non-financial information to legitimise their corporate 
behaviours. 
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CHAPTER 7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this concluding chapter, the aims and objectives of the study are reiterated. A 
summary of the theoretical and practical discussions presented in Chapter 2 to explain 
the disclosure of non-financial information follows in section 7.3. The first part of the 
literature review, which was presented in Chapter 2, is summarized in section 7.3. A 
summary of the second part of the literature, which was carried out in Chapter 3 and 
focused more on the review of the empirical findings of previous studies follows in 
section 7.4. In section 7.5, a brief summary of the methodological issues, discussed in 
Chapter 4, is presented. In section 7.6, a summary of the main findings together with 
concluding remarks is presented. Scope and limitations of the study are presented and 
discussed in section 7.7. In section 7.8, recommendations for ftirther research and 
further comments are presented. 
7.2 OVERALL AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
The aim of this study is to investigate the possible reasons for the major UK companies 
disclosure of non-financial information in the absence of any recognition by the 
accounting profession and any requirements by the regulatory bodies. The study 
Particularly focused on two key research questions. The first key research question 
concentrated on whether the major UK companies disclosed non-financial information 
to legitimise their behaviours to their stakeholders and the second key research question 
was based on whether the major UK companies disclosed information to meet the 
information requirements of their stakeholders. 
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In the absence of any recognition by the accounting profession and any requirements by 
the regulatory bodies, companies are likely to use non-financial information disclosure 
to legitimise their behaviours to their stakeholders. The author argued that if companies 
did not use non-financial information to legitimise their behaviours, companies were 
expected to disclose non-financial information regardless of their corporate 
characteristics (i. e. section 2.2.3 in Chapter 2). 
The second research question was presented to seek out ftulher evidence to expand the 
findings of the first key research question. This is to say whether companies made any 
attempts to provide their stakeholder groups with information that they required. This 
was investigated by seeking to find out whether companies identified their stakeholder 
groups and whether they held dialogue. 
The two key research questions were expected to provide evidence that would clarify 
whether UK companies were in a transitional period to become more transparent. In a 
way, the evidence was expected to shed light on whether UK companies had become 
more inclusive of their stakeholders and were taking on board their stakeholders' views. 
The motivation behind this study was based on the fact that in the absence of any 
recognition by the accounting profession and any requirements by the regulatory bodies, 
companies would use non-financial information for their own benefit. Companies are 
unlikely to disclose non-financial information to serve their stakeholders when 
stakeholders are not represented in companies' decision making processes (i. e. 
governance structures) and when there is no procedures to verify the disclosed 
information. One way of ensuring the quality of non-financial information is through 
social audit. Although the practice of social audit is not common among the major UK 
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companies, it was decided here to focus on two of aspects, which could be applied. to a 
large number of companies. These two aspects were 'stakeholder identification' and 
'stakeholder dialogue'. It was argued that if companies pay any attention to the quality 
of non-financial information they disclose, they are also expected to identify their 
stakeholder groups and to hold dialogue with them. It is only then that there is evidence 
to suggest that there has been a transition towards transparency among the UK 
companies. 
To explore each key research question, 6 supporting research questions were presented 
in Chapter 3. For the first key research question, supporting research questions I to 4 
were posed and for the second key research question supporting research questions 5 
and 6 were presented. 
73 THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL DISCUSSION RELEVANT TO THE DISCLOSURE OF 
NON-FINANCIAL INFORMATION 
The literature review of this research project was carried out in two parts. The first part 
concentrated on the broader accounting literature and reviewed theoretical and 
conceptual aspects. This part of the literature review was presented in Chapter 2. The 
second part of the literature review, which was presented in Chapter 3, focused on the 
narrower part of the literature and presented a survey of the empirical studies. While the 
first part of the literature highlighted the gaps in the theoretical and conceptual literature 
and resulted in posing the two key research questions of the study, the second part of the 
literature review led to the presentation of the supporting research questions. 
In order to have a tenable theoretical explanation for the disclosure of non-financial 
information, Chapter 2 illustrates a historical review of the theories that were used to 
- explain the disclosure of information since the early days of the formation of modem 
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accounting in the late 19'h century. The literature review revealed how the literature 
evolved over the years to incorporate different internal and external aspects. It was 
revealed that conventional accounting focused on recognising the economic contracts 
between companies and its information users. This was followed by the surge of critical 
perspectives when academics argued that companies also needed to take account of 
social contracts as well as the economic contracts and to disclose non-financial 
information (mainly what they regarded as social information) to groups with whom 
they hold social contracts. This brought up the issue of accountability of companies to 
society-at-large. Proponents of accountability argued that in any democratic society, 
companies needed to discharge their responsibilities to society even in the absence of 
any regulations or legal requirements. 
There were, however, difficulties in defining the terms of a social contract based on 
which disclosure of non-financial information could be explained. For instance, what 
information categories need to be disclosed, who determines the terms of accountability, 
to which groups are companies held accountable, and when is the accountability due? 
As these questions remained unanswered, it was argued that other theories would be 
used to explain the disclosure of non-financial information. 
Further literature review revealed that legitimacy -and stakeholder theories were the 
most relevant theories to explain the disclosure of non-financial information: While 
legitimacy theory argues that companies disclose non-financial information to adopt one 
of the four strategies introduced by Lindblom C. K. (1994), stakeholder theory 
recognises that there are different stikeholder groups. 
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In order to provide a comprehensive theoretical explanation as to why companies 
disclose non-financial information to their stakeholders in the absence of any regulatory 
or legal requirements, it was decided to use both stakeholder and legitimacy theories 
jointly and interchangeably. The two theories were believed to supplement each other. 
WUle the legitimacy theory explained the disclosure of non-financial information by 
companies to justify their behaviours to society-at-large, stakeholder theory identifies 
different corporate stakeholder groups. Based on these two theories, the first key 
research question was presented as: 
"Do companies disclose non-financial information to legitimise their 
corporate behaviours to their stakeholder groups? 
To expand the first key research question, further evidence was required to show 
whether companies met the information requirements of their stakeholders or whether 
they pay any attention to the quality of the non-financial information. The recent 
literature on the quality of the non-financial information was discussed. It was argued 
that if companies intended to meet the information requirements of their stakeholders, 
supporting evidence was required to suggest that companies had taken the appropriate 
steps to ensure the quality of non-financial information. Both legitimacy and 
stakeholder theories failed to explain how companies could meet the information 
requirements of their stakeholders. Hence, the literature review was extended to include 
a discussion of the literature on 'Social and Ethical Accounting and Auditing and 
Reporting' (SEAAR). 
The literature review on SEAAR revealed that the proponents of a triple-bottom-line 
argument regard the transition towards corporate transparency as one of the main 
features of tomorrow's companies. It was then argued that if UK companies were 
287 
Chapter 7 
undergoing such a transition, evidence needed to suggest that they were paying attention 
to the quality of non-financial information they were disclosing to their stakeholders. It 
was highlighted that if companies intend to meet the information requirements of their 
stakeholders, they had to (a) identify and (b) to hold dialogues with their stakeholder 
groups. 
This led to the presentation of the second key research question, which was: 
"Do companies disclose non-financial information to meet the 
information requirements of their stakeholder groups? " 
7.4 CORPORATE LEGITIMIZATION 
- AND 
STAKEHOLDERS' REQUIREMENTS: 
CLASSIFICATION OF NON-FINANCIAL INFORMATION, CORPORATE 
CHARACTERISTICS, AND QUALITY OF NON-FINANCIAL INFORMATION 
'Me second part of the literature review was carried in Chapter 3 where supporting 
research questions I to 6 were presented in order to explore the two key research 
questions that were raised in Chapter 2. 
Chapter 3 comprised of three main parts. In the first part, the classification of non- 
financial information into two groups of governance and non-governance information 
was discussed. It was argued that having a transparent and a sound governance structure 
is necessary for those companies that. claim to be socially responsible. The author 
argued that in the absence of any regulatory and statutory requirements, this is the only 
way that companies can provide the required assurances to their stakeholder groups. 
The first part embraced discussion of the classification of non-financial information into 
two groups of governance and non-governance information. In order to justify why each 
information category was considered, the literature relevant to each category was 
surveyed. For instance, in the case of governance information, information categories 
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were mainly selected based on the recommendations of the Cadbury Committee (1992). 
The literature review in this part presented 10 non-govemance and 13 governance 
information categories that would be used in this study to measure the level of non- 
financial information disclosure. 
The second part of Chapter 3 focused on the findings of previous relevant studies 
reviewed for the purpose of this stud Y85. The literature on four corporate characteristics 
was reviewed to present supporting research questions I to 4. The four corporate 
characteristics were: industrial affiliation, size, growth and performance. It was argued 
that if companies disclosed non-financial information to meet the information 
requirements of their stakeholder groups, they would do so regardless of their corporate 
characteristics in which case it was unlikely to observe any associations between 
corporate characteristics and non-financial information disclosure. The findings of the 
previous studies were considered when stating the expectations on the findings of each 
supporting research question. 
The third part of the chapter focused on exploring the literature relevant to the second 
key research question. The second key research question was concerned with the quality 
of non-financial information and asked whether companies paid any attention to the 
quality of non-financial information they reported. It was decided to address the issue of 
quality by focusing on two of the five aspects of the 'Social and Ethical Accounting, 
Auditing, and Reporting' (SEAAR). The two aspects were: 'stakeholder identification' 
and 'stakeholder dialogue' based on which the two supporting research questions 5 and 
6 were presented. While the fifth supporting research question was concerned with 
85 It was found that some of the previous studies had measured the level of social and environmental 
information while others had referred to social and enviroranental activities. 
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whether companies identified their stakeholder groups, the sixth supporting research 
question focused on investigating whether there was any stakeholder dialogue between 
companies and their stakeholder groups. 
The other three remaining aspects of SEAAR that were not selected were 'public 
disclosure', 'indicators benchmark', and 'continuous improvements'. Despite the fact 
that 'public disclosure' was to some extent measured in this study, it was decided not to 
consider this aspect, as the extent of information disclosure was not measured in this 
research project. As for the other remaining two aspects (i. e. 'indicators benchmark' and 
Gcontinuous improvements'), they were not considered as doing so was neither in the 
time limit nor in the scope of this study. For instance, these two, aspects required 
extensive research to find out whether companies had any procedures to find out about 
their stakeholder values, interests and expectations and whether companies had any 
procedures to continuously incorporate the changes in their stakeholders values, 
interests and expectations. 
The sixth supporting research question was explored by looking at three aspects of 
stakeholder dialogue. The three aspects were: 'methods of communication', 
'information items disclosed to each stakeholder group', and 'two-way communication 
and consultation'. 
7.5 METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
Methodological issues of this thesis were discussed in Chapter 4. This chapter mainly 
discussed the methodology and methods that were adopted and applied in this study. 
Chapter 4 proceeded by providing a brief summary of the methodological approaches 
commonly used in social sciences. It was argued that methodology adopted in any 
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research project should be relevant to the overall aim and objectives of the reseqch. It 
was argued that the methodology adopted in this research is positivist as the study seeks 
to draw conclusions based on empirical findings and observations. This undoubtedly 
meant that the methodology adopted in this research was an applied one. Furthermore, 
the methodology was reported to have adopted a deductive approach as the research 
questions were derived from the existing literature and based on gaps in it. Having 
discussed the appropriate methodology for this study, the remaining parts of Chapter 4 
discussed the relevant methods that would be used in this study. 
Chapter 4 showed that the research methods used for the two key research questions 
were different. For the supporting research questions I to 4, it was decided to use 
content analysis to collect data on the level of non-finapcial information disclosure. This 
was so because the four research questions were concerned with the level of non- 
financial information. Among different content analysis techniques, it was decided to 
use indexing as the study would not measure the extent of disclosure for each 
information category and as indexing would provide the most reliable outcome for this 
research proje6t. In the case of the second research question, postal questionnaires were 
selected from different survey methods to be the most appropriate data collection 
technique. 
In order to carry out content analysis, it was decided to use the annual reports of the Top 
100 UK companies as the main data source. It was also decided to collect data for 1985, 
1990 and 1995. For the postal questionnaire, three groups were chosen. They were: 
companies, employees and investors. Employees and investors, which represented two 
stakeholder groups, were selected on the premise that they have different interests and, 
therefore, presented different perspectives. Ideally, it would have been more 
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comprehensive to approach more stakeholder groups. However, due to time and 
resource limitations only two stakeholder groups were approached. 
The Chapter presented evidence on the rising level of governance and non-governance 
I 
information in 1985,1990 and 1995. The evidence showed that the level of governance 
information was generally higher than that of non-govemance information in the three 
years. This was followed by a discussion on different data analysis techniques that 
would be used for examining the research questions I to 4. To be able to measure the 
association between corporate characteristics and non-financial information disclosure, 
appropriate statistical techniques were selected. It was decided to use non-parametric 
tests as the assumptions for parametric tests did not hold. Kurskal Wallis's test was 
chosen to examine if companies with different characteristics had the same governance 
and non-govemance scores. Also, Spearman Rank Correlation was used to measure 
association between govemance/non-govemance scores and corporate characteristics. In 
addition to these, cross-tabulation was used to present the spread of governance, non- 
governance and total scores across different size and industrial categories (e. g. to show 
if larger companies had scored higher). 
Questionnaire design was also discussed in Chapter 4. The reasons why each question 
was asked and which aspects of stakeholder dialogue it was aiming to address were 
presented. This was followed by the analysis of the financial and non4mancial 
characteristics of respondents and non-respondents. Non-financial characteristics were 
measured in terms of governance and non-govemance information the companies had 
disclosed. It was found that resI56ndents had higher non-governance, scores and had 
performed better financially than non-respondents. 
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Chapters 5 and 6 reported on empirical investigation on the first and second research 
questions, respectively. Chapter 5 presented the findings on supporting research 
questions I to 4 and provided analytical discusýions for each research question. In 
Chapter 6, empirical investigation was carried out to-present evidence on supporting 
research questions 5 and 6. In Chapters 5 and 6, the findings for the supporting research 
questions were used to answer key research questions I and 2, respectively. In the next 
section, the main findings of Chapters 5 and 6 are presented and discussed. 
7.6 THE NIAIN FINDINGS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Tbe'overall finding of this study suggests that in the absence of any recognition by the 
accounting profession and of any requirements by the regulatory bodies, UK companies 
disclosed non-financial information to legitimise their behaviours to their stakeholder 
groups rather than meeting their stakeholders' information requirements. 
The above findings were supported by evidence found on the two key research question. 
According to the findings of the first key research question, associations were observed 
between certain corporate characteristics and non-financial information disclosure. 
Evidence on the second key research question suggested that companies paid more 
attention to the information requirements of their investors relative to the information 
requirements of their employees. 
Evidence was found to suggest that companies always disclosed more information on 
their governance structures than on their non-govemance issues. Disclosure of more 
information on'governance structures clearly suggested that UK companies paid more 
attention to their investors ensuring them of the soundness of their managerial 
structures. 
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The overall findings for the first key research question illustrated that companies use 
non-financial information disclosure for legitimacy purposes. More detailed findings 
related the first key research question are as follows: 
The findings suggested that companies in certain industries were associated with the 
disclosure of governance information in 1985 and 1995. 
The findings implied that companies could have disclosed governance information to 
adopt either of Lindblom's C. Y, (1994) four strategies to provide assurances on their 
managerial structures. The finding that governance score was associated to the 
industrial backgrounds of companies in 1995, after the introduction of the Cadbury 
Code of Best Practice in 1992, suggested that companies in certain industries were 
under more pressures to provide assurances on the soundness of their management. 
This finding supports the earlier presumption that UK companies regard their 
investors as their most important stakeholders and they use the disclosure of non- 
financial information to legitimise their behaviours to them. 
(b) No association was observed between non-governance information and industrial 
affiliation in either of the three years. This observation, which was not in alignment 
with the overall perception given by the previous studies, was explained by the fact 
that this study did not measure the extent of non-govemance information disclosed 
by companies. It was argued that companies in certain industries are likely to 
concentrate on certain information categories and report on that category 
extensively. T'his, however, could not be reflected in this study. 
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(c) Empirical evidence suggested that with the rising level of non-financial information, 
non-governance scores were found to be associated with corporate size in 1985 and 
1995. This finding suggested that larger companies disclosed more non-govemance 
information than smaller companies. This finding was also in alignment with the 
findings of the earlier studies illustrating that larger companies arc more in the 
public eye, and hence are more likely to disclose information. It was argued that 
larger companies disclose more non-govcmance information, either to justify their 
behaviours to their stakeholders or to indicate that they have the same norms and 
values as those of the society. In doing so, companies could have adopted the first, 
second or the fourth strategy introduced by Lindblom. 
(d) Association was observed between corporate growth rate for the period 1990-95 and 
non-governance information disclosed in 1995. No association was found between 
corporate growth rate and governance information disclosure. 
(e) As the'level of non-financial information increased in the period from 1985 to 1995, 
the number of performance aspects that were associated with non-govemance scores 
also increased as compared to the number of associations with governance 
information. The evidence also showed that in the second half of the 1980s, when 
the level of non-financial information disclosure was still low and when no 
regulatory code of best practice had been introduced on corporate goveman ce, 
governance information disclosure was associated with certain performance aspects. 
The evidence suggests that companies were using governance information to assure 
their investors that managers were acting in their best interests. 
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The introduction of Cadbury code of best practice in 1992 was only a starting point 
for the publication of regulations on governance structures. After the introduction 
of the Cadbury code of best practice in 1992, governance information disclosure 
was observed to be associated with less aspects of corporate performance. Instead, 
the increasing number of associations between different aspects of performance and 
non-governance information clearly suggested that in the absence of any 
regulations, companies with certain performance characteristics (e. g. high 
profitability, high productivity and high working capital) disclosed more non- 
governance information. 
Based on the empirical findings, it was argued that companies coulo have adopted 
either of Lindblom's four strategies when disclosing non-governance information. 
The overall finding for the first key research question can be interpreted as UK 
companies disclosing non-financial information to legitimise their corporate behaviours. 
The detailed findings for the second key research question are: 
(f) The evidence suggested that even though different companies attached different 
importance to their stakeholder groups, UK companies did not appear to have any 
procedures to classify their stakeholder groups. Companies were found to classify 
investors as their most important stakeholder groups with employees in the second 
place. 
Overall, the findings of this chapter provided limited evidence to be able to argue 
that UK companies paid much attention to the identification of their stakeholder 
groups and to the dialogue with their stakeholder groups. In the absence of such 
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evidence it was not possible to argue that UK companies pay attention to the quality 
of non-fmancial information they disclose. 
In summary, the overall findings for the second key research question does not point to 
the direction that UK companies have moved or are moving towards more corporate 
transparency. It was suggested that the overall finding for the second research question 
suggests that the adoption of Lindblom's second strategy by UK companies where 
companies use information disclosure and stakeholder dialogue to change the perception 
of others without having to change their actual behaviours. 
7.7 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
Inevitably, investigation in research of this nature has shortcomings. Shortcomings are 
primarily due to the information content of the area under investigation. The main- 
shortcomings of this study are: 
(a) Companies publish a large volume of information in different mediums of 
communication other than their corporate annual reports. Although annual reports 
are the most important medium, the information published in journals, magazines 
and other mediums could represent corporate behaviour in times of, for instance, 
crisis. Annual reports are published once a year and, sometimes, it is too late for 
companies to respond to events in their annual reports. 
(b) In this study, the non-fmancial information was divided into two groups of 
governance and non-govemance information. The governance information 
categories were mostly recommended by the Cadbury codes of best practice and 
were investor oriented and would not therefore reflect the interests of other 
stakeholder groups. Despite this shortcoming, the index would still represent the 
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changes in the transparency of the governance structures of UK companies in 1985, 
1990 and 1995. 
(c) Companies in the Top 100 were from different industrial backgrounds. This meant 
that some companies would concentrate more on certain information categories than 
on some others. To overcome this problem, all the information categories included 
in the index were equally weighed and no sub-category was included. However, 
there was one remaining problem. Some companies could find some information 
categories totally irrelevant and, therefore, would not disclose any information on 
them. The indexing method used in this study does not identify this and treats the 
absence of information item as non-disclosure. 
(d) To assess stakeholder dialogue, the study focused only on two stakeholder groups 
(i. e. investors and employees). Other stakeholder groups, for instance, consumer 
groups, suppliers and public representatives, were not approached. As this study is 
limited to only two of the major stakeholder groups, the results cannot be regarded 
as comprehensive as it could have been if a few more stakeholder groups had been 
approached. This would have been beyond the scope of the study and would have 
been too timely and required expertise from other fields. 
(e) From the two groups of individual and institutional investors, it was decided to 
consider institutional investors, only. Individual investors were not included, as it 
was difficult to track them down. Also, they could not have provided detailed 
information in the same way as investment managers, representing institutional 
investors would. 
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As for the employees, it would have been ideal to approach either employee 
representatives, who were elected by the employees themselves, or individual 
employees to participate in the questionnaire suTvey. As the names and addresses of 
employee representatives were not publicly availablej companies were approached to 
provide the details. Individual employees were reluctant to participate in the 
questionnaire survey. At the same time, companies were reluctant to provide such 
information. Thus, the only option left was to approach the trade unions. 
(f) There were a number of limitations associated with the trade unions Firstly, not all 
the companies selected for this study had trade union representatives. Secondly, the 
union representatives have the back up of their union to communicate with 
companies whereas individual employees who are not supported by unions are in a 
much more vulnerable position and could be treated differently by their companies. 
Hence, the fmdings of this study could suggest a higher level of dialogue. Thirdly, 
for those companies that had a union representative, there were various groups of 
workers and employees. As the trade union took the responsibility of sending out 
the questionnaires to their representatives in each company (they were not allowed 
to reveal the names and addresses of their representatives due to the Data Protection 
Act), the selection depended on them. As a result, some groups could have been 
missed out and therefore not represented in the survey. 
Ideally, a pilot survey should have been carried out before sending out the 
questionnaire to the selected groups. However, the fact that the union 
representatives could be approached only once did not allow a pilot survey to be 
carried out for employees. A pilot survey, having access to some of the selected 
union representative would have enabled the author to ensure that all of the 
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questions selected were understood by the individuals who completed the 
questionnaire. As a pilot survey could have not been sent out to the trade union 
representatives, it was decided to treat the questionnaires to all the three groups in a 
similar manner. Hence, a pilot survey was not sent out to any of the three groups. 
In order to avoid any possible ambiguities in the questionnaires, the questions were 
kept short and simple so that they could be easily understood. Questionnaires were 
drafted a number of times before their fmal versions. The questionnaires were 
discussed with and commented by fellow PhD students, a professional researcher 
specialised in industrial relations and another researcher, who had experience in 
working with the trade unions, -at Middlesex University Business School. In 
addition, the questionnaire for employees was reviewed by the head of research in 
one of the unions who participated in the survey before sending them out to their 
representatives. 
(g) Another limitation of this study is the way it focuses on only two of the five aspects 
of SEAAR as the other three were out with the time limit and scope of this study. 
This study used the five characteristics of SEAAR (as discussed in the literature) to 
investigate whether companies paid any attention to the quality of non-financial 
information they disclose. The fact that the study focused on only two aspects 
makes the overall conclusion less comprehensive. As was discussed in section 7.4, 
there were three other aspects that were not considered in this study, as doing so 
would have required technical expertise and extensive research in other academic 
fields. 
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7.8 REcoMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH AND FURTHER REMARKS 
While this study found evidence suggesting that companies disclose non-financial 
information to legitimise their behaviours, the findings of this study can benefit from 
further research. Further research can focus on the following issues: 
(a) This study investigated whether companies paid any attention to the quality of non-- 
financial information disclosure by focusing on only two of the five aspects of 
SEAAPL Further research can be carried out to assess the other three aspects as well 
as expanding the findings for stakeholder dialogue. The findings for stakeholder - 
dialogue can be expanded by approaching stakeholder groups other than investors 
and employees. For instance, consumer groups can be approached in which case 
consideration need to be made for their issues with the main focus on their 
information requirements. 
In this study, questionnaires were sent out to a small number of companies and 
institutional investors due to resource limitations and time constraints. The results could 
present a more comprehensive picture by selecting a larger number of companies and 
institutional investors. 
(b) Another aspect of SEAAR which was not considered in this study was 'public 
disclosure'. In this study, the simplest form of content analysis, commonly known as 
indexing, was used to measure the level of non-financial information disclosure and 
not the extent of disclosure. To be able to investigate this aspect of SEAAF, the 
index used in this study can be expanded by including more governance and non- 
governance information categories. In addition, for each information category sub- 
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categories can be included. In this way, the study would measure the extent of 
information disclosure. 
(c) Another point that can be considered for future research is to take into account the 
information requirements of stakeholder groups when deciding on which 
information categories to consider for content analysis. This can be done by 
approaching different stakeholder groups and by finding out their information 
interests and requirements. Although this would be a long process, it would allow us 
to measure whether companies have met the information requirements, of their 
stakeholders. The difference between this approach and conventional content 
analysis techniques is that more attention would be paid to stakehqlder groups and 
to their information requirements rather than focusing on what companies decided to 
disclose to their stakeholders. 
(d) Investigation needs to be carried out on the other two aspects of SEAAR. Studies 
can be conducted to find out if companies use any 'indicators and benchmarks' that 
they can compare their non-financial information with. In addition, investigation 
needs to be carried out to find evidence on whether companies continuously review 
and update their benchmarks and indicators with the changing interests and 
expectations of their stakeholder groups. 
(e) In Chapter 2, the literature review revealed that little attention has been paid to the 
significant role that corporate governance can play in making companies more 
accountable to their different stakeholder groups. Under the current UK system, 
stakeholder groups are not represented in the governance structures of companies. 
Hence, they do not play any roles in decision making process. Further research needs 
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to be conducted on how willing different stakeholder groups are to have an active role 
in companies' governance structures. Conversely, research can be carried out to find 
out how companies would react to the idea of having stakeholder representatives in 
their governance structures. 
The overall findings of this study suggested that UK companies use non-financial 
information disclosure to legitimize their corporate behaviours to their stakeholders in 
the absence of any regulatory requirements qr any recognition from the professional 
bodies. 7he evidence even suggested that companies made less effort to meet the 
information requirements of their employees. Considering the wide variety of 
stakeholders' interests and values, it could be a Micult task, if not impossible, to 
introduce regulatory requirements that would serve the interests of all stakeholder 
groups covering a wide range of non-financial issues. One problem with regulations on 
different non-financial issues is that they need to be up-dated regularly to incorporate 
changes in the expectations and values of stakeholders. As regulations are highly 
unlikely to serve the changing interests of stakeholders, the presence and involvement 
of stakeholder representatives would ensure that companies act in interests of their 
stakeholders. In this way, the level of mutual understanding between companies and 
their different stakeholders is increased. 
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APPENDix 2 
SECTION 2A 
Development ofAccounting Practice and The Needsfor Information Disclosure over the years 
A useful way to see the purposes served by accounting is to review the way accounting has been 
developed over the years within its social and organisational contexts. VAiile the social context 
includes all the issues in the environment external to an organisation ranging from political, 
economic to social issues, the organisational context covers all internal issues, mainly 
managerial. Although this section does not review accounting history but it briefly looks at the 
stages through which accounting profession has been developed. This provides a better 
understanding of how accounting has been developed over the years due to social changes. 
Accounting history is defined as "... the study of the evolution in accounting thought, practices 
and institutions in response to changes in the environment and societal needs" (Committee on 
Accounting History - cited in Belkaoui, 1992: p 13). 
The shareholders, who did not have the technical knowledge, experience or the commitment to 
manage the company had to employ salaried managers to run companies on both short and long- 
term basis. This generated a new class and a new phenomena called 'managerial capitalism' 
(Chandler, 1977), leading to the introduction of a whole new concept of information 
communication. In 1877, Newmarch explained the difference between a private partnership and 
a joint stock company and how the difference leads to the need for information communication. 
Newmarch (1877, as quoted in Select Committee, 1877) argues that: 
"... it must be remembered that the difference between a joint stock company ... 
and a private partnership is this, that the private partnership consists of two, three, 
four, five, or half-a-dozen persons who are in constant communication with each 
other, and who have the means, therefore, of confidential discussion regarding the 
whole affairs of the concern; whereas in the case of joint stock company it is a 
collection of miscellaneous persons, not in communication with each other at all, 
only so in very imperfect manner; the business of the compýmy must be 
necessarily in the hands of the shareholders reasonably informed of what is 
actually being done by the people who administer the affairs of the company" 
(Select Committee, 1877: q. 724) 
Since the late 19th century, listed companies have been providing information to their 
shareholders and the general public on their financial performance. Over the years the concept of 
information reporting went through changes alongside with political and social changes that took 
place in the external environment. 
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TA13LE 2A CHARACTERISTICS OF DECISION USEFULNESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY APPROACH 
Characteristics Decision Usefulness Accountability 
Parties to the information Organisation and Users of Agent and Principal Information 
Parties determined by Habit, convention, or Existence of a contract 
assumption 
Rights to information Assumption or equated with By contract determined by need 
Recipients of information Investors credits and others 
Society-at-large and groups 
assumed to be , within society 
Orientation of information Future decisions of recipients 
Past and fiiture responsibility 
of organization 
Content of information 
Imputed or estimated user Responsibility for activity 
determined by demand or what users should imposed upon agent 
by 
want principal 
Reporting is assumed to be Demand-driven Responsibility-driven 
Communication criteria 
Information must reach Information must be 
recipient available to principal 
Distinguish between 
Descriptive power Very low 
enforceable and non- 
enforceable contracts and ex 
gratia disclosure 
Normative validity 
I 
Presupposes users rights 
Set within status quo of law 
and quasi-legal requirements 
Source: Adopted from Gray, Owen and Maunders (199 1: P4) 
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FIGuRE 2A A SIMPLE NEO-PLURALIST VISUALISATION OF SOCIETY 
Bio-sphere 
Society, Culture, ethics 
Economic Domain 
The State 
Companies, Stakheolders, 
private and .4 10pressures groups, 
public individuals 
sector 
entities 
I 
Source: Adopted from Gray, Owen, and Adams (1996: p34). 
322 
Append& 
Table 2B Social and Ethical Accounting and Auditing: Key Elements 
- 
Principles Key Elements 
I. inclusivity Level ofstakeholder consultation: 
Accounting process design, 
Stakeholder mission values incorporation, 
Stakeholder objectivetaims incorporation, 
Indicators selection design, 
Impact, rincome 
2. Comparability Forms ofcomparability. ý 
Mandatory compliance, 
Non-mandatory compliance, 
Inter-industry/company, 
Organisation score over time, 
Social and ethical nonnsibenchmarks, 
Targets 
3. Completeness Stakeholder coverage: 
Stakeholder identificationlacknowledgement, 
Short-term, 
Long-term (retrospective), 
Long-term (forward commitments), 
Feedback on previous disclosure, 
Sustainability Linkages: 
Linkagerhicorporation of financial data, 
Linkage/incorr*ration of environmental data 
4. Evolutionary Regular, 
Timeliness, 
Development of breath over time, 
Development of depth over time, 
Responsiveness of scope to feedback, 
Responsiveness of scope to 'pinch points' (hot spots) 
5- Management policies and'systems Overall social and ethical policy statement, 
Stakeholder-specific social policies, 
Management systems, 
Responsibility and accountability guidelines, 
Internal auditing procedures and practice, 
Social and ethical review. - 
Management reports, 
Board reports 
6. Disclosure Publication of social statement (summary of social/ethical accounts), 
Completeness, 
Intelligibility, 
Usability, 
Accessibility (includes cost of access to stake olders) 
I. External Verification Tliird party, 
Published verifier's report, 
Coverage of verification, 
Audit review panel, 
Verifier qualification/accreditation 
8- COntinuos Improvement Targets/commitments 
Stakeholder perspectives over time 
Reporting on stakeholder feedback 
Renrhmark- 
Source: Zadek et al (1997: p 229-230) 
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FIGuRE 2B A TENTATIVE SCHEMA OF POLITICAL AND SYSTEMS-BASED THEORIES OF CSR 
Systems-based theories of CSR 
Classical Political Economy 
(Marx) 
Legitimacy theory I 
(of the system) 
I 
Source: Gary, Owen and Adams (1996: p 49). 
Bourgeois Political 
Economy 
(J. S. Mill) 
Legitimacy theory eholder theory 
(of the organisation) 
[ii(ýaccountability) 
_ 
I Stakeholder theory I 
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Appendix 2 
TABLE 2D TEN TRANSITION TOWARDS SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING 
Establishia F, on: ' "I"", ti, I iiing foctis'6n: 6ý 6-n-e-way. assive communication Multi-way, active dialogue 
. 
2. Verification as an option Verification as standard 
. 
3. Single company reporting Benchmarkability 
4. Management Systems Life Cycles, Business Design, Strategy 
5. Inputs and Outputs Impacts and Outcomes 
6. Ad-hoc operating standards Global operating standards 
. 
7. Public relations Corporate governance 
8. Voluntarv reporting Mandatory reporting 
9. Company sets reporting boundaries Boundaries set by stakeholder di I ý 
10. Environmental performance Triple bottom line performance 
ý 
Source: SustainAbility/LJNEP (1996, as quoted in Elkington, 1999: p172). 
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APPENDix 3A 
The Latest Development in Regulatory and Statutory Requirements 
There are no statutory and regulatory reporting requirements in regard to social 
information. The 'Tumbull report' was published in 1999, under the title of "Internal 
Control: for Directors on the Combined Code". The prime objective of Turnbull report is 
to establish a system of risk management and internal control in order to safeguard 
shareholders' investments and the company's assets. According to the Turnbull report, 
companies are required to report , on 
how appropriate their processes are in identifying, 
evaluating and managing significant risks and. whether their boards review the 
effectiveness of risk management process. However, the company has no obligation to 
disclose the identified risks. The Appendix to Turnbull report states that "significant risks 
may for example include those related to markets, credit, liquidity, technological, legal, 
health and safety and environmental, reputation and business probity issues" (Internal 
Control, 1999: p13). The last two issues are directly related to how socially responsible a 
company is. 
According to the Combined Code the board is responsible to ". -- maintain a sound system 
of internal control to safeguard shareholders investments and the company's assets" 
(Internal Control, 1999: p3) and "the directors should, at least annually, conduct a review 
of the effectiveness of the groups system of internal controls and should report to 
shareholders that they have done so. The review could cover all controls, including 
financial, operational and compliance controls and risk management" (Internal Control, 
1999: p3). 
There is one potential statutory requirement expected to be introduced. Companies 
in 
breach of stock market listing rules, which set out the obligations of publicly quoted 
companies on the London Stock Exchange, could face unlimited fines from the Financial 
Services Authority (The Times, 18 January 2001). Proposals to introduce fines is followed 
by an extension of the Financial Services Authority's powers last year to include authority 
over the listing requirements of the London Stock Exchange. Previously the London Stock 
Exchange handled the listing requirements for all companies traded in the UK. It did not 
have the power to. impose penalties against companies found to have broken the listing 
rules, although 'there was the threat of de-listing. A legislative requirement could result 
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from the changes proposed in the company Law Review Steering Group's Consultation 
Document in March 2000, together with subsequent reports, to wider public disclosure of 
business risks. 
The Company Law Review proposes that public and very large private companies should 
include in their full annual report a new statutory Operating and Financial Review (OFR) 
which would allow users to properly assess the performance, future plans and prospects of 
the business. The OFR would contain information on the company's relationships with 
employees, customers, suppliers, its reputation and its impact on the community and the 
environment. 
If these proposals were to become law they would add even greater pressure for the 
management on the disclosure of social information. 
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APPENDix 3B 
_Equal 
opportunity Legislation In Britain 
I. Disabled Persons (Employment) Act 1944 
2. Disabled Persons (Employment) Act 1958 
3. Race Relation Act 1965 
4. Race Relation Act 1970 
5. Equal Pay Act 1970 
6. Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 
7. Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1974 
8. Sex Discrimination Act 1975 
9. Race Relations Act 1976 
10. Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 
11. Companies (Directors, Report) (Employment of Disabled Persons) Regulations 1980 
12. Equal Pay (amendment) Regulations 1983 
13. Sex Discrimination Act 1986 
14. Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1989 
15. Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act 1993 
16. Disability Act 1995 
Source: Adams and Harte (1999: p3) 
_Business 
Initiative 
Race for equality and the 
Opportunity 2000 Employers' Forum on 
- 
Disability 
__ 
Source: Adams and Harte (1999: p 14) 
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APPENDix 3C 
The major part of the literature on communication and consultation focuses on 
communication with employees and little attention has been paid to communication with 
other stakeholder groups. As the nature of the relationship between companies and each of 
their stakeholders varies, so does the nature of the communication between them. Despite 
this variation, there is expected to be a common ground for communication with all 
stakeholder groups. 
Some of the reasons why companies communicate with their employees are shown here. 
For example, Arnott, Minton and Wilders (1981) outlined the reasons why employers 
communicate with their employees. They presented their reasons according to their 
importance as follows: 
I. Make organization work better 
2. Improve morale 
3. Employees have a right to know 
4. Improve productivity 
5. Gain acceptance of change 
6. Make managers manage 
7. Reduce industrial disputes 
8. Moderate wage claims 
9. Increase flexibility 
10. Legal requirements 
II- Trade union pressures 
12. General social trends 
13. Pre-empt expected legislation 
14. Employee pressures 
Although some of the above reasons apply to stakeholders only, some other reasons apply 
to other stakeholders as well. Also, Perkins (1986) argues that even tough the reasons why 
companies decide to communicate with their employees change over time, the 
underlying desire for communication rests on the following proposals: 
to harness the knowledge of all employees to make the organization more efficient 
by encouraging feedback and thus improving decision making, 
to improve employee morale which may have been reduced, in the public sector, 
by 
political decisions taken nationally, ' 
to reduce alienation by explaining to employees how their jobs contribute to the 
overall organization, 
Ov) Jo increase the overall awareness about the fmancial state of the organization and the 
restraints under which it must work, 
(v) to provide a background to realistic expectations about pay and conditions, 
(Vi) to ensure day to day feedback about problems being encountered in providing the 
service, 
(vii) to improve motivation, 
(viii) to improve understanding about the need for change and what this will mean, 
Ox) to increase the level of trust and reduce the scope of conflicts based on ignorance, 
W to ensure'that employees can present the aims and activities of. organization to the 
outside world, 
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(xi) because communication, if not carried out by the organization, will be carried out by 
others who may not have the fidl facts or may deliberately distort them. " (pp6-7) 
At the same time, Bland and Jackson (1990) point out the disadvantages of poor internal 
communication. According to them, poor internal "... communication leads to: 
"a lack of understanding of company objectives 
" the inability to carry out individual jobs to the highest possible standard 
"a lack of perception of consumer demands and competitors' challenges 
" poor relationships with immediate superiors 
" criticism and misunderstanding between different departments and divisions 
" the inability to give fi-ank information to subordinates 
" insufficient appreciation of the need for quality and excellence 
"a preference for quick resource to industrial action rather than more lengthy discussion 
leading to harmonious solutions 
"a general lowering of morale" (p 16). 
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Appendir 4 
APPENDiX4B 
COMPANYNAM 1985 1990 1995 
A 
1. Aegis Group Plc: Vrqft Collins Rutherford PIC Y 
Y NIS 
(NIA) 
2. Allied Domecq Plc Allied Lyons Pic Allied Lyons Pic 
Y S 
3. AMIEC PLC Y Y 
4. Argyll Group Plc Y Y 
Y NIS 
5. Atjo Wiggins Appelton Plc Peakgilt Pic (N/A) wigins Teape 
Appelton Plc Y NIS 
6. Asda Group Pic Asda-MFl Y 
Y 
7. Associated British Foods Pic 
8. BAT Industries Plc Y 
Y Y S 
9. Bass Pic Y 
10. Beazer Pic C. H. Beazer (Holdings) Pic 
Y 
11. Berisford Pic Lid Berisford international 
Pic Y S 
12. BET Plc Y 
Y Y S 
13. BICC Pic Y 
S 
14. BOC Group Plc: Y 
Y 
15. Booker Pic Ltd 
Y 
16. Boots Company Plc Y 
17. British Petroleum Pic Y 
18. British Aerospace Plc Y 
19. British Airway Pic Y 
S Y 
20. British Gas Plc 
21. British Steel Plc 
22. British Tel ecommunication Y 
PIC 
S Y 
23. BTR Plc: Y 
S Y Y 
24. Bunzel Y ---------- 
25. Burton Group Pic Y 
S Y Y 
26. Burmah Castrol Group Pic Y 
S Y Y 
27. Cable .& Wireless Pic Y 
S 
28. Cadbury Schweppes Pic Y 
NIS 
29. Coats Viyella. Plc Vanwm Viyeua Pic (N/A) 
Y Y 
30. Cortlauds Pic 
31. Dalgaty Pic Y 
NIS 
32. Dee Corporafion Pic Y (NIA) Gateway 
corporation Plc 
(N/A) 
342 
COMPANY NANEE 1985 
33. Dixon Group Pic y 
34. Forte Pic Tmst House Forte Ple 
35. General Electric Company 
PIC 
y 
36. GKN Pic LAd 
37. Glaxo Holdings Pic y 
38. Granada Group Pic y 
39. Grand Metropolitan Pic y 
40. Great Universal Stores Pic y 
41. Guinness Pic y 
42. Hawker Siddleley Group Pic y 
43. Hanson Pic Ltd 
44. Harrisons & Crossfield Pic y 
45. Hillsdown Holdings Pic y 
46. ICI PIC y 
47. Inchape Pic y 
48. bosceles Pic Lid 
49. Johnson Mathey Pic y 
50. Kingfisher Pic Woolworth PIC 
51. Kwik Save Group Pic Kwik save Discourtt Pic 
52. Ladbroke Group Pic y 
53. Lex Services Pic y 
54. Littlewood Organizaion Pic Y (N/A) 
55. Lonhro Pic y 
56. Lucas Industries Pic 
57. Marks and Spencer Pic 
y 
y 
58. National Power PIC 
59. NFC Pic y 
60. Northern Foods Pic y 
61. Nuclear Electric Pic 
62. Peninsular and Oriental 
Steam Navigation Co (Ibe) 
PIC 
y 
63. Pilkington Pic pdkftwn Brothers Pic 
64. Plessey Company PIC Y (N/A) 
65. PowerGen Pic 
L66. Racal Electronics Pic y- 
Appendbc 4 
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COMPANYNAME 1985 1990 1995 A 
67. Rank Hovis McDoughall. PIC y y Acquired by 
Tomkins 
PIC 
S 
68. Rank Organization Pic y 
69. Recldtt & Coleman Pic y 
70. Reed International Pic y 
71. Redland Pic y 
72. RMC Group Pic y 
73. Rolls-Royce Pic y 
74. kTZ Pic ne Rio TintD-Zinc CorPontion y 
y 
PIC 
75. Saatchi & Saatchi Pic Y (NIA) y 
y NIS 
76. Sainsbury Pic y 
77. Sears Pic y 
78. Shell (Transport and Trading y 
Co. ) Pic 
79. W. H. Smith Pic W. H. Smith & Son HOlding Pic Y (N/A) 
y NI 
80. SniidMine Beecham Pic Goldslot Pic (N/A) 
y NIS 
NIS 
81. STC PIC Y (N/A) 
82. Tate & Lyle Pic y 
S 
83. Tarmac Pic y 
y S 
84. Tesco, Pic y 
S y y NI 85. THORN ENH Pic y 
IS 
86. Tomkins Pic F. H. Tomkins PIC Y (N/A) 
y N 
87. Trafalgar House Pic y 
y y S 
IS 
88. Tricentrol Pic Y (N/A) Y (N/A) 
N 
y Acquired by Lasmo S 89. Ultramar Pic y Pic in 1991 
S 
90. Unigate Pic y 
91. United Biscuits Holdings PIC y 
------------ S y 
92. Unilever Pic y 
93. Wellcome Pic 
S 
94. Whithread PIC Whidwaad arid COMPY Pic 
y y 
S 
95. WoIseley Pic Lid 
y 
96. WPP Group PIC WIMs & pWtic Products Pic 
y 
y y S 
197. Zeneca Pic 
Note: In column A, S stands for -Selected for the Sample', NIS stands 
for not selected for the Sample'. 
N/A stands for annual reports not available. 
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AppiENDix 4C 
FIGuRE 4C. 1 AGGREGATE PREFERENCE CAPITAL 
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FIGURE 4C. 3 AGGREGATE CAPITAL EMPLOYED 
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FIGuRE 4C. 5 AGGREGATE LoAN CAPITAL 
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FIGURE 4C. 7 AGGREGATE GEARING RATIO 
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FIGuRE 4C. 9 AGGREGATE BORROWING RATIO 
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APPENDix 4D 
Non-rewndents No Response 
I. Associated British Foods Pic I. Beazer Group Pic 
2. Berisford Pic 2. BTR Pic 
3. BET Pic 3. Bunzel Pic 
4. BICC Pic 4. Cable and Wireless Pic 
5. British Aerospace Pic 5. Hanson Pic 
6. British Airways Pic 6. Johnson Matthey Pic 
7. British Peteroleurn Pic 7. National Power Pic 
8. British Telecome Pic 8. Northern Foods Pic 
9. Burton Pic 9. Powergen Pic 
10. Cadbury Schweppes PIC 10. Racal Electronic PIC 
11. Courtlauds Textiles Pic 11. Reckitt & Colman Pic 
12. Guiness Pic 12. The BOC Group Pic 
13. Harrisons & Crossfield PIC 13. Whitbread Pic 
14. Imperial Chemical Industries PIC 
15. Inchape Pic 
16. J Sainsbury PIC 
17. Ladbrokes Group Pic 
18. LEX Services Pic 
19. LONRHO PIC 
20. Lucas Industries Pic 
21. P&0 
22. Rolls-Royce Pic 
23. Sears Pic 
24. Tate & Lyle Pic 
25. The British Petroleum Pic 
26. The Shell Transport & Trading Co. Pic 
27. Unigate Pic 
28. Unilever Pic 
29. United Biscuits Pic 
30. Wolseley Pic 
3 1. Zeneca Pic 
Notes 
'Non-response' list presents all those companies who responded that they would not co- 
operate with the survey. 
'No response' list present the names of all those companies who neither said they would 
or 
would not co-operate. 
The names of the respondents could not be included as many of the companies strictly asked 
for confidentiality and did not want their names to be revealed. 
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APPENDix 4E 
Letter to company secretaries 
Date 
Dear Name, 
I am writing to ask for your assistance in a research project I am directing at the Business School 
on the disclosure of non-fmancial information by major UK companies. , The project is 
investigating one of the most important changes in corporate behaviour in recent years, namely 
the increasing concem of companies and employees with effective communication and 
consultation between companies and their ma or stakeholder groups. We wish to analyse the 
nature and degree of the change and to see if it is related in any way to company performance. 
All that we ask is that you, as employee representative, give up a few minutes of your time to 
complete the enclosed brief questionnaire. All replies will be treated in confidence and no 
individual company details will be disclosed. If you wish, we will also send a report on the findings on completion of the study. 
May I take the opportunity of thanking you in advance for your support in this matter. 
Yours sincerely, 
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Communication and Consultation with 
Stakeholder Groups ', ý 
Survey Questionnaire, 
Project On The Disclosure of Non-Financial 
Information by UK Companies 
MIDDLESEX UNIVERSITY 
BUSINESS SCHOOL 
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I A. Stakeholder G rou ps 
Theoretically, there are five groups of stakeholders. In practice, however, stakeholder groups associated to a 
particular company and the importance attached to each stakeholder group varies depending on the business 
operations of a company. 
Could you identify how major the following stakeholder groups are to your company. 
(Please tick as appriq priate) 
Very Major Somewhat Not very Not at all 
Major Maýor M or Major 11 " Institutional Shareholders 11 11 
" Employees 
" Customers 
0 
0 
" Suppliers 
" Public 
11 
El 0 
* Do you have any specific procedure in determirag your major stakeholder groups? 
Yes 0 No D 
Methods of Communication 
Which one of the following methods are used in your company to communicate with each of your 
stakeholder groups? (Please tick as appropriate) 
Institutional 
Shareholders Employees SupEliers Customers 4 
Public 
5 Face-to-face methods: 1 2 El El 11 Group Meetings kApart from 
. the annual general meeting) Cascade networks 0 
0- ,0 
Large-scale meetings n 
Written Methods: 
ýT -3m j ý ýýTf Z2 2- 1b 0oks 0 a 13 13 C3 " Information notes to stakeholder 13 
representative 
" HOusejoumals El Newsletters 
D 
C1 
p epartmental Bulletins 13 Notices 
Individual letters to stakeholder n 0 
group representatives (to give 
information of major importanc e 
accurately and simultaneously) 
Other Methods: 
Information points El Audio-visual aids 0 11 11 
11 
13 11 Electronic mail 13 
353 
Appendix 4 
C. Different Types of information communicated: 01 * Please consider DO NOT consider ANNUAL REPORTS since they are regarded as publicly 
available information. 
4 Please consider the following information items in regard to each stakeholder group separately. 
* Please do not tick if you think the information item is irrelevant to a particular stakeholder group. 
Shareholders 
A) Information about the organisation: 
Work objectives and performance Operating and technical information 
Health and safety 
Information on personnel (Who the key positions are) 
Working conditions 
Supervision and management 
of different operational procedures 
Administrative procedures Training and development 
Development in technology and methods Equal opportunities 
Social and welfare facilities 
to each stakeholder group 
00 marketing Information: 
Company Market Share 
Company Market Segment 
Mergers and Acquisitions 
Investment 
Details of products and services 
Future plans on developing products 
and services 
Future plans on other issues 
Research and development 
Environmental issues 
Employees Suppliers Customers 
2 3 4 
u u 11 
0 El 
0 0 0 
El 11 11 
11 0 11 
El 0 0 0 
0 11 11 11 
11 0 El 
11 0 0 
0 0 El 
El 
0 
0 0 Q 
0 El 0 0 El 
0 0 El 
0 0 El 11 
0 0 
0 0 
El 0 0 
jý-Consultationffwo--wvay 
communication: 
Communication with different stakeholder groups is important in allowing an organisation to 
know its 
stakeholders' needs and interests as well as having the opportunitY to inform the stakeholders of the existing impediments in various areas. 
M DialogUe Circles: 
Each dialogue circle (sometimes called quality circles or focal groups) consists of a particular stakeholder 
groups' representatives. These representatives identify the areas in which improvements can 
be made. They then 
present proposals to the top management. 
Could you identify whether you have any quality circles for any of your stakeholders. 
Yes No 
" Institutional Shareholders 0 
" Employees n 0 
" Customers 0 " Suppliers 0 " Public 
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if 
0 Could you indicate how often the meetings are held. 
Once a year Twice a year Four times a year More 
Institutional Shareholders 11 11 11 
Employees El 
Customers n 
Suppliers 11 
El El El Public 0 
IfNO 
9 Could you indicate how useful you think the dialogue circles would be to the overall management of 
Your company. 
Not at all Not very Somewhat Very 
useful useful useful useful 
Institutional Shareholders 0 0 E) 
0 
0 Employees El 0 Customers 
Suppliers 0 11 0 
Public 0 E) El 
00 Training programmes : 
Well-designed training courses are a useful way of giving staff factual information about their positions 
in the 
Organisation. Training events enables the staff to have better communication skills when 
dealing with 
cOnIPanY0S stakeholders. 
0 Do you have any b-aining courses within your organisation? Yes 0 No 
0 
If YES 
ation skills when How useful are the training courses in enabling your staff to have better communic 
dealing with company stakeholders? 
Not at all Not very Somewhat Very 
useful useful useful useful 
13 11 0 11 
010 Joint consultation: 
Joint consultation takes place between managers and stakeholders' representatives who come together on regular basis to discuss issues of mutual concern. 
0 Do you have anyjoint consultation arrangements for any of your stakeholder groups. 
Yes No 
Institutional Shareholders 
Employees 
Customers 
Suppliers 0 Public 
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If YES 
0 Could you indicate how often you consult your stakeholder groups? 
Once a year Twice a year Four times a year More 
" Institutional Shareholders 13 11 11 ri 11 " Employees 
" Customers 
D 13 
0 
" Suppliers 0 
" Public 0 0 
IfNO 
Could you indicate how useful you Ua* consultation would be in finding out the views and interests 
of vour stakehnIdem 
Not at all Not very Somewhat Very 
useful useful useful useful 
" Institutional Shareholders 13 11 11 11 0 " Employees 11 0 11 
0 
n 11 " Customers 
" Suppliers 
0 
0 0 0 11 
" Public 0 
OV) Attitude Surveys: 
Do you carry out any attitude surveys for any of your stakeholder groups. 
Yes No 
Institutional Shareholders 0 11 
Employees 11 0 
Customers 0 0 
Suppliers 0 0 
Public 11 0 
ff-LES 
0 Could you indicate how Often the attitude surveys are carried out? 
Once a year Twice a year Four times a year 
More 
Cl 
" Institutional Shareholders 11 11 0 
0 
11 11 " Employees 
" Customers 
n 
n 
" Suppliers 0 " Public n 
Suggestion Schemes: 
, Do you have any suggestion schemes for any your stakeholder groups? 
Yes No 
Institutional Shareholders 11 11 
Employees 13 0 
Customers 13 11 
Suppliers 0 13 
Public 13 11 
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a ls, 46 t:, ", 
YoUrco" compe es 0 -ýOpqijatiohin' 
very muc , -app, q 
Please tick the box if you wish to receive a copy of the fmdings 0 
Company's Name 
........................................................................................................................... 
Please return to: 
Professor JP Dunne, 
Business School, 
Middlesex University, 
The Burroughs, 
Hendon, 
London, NW4 4BT 
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APPENDIX 4F 
Letter to Institutional Investors 
Date 
Dear Name 
I am writing to ask for your assistance in a research project I am directing at the 
Business School on the disclosure of non-financial information by major UK 
companies. The project is investigating one of the most important changes in 
corporate behaviour in recent years, namely the increasing concern of companies and 
institutional investor with effective communication and consultation between 
companies and their major stakeholder groups. I wish to analyse the nature and 
degree of the change and to see if it is related in any way to company performance. * 
All that we ask is that you, as an institutional investor, give up a few minutes of your 
time to complete the enclosed brief questionnaire. All replies will be treated 
in 
confidence and no individual company details will be disclosed without permission. 
We will also send a report on the findings on completion of the study, if you wish. 
May I take the opportunity of thanking you in advance for your support in this matter. 
Yours sincerely, 
Name 
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Communication and Consultation with 
Institutional Investors 
Survey Questionnaire 
Project On The Disclosure of Non-Financial 
Information by UK Companies 
MIDDLESEX - UNIVERSITY 
BUSINESS SCHOOL 
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A. Methods of Communication: 
Could you indicate: 
Which one of the follo, %ing methods of communication are commonly used 
by the public limited companies which you have major holdings in, i. e. more 
than 3%; and 
2. V. Iiich of the following methods of communication are preferred by you. 
PLEASE NOTE THAT THE FOLLOWING METHODS ARE OTHER THAN 
THE ANNUAL GENERAL MEETINGS 
Method used by Method Preferred by 
company institutional investor 
Face-to-race_methods: 12 
" Group Meetings 0 
" Cascade networks 1) 
" Large-scale meetings n0 
0* Inter-departmental brief"ings 11 0 
Written Methods: 
" Company Handbooks 0 
" Employees information notes/reports 
" Housejournals 
" Newsletters E) 
" Departmental Bulletins Cl 
" Notices 0 
" Individual letters to all employees 0 n 
Other Methods: 
" Information points 
" Audio-visual aids n 
" Electronic mail 11 
Could you specify if there are any other method/(S) of communication that either 
companies use or you prefer them to use. 
I................................................................................................................................................ 
2............................................................................................................................................... 
3............................................................................................................................................... 
4................................................................................................................................................ 
5................................................................................................................................................. 
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ýB. Different Types of Information Communicated 
Could you indicate whether the following information items are provided to you by 
companies, if Could you indicate how useful you find the communicated information in 
your decision making as an investor. 
Information on the organisation: 
NO YES 
Work objectives and performance 
operating and technical instruction 
Health and safety at work 
Information on personnel n (Who the key positions are) 
Working conditions El 
Supervision and management 
Administrative procedures 
Training and development 
Development in technology and methodsO 
Equal opportunities 11 
Social and welfare facilities 0 
00 Marketing information 
Company Market Share 
Company Market Segment 
Mergers and Acquisitions 
Investment 
Details of products and services 
Future Plans on development 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Not at all 
useful 
Not very 
useful 
2 
0 
n 
0 
11 
Somewhat 
useful 
3 
n 
ri 
n 
11 
Very 
useful 
4 
13 
0 
o 0 0 0 0 
0 
o 0 0 0 0 
0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
WAN 
MOMMM 
There are various ways of twoway, communication and consultation with 
institutional investors. 
Consultation or two-way communication provide institutional investors with 
the opportunity to 
express their views and what they expect from the company as well as giving 
the managers the 
Opportunity to inform their investors of the impediments in achieving certain objectives. 
(i) Dialogue Circles : 
A dialogue circle (or sometimes called a focal group) consists of 
investors' 
representatives. 'Mese representatives identif the areas in which 
improvements can be y 
made. They then present proposals to the top management. 
Do you have dialogue circles for any of the public limited companies you 
have major 
holdings in, i. e. 3% or more? 
Yes 0 No 11 
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If YES. 
e Could you specify the companies for which you have a dialogue circle? 
I............................................................................................................................................. 
2.............................................................................................................................................. 
3.............................................................................................................................................. 
4.............................................................................................................................................. 
Could you indicate how useful you find the dialogue/focus groups in expressing your 
views for each of the comvanies? 
Not at all Not very Somewhat very 
useful useful useful useful 
Company I .... ....... 
Company 2 
.................................... 
............ . ....... 
Company 3 
. ......................... 
............................................... 
11 
Company 4 ............................................... 
D 0 D 
How often do you have your meetings? 
Once a year Twice a year Four times a year 
More 
I a Com 11 p ny 
2 an Com 
............................................... n y p 
3 an Com 
............................................... C1 11 0 y p 
Company 4 
............................................... 
............................................... 
D 11 11 
If NO. 
Could you indicate how useful you would find dialogue circles in communicating 
your views to the top management. 
Not at all Not very 
useful useful 
13 0 
Somewhat Very 
useful useful 
Dn 
00 Joint consultation : 
Joint consultation takes place between the top management representative and the 
investors 
representatives who come together on regular basis to discuss issues of mutual concern. 
Howeverg 
consultation does not require companies to accept the views offered. 
Do you have joint consultation with any of the public limited companies you 
have 
major holdings in, i. e. 3% or more? 
Yes 0 No 11 
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ff-YES. 
Could you specify the companies with which you have joint consultation? 
I....................................................................................................................................... 
2 ......................................................................................................................................... 
3........................................................................................................................................ 
4........................................................................................................................................ 
Appendix 4 
Could you indicate how useful you find joint consultation in expressing your views for each of the 
companies? 
Not at all Not very Somewhat Very 
useful useful useful useful 
Company I ............................................... 
Company 2 .............................................. 
Company 3 ............................................... 
Company 4 ............................................... 
How often do You have your meetings? 
Once a year Twice a year Four times a year More 
Company I ............................................... 
[] 0 0 
Company 2 .............................................. 
El 11 
Company 3 ............... . ...... . ...................... 
[3 n 
Company 4 ............................................... 
[3 11 0 
Could you indicate how useful you think the role of consultation would be in improving your investment decision making? 
Not at all Not very 
useful useful 
0 11 
Somewhat Very 
useful useful 
nn 
I r'9,41titude 
survey : 
Do you receive any attitude surveys asking your views and opinions from any of the public 
limited 
cOrnpanies you have major holdings in, i. e. 3% or more? 
Yes 0 No 
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ff-LES. 
0 Could you specify the companies for vdiich you receive attitude surveys? 
I.......................................................................................................................................................... 
4............................................................................................................................................................ 
Could you indicate how well structured YOU find these surveys as a systematic means for the 
management to investigate the opinions and views of investors on issues of specific relevance? 
Not at all well 
structured 
Company 1 ................................................. 
Company 2 ................................................ 
Company 3 ................................................. 
Company 4 ................................................. 
How often do you receive the surveys? 
Once a year 
Company I ............................................ . ... 
Company 2 ...................................... . ........ 
Company 3 ................................................. 
Company 4 ................................................. 
Suggestion schemes 
Not very well Somewhat Very well 
structured structured structured 
0 
Twice a year Four times a year More 
o 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
Is there any suggestion schemes for any of the public limited companies you have major 
holdings in, 
i. e. 3% or more? 
Yes 0 No 
ý_Ms_ 
' Could you sp*ecify the companies for which you have suggestion schemes? 
I........................................................ 
. .................................................................................... 
2.................................................. 
. ............................................................................ .............. 
. ....................... . ....................................................................................................................... 
. ................................................... . ............. . ............................................................................ 
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Could you indicate how useful you find the suggestion schemes inputting your views and ideas forward? 
Not at all Not very Somewhat Very 
useful useful useful useful 
Company I ................... . ......................... 
Company 2 
.............................................. 
Company 3 ............................................... 
Company 4 ..................... . ........................ 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
Yo 
........ . 
urco. ýoperationin co' pleting, -this, 'ou6stionnaire'is m 
qciatecl- 
Please tick the box if you, %ish to receive a copy of the findings 
COmPany's Name ............................................................................................................ 
Please return to: 
Professor JP Dunne, 
Business School, 
Middlesex University, 
The Burroughs, 
Hendon, 
London, NW4 4BT 
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APPENDix 4G 
etary General 
Date 
Dear Name, 
We are writing for your assistance in a research project we are directing at the Business School on the disclosure of n0n-financial information by major UK companies. The project is investigating one of the most important changes currently taking place in corporate behaviour, namely the increasing concern of companies and trade unions with effective communication and consultation between companies and major stakeholders' representatives. This was underlined in "Your Stake at Work", a report published by the TUC in 1996. 
Although we appreciate that you will receive many requests for assistance from researchers we believe this request is especially deserving of your attention. One area of interest from this research is a possible link between recognition of trade unions for collective bargaining purposes and effective communication and consultation Policies. Another is the comparison between the management and investor views on these matters with those of the trade union representatives. Without union involvement in this survey only the two dominant stakeholders Perspectives would be recorded. 
Our research aims to cover twenty major UK companies. All that we request is that you, as General Secretary, Provide us with the names and work addresses of the most senior trade union representative, if any, at the main site of each company listed on the attached sheeL If for any reason that information is not readily available then please supply the name and work address of the Branch Secretary concerned. 
Please arrange for the completion and return of the attached list of companies in the sample. A copy of the questionnaire is enclosed for information only. Once we have the details requested we will write direct and ask Your representative to complete the questionnaire. All replies will be treated* in confidence and no 
individual 
c0'nPany or union details will be disclosed without permission. If you wish, we will also send a report on the findings on completion of the study. 
May we take the opportunity of t1lanking you in advance for your co-operation in this matter. 
'fOurs sincerely, 
Name 
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Communication and Consultation with 
'Employees' Representative 
Survey Questionnaire 
Project On The Disclosure of Non-Financial 
Information by UK Companies 
MIDDLESEX UNIVERSITY 
BUSINESS SCHOOL 
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iA. Trade Union Recognifion 
Could you indicate if the company recognizes trade unions on the following 
issues: 
YES NO 
0 Provision of information Cl 13 
0 Consultation (Joint Consultive Committees) 
0 Collective Ba 
(Waining 4 Ci Ies Otherissues ea pe 05y) 
1. ........ . ...... . ........ . ........ . ...... 
2 13 
3. . ..................... 
n 
Metbods Of Communication: 
Which methods of communication are used in Your cOmPany to communicate with you? 
(Please tick as appropriate) 
--.. . 11 1L-- 
ILAr-#L-A IDv9%f9IF-, r9%d Aiettioa usea Dy MMULAULS Aaý. - -- 
by 
Face-to-face methods: company employees f7l 
" Group Meetings 
d e networks " Casca 
" Large-scale meetings 
11 Inter-departmcntal brierings 
Written Methods: 
" Company Handbooks 
" Employees information notesimpor ts 
" Housejournals 
" Newsletters 
" Departmental Pulletins 
" Notices 0 
" Individual letters to all employees 
Other Methods: 0 
" Information points 
" Audio-visual aids 
" Electronic mail 
Could you specify if there are any other method/(s) of communication 
that either your company uses or you prefer the company to use. 
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C. Different Types of Information Communicated 
The re are different types of information that companies provide their employees with. Does your 
company provide any information on any of the following non-fmancial categories; if the answer is YES r , ould you indicate how informative you find each information item: 
NO YFS Not at all Not very Somewhat Very N Information the organization informative informative informative informativ 
and the organization: 123 4 
Work objectives and performance D 11 11 11 11 n Operating and technical instruction D 11 C1 C1 11 C3 
Health and safety at work 0 Cl 13 11 0 13 
Information on personnel D 11 000 n (Who the key positions are) Working conditions 13 Cl 13 
Supervision and management 11 13 0 11 13 0 Administrative procedures Cl 13 11 13 Cl 11 11 Training and development 0000 Cl 
Development in technology and methods C3 0 C1 Cl 11 Equal opportunities 11 13 13 11 
13 
Social and welfare facilities 0000 
00 Marketing Information 
Company Market Share 
Company Market Segment 0000 11 Mergers and Acquisitions 00 11 11 El 
Investment 11 11 11 13 11 11 
Details of products and services 13 0 11 El 
11 
Future Plans on development 0 11 13 11 0 
11111ý11111 ýýIIýIýIýýýIIýIIýIIIIIýIIIIIýIIII , to, to 0 
Consultation with employees is legally required on certain issues, e. g. health and safety, 
redundancies, business transfers and occupational pensions. By definition, consultation 
requires a free exchange of ideas and views affecting the interests of employees and those of 
the Organization. However, consultation does not require the company to negotiatq on issues 
raised or even accept views offered. 
0) Quality Circles : 
A quality circle is a group of people within an organization who meet together on a regular basis to identify, analyse and solve problems On quality, productivity, or other aspects of daily 
working life using problems solving techniques. 
9 Do you have any quality circles in your company? Yes 0 No 
0 
if 
How useful do you find them as mediums of exchanging ideas and views with 
the top managers? 
Not at all Not very Somewhat Very 
useful useful useful useful 
11 0 11 11 
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9 How regularly do you havc your mectings? 
Once a year Twice a year Four times a year 
0 11 0 
If NO 
0 Are you willing to take part in quality circles? 
More 
Cl 
Yes 0 No 
If YES 
Could you indicate how useful you would find the role of dialogue circles in 
communicating with the top management? 
Not at all Not very Somewhat Very 
useful useful useful useful 
11 11 11 11 
(U) Trainingprogrammes: 
Well-designed training courses are a useful way of giving employees factual information about 
their employment. Training events can provide explanations of what is happening in the 
Organization, Opportunities for questions to be put to management and answers to be given on issues raised by course members. 
Do you have any training programmes on staff development which you have 
attended within your organization? 
Yes 0 No 0 
If YES. 
Could you indicate how ivell designed you find the training programmes in helping the 
employees to have a better understanding of their roles and responsibilities? 
Not well Not very Somewhat Very 
designed at all well designed well designed well 
designed Cl 
ON Joint consuftative committees : 
as they are sometimes known, have Joint consultative committees (JCCý or work councils 
long been used as a method of employees consultation. The committees are made up of 
managers and employee representatives who also come together on regular basis to 
discuss 
issues of mutual concern. 
9 Do you have anyjoint consultative committees in your company? Yes 
* No 0 
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-f 
YES 
Could you indicate if any of the following issues are consulted with you in a joint consultation committee. 
YES NO 
Working conditions 13 11 New ways of working 0 11 Output and quality 0 0 Training 11 0 
Health and safety 0 D New equipment 13 11 
Stafruig levels C1 
Welfare 11 
Pay-related issues 11 0 
Could you specify if there are any other issues that you are consulted 
about. 
Could you indicate how useful you find the consultation on each issue. 
Not at all Not very Somewhat Very 
useful useful useful useful 
" Working conditions 11 11 11 11 
" New ways of working 11 13 0 0 
" Output and quality 0 11 0 0 
" Training 0 C1 0 0 
" Health and safety 11 11 0 11 
" New equipment 0 0 0 
" Staffing levels 0 0 11 
" Welfare 11 11 0 
" PaY-related issues 0 0 0 0. 
Could you indicate how often you are consulted on each issue? 
Once a year Twice a year Four times More a year 
" Working conditions 0 0 El 0 
" New ways of working 0 
" Output and quality 13 
" Training 13 13 
" Health and safety n 0 13 
" New equipment 13 11 11 
" Staffing levels 13 0 0 El 
" Welfare Pay-related issues 
0 
13 
11 0 
ID 
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tv) Attitude survey : 
, Do you have any attitude surveys in your organization? Yes 0 
No 0 
UES 
Could you indicate which one of the following issues are -covered in the attitude survey. 
YES NO 
" Working conditions 
" New ways of working 
" Output and quality C1 
" Training n 
" Health and safety 11 
" New equipment 11 
" Staffing levels 13 
" Welfare 0 
" Pay-related issues n 
Could you indicate how well structured these surveys are in providing a systematic means 
for 
management to investigate the opinions and views of employees on each of the 
following 
issues ? 
Not at all well Not very well 
tured St 
Somewhat 
Structured 
Very well 
Structured Structured ruc 0 0 Working conditions 11 0 0 0 New ways of working 0 0 0 0 Output and quality 0 0 0 13 Training 11 11 
11 n 11 0 Health and safety 13 C1 Cl 0 New equipment Cl 11 0 13 0 Staffing levels 0 0 0 0 0 Welfare 0 
* Pay-related issues 0 
0 
0 0 0 
How often are the attitude surveys carried out? 
Once a year Twice a year 
Four times More 
a ar 11 
Working conditions 
N 
13 
11 C1 C1 ew ways of working 
O 11 El 
C1 
utput and quality 
Training C1 El 
11 
0 
Health and safety C1 0 N 
D 
0 
0 
0 0 
ew equipment 
Staffing levels 0 11 C1 11 
11 
11 
Welfare 0 
Pay-related issues 0 
11 
13 n 11 
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0 (0) Suggesdon schemes: 
Could you indicate if there is a suggestion scheme for any of the 
following criteria? 
VIES NO 
Methods of working 
Increasing productivity 
Cutting costs 
Pay-related issues El Any other aspect of the work 
environment which might benefit the 
organization and'or its %%ork force 
if 
Could you indicate how useful you find the scheme? 
Not at all Not very Somewhat 
useful useful useful 
Methods of working 11 11 
Increasing productivity El 
Cutting costs 11 
Pay-related issues 
Any. other aspect of the work D 
envirýnment which might benefit the 
Organization and/or its work force 
Very 
useful 
Your co-operation in completing this questionnaire 
is very much appreciated 
Name of Your unioll 
Name of Your Company: ................................................................ * .... -- 
Could ý'ou specffý \ýhich group of eniplo)-ees vou are representing? 
If You wish to receive a copy of the findings, you can contact us at the following address: 
Profemr J Paul Dunne, 
Business School. 
Middlesex Universit, -'. 
The Burroughs, Hendon, 
London NW4 4BT. 
Tel : 0181-362-6825 
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APPENDix 4H 
t-tests for indeDendent samples of RESPONSEINON-RESPONSE 
Number 
Variable of Cases Mean SD SE of Mean 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
TOTAL NVMBER OF EMPLOYMENT 
'non-respondents' 44 48423.9545 52301.632 7884.768 
respondents 16 51219.0000 28561.608 7633.411 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Mean Difference - -2795.0455 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F- . 343 P... 560 
t-test for Equality of Means 9 SW . 
Variances t-value df 2-Tail Sig SE of Diff CI for Diff 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Equal 
-. 19 56 . 850 
14683.313 (-32215.9, 
26625-86) 
Unequal -. 25 41.32 . 800 
10974.449 (-24963.5, 
19373.41) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Number 
Variable of Cases Mean SD SE of Mean 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
PROFIT AM LOSS 
'non-respondents, 44 998528.0222 1642236.64 244810.183 
respondents 16 1443500-0000 1475659.7.9 394386-668 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Mean Difference - -444971.9778 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= . 134 p= . 716 
t-test for Equality of Means 95%- 
Variances t-value df 2-Tail Sig SE of Diff CI for Diff 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Equal -. 91 57 . 369 491403.597 
(-1429214, 
539270.5) 
Unequal -. 96 23.90 . 347 464190.553 
(-1403242, 
S13298.5) 
------------------------------------------------------ 
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t-tests for independent samples of RESPONSE response/non-response 
Number 
Variable of Cases Mean SD SE of Mean 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
SALE 
'non-respondents' 44 6564005-1333 9736136.28 1451377.50 
respondents 16 5030514.3571 2401959.30 641950.625 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Mean Difference - 1533490.7762 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 3.050 P= . 086 
t-test for Equality of Means 95W 
variances t-value df 2-Tail Sig SE of Diff cj for Diff 
---------------------------------------------------------- I ------------- Equal 
. 58 57 . 564 2641200-856 
(-3756626, 
6823607) 
Unequal 
. 97 55.69 . 338 1587008.904 
(-1646394, 
4713375) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Number 
Variable of Cases Mean SD SE of Mean 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
MAKAHERIAL EFFICIENCY (PROFIT/TOTAL NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES) 
'non-respondents$ 44 29.7145 46.377 6.992 
respondents 16 29.0472 22.965 6.138 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Mean Difference - . 6673 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= . 984 p= . 
326 
t-test for Equality of Means 95% 
Variances t-value df 2-Tail Sig SE of Diff CI for Diff 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Equal 
. 05 S6 . 959 12.924 
(-25.228,26.563) 
Unequal. 
. 07 45.48 . 943 9.303 
(-18.075,19.410) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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t-tests for independent samples of RESPONSE response/non-response 
Number 
Variable of Cases Mean SD SE of Mean 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
MANGERIAL EFFICIENCY (SALES PER EMPLOYEES) 
'non-respondents' 44 162.9955 179.736 27.096 
respondents 16 104.9819 25.888 6.919 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Mean Difference w 58.0136 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 4.778 P= . 033 
t-test for Equality of Means 95W 
Variances t-value df 2-Tail Sig SE of Diff CI for Diff 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Equal 1.20 56 . 236 
48.479 (-39.124,155.152) 
Unequal 2.07 48.11 . 043 
21.966 (1.772, 
114.255) 
......................................................................................................................... 
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APPENDix 41 
Niann-Whitney Test for Non-Financial Characteristics 
VAR00001 N Afean Rank Sum of Ranks 
. 00 41 25.67 
1052.50 
NGSCORF, 95 IM 12 31.54 378.50 
Total 53 
. 00 41 26.94 1104.50 GSCORE95 1.00 12 27.21 326.50 
Total 53 
. 00 41 25.63 
1051.00 
TSC95 1.00 12 31.67 380.00 
Total 53 
Notes: '0' stands for non-respondents, ' I' stands for respondents 
NGSC stands for non-govemance scores. 
GSC for governance scores 
TSC stands for total scores 
Ted St2tistics 
NGSCORE95 GSCORE95 TSC95 
I%Iann, %Nlhitney U 191.500 243.500 190.000 
Nvilcolon w 1052.500 1104.500 1051.000 
z -1.170 -. 054 -1.191 Asymn. Sig- 12-t2iled) . 242 1 . 957 1 . 
234 
Ia Grouping Variable: VARO"i 
377 
Appendir 4ý 
APPENDix 4J 
TABLE 4j, LoGrr REGRESSION RESULTS 
iI 
Variables Co-efficient df Sig 
R2 
Stare I 
Rmression I 
G95 -1. -13717 1 0.672 0.000 
Constant -0.4190 1 '0.8442 
Regression 2 
NGSc95 0.5218 1 0.7411 0.000 
Constant -1.6276 1 0.0851 
Reeression 3 
G95 -1.7595 1 0.6061 
0.000 
NGSc95 0.6419 1 0.6988 0.00 
Constant -0.5215 1 0.8092 
Stare 2 
Regression 4 
G95 -1.4177 1 0.6872 
0.000 
NGSc95 0.6471 0.6972 0.000 
EMPL95 2.04E-06 1 0.7605 0.000 
Constant -0.8272 1 0.7221 
0.000 
Regression. 5 
_ G95 
-0.6654 1 
0.8566 . 0.000 
NGSc95 0.6585 1 0.6941 0.000 
PLS95 1.82E-07 0.3451 0.000 
Constant -1.4854 0.5446 
Regression. 6. 
_ G95 -1.8377 0.5952 
0.000 
NGSc95 0.8169 1 0.6305 0.000 
SALE95 -2.1 E-08 1 
0.6588 0.000 
Constant -0.4365 1 _0.8436 Rerm. sion 7 
G95 -1.6976 1 0.6174 
0.000 
NGSc95 0.7069 1 
_0.6691 
0.000 
PLEMPL95 
Constant 
-0.0(*9 
-0.5449 
1 0.9134 
0.8019 
0.000 
Reeression 8 
G95 
NGSc95 
-0.9852 
0.9210 1 
0.7749 
0.5855 
0.000 
0.000 
SA-LEMPLS-9,5, 
- -0.0041 1 
0.3529 0.000 EE E 
j 
=n sý_ -0.6234 1 
0.7826 O O o 
Notes: Abbreviations: 
G95 Governance scores for 1995 
NG95 Non-governance scores for 1995 
PL95 Profit or Loss for 1995 
EMPL95 Total number of employees in 1995 
SALES95 Total sales for 1995 
SALEMPLS95 Total sales per employees (managerial efficiency) 
PLEMPL95 Profit per employees (managerial efficiency) 
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APPE"r-K 5A 
TABLE5A INDUSTRIAL CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION- 1995 
COMPANY INDUST CINDUST A B 
T RTZ Extractive Industries Mineral Extraction I I 
2. -. Ultramar PIC Mineral Extraction Mineral Extraction I I 
3 Burmah Castrol PIC Oil integrated Mineral Extraction 1 1 
4. Shell (Transport and 
Trading Co. ) Pic 
Oil integrated Mineral Extraction I I 
I-- -- 5. British Petroleum Pic Oil integrated Mineral Extraction I II 
6. Beazer Pic Building & 
Construction 
General industries 2 1 
7. AMEC Pic 
- 
Building & 
Construction 
General Industries 2 1 
Imp-erial Ch-emical 
Industries Pic 
Chemicals General Industries 2 1 
9. BOC Group Pic Chemicals General Industries 2 1 
10. BIR Pic Diversified Industries General Industries 2 1 
11 - Hanson Pic Diversified Industries General 
Industries 2 1 
12. Lonrho Pic Diversified Industries General Industries 2 1 
13- Trafalgar House Pic Diversified Industries General Industries_ 2 1 
14. Harrisons & Cros-sfield Pic Diversified Industries General Industries 2 1 
15. General Electric Company 
PIC 
Electronics General Industries 2 1 
16. Racal Electronics Pic 
17. British Steel Pic 
Electronics 
Engineering 
General Industries 
General Industries 
2 
2 
1 
11 
18. British Aerospace Engineering General Industries 2 1 
19. GKN Pic Engineering -je-neral Industries 2 1 
20. Rolls-Royce plc Engineering je--neral Industries 2 1 
21. Lucas Industries Pic_ 
22. Johnson Mathey Pic 
_ Engineering 
Engineering 
je-n--eral Industries 
General Industries 
2 
2 
1 
1 
23. BICC Pic 
24. Hawker Pic 
25. Tarmac; Pic 
X Piklington Pic 
27. Wolseley Pic 
28. Redland Pic 
neering Engi 
Engineering_ 
Merchanding 
Merchanding 
Merchanding 
Merchanding 
General Industries 
General Industries 
- General Industries_ 
General Industries 
General Industries 
General Industries 
2 
2 
2_ 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
29. Berisford International Pic 
30. RMC - Group Pic 
3 1. Bunzl Pic 
32. Wellcome Pic 
Merchanding 
Merchanding 
Paper, Packagin 
PhamiaccutiRg 
Industries 
General Industries 
General Industries 
General Industries 
2 
2 
2 
2 
33. Glaxo Holdings Pic _. Pharmaceutical General Industries 2 
34. Zeneca. Pic Pharmaceuticals General Industries 2 H 35. Cortaulds, Pic Textile General Industries 2 
36. National Power Pic 
37-Power en Pic 
38. British Gas Pic 
Electricity 
Electricity 
Gas Distribution 
Utilities 
Utilities 
Utilities 
5 1 
] 
39. Whitbread Pic - Breweries Consumer Good 
:: 2: 
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COMPANY INDUST CINDUST A B 
40. Guinness Pic Spirit, Wine & Ciders Consumer Goods 3 2 
41. Bass Pic Breweries Consumer Goods 3 2 
42. Grand Metropolitan Pic Spirit, Wine & Ciders Consumer Goods 3 2 
43. Allied Domecq Pic Spirit, Wine & Ciders Consumer Goods 3 2 
44. Cadbury Schweppes; Pic Food Producer Consumer Goods 3 2 
45. Northern Foods Pic Food Producer Consumer Goods 
_3 
2 
46. Hillsdown Holding Pic Food Producer Consumer Goods 
_3 
2 
47. Booker Pic Food Producer Consumer Goods 3 2 
48. Dalgety Pic Food Producer Consumer Goods 3 2 
49. Unilever Pic Food Producer Consumer Goods 3 2 
50. Tale &Lyle PIC Food Producer Consumer Goods 3 2 
5 1. Rank Hovis Pic Food Producer Consumer Goods 3 2 
52. Unigate PIC Food producer Consumer Goods 3 2 
53. United Biscuits Pic Food producer Consumer Goods 3 2 
54. Associated British Foods 
PIC 
Food producer Consumer Goods 3 
. 
2 
1 
55. Reckitt & Colman Pic Health Care Consumer Goods 3 2 
56. B. A. T Industries Pic Tobacco Consumer Goods 3 2 
57. Inchcape Pic Distributors Services 4 '2 
58. Lex Industry PIC Distributors Services 4 2 
59. Tesac Pic Food Retailers Services 4 2 
60. Sainsbury (J) Pic Food Retailipl Services 4 2 
61. Kiuj Save Group Pic Food Retailing Services 4 2 
62. Forte Pic Hotel & Leisure Services 4 2 
63. Rank Organization Pic Hotel & Leisure Services 4 2 
64. Ladbrokes Group Pic Hotel & Leisure Services 4 2 
-- 65. Reed International Pic Media Services 4 2 
66. WPP Pic Media Services 4 2 
67. Granada Group Pic Media Services 4 2 
68. Kingfisher Pic Retailers Services 4 2 
69. Marks & Spencer Pic Retailers Services 4 2 
70. Boots Company Pic Retailers Services 4 2 
7 1. Great Universal Pic Retailers Services 4 2 
72. Burton Group Pic Retailers Services 4 2 
73. Dioxins Group Pic 
74. Ads Group Pic 
Retailers 
Retailers 
Services 
Services 
4 
4 
2 
2 
75. Sears Pic Retailers Services 4 2 
76. BET Pic Support Services Services 4 2 
77. Peninsular and Oriental 
Steam Navigation Pic 
Transport Services 4 2 
78. NFC Pic Transport Services 2 
79. British Airways Pic Transport Services 4 2 
80. British Telecommunication 
PIC 
Communications Utilities 5 
7 
2 
[8 L Cable & Wireless Pic 
t 
Communications Utilities 3ý 2 271 
Notes: A Five Industrial Categories classified according to 'TTSE Actuaries Classification 
Definitions", B Two Industrial Categories 
. 
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APPENDIX 5C 
TABLE5C. 1 CORPORATE SIZE CATEGORY- 1985 
COMPANY CSALE85 CTSALE85 CGSALE85 CSCSALS5. 
Burton roup Pie I- Dead in 1985 NA 
NA NA 
Marks 2- Marks R 9pencer Pic Dead in 1985 NA NA NA 
p 
Wolsele Wolseley Pic Dead in 1985 NA NA NA 
ý! ninsu I Peninsular and Oriental Steam Dead in 1985 N 
Tý NA NA 
Navigation Pic 
Rank Ran n . Rank Organization Pic k 0 r a tz a ti o n : atio Pic Or 1z ead in 1985 
NA NA NA 
0 rd I n te M a t ECf, onal PIC . Berisfon' International Pic Lrit Ord International Pic If B Ber s er r! Dead 
in 1985 NA NA NA 
P IC . RTZ P1 RTZ Pic TZ Dead 
in 1985 NA NA NA 
8 Pie 13ET Pic BI BT Dead in 1985 NA NA NA 
V E 
at Universal Pic iv Pic Great Universal Pic Dead in 1985 
NA NA NA 
Ilied Domec Pic 
r 
li ic 10. A mc P 10. Allied 
ýomec 
Pic Dead in 1985 NA NA 
NA 
11. Bass PIC 11 - Bass Pic 
Dead in 1985 NA NA NA 
iscuits Pie 12. Unjted Biscuits Pic 12. UnitedBi uitspic Dead in 1985 NA 
NA NA 
13. Imperial chemical Industries-Pic Dead in 1985 NA 
NA NA 
14. Unilever Pic Dead in 1985 NA NA_ 
NA 
15. Trafalgar House Pic <CQ. Ib 
16. Powergen Pic ý10. lb <EI. Ob 
- Ladbroke Group Pie ý10. lb <EI. Ob T8 -British Gas Pic ý10. lb <EI. 0b 
19. wPP Pic aO. 1b <EI. 0b 
0. Tale & Lyle Pic aO. 1b <El. 0b 
I- Glaxo Holdings Pic 
[ 
aO. 1b <EI. 0b 
2. Whitbrcad Pic aO. 1b <El- 
33 
- Aý dda rl qa Group Pic aO. 1b <; EI: 
Ob 
4. Kwik Save Group Pic aO. 1b <EI. 0b 
25. General Electric Company Pic aO. 1b <f. I. Ob 
26. Hanson Pie aO. 1b <EI. Ob 
7. Granada Group Pic 210.1b <E1.0b 
28. Grand Metropolitan Pic aO. 1b <; EI. 5b 
29. Inchcape Pie 210.1b <f. 1.5b 
30. Cable ý; d Wireless Pic aO. 1b <fl. 5b 
3 1. Zeneca Pic aEO. Ib <E 1 51 
2. Lonrho Pie -90-5-b<E1.5b 
33. Booker Pic 210.1b <f. 1.5b 
34. Boots Company Pic aO. 1b <0.5b 
3 5. Racal Electronics Pic aO. 1b <EI. 5b 
3 6. Tarmac Pie aO. 1b <EI. 5b 
3 7. British Aerospace Pic ; ->EO. Ib <f. 
1.5b 
3 8. Forte Pic ý10. lb <f. 1.5b 
39. Cortaulds Pic zLO. lb <EI. 5b 
40. Dixons Group Pic 210.1 b <EI. 5b 
41. LEX Industry Pie aO. Ib <Q. 5b 
ý2. Wellcome Pic . 210.1 b <El. 5b 
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. COMpANy 
CSALE85 
_ 43. Lucas industries Pie 2-10.1b <f. 1.5b 
44. GKN Pic ZfO. lb <f. 1.5b 
45. Rolls-Royce Pie 210.1b <El. 5b 
46. Dalgety Pie 211.5b <E2. Ob 
47. Tesco Pie Zfl. 5b <f. 2. Ob 
_ - 
48. BICC Pie . 
5b<; E2.0b, ýFI 
49. The "Shell" Transport and Trading zil. 5b <f. 2. Ob 
Company Pic 
50. BTR Pic ZII. 5b <E2. Ob 
51. AMEC Pic zfl. 5b <E2. Ob 
_ ý 
52. Bunzi Pie 5b<; U. Ob 2ýf i 
53. Ultramar Pic ý11.5b <f. 2. Ob 
_' 54. Reed International Pie 
ýi ý15bp <E2.0b 
55. Harrisons & Crossfeild Pic ; ->EI. 
5b <E2. Ob 
56. Beazer Pie ý11.5b <f. 2. Ob 
_ _ 
57. Rank Hovis Pie b<E2. Ob 
_ýTI 5 
58. Piklington Pie 211.5b <E2. Ob 
59. RMC Group Pic >-EI. 5b <E2. Ob 
- 
60. British Steel Pic, Ob <E2.5b 
92 
61. Sainsbury J Pie >ýUft <E2.5b 
2. British Petroleum Pie ; ->f2. 
Ob <f. 2.5b 
3. National Power Plc >: E2. Ob <f. 2.5b 
4. Hillsdown Holdings Pic 
1 
92 Ob <f. 2.5b 
-- - 5. Burmah Castrol Ple . 
Ob 42.5b 92 
ý 
66. Cadbury Schweppes b<; L-2.5 b 0 
_ 67. Johnson Mathey Pic 
ý_ý2-5b-5L3_3.0b 
68. Unigate Pie . 
t2.5b 
<ElOb 
_ - ý 
69. BOC Group Pic 5Q. Ob _ýý 2 5b 
70. Kingfisher Pie Ob 5Q. 5b 
__ _ _ ý 7 1. B. A. T industries Pic 43.5b 
;1 
33 0b 
72. Hawker Pic 
; jEOb 
<0.5b 
73. Reckitt & Colman Pic 
ýamb 
<0.5b 
74. Rediand Pie >10.0 42 O. Ob _0.0' 
75. British Telecommunication Pic >__fjO. Ob <; E20'Cf 
76. Associated British Foods Pic >_fIO. Ob <E20. O 
77. Guinness Pie alO. Ob <E20.0 
78. Sears Pie alO. Ob <E20-0 
79. Northern Foods Pic alO. Ob <f. 20.0 
80. NFC Pie alO. Ob <E20.0 
[9 1. British Airways Pic ; _>f30. 
Ob 
CTSALE85 i CGSALES51 CSCSAL85 
1 1- 
I I 
I 1 1_ 
-1 2 2 
1 2 2 
1 2 
2 
2 
2 2 
2 
M 
2 
2 2 
- 2 2 
2 2 
2 2 
2 2 
2 2 
2 2 
2 2 
2 2 2 
2 2 2 
2 2 2 
2 2 2 
2 2 2 
M 
2 2 2 
2 2 2 2 
2 2 2 
22 2 2 
2 3 2 
2 3 2 
2 3 2 
2 3 2 
2 2 
2 3 2 
2 3 2 
2 3 2 
2 3 2 
2 3 2 
2 3 2 
2 3 2 
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TABLE5C. 2 CORPORATE SIZE CATEGORY- 1990 
Company Name CSALE90 CTSALE90 CGSALE90 CSCSAL90ý 
Associated British Foods Pic Dead in 1990 NA NA NA 
2. Zeneca Pic Dead in 1990 NA NA NA 
3. National Power Pie Dead in 1990 NA NA NA 
4. Powergen Pie Dead in 1990 NA NA NA 
5. Cortaulds Pic <fO. Ib I I I 
6. Wpp PIC 21.0.1b <EI. Ob 
7. Granada Group Pic 210.1b <El. Ob 
Redland Pie aO. 1b <EI. Ob 
9. Rank Hovis Pic 
10. Northern Foods Pie 
aO. 1b <EI. Ob 
210.1b <f. I. Ob 
I I I 
II- Kwik Save Group Pic 210.1 b <EI. Ob 
12. Bunzl Pic ý! M Ib ýdl. Ob 
13. Wellcome Pic 210.1b <EI. Ob 
_ 14. Reckitt & Colman Pie aO. 1b <E1.5b 
15. Johnson Mathey Pic ý10. lb <fl. 5b 
16. Racal Electronics Pic 210.1 b <CI. 5b 
17. Rank Organisation Pic aO. 1b <EI. 5b 
18. Ultramar Pic aO. 1b <E1.5b 
19. Berisford International Pic ; ->EO. 
lb <E1.5b 
20. Burton Group Pie aO. 1b <f. 1.5b 
21. NFC Pie aO. 1b <Q. 5b 
22. Dixons Group Pic aO. 1b <fl. 5b 
3. Harrisons & Crossfeild Pie aO. 1b <EI. 5b 
24. Wolseley Pic aO. 1b <EI. 5b 
7-5. LEX Industry Pic aO. 1b <fl. 5b 
26. Reed International Pic aO. 1b <EI. 5b 
27. Unigate Pic 
28. Burmah Castrol Pic 
ý11.5b <E2. Ob 
al. 5b <E2. Ob 
1 2 
2 
1 
1 
29. Forte Pic al. 5b <f2. Ob 2 1 
30. United Biscuits Pic al. 5b <E2. Ob 2 1 
3 1. Sears Pic <f .0 al. 5b <E2.0b 
1 2. 1 
32. Lucas Industries Pic ; ->f1.5b <L2. 
Ob 1 2 1 
33. AMEC Plc al. 5b <f. 2. Ob 1 2 1 
34. GKN Pic al. 5b <f. 2. Ob 1 2 
35. Hawker Pic al. 5b <f2. Ob 1 2 
36. Cable and Wireless Pic al. 5b <f. 2. Ob 1 2 
37. Beazer Pic al. 5b <E2. Ob 1 2 
T8. -Whitbread Pie al. 5b <f. 2. Ob 1 2 
39. RMC Group Pic 212. Ob <E2.5b 2 2 2 
40. BET Pic a2. Ob <f. 2.5b 2 2 2 
41. Piklington Pic a2. Ob <E2.5b 2 2 2 
42. Kingfisher Pic a2. Ob <E2.5b 2 2 
43. Glaxo Holdings Pic a2. Ob <E2.5b 2 2 2 
. 
44. BOC Group Pic a2. Ob <E2.5b 2 2 2 
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CompanyName CSALE90 ICTSALE9 01 CGSALE90 I CSCSAL90 
45. Great Universal Pie alft <U. 5b 12 12 12 
46. Booker Pic 212.0b <E2.5b 2 2 2 
47. Boots Company Pic ýtMb <E3.0b 2 2 2 
48. Lonrho Pic a-2.5b <D. Ob 2 2 2 
49. Inchcape Pic a2.5b <E3. Ob 2 2 2 
50. Trafalgar House Pic a2.5b <13. Ob 2 2 2 
5 1. Cadbury Schweppes Pic a2.5b <f: 3. Ob 2 2 2 
52. Tale & Lyle Ple a2.5b <E3.0b 2 2 2 
53. BICC Pic alft <E3.5b 2 2 -2 
54. Asda Group Pic ; ->f3.0b <E3.5b 
2 2 2 
5 5. RTZ Pic alft <E3.5b 2 2 2 
56. Tarmac Pic alft <E3.5b 2 2 2 
37--Rolls-Royce -Plc alft <E3.5b 2 2 2 
5 8. Ladbroke Group Pie alft <E3.5b, 2 2 2 
59. Guinness Pie alft <E3.5b 2 2 2 
0. Hillsdown Holdings Pie 0 H i s d al5b <E4.0b 2 2 2 
I- Bass Pie B a s s al5b <f: 4. Ob 2 3 2 
2 2. British Gas Pic I Is B r it I sh ,t ; ->E4. 
Ob <E4.5b 2 3 2 
3. Dalgety Pic 3. Dalgel a4. Ob <E4.5b 2 3 2 
4. Allied Domecq Pic 
k 
4. Allied -ýtE4. Ob <E4.5b 2 3 2 
s 5. Marks & Spencer Plc 5. Marks a4.5b <0.0b 2 3 3 
.r 6. Gra nd Metropolitan Pic ýtE4.5b <E5. Ob 
2 3 3 
77Pis Penins . Peninsular and Oriental Stearn Navigation Pic 
2! f4.5b <E5. Ob 2 3 3 
68. BTR Pic a4.5b <E5.0b 2 3 3 
69. Sainsbury J Ple 
70. Tesco Pic 
2! J4.5b <E5.0b 
a4.5b -<E5.0b 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
ýI -British -Petroleum Pic It >ýE4.5b <E5. Ob 2 3 3 
2. British Steel Pic ý14.5b <0.0b 2 3 3 
3. General Electric Company Pie 214.5b <E5.0b 2 3 
3 
4. son Pic a4.5b <f. 5. Ob 2 3 3 
75. B. A. T Industries Ple ; 
-ý-O. 
Qb <E I Ob 2 3 3 
76. British Aerospace Pie ; 
->L5. 
Ob <E10b 2 
3 3 
77. Imperial chemical Industries Pic a5. Ob <ElOb 2 
3 3 
78. British Telecommunication Ple 215.0b <f. I Ob 
T 3 3 
'79. Unilever Pic 2110.0b <L20. Ob 2 
3 3 
80. The "Shell" Transport and 
-- 
Trading Company Ple 
ý-f I O. Ob <E20.0b 
- 
3 3 
- 
8 1. British Airways Pie 2120.0b <E29.99b 2 3 
3 
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TABLE 5r-A rORPORATE SIZE CATEGORY - 1995 
Company Name CSALE95 CTSALE95 CGSALE95 CSCSAL95 
-I. 
Ultramar Pic Dead in 1995 NA NA NA* 
_ 2. Wellcome Pic Dead in 1995 NA NA NA 
3. Hawker Pie Dead in 1995 NA NA NA 
4. Rank Organisation Pic Dead in 1995 NA - NA NA 
5. Berisford International 
PIC <f. 0. Ib 
I 
6. Racal Electronics Pic <E0. lb I 
Beazer Pic 
. 
7. <EO. Ib I -- 8. Cortaulds Pie aO. 1b <EI. 0b 2 
9. VVTp PIC aO. 1b <fI. 0b 2 1 
10. Bunzel Pie ý10. lb <fI. 5b 3 1 
II- Lonrho Pic aO. 1b <EI. 5b 3 1 
12. AMEC Pic aO. 1b <EI. 5b 1 
13. Northern Foods Pic aO. 1b <f. 1.5b 3 1 
14. Uninte Pic aO. 1b <EI. 5b 3 1 
15. Reed International Pic aO. 1b <fl. 5b _3 
1 
16. Lex Industry Pic aO. 1b <f. 1.5b 3 1 .1 
17. Dixons Group Pic 
18. BET Pic 
aO. 1b <EI. 5b 
aO. 1b <f: 1.5b 
3 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
19. Forte Pie aO. 1b <EI. 5b 3 1 1 
20. Burton Group Pic aO. 1b <fl. 5b 3 1 1 
21. Harrisons & Crossfeild 
PIC al. 5b <E2.0b 
4 1 1 
22. Tarmac Pic ; ->; EI. 
5b <f2. Ob 4 1 1 
23. Johnson Mathey Pic al. 5b <f 2. Ob 4 1 1 
24. Whitbread Pic al. 5b <f. 2*Ob 4 1 1 
25. Reckitt & colman PIC 
26. Rank Hovis Pie 
27. NFC Pic 
28. Granada Group Pic 
29. Sears Pic 
al. 5b <E2.0b 
al. 5b <E2.0b 
al. 5b <E2.0b 
al. 5b <f. 2. Ob 
al. 5b <f. 2. Ob 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
30. Redland Pic ý12.0b <E2.5b 5 2 2 
3 1. GKN PIC a2. Ob <f2.5b 5 2 2 
32. Lucas Industries Pic -aMb <f2.5b 
5 2 2 
_L3. 
Piklin on PIC gt a2. Ob <f2.5b 5 2 2 . ____ 34. Great Universal Pic a2. Ob <f. 2.5b 5 2- 2 
35. Kwik Save Group Pic a2. Ob <E2.5b 5 2- 2 
36. Powergcn Pic a2. Ob <f, 2.5b 5 2 2 
37. Burmah Castrol Pic a2.5b <f3.0b 6 2 2 
3 8. Allied DomecS Pic a2.5b <E3. Ob 6 2 2 
39. Hillsdown Holdings PIC a2.5b <f3. Ob 6 2 
40. United Biscuits Pic a2.5b <f3.0b 6 2 _2 4 1. Wolseley Pic 
_ 
2tfMb <f3.5b 7 2 2 
L42. Trafalgar House Pic 2--f3.0b <E3.5b 1 7 2 
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Sompany Name CSALE95 CTSALE95 CGSALE95 CSCSAL95 
- 43. Rolls-Royce Pic a3. Ob <E3.5b 7 2 2 
44. B OC Group Pic a3. Ob <E3.5b 7 2 2 
45. Ladbroke Group Pic a3. Ob <E3.5b 7 2 2 
46. National Power Pic zaMb <E3.5b 7 2 2 
47. RMC Group Pic a3.5b <E4.0b 8 2 2 
48. BICC Pic a3.5b <E4. Ob 8 2 2 
49. Booker Pic a3.5b <E4.0b 8 2 2 
50. Boots Company PIC ZtD. 5b <E4. Ob 8 2 2 
5 1. Zeneca Pic -a4. Ob <E4.5b 9 2 2 
52. British Steel Pic 
-a4. 
Ob <E4.5b 9 2 2 
53. Associated British Foods 
PIC 
ýE4. Ob <E4.5b 
9 2 2 
a4. Ob <E4.5b 9 2 2 
5 S. Tale &Lyle Pic 214.0b <E4.5b 9 2 2 
56. Guinness Pic a4. Ob <L4.5b 9 2 2 
57. Bass Pic a4. Ob <f. 4.5b 9 2 2 
58. CadbM Schweppes Pic 2V. 0b <E4.5b 9 2 2 
59. Kingfisher Pic a4. Ob <E4.5b 9 2 2 
60. British Petroleum Pic a4.5b <E5.0b 10 2 3 
61. RTZ Pic a4.5b <L5.0b 10 2 3 
62. BTR Pic 
63. General Electric 
- 
Company Pic 
64. British Aerospace Pic 
65. Glaxo Holdings Pic 
a4.5b <E5.0b 
214.5b <f-5.0b 
2t. E4.5b <E5. Ob 
a4.5b <L5. Ob 
10 
10 
10 
10 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
66. Grand Metro2olitan Pic 
67. Peninsular and Oriental 
Steam Navigation Pic 
214.5b <E5.0b 
2: L4.5b <E5.0b 
10 
10 
- 
2 
2 
3 
3 
68. Asda Group Pic ? E4.5b <f. 5. Ob 10 2 3 
69. Marks &Spencer Pic 214.5b <E5. Ob 
10 2 3 
70. Inchcape Pic a4.5b <E5.0b I 2 3. 
7 1. British Gas Pic >L4.5b <E5.0b 10 2 3 
72. Cable & Wireless ý14.5b <L5.0b 10 2 3 
73. Hanson Pic a5. Ob <E10b 11 2 3 
74. Imperial Chemical 
Industries Plc ?, >-0.0b <El0b 
11 2 
75. Tesco Pic ýe-ES. Ob <EI0b 11 2 3 
76. Sainsbury (J) Pic ý15.0b <E10b 11 2 3 
77. British Telecommunication 
PIC ; ->ES. Ob <f 
10b 11 
2 3 
78. B. A. T Industries Pic a5. Ob <fl0b 12 2 3 
79. Shell (Transport and 
_ 
Trading Co. ) Plc a10.0b <E20.0b 
13 2 3 
_ 80. Unilever Pic a10.0b <E2O. Ob 13 2 3 
8 1. British AirwUs Pic a10.0b <f20. Ob 13 2 3 
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Appendix S 
APPENDIX 5E 
701 Return on shareholders equity [(210 or 182)/[305-344+(312 or 311)]] * 100 
703 Return on shareholders capital [(175-176-177-629-207)/(307-344+(312 or 311))] * 100 
711 Trading profit margin(%) : [135/104]*100 
713 Operating profit margin(%) (137/104)*100 
721 Tumover/assets employed 104/(339+356+359+390+309) 
723 Turnover/net current assets : 104/390 
725 Stock ratio (days) : [364/104]*365 
727 Debtors ratios (days) : (370/104)*100 
729 Creditors ratio (days) : [(385Y(104-135)1*100 
731 Capitalgearing% [(306+295+321+309)/(322+309-344-928)1 
733 Borrowingratio (295+321+309)/(305+[312or3ll]-344) 
741 Working capital ratio : 376/389 
742 Quick assets ratio : (376 - 364)/389 
762 Sales per employees : (203/154)*100 
763 Operating profit per employees 137/219 
764 Capital employed per employee (322+309-344)/219 
Notes: 
104 = Total sales 
135 = Trading profit 
137 = Operating profit - adjusted 
154 = Published pre-tax profit 
182 = Earned for ordinary -full tax 
203 = Published Tax 
210 = Earned for ordinary shares 
219 = Total number of employees 
295 = Subordinated debt 
305 = Equity capital Reserves 
306 = Preference capital 
309 = Borrowings repayable within I year 
311 = Deferred tax 
312 = Total deferred tax 
321 = Total loan capital 
322 = Total capital employed 
339 = Total Fixed Assets - net 
344 = Total intangible assets 
356 = Total investment, incl. associates 
359 = Other assets 
364 = Total stock and work in progress 
370 = Total debtors and equivalent 
376 = Total current assets 
385 = Total creditors and equivalent 
389 = Total current liabilities 
390 = Net Current assets 
801 = Total Revenue 
802 = Turnover 
805 = Total property income 
928 = Future income tax benefits 
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